Strategic Briefing Paper

Responding to Gun Crime

2009
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**Responding to Gun Crime 2009**

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Preface


The document outlines how existing staff skills, business processes and networks of local partner and other law enforcement agencies can be used to gather intelligence, and develop and implement enforcement and prevention strategies.

The work was initiated and led by DCC Bernard Lawson ACPO Competency Standards and Training, and ACC Susannah Fish ACPO Criminal Use of Firearms work stream.

**Target Audience**

The briefing paper is written for BCU commanders and investigators, and serves as a starting point for those forces that may experience emerging gun crime issues in the future.
Identifying the Problem

This section describes a framework for identifying and defining local gun crime problems for the purposes of developing a multi-agency strategy to detect, disrupt and deter firearms incidents.
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1.1 The Nature and Extent of Gun Crime

The term gun crime is used within this document to refer to the wide range of criminal activity where firearms are used.

Firearm-related incidents have a significantly high impact on victims, their families, the local community and society as a whole. The reluctance of witnesses to provide information for fear of reprisal often means that firearms incidents go unreported.

The nature of gun crime incidents varies across the UK. There are many different groups operating at varying levels of criminality. Individuals who carry guns are often responsible for a spectrum of crime types, which are usually intrinsically linked to the drug market.

There is a growing perception in the UK of an emergent gang culture. Violent deaths of young people, frequently involving guns or other weapons in crimes that are not linked to financial motives, have emphasised the wider problem of serious violence within communities. See National Firearms Intelligence Cell (2007) The Scale and Nature of Firearms Crime within England and Wales and its Prevalence Among Young People.

The motivation behind the criminal use of firearms is commonly referred to as the ‘three R’s’: respect, revenge and revenue.

When defining the nature of gun crime, there is a need to be alert to the stereotypes associated with gang culture. The term gang has been used as a ‘catch-all term to describe all sorts of urban groups’ (Heale, 2008). A gang implies a hierarchical structure and set of rules and behaviours, however, this is not always the case.

UK street gangs tend to be formed around personal relationships (peer groups) and geographical location, having fluid membership and a transient structure. Not all gang involved youths are gang members; who an individual is friends with or where they live can lead them and others to perceive them as being involved in a gang. In a recent study of youth gangs in Waltham Forest, London, forty-two per cent considered themselves occasional or reluctant gang affiliates (Pitts, 2007). This emphasises the need for caution in labelling groups of young people as being gang members.

Manchester Multi-Agency Gang Strategy (MMAGS) defines a gang member as ‘someone who has identified themselves as being a member of a gang through verbal statements, tattoos, correspondence or graffiti. This identity is corroborated by the police, partner agencies or community information’.

The current ACPO endorsed definition (Hallsworth and Young, 2004) outlines three types of groups commonly referred to as gangs. Peer groups, street gangs and organised crime groups (OCG) are differentiated in terms of their durability and level of criminality (see Text Box 1).
In practice, the distinction between the three groups outlined in Text Box 1 is not clear cut. Many groups who are considered street gangs may be no more than loosely affiliated youngsters brought together by geographical proximity. There is a negative self-fulfilling prophecy when groups of young people are labelled as gangs, without the requisite understanding of what a gang is and the drivers behind gang affiliation. Labelling groups of young people as being involved in a gang can attract unnecessary and negative media images. It is, therefore, important that the focus is on individuals and the frequency and seriousness of offending behaviour.

While gun crime and gang culture are often referred to synonymously, research indicates that effective enforcement and preventive strategies are those that focus on violent behaviour rather than gang affiliation (Bullock and Tilley, 2008; Marshall, Webb and Tilley, 2005).

Due to the complex and multi-faceted nature of gun crime and different regional characteristics, no single definitive strategy for tackling gun crime exists. To be effective a strategy should:

- Be tailored to the local characteristics of the problem;
- Have early intervention measures in place for those deemed most at risk of becoming involved in gun crime;
- Be multi-agency, working closely and sharing information with all relevant local partner agencies, community groups, local Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs), Key Individual Networks (KINs) and national law enforcement agencies such as the National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS).
The tactical options within the strategy will, therefore, vary across force areas.

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) and problem oriented policing (POP) principles should be used to develop a problem profile.

The scope of the problem should also be included within the strategic assessment (SA). The development of strategic intelligence is central to the business processes set out in NIM. Effectively captured and articulated strategic intelligence provides an understanding of key issues affecting a force, region, or the UK as a whole. Strategic assessment drives the business of tasking and co-ordination, where activity is prioritised, tactical options are considered and responses initiated.

Consideration will need to be given as to where the SA sits within the force and who has responsibility and accountability for levels 1 and 2 tasking and co-ordination.

The problem profile and SA will provide an evidence-based approach for developing specific intelligence, enforcement and prevention strategies.

Once the problem has been identified a strategy can then be formulated. Incidents need to be scanned and analysed to understand what it is that is leading to firearms incidents.

1.2 Identifying Precursors

The identification of precursors is vital to reducing and preventing firearms incidents. Precursors are divided here into offender and event precursors.

1.2.1 Offender precursors

Identifying offender precursors entails an understanding of the life path of those who become involved in criminal activity (see Figure 1). This life path is not unique to gun crime but provides a useful framework for developing targeted prevention, intelligence and enforcement strategies.
Local partnership intervention is important at each stage. Information should be shared locally across agencies on those individuals considered to be most at risk of becoming involved in gun crime and those who are, or have been, processed through the criminal justice system.

The identification of precursors means that prevention work can focus on individuals identified as being most at risk. The implementation of early preventive intervention measures coincides with Public Service Agreement (PSA) 14, to increase the number of children and young people on the life path to success.

Figure 1 shows that prevention opportunities should be targeted towards those individuals who:

- Live in areas of high deprivation (deprived housing, low income, low employment, low skill and education levels, and lack of access to facilities).

- Show signs of early risk factors (eg, social exclusion, truancy, school exclusion, elder siblings involved in crime).

- Have engaged in early criminal activity (eg, anti-social behaviour, acquisitive crime, robbery, class A drug use, drug running or dealing).

- Have an indirect involvement with gun crime.
Where individuals have been through the criminal justice system, prevention strategies can be targeted while they are in prison. These strategies can then be continued by the Probation Service when the individual is released. Prevention measures are discussed further in 5 Prevention.

1.2.2 Precursor events

Despite variations in the characteristics of those involved in gun crime and the nature of firearms incidents across force areas, it is possible to identify a number of event precursors that can indicate an emergence or escalation of gun crime. These include:

- Drug disputes;
- New drug markets (eg, crack houses) opening up;
- Drug market displacement (eg, appearance of criminals from outside the force area);
- Migration and displacement of individuals linked to firearm offences from high gun crime areas to areas where this type of criminality is less prevalent;
- Aggravated burglary with use of a firearm;
- Territorialism within the force area (eg, postcode rivalries);
- Music events – key nominals travelling into another force area to attend an event;
- An initial shooting in their own or other force area;
- Imprisonment of key nominal – leaving a void for others to fill;
- Key nominal released from custody.

Precursor events are not limited to drug disputes; they can involve other forms of criminality, long-standing disputes within and between different groups, and ‘tit-for-tat’ shootings. Inter and intra gang disputes are often expressive rather than instrumental (Heale, 2008). Firearms use outside of a gang context should also be considered (eg, commercial and cash-in-transit robberies).

Intelligence analysis of gun-enabled criminality is crucial for understanding and responding to the problem. Merseyside Police produce a weekly intelligence digest, Guns Assessment and Response Document (GARD), detailing gun-enabled criminality in Merseyside. The document includes:

- Association charts of key players in ongoing disputes;
- Brief details of ‘impact players’ for gun crime across Merseyside;
- Brief details on any discharges or precursor incidents in the last seven days, examining why they happened and what is perceived as likely to happen next.

Effective intelligence gathering from a wide range of sources will permit early recognition of event precursors. This will form the basis of a proactive enforcement strategy to ensure that action is taken before a firearms incident occurs. Examples of proactive enforcement strategies are discussed in more detail in 3.1 Proactive Enforcement Strategies.
1.3 Developing a Multi-Agency Strategy

The first step in developing a gun crime strategy is to ensure that there is a thorough understanding of the nature of gun-enabled criminality in the local area, and that those involved are identified. Knowledge of local and national strategic firearms-related issues is also required.

Information should also be gathered on those individuals considered to be at risk of becoming involved in gun crime (see 1.2.1 Offender precursors). For this to be achieved all partner agencies must work together and share information. For further information see Home Office (2008) Tackling Gangs: A Practical Guide.

Collaboration with partner agencies is central to developing and implementing a gun crime strategy. Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 outlines the responsibility of the Police Service and local authorities to work in partnership to address crime and disorder.

Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) provide a framework to build upon to develop a multi-agency gun crime strategy. Examples of local partner involvement include:

- The police;
- Police authorities;
- Local authorities
  - education departments
  - social services
  - youth services
  - leisure
  - local councillors;
- Primary care trusts;
- Fire and Rescue Service;
- Probation Service;
- Youth offending teams;
- Drug action teams;
- Crown Prosecution Service and magistrates’ court;
- Community groups;
- Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) and Key Individuals Networks (KINs).

In Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland engagement with the devolved administrations is imperative for the development of a multi-agency strategy.
There should be a coordinated approach, with all key partner agencies signed up to the aims of the strategy. They should have clear targets and early intervention and monitoring arrangements in place. Information-sharing protocols and lines of communication should be established locally within force, across Basic Command Units (BCU), bordering forces and nationally through the provision of intelligence and recovered ballistic material to the National Intelligence Ballistics Service (NABIS).

Integrated working at all levels from neighbourhood policing to information sharing with local partner and national law enforcement agencies is crucial for effectively tackling gun crime.

Neighbourhood policing fosters community engagement. Building community trust and confidence will encourage the provision of information for targeted action. Community engagement is not just a police responsibility. The coordination of partners in conjunction with community leaders and hard-to-reach groups is essential.

Joint ownership of problems and local accountability helps communities participate in the policing of their neighbourhoods.

Police forces should ensure that a long-term strategy is in place, together with a reactive response.

Accountability for the strategy should be determined from the outset. This could include a strategic and tactical lead, and dedicated intelligence, enforcement and prevention teams.

Measures to evaluate the strategy should be put in place to monitor performance and success (Squires, Grimshaw and Solomon, 2008).

Strategy performance indicators could include the following:

- Number of firearm discharges;
- Number of firearms injuries;
- Numbers of arrests for firearms-related offences;
- Percentage of convictions from arrests for firearms offences;
- Sentences for gun crime offences;
- Numbers of search warrants, searches for firearms or evidence;
- Numbers of firearms seizures (not including air weapons or CS spray);
- Frequency of Osman warnings;
- Number of incidents of positive engagement with key nominals and their families;
- Number of enforcement interventions with key nominals, their families and associates;
- Public confidence levels in the force’s ability to tackle gun crime;
- Public perception of levels of gun crime.
When considering precursor events, much of the enforcement and intelligence activity will have no firearms connection and, therefore, may not feature within any of the strategic indicators, yet its impact would prevent future firearms-related offences, or the escalation of disputes that may lead to such offences. Any indicators should take this into account. There should not be a presumption that a reduction in firearms offences or the performance indicators means that there is a reduction in intelligence or activity.

**Text Box 2**

**Merseyside Three-Year Gun Crime Strategy**

Merseyside Police have implemented a three-year gun crime strategy that merges neighbourhood and specialist policing and partnership interventions. The multi-agency strategy focuses on:

- Prevention;
- Enforcement;
- Rehabilitation.

The chief executives from five local authorities have signed up to the achievement of medium (e.g., mediation, routes out, community activity) and long-term (e.g., education and social/economic) objectives. Partnership working is coordinated and governed at the strategic level via a Multi-Agency Governance Group (MAGG), which meets on a quarterly basis.

**1.4 Summary**

Tackling gun crime is not solely a police issue; responding effectively requires a multi-agency approach. The development of a gun crime strategy to detect, disrupt and deter firearm incidents requires:

- A clear definition of the nature and extent of local, neighbouring BCU and cross-force boundary gun crime incidents;
- A multi-agency strategy with a clear structure of accountability and ownership, agreed objectives and information-sharing protocols;
- The trust and confidence of the community;
- Information and intelligence gathering and sharing, locally and nationally.
Intelligence

This section details a number of generic and specific intelligence sources that can be used to develop proactive enforcement and prevention strategies, and form the basis of reactive investigations.
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2.1 Intelligence Gathering

Proactive strategies and reactive investigations are built on intelligence. All intelligence sources should be exhausted to identify and gather information on those individuals involved in gun crime and the locations they frequent. Early recognition of gun crime issues and opportunities for intelligence gathering are essential for the prevention of future firearms incidents.

ACPO (2005) Guidance on the National Intelligence Model (NIM) describes the key principles for gathering intelligence. Intelligence should be used to formulate and update the problem profile and SA.

Once intelligence is gathered, it is crucial that it is shared with local partner and national law enforcement agencies. Information-sharing agreements (ISA) are covered in detail in ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Management of Police Information.

2.2 Sources of Intelligence

There is a wide range of sources of intelligence that can be used to build a picture of the local nature and extent of gun crime incidents, a number of which are covered in this subsection. This list is by no means definitive, but provides a starting point from which to devise proactive enforcement and prevention strategies, and inform reactive investigations.

Community intelligence

The community is a vital source of intelligence. It is imperative that relationships with the community are established and built upon. Effective local policing is fundamental to building relationships with the local community and gaining their trust and confidence.

Neighbourhood policing teams (NPT), community-based groups, KINs and IAGs can provide useful links to members of the community. Management of community information is at the core of crime and disorder reduction strategies.

Responding promptly to community intelligence, and the attendance of senior officers at public meetings, will serve to establish effective relationships with the community, increase reassurance and satisfaction and encourage the provision of information in the future. See Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2004) Guns, Community and Police.

Crimestoppers

Due to the nature of gun crime and fear of retribution, Crimestoppers has a fundamental role in the development of community intelligence. Crimestoppers can make a contribution through intelligence submissions, publicity, marketing, rewards, covert human intelligence source (CHIS) recruitment and community reassurance.
Internet sites

The internet is a useful intelligence resource. On social networking and music websites individuals openly advertise their gang affiliations. This information can be used to show connections between groups of individuals.

Adequate resources should be assigned and the correct evidence collection processes must be followed when carrying out this type of intelligence work. The identification of individuals who may be involved in gun crime via social networking internet sites may also provide potential prevention opportunities.

Opportunities to seize an individual's computer when making an arrest should not be overlooked. Hi-Tech forensic recovery can retrieve information on websites visited and images posted.

The photographs and videos posted on these sites can also be used to build up an intelligence picture of the type of weapons in circulation within a particular area. Force e-crime units, the National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS), the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the National Firearms Intelligence Cell (NFIC) are able to provide further assistance in this area.

Covert strategies and resources

There are a number of covert strategies and resources available that can elicit intelligence. Intelligence gathered from covert operations (eg, drug offences) should, where possible, be shared within force to build the intelligence picture on firearms.


HOLMES

Information stored on HOLMES for major incident investigations that are drug- or gang-related will provide intelligence opportunities that should be capitalised on to enhance the firearms intelligence picture. Such intelligence should be entered on to the force intelligence systems for general use where appropriate.

Telecoms data

As well as being an important investigative tool, analysis of telecoms data can provide useful intelligence. Mobile phones seized during an arrest should be examined for any images or videos and listed contact numbers.

National Firearms Licensing Management System (NFLMS)

All firearm certificate holders must use their registered firearm for declared legitimate activity (eg, member of a gun club). Checks should be carried out to determine whether individuals are actually engaged in the activities declared on their firearms licence application and contained within the NFLMS.

National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS)

The National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS) delivers a unique, world-class firearms intelligence capability which is the foundation of a multi-agency approach to tackling gun crime. NABIS uses forensic science as a tool to drive its wider intelligence capabilities.

NABIS works with the forty-three police forces of England and Wales as well as its partner law enforcement agencies (LEA): HM Customs and Revenue (HMRC), the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), MI5, Ministry of Defence (MOD) Police, Royal Military Police (RMP), British Transport Police (BTP), HM Prison Service (HMPS) and the UK Border Agency (UKBA).

NABIS provides three core functions.

1. **Registry for all recovered ballistic material** (firearms and ammunition) coming into police possession in England and Wales. Each force must record basic descriptive and recovery details of all ballistic material recovered on a day-to-day basis. The NABIS database details the movement of all ballistic items up until the point of destruction or disposal. All recovered ballistic items should be submitted to the NABIS hubs to ensure that all relevant forensic intelligence is captured on one system. This provides the best possible opportunity to identify linked incidents, active guns, trends and emerging threats.

2. **Identification of ballistic material and comparison facilities** – relevant ballistics material is identified during the registry process and when submitted to a NABIS hub is subject to laboratory examination. Examinations include identification, legal classification or investigation into previous use of the same weapon. The latest 3D Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) is used to establish links that are crucial in the detection of firearms criminality. In urgent cases this can be carried out within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Full details of the results are updated on the NABIS database for the benefit of the submitting force.

3. **The NABIS intelligence database** compiles information about people, objects, locations and events, which can be linked to gun crime incidents and ballistic items both contemporarily and retrospectively. This intelligence must be maintained by each force intelligence bureau (FIB) to ensure an accurate picture of activity in each force and region.
Nothing can be created within the NABIS database without there being an incident to relate to. Incident details provide the justification for the ballistic item within the database. Local clearing house (LCH) users with administrative responsibility for recording descriptive details of ballistic items and circumstances of recovery have the necessary level of understanding to input the required information.

The NABIS database brings several benefits to forces, including:

- An intelligence tool focusing on active firearms to assist reactive gun crime enquiries and support activity around recovery, disruption and prevention;
- Provision of 5x5x5 intelligence reports, standard incident reports, ballistic item reports or remand statements to assist forces in their intelligence gathering;
- Common language and data standards for gun crime and ballistic examinations, thereby aiding effective communications between departments, forces and agencies;
- A single system for all commercial forensic suppliers to use, thereby preventing data being stored and controlled by commercial companies.

The key functions of NABIS are illustrated in Figure 2.

**Figure 2 NABIS Functions**
For further information on NABIS, see ACPO (2008) Practice Advice on the National Ballistics Intelligence Service and http://www.nabis.police.uk

The National Firearms Intelligence Cell (NFIC)

Working alongside NABIS, NFIC is the senior intelligence user of the NABIS database and produces regular assessments of NABIS data, identifying underlying trends and linkages. NFIC is also a key contributor to the SOCA Firearms Programme of Activity.

NFIC works under the ACPO Criminal Use of Firearms work stream, and much of NFIC’s work is directed at supporting cross-force activity. NFIC is a multi-agency team made up of staff from SOCA, HMRC, UKBA and police forces.

The overarching aim of NFIC is to coordinate intelligence and increase understanding of firearms-related crime and the key criminals involved, in order to support activity to reduce the harm caused. NFIC brings together, what are for its constituents, shared responsibilities for responding to firearms crime by providing a central intelligence function. NFIC achieves this by:

- Developing and maintaining a dynamic baseline knowledge of the nature, scale and impact of firearms-related crime and of the law enforcement response to it;
- Identifying links and synergies between enforcement activity at a national and international level, developing knowledge of the most harmful criminals and supporting activity to tackle them;
- Working collaboratively with partners within and beyond law enforcement to coordinate and develop firearms-related intelligence;
- Managing an international firearms tracing service in collaboration with Interpol.

NFIC can be contacted at nfic@west-midlands.pnn.police.uk

Sources of intelligence also include information provided by local partner agencies.

Prison debriefing

Prison debriefing is not carried out as a matter of course. There is a myth that prisoners will never talk and that debriefing is too dangerous to carry out. There has, however, been some success in debriefing firearms and gang offenders to gather intelligence. Prison debriefing should follow the ACPO-HMPS protocol and have clear intelligence requirements and structured recording. The debriefing process provides overt access to prisons, hard-to-reach communities, organised crime networks and high-quality strategic and tactical intelligence. It also supports specific intelligence requirements.
Prison intelligence

It is well known that imprisonment does not prevent the determined serious organised criminal from continued involvement in criminal activity. The ability to communicate with associates through the use of illegally held mobile phones, prison PIN phones and mail, or at face-to-face meetings during social visits, ensures that control of the OCG can be maintained. It follows, therefore, that prisons are fertile ground for targeted intelligence gathering, but the opportunities are often ignored or under exploited.

Sections 35A, 35B, 35C and 35D of The Prison Rules 1999 (as amended) provide a statutory basis for disclosing information to LEAs, where disclosure is necessary for specific reasons including:

- The prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of crime;
- In the interests of national security or public safety;
- For the purposes of securing or maintaining prison security or good order and discipline in prisons.

This is also documented in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended). Section 115 of the Act provides a lawful power for disclosure of information which is necessary for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the Act. Prison governors are, therefore, empowered to voluntarily disclose material to LEAs. Responsibility for the prison intelligence-gathering process lies with the Police Advisers Section at Prison Service Headquarters.

Gathering prison intelligence also presents opportunities to link in with offender resettlement and rehabilitation programmes.

Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels (MAPPP)

Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels (MAPPP) provide useful sources of information regarding previous offending and current behaviour (see 5.2.2 Methods of control).

In 2006 the Pan-Birmingham Multi-Agency Public Protection Panel (MAPPP) was created under the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) to facilitate the management of gang members on a statutory and multi-agency basis. It is chaired by a senior police officer or district manager from West Midlands Probation Service and strictly adheres to MAPPA guidelines addressing the management of all Birmingham gang level 3 offenders and some gang level 2 offenders subject to a multi-agency selection process.

In 2007 its work was complemented by the establishment of a Pan-Birmingham Shared Priorities Forum (SPF) under the Prolific and other Priority Offender (PPO) Strategy. The SPF enables multi-agency management of a greater number of individuals by including those gang members that do not fit the MAPPA criteria. Selection of gang members to be managed at the SPF is based on a multi-agency threat assessment. Meetings of MAPPP and the SPF take place on a monthly basis, with a facility for hot tasking.
**Accident and emergency departments**

Health authorities must fulfil their obligation to share and disclose information under section 115 Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The General Medical Council (GMC) has outlined guidance for doctors in Accident and Emergency departments to report gunshot wounds. See General Medical Council (2003) Reporting Gun Shot Wounds Guidance for Doctors in Accident and Emergency Departments.

**2.3 Managing Intelligence**

There is a need for intrusive monitoring of gun crime intelligence through force and BCU tasking and co-ordination processes. The integration of these requirements within force and BCU performance frameworks will also improve the intelligence picture.

Once intelligence is gathered, it should be shared internally within force and with local partner agencies, neighbouring forces and national law enforcement agencies.


It is vital to respond quickly to intelligence. If the response is not immediate, such intelligence may not be forthcoming in the future.

Larger police forces are more likely to learn that key nominals are travelling out of the force area into neighbouring forces or other regions of the country. There is, therefore, a need to notify those forces to where individuals are travelling, and for intelligence to be exchanged.

Intelligence exchange should follow the processes used to police public order offences, whereby information about individuals travelling to events such as football matches is shared to prevent incidents occurring.

The national organised crime group mapping (OCGM) process will assist with the identification of nominals moving between force areas.

Information-sharing agreements (ISA) should be in place for working with local partner agencies and for the management of information exchange across force boundaries and nationally.

There should be a primacy of intelligence exchange within and across police force boundaries and national agencies. For example, local intelligence on the weapon of choice in a particular area can be shared with the UKBA, which can then focus its strategies on how particular firearms are entering the UK. NABIS and NFIC will assist with sharing intelligence across the Police Service on a national basis.
A cohesive agency approach to intelligence gathering is required to effectively capture the broader intelligence picture. The importance of this process and its benefits, both in terms of wider goals and the consequences for individuals concerned, may need to be communicated effectively to partners in order to achieve this.

Effective communication with partner agencies is required to emphasise the importance of the need to gather, share and manage intelligence for prevention purposes.

There need to be appropriate processes in place to collate intelligence and ensure that there is a clear understanding of how it will be disseminated and used. Consideration should be given to who has access to shared intelligence in the wider context (e.g., street pastors, Children and Young People’s (CYP) services and street link workers). This is in addition to mainstream agencies such as youth offending teams (YOT) and social services.

Joint strategic assessments based on broad community intelligence and information from agencies will help to focus the multi-agency response and resources required to address initial issues. The establishment of a multi-agency governance group to monitor partnership working will ensure appropriate lines of accountability.

2.4 Summary

Intelligence gathering is an ongoing activity that is essential for developing a comprehensive understanding of local and national gun crime issues. Intelligence provides the foundation for developing and implementing enforcement strategies, investigative activity and preventing future incidents occurring. In gathering and managing intelligence:

- The core principles of NIM should be followed;
- Trust and confidence of the community should be established;
- All sources of intelligence should be identified and used to develop the most accurate picture of gun-enabled criminality, locally and nationally;
- Information-sharing protocols and management processes should be put in place.
This section outlines examples of proactive enforcement strategies for targeting and disrupting those individuals involved in gun crime.
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3.1 Proactive Enforcement Strategies

The aim of proactive enforcement strategies is to provide a sustained and coordinated response to disrupt and prevent future firearms incidents occurring. Proactive enforcement strategies can be implemented in addition to existing policing activity and reactive investigations.

Employing proactive enforcement strategies requires dedicated resources and a clear tasking and co-ordination structure. For further information see ACPO (2006) Practice Advice on Tasking and Co-ordination.

An example of a successful coordinated proactive enforcement initiative is Greater Manchester Police’s Operation Cougar, led by Xcalibre (see Text Box 3).

**Text Box 3**

**Greater Manchester Police Xcalibre Operation Cougar**

Greater Manchester Police (GMP) have had significant success in restricting gun and gang activity with Operation Cougar, a joint police, CDRP and Children’s Services initiative, which has involved three key elements:

1. High-visibility policing;
2. Disruption tactics;
3. Early intervention work.

Tactics have included:

- Stop and search;
- Breach of licence arrests;
- Public order arrests;
- Warning letters;
- Use of child protection laws and emergency police protection orders (EPPOs) to protect children involved in or at risk of becoming involved in gun crime.

The longevity of a proactive enforcement strategy must be considered because problems are likely to re-emerge if the strategy is not embedded as part of a long-term approach. Dedicated resources, joint working with local partners and community relationships are key ingredients for a long-term proactive enforcement strategy.

Proactive enforcement strategies should be tailored to the local problem. Dependent upon the nature of gun crime incidents in the force area, the strategy could focus on individuals, groups and locations (see Figure 3).
Individuals

The individuals strand of the strategy involves identifying the key gun crime nominals within the force area. The BCUs affected by gun crime incidents should nominate a list of those individuals causing the most concern. Once this has been collated the individuals on the list can be prioritised according to a range of risk indicators. The number of individuals categorised as high risk (key nominals) should be kept to a manageable number in line with the resources required to carry out targeted enforcement action. Information on the identified key nominals should be shared locally and regionally with neighbouring forces through Regional Intelligence Units (RIU).

Groups

The types of groups operating within the area should also be taken into account within the strategy (see Text Box 1) along with the social make-up and dynamics of the group (eg, number in group, age, ethnicity, locations they reside in or frequent and types of crime involved in). For information on organised crime groups, see Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2008) Getting Organised. A Thematic Report on the Police Service’s Response to Serious and Organised Crime.

Any identified group engaging in gun crime activity should be managed through the OCGM process within force. See ACPO (2008) Briefing Paper on Organised Crime Group Mapping. Identification, Assessment and Use of Knowledge.

Locations

Gun crime tends to occur in concentrated, rather than wide, geographical areas. Affected forces are able to pinpoint the hot spot areas where firearms incidents occur. Proactive enforcement strategies should be focused on the identified hot spot areas. At a national level, OCGM will be relevant for understanding organised criminal networks.
Preventive work can also be carried out on identifying location opportunities as opposed to hot spots. Areas of dereliction and deprivation should be identified to prevent them becoming areas where future firearm-related crime could occur.

**Venues and events**

When setting a location strategy, venues and events may also be considered. BCU licensing departments should establish a link with force intelligence units so that high-risk music events can be lawfully disrupted, thereby reducing the potential for disorder.

Intervention work can be carried out in conjunction with licensees, events organisers, music promoters and DJs to reduce the occurrence of firearms incidents at particular venues or events. Trident run by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) carries out proactive and reactive work to improve the safety of music venues (see Text Box 4).

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**Text Box 4**

**MPS Trident Intervention Work with Music Venues**

Trident works closely with music venues to prevent and deter firearms incidents occurring within music venues. Based on a comprehensive literature review of nightclub security, a ‘Safe and Sound’ A-Z spreadsheet of safety factors has been compiled, which is used to conduct a security review of licensed premises. Factors include:

- Management;
- How access to the venue is monitored;
- Security staff training;
- Search policy and equipment;
- CCTV coverage;
- Incident register and procedure;
- Health and safety, and risk assessments.

The work carried out by Trident prevention officers is both proactive and reactive. A security review report is compiled using the Safe and Sound template and this is submitted to the borough licensing committee and manager of the venue. Where necessary, conditions are then imposed by the licensing board.
3.1.1 Managing key nominals

The response of Merseyside Police to gun crime provides a useful example of how key nominals can be managed by the implementation of a targeted proactive enforcement strategy.

Prioritisation

A discrimination matrix is used to prioritise those individuals considered to be key nominals. The matrix is intelligence-led and requires understanding and awareness of the individuals involved. The matrix includes a range of indicators such as:

- Intelligence they have been involved in gun crime;
- Intelligence they are associated with people involved in gun crime;
- Evidence they have been charged with a gun crime offence;
- Evidence they have been a victim of gun crime;
- Evidence they have threatened someone with a firearm or they themselves have been threatened.

The force systems are trawled for intelligence on individuals involved in gun crime. Once compiled, the intelligence package is forwarded to the detective superintendent in the Matrix Unit. The detective superintendent then makes a decision on whether the individual is to be included within the strategy, based on necessity, proportionality and justification. If agreed, a standardised risk management process is set. The individual is then served with a notice that outlines how the use of guns will not be tolerated, and that individuals involved in gun-enabled criminality will be targeted for all the types of crimes they commit (see Text Box 5).

A ‘carrot and stick’ approach is adopted by Merseyside Police. Legislative measures are outlined (the ‘stick’) together with initiatives to encourage individuals to turn their back on gun crime (the ‘carrot’). These include re-housing, employment, education, skills training and helping individuals to change their behaviour with regard to drugs and alcohol.
Throughout the risk management plan a set form of words is used. When an individual is visited by officers, they are told it is because intelligence has linked them to being involved in gun crime. They are offered the opportunity to absence themselves from this by taking up training and work opportunities. Once an individual is included within the strategy, they are owned by the Matrix team but managed locally on the BCU.
The risk management plan is assessed on a weekly basis. The main element of the plan is the number of visits made to the key nominal’s home address:

- Gold – once every day;
- Silver – three times a week;
- Bronze – once a week.

**Collateral targeting**

Collateral targeting refers to a proactive enforcement tactic whereby the Police Service, in collaboration with partner agencies, makes full use of all legislative measures to exert pressure on individuals to stop their involvement in gun crime.

An individual’s associates can also be targeted, thereby creating criminal peer pressure. As well as providing methods for reducing individuals’ involvement in gun crime, collateral targeting can provide reassurance to communities that action is being taken.

**Text Box 6**

**Effective Use of Legislative Measures to Disrupt Individuals Involved in Gun Crime**

This includes the use of:

- Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994;
- Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002;
- Road Traffic Act 1988 (as amended);
- Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006;
- Firearms Act 1968;
- Serious and Organised Crime Police Act 2005;
- Criminal Justice Act 2003;
- Immigration laws;
- Bail and licence management;
- Housing legislation;
- Care proceedings.

The strategic framework that Merseyside Police have in place for tackling gun and gang-related crime is illustrated in **Figure 4**.
The gun crime coordination group meets weekly, focusing on groups and locations. The number of firearm discharges, intelligence and any ongoing fractional disputes outlined in GARD are also discussed.

JAG meets once a week to discuss key nominals, actions and the risk they currently pose.

MAGG meets quarterly. These meetings focus on strategic issues for the police, local authorities, court, Fire and Rescue Service, Probation and Prison Services.

Operation Noble is Merseyside Police enforcement and reassurance gun crime strategy. It was developed following a spate of injury shootings during July 2008. Operation Noble is coordinated by Matrix, which is Merseyside’s dedicated gang and firearm-related crime team. Operation Noble consists of five responses (Neon, Xenon, Argon, Radon and Krypton). Each is tailored to a particular circumstance that the force is facing at a particular time and includes a range of tactics.

Dedicated CPS support

Dedicated CPS support is crucial for implementing a proactive enforcement gun crime strategy and management of key nominals. It is beneficial to have local arrangements in place between the CPS and the police for the handling of serious incidents of gun and gang-related violence. This should include the early involvement of Area lawyers or Group Complex Casework Unit (CCU) lawyers, with senior officers leading the investigation. See Crown Prosecution Service (2008) Good Practice Guide to Prosecuting Complex Gun and Gang Related Crime.
3.1.2 Disruption

Collateral targeting is a form of disruption. Disruption refers to enforcing a targeted zero-tolerance policy and using tactics that make it impossible for offenders causing the most concern or harm in a force area to go about their daily business.

Disruption must be intelligence-led, with plans developed around the capability of individuals. The Conflict Management Model principles are directly applicable to disruption. See *ACPO (2008) Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace*.

The type of disruption tactics to employ will depend on the local characteristics of the problem. As well as using the range of legislative measures available, proactive use of investigative tools such as Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) can be used so that armed response vehicles (ARV) can target travelling key nominals.

**Text Box 7**

**MPS Operation Strobe**

Operation Strobe is a proactive MPS CO19 initiative. Its aim is to contribute to the MPS objective of reducing serious violence by:

- Stopping and investigating vehicles and occupants flagged as linked to firearms, gangs, gang members and associates;
- Obtaining intelligence on gang members and vehicles stopped;
- High-visibility community reassurance; and
- Reassuring local unarmed officers.

Unlike MPS Neon operations, which can be deployed anywhere in the MPS, either as a one-off operation or as part of a programme to deal with specific peaks in gun-enabled crime, Operation Strobe is a pre-planned deployment, designed to remain on a tasked borough operational command unit (BOCU) for a set period of time. This allows the host BOCU time to research and task firearms officers to local gun-related crime, based on the latest intelligence, and then allocate local resources to support and direct those taskings.

The first trial period for Operation Strobe began on 15 September 2008, for a period of nine weeks. A full evaluation, which included future tasking and deployment recommendations, has taken place.

It is anticipated that the second phase of Operation Strobe will begin in February 2009 and will incorporate a new firearm tactic. The new tactic is a ‘spotter only Neon’ called Operation Xenon. Whereas Neons are designed to be run borough-wide and Argons MPS-wide, Xenon has been designed to be ward-based and will require fewer personnel to run. As a consequence, it is not anticipated that a Xenon would run for the duration of a whole shift.
Disruption strategies can be short, medium or long-term (eg, dismantling a criminal network and disrupting the supply of firearms).

An effective example of targeting and disrupting key nominalis is Operation Demon carried out by Gwent Police in collaboration with West Midlands Police to tackle emerging gang issues in the Newport area. The strategic, tactical and proactive enforcement measures put in place by Gwent Police are outlined in Text Box 8.

Text Box 8
Operation Demon Gwent Police

Context
Operation Demon commenced in July 2006 following intelligence reports that around seventy nominalis from the West Midlands area had infiltrated the local drug market and were dealing class A drugs in the Pillgwenlly area of Newport City. These individuals were predominantly from the Birmingham area and were known members of OCGs. They were also known to be dangerous, violent and linked to firearms.

Some examples of the strategic, risk assessment, tactical and proactive enforcement elements of Operation Demon are outlined below.

Strategic

- Flagged at Tasking and Co-ordinating Group (T&CG) – critical incident declared for the force.
- Gold command group formed, providing clear aims and objectives for the investigative team and provision of resources and finance to support the investigation.
- Regional collaboration – wider picture and provision of resources.
- Critical friend – experienced detective chief superintendent.
- Formation of a dedicated team, including intelligence, investigation, financial investigators, covert resources, HOLMES, firearms and single point of contact.
- The formation of a team of Silver firearms commanders who met weekly (unless required to respond sooner) to discuss all firearms intelligence received in the previous week. This ensured all the commanders were aware of the current firearms threat/risks and provided resilience and consistency in decision making.
- The appointment of a dedicated CPS lawyer to obtain advice and aid consistency in decision making.

continued overleaf
• Control room inspectors briefed and supplied with copies of target profiles to ensure staff were able to operate in a safe environment when challenging key nominals (eg, arranging support of ARV).

• Forensic, witness and firearms strategy developed to respond to the potential threat of firearms-related activity when injured victims were conveyed to local hospitals.

• Forensic strategy developed for the arrest of persons believed to be using firearms.

• Forensic strategy developed for the examination of scenes involving the discharge of firearms and the subsequent recovery of firearms and/or ammunition.

• Continuous debriefing of staff and incidents.

Risk assessments

Examples of the risk assessments carried out on a daily and weekly basis were:

• Following identification of the problem and analysis of intelligence there was an initial risk assessment regarding officers working in pairs with the support of ARVs.

• The force health and safety officer carried out risk assessments in relation to the twelve key nominals, based on the intelligence developed and obtained, mainly around the firearm threat of these individuals.

• A weekly Silver firearms commanders meeting was held to conduct a risk assessment on firearms intelligence received. The force made a decision through the Gold group to overtly arm the ARVs. This was the first time this had happened. The force does not routinely arm and does not carry firearms unless authorised.

• Prior to any arrest or execution of a warrant, a risk assessment was conducted based on current intelligence.

Tactical

• Early intelligence gathering – neighbourhood policing teams (NPT) and force intelligence unit (FIU).

• Access to the West Midlands Police intelligence system to develop profiles on members of the OCG and accurately risk assess any threat from firearms.

• The recruitment of covert human intelligence sources (CHIS).

• The use of vehicle flags and ANPR.

• Proactive monitoring of social networking sites for evidence of any gun or drug-related activity.
• Analysis of telephone data.

• Static and mobile surveillance.


Proactive enforcement

The early identification of trigger incidents is essential for disrupting this type of OCG. Having identified trigger incidents, these groups were proactively investigated and arrests made even when there were no formal complaints from victims. This provided further intelligence opportunities, and Gwent Police communicated to the group that their behaviour would not be tolerated. This was considered a vital part of the proactive enforcement response. Proactive enforcement tactics included:

• Use of dedicated ARV to support stop and search procedures and execution of search warrants involving key individuals.

• Policing and working in partnership with music events and visiting DJs. Gwent Police sponsored events so that the force crest appeared on the event tickets. In conjunction with the venues and Security Industry Association (SIA) a visible police presence was provided, searching people on entry for drugs and weapons. A capacity was also provided to stop and search those who turned away once they had seen the level of security.

• Closure of crack houses and ASBO legislation was considered frequently and used where appropriate.

• Positive action to target and prosecute any gang members driving while disqualified.

• Face-to-face meetings with nominals were initiated. Nominals were informed that they would be targeted if they continued to be involved in drug trafficking.

• Nominals were referred to Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels (MAPPP) for management as potentially dangerous offenders.

Through the range of strategic, tactical and proactive enforcement actions outlined, Gwent Police sent out a clear message to the OCG members that any criminal activity would immediately be acted on.
Offender exit strategies

Along with proactive enforcement and disruption strategies, it is important that opportunities are provided for individuals to exit their criminal lifestyle through access to employment, training and, where necessary, by relocation out of the area.

3.1.3 Summary

For proactive gun crime enforcement strategies to be effective, they require:

- Intelligence to identify those involved in gun-enabled criminality;
- Prioritisation of key nominals to be targeted with a range of legislative measures;
- Clear tasking and co-ordination structure;
- Dedicated resources;
- Links with regional and national enforcement strategies;
- Inclusive role of IAGs.

3.2 National Level Enforcement Strategies

Proactive enforcement at a national level plays a vital role in tackling and disrupting those individuals involved in supplying firearms and providing intelligence on the origins and movements of firearms. Work with overseas partners to tackle the illegal supply of imported firearms and the conversion of replica and deactivated firearms is crucial for reducing the potential for gun crime.

The following agencies provide a national-level response to the criminal use of firearms.

Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)

Established 1 April 2006, SOCA is an intelligence-led agency with law enforcement powers and harm reduction responsibilities. Harm in this context is the damage caused to people and communities by serious organised crime. The UK Serious and Organised Crime Control Strategy 2008/09 programme 5 focuses on disrupting the supply and demand of firearms.

National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS)

The objectives and functions of NABIS are given in 2.2 Sources of Intelligence.

National Firearms Intelligence Cell (NFIC)

The objectives and functions of NFIC are outlined in 2.2 Sources of Intelligence.
UK Border Agency (UKBA)

The UK Border Agency is responsible for managing border control for the UK, enforcing immigration and customs regulations, and detecting the illegal movement of firearms.

Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)

HMRC was formed on the 18 April 2005, following the merger of the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise Departments. HMRC is responsible for collecting the bulk of tax revenue, as well as paying Tax Credits and Child Benefits, and strengthening the UK’s border. HMRC also has responsibility for firearms import and export policy, legislation and inland control of registered firearms dealers.

ACPO Criminal Use of Firearms Work Stream

The ACPO Criminal Use of Firearms work stream coordinates the national response of the above agencies to tackle firearm-related crime.
Reactive Response

This section describes the core principles of a reactive response. It should be read in conjunction with ACPO (forthcoming) Criminal Use of Firearms Group Gun Crime Investigative Guidance, which details investigative opportunities and strategies.
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Despite all efforts to prevent gun crime, and no matter how effective proactive responses to it may be, it is often the manner in which the Police Service responds to gun crime incidents that is the focus of public and media attention. An effective reactive enforcement response is fundamental to public safety, developing and maintaining public reassurance and providing a deterrent effect.

4.1 Initial Response

The initial response to any incident that involves the use of a firearm will nearly always have a major impact on the effectiveness of any subsequent investigation. The roles and responsibilities of individuals performing key roles in the aftermath of a shooting incident are outlined in *ACPO (forthcoming) Criminal Use of Firearms Group Gun Crime Investigative Guidance*, Second Edition.

Officers initially attending an incident may have little or no experience of dealing with firearms crime. It is, therefore, essential to ensure that robust processes are in place to assist the decision-making processes in the ‘golden’ investigative hours in the immediate aftermath of an incident. Such processes should enable effective risk assessments to be made and evidence recovery procedures to be implemented.

In addition to having effective processes in place, it is crucial that there is access to suitably experienced and competent practitioners, who are able to provide operational support and guidance at an early stage of any incident.

The varying circumstances surrounding gun crime incidents mean that it is impossible to provide generic advice that will fit all scenarios. However, Table 1 can be used as a checklist to ensure that the highest priority issues and most important operational options have been considered.

Table 1 outlines a model of investigation from the report of an incident through to the initial investigative evaluation, deployment and response. The elements listed in this table should be viewed in line with the Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP) and National Occupational Standards (NOS).

The key component throughout is the provision of competent staff, who know their role and what is expected of them. They must be capable of ensuring that all opportunities to maximise the potential for gathering and securing material at the earliest stage of an investigation are undertaken. For example, the initial responder, if not specialist, is likely to be a PIP Level 1 uniformed investigator. If they are competent against the NOS for conducting volume and priority investigations, they will be able to meet the initial response objectives listed in Table 1.
Table 1 Stages in Responding to a Firearms Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call or report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Call handler to obtain the best possible account of the incident and accurately record it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Control room supervisor to make deployment decision based on initial risk assessment as per force deployment policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consideration to be given to obtaining advice from firearms tactical adviser.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Preservation of life and safety of public to be a priority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. If offence is in progress, procedures for authorities, command and control, risk assessment and intelligence capacities, including NABIS check, to be implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Investigation to commence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Appropriate response to be made at the scene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Scene risk assessment conducted (victims, officers, public and other agencies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Thorough search to be conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. House-to-house enquiries to be conducted.</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Scene preservation to be ensured (number of scenes, vulnerability).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Recovery to be conducted (forensic standards maintained).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Victim to be considered as a separate scene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Weapon to be considered as a scene (safety, security, recovery and preservation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Suspect to be considered as a separate scene (consider contamination).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Compliance with National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) to be ensured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Incident finalisation coding (firearms) to be carried out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Details recorded and circulated as appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Forensic opportunities to be fully exploited (fingerprints, DNA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Samples to be submitted for forensic examination, and relevant ballistic material to be submitted to a NABIS forensic hub.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Clear ownership of investigation (and tasks) to be ensured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hot debrief of officers involved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational and tactical issues**
- Identification, support and management of significant witnesses. Use of powers under the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008.
- Fast-track identification of victim and any potential suspects.
- Provisions made for the safety of the victim.
- Community impact assessment and patrol strategy carried out.
- Media management strategy implemented.
- Interviews with witnesses and victim, with strategies in place to deal with hostile witnesses or victim.
- Intelligence requirements (5x5x5).
4.2 Scene Management

ACPO (2008) *Practice Advice on the National Ballistics Intelligence Service*, Section 5 Crime Scene Management, outlines the core scene management principles for firearms incidents. These include:

- Officer safety during exhibit search;
- Forensic contamination control;
- Recording the condition of the firearm;
- Trace evidence.

4.3 Forensic Management

It is essential that every opportunity is taken to recover ballistic items (bullets, wadding and spent cartridges) from any incident where a firearm may have been discharged in suspicious or obviously criminal circumstances.

The launch of the National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS) in 2008 provides a police governed forensic intelligence capability to link firearms and ballistic material to weapon type (*James, 2008*).

There are three regional firearms forensic hubs, based in Manchester, Birmingham and London. The hubs use the latest technology to test fire, analyse and link firearms and ballistic material to items submitted from other incidents across the UK.
The NABIS database can provide investigators with fast-time intelligence. The database links ballistic material and contains contemporary intelligence linking people, objects, locations and events to crimes and events. Sharing such intelligence nationally has the potential to make a real difference to the fast-time actions carried out in the early stages of an investigation. The early indication that a gun used in a crime is linked to a specific individual or crime group may allow arrests to take place or covert activity to be instigated.

NABIS forensic hubs do not produce evidence, except for remand statements where a suspect is in police custody, and the statement will assist in an application for a remand in custody. Forensic evidence, if required, should be obtained from a commercial forensic provider in the usual manner.

All recovered ballistic items should be detailed on the NABIS database and items fitting the NABIS submission criteria should be sent to one of the NABIS hubs. Like any intelligence system, NABIS will only be as good as the level of information entered onto the database. It is, therefore, vital that forces ensure that they play their part by actively submitting items in a timely manner and by inputting relevant information onto the database.

Regarding the arrests of persons involved in the discharge of firearms, BCU commanders should review existing custody arrangements for the receipt of detainees and the use of firearms residue kits to secure essential forensic evidence.

4.4 Assessment and Categorisation

Firearms incidents range from spontaneous (eg, occurring as the result of an issue of disrespect or territorialism) to pre-planned (reinforcement of serious crime such as drug dealing, or contract type killings).

Every firearms incident has the potential to become a critical incident, see ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical Incident Management. The disproportionately high impact that gun crime has on communities can also have huge implications for police forces, particularly those that are not regularly affected by such incidents. These forces may not have the same levels of experience and contingency planning and procedures in place as forces covering large urban areas with a history of firearms-related crimes.

An investigation will benefit from the early appointment of a suitable senior investigating officer (SIO) and investigation team. This should be combined, where appropriate, with ACPO support. In certain cases the establishment of a Gold/Silver/Bronze structure has been found to be good practice.
4.5 Investigation Management

The nature of gun crime means that there can invariably be many distractions for investigators, such as media demands and the potential for recriminatory tit-for-tat incidents. It is vital that the SIO and investigative team are allowed to focus clearly upon the crime under investigation. It is sometimes possible for the SIO to become so embroiled in assessing the risk of further related incidents and developing preventive measures that they become distracted from their primary role. Such pressing peripheral issues should be identified and the responsibility to manage them passed to suitably experienced and skilled staff, who should work in conjunction with the SIO.

4.6 Joint Investigations

The establishment of NABIS means that there is likely to be a marked increase in the identification of linked gun crime incidents occurring across force borders. As well as potentially increasing the chances of solving individual crimes, there is also the potential to use information gathered in such joint investigations to identify individuals involved in importing, supplying, reactivating and storing guns for criminal use. Forces are encouraged to actively support any opportunity to develop shared investigations and to act collaboratively to exploit all such investigative opportunities.

4.7 Summary

An effective reactive investigative response to the report of a firearms incident requires:

- Efficient processes and procedures governing the response to such incidents to be in place;
- Competent and experienced staff available to support frontline officers;
- Appropriate management and accountability for the initial response stage and subsequent investigation;
- Appropriate consideration of fast-time actions and procedures;
- Good scene and forensic management;
- Understanding and use of NABIS;
- Support and management of victims and witnesses;
- Investigative support structure with ACPO participation, where appropriate;
- Clear ownership of the investigation and collaborative working, where relevant.
Prevention

This section details a number of general preventive measures for practitioners to consider and build upon.
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5.1 Core Principles

Any gun crime prevention strategy should be tailored to the local characteristics of the problem. This requires an agreed definition of the scope and extent of gun-enabled criminality in the force area (see 1 Identifying the Problem).

Prevention strategies can be targeted (focusing on particular individuals, groups and locations) or general.

There are two levels of prevention:

1. Working with local partner agencies (CDRP or CSP-led);

2. Working at a national level to disrupt the supply of firearms (eg, NABIS, NFIC, SOCA, UKBA, HMRC and ACPO Criminal Use of Firearms work stream).

All prevention strategies require a clear management structure, ownership and leadership, agreed objectives and roles for each agency involved.

A useful example of a local partner agency prevention plan is the three-year gun crime strategy of Merseyside Police (see Text Box 9).

Text Box 9
Merseyside Partner Agency Gun Crime Prevention Strategy

The prevention elements of Merseyside’s partner agency gun crime strategy include:

- Educational packages to deter young people’s involvement in gun crime, delivered through the Personal Health and Social Education (PHSE) element of the school curriculum.

- Police officers dedicated to schools in affected areas.

- Multi-agency case conferences used to manage young people in danger of offending.

- The MAPPA process used to manage high-risk offenders upon release from custody.

- High-risk adult offenders not meeting MAPPA criteria considered for management under Local Risk Assessment and Management Meetings (LRAMM) using information-sharing agreements under section 115 Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

- Mentor and Mediation schemes developed to perform outreach work with risk groups and to offer routes out of gang membership.

- Youth diversion schemes developed for high-risk areas and individuals.
5.2 Prevention Strategies

The preventive measures detailed in 5.2.1 Coordinated use of the criminal justice system to 5.2.7 Community groups are by no means definitive but provide a starting point to build a preventive strategy.

5.2.1 Coordinated use of the criminal justice system

Frontline officers need to have understanding, knowledge and awareness of the key principles of firearms and violent crime reduction legislation, to ensure investigative and preventive opportunities are not missed. The whole range of legislative powers should be used to disrupt and deter individuals from committing firearm offences.

Frontline officers should look out for the following when on patrol:

1. Key nominals (identified subjects);
2. Impact factors – areas of dereliction (opportunities for crime);
3. Information on pseudo-gang structures (‘ear to the ground’).

At a strategic level, local criminal justice boards (LCJB) established in 2003, consisting of chief police officers, CPS, HM Courts Service, the Prison Service, Probation and Youth Offending Services should be working together to join up the criminal justice system at a local level. LCJBs should work closely with members of the CDRP/CSP.

5.2.2 Methods of control

The management and restriction of the movements and activities of those individuals causing the most concern and/or harm are outlined in 3.1.1 Managing key nominals. Methods of control include ASBOs, section 60 powers and bail licence conditions (e.g., curfew door stop challenge).

Letters of concern regarding personal safety

Greater Manchester Police BCU commanders send out letters of concern to individuals who are believed to be at an increased level of personal risk and injury. Extreme care must be taken when issuing a letter of concern. A risk assessment must be carried out and authorisation to proceed should be given by a senior officer. Officers should refer to their force ‘threat to life policy’ for guidance in this area.

Offender management

Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) place responsibility on the Police, Prison and Probation Services to make joint arrangements for the assessment and management of offenders who may cause serious harm to the public. For guidance on MAPPA see http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/dpr45.pdf
Convicted offenders should be managed under MAPPA with plans set in place to restrict behaviour to prevent future offending.

If an individual poses a threat to the safety and confidence of the community but has not been convicted (e.g., ‘potentially dangerous person’), they can be risk managed under the Prolific and other Priority Offender (PPO) programme. A PPO programme consists of three strands: catch and convict, rehabilitate and resettle, prevent and deter.

5.2.3 Target hardening

Target hardening involves more than proactive enforcement. It is a prevention measure which requires a multi-agency approach to environmentally scan existing and potential problems, with the aim of creating a better environment for communities (‘broken windows’ theory). The identification of areas of dereliction and deprivation that could become hot spot areas for future firearm-related crime, outlined in 3.1 Proactive Enforcement Strategies, is a prime example of preventive location target hardening.

There are numerous target-hardening measures that can be used to prevent gun crime and minimise risk and harm, including:

- Mobile metal detectors, weapon arches and handheld wands;
- Working with licensees of music venues;
- CCTV;
- Targeted visible policing.

5.2.4 Media strategy

The media provide a vehicle for communicating force and national strategies, operational successes and preventive activities.

Forces could consider marketing their specialist firearm-related crime units (e.g., MPS Trident, GMP Xcalibre and Merseyside Matrix) to convey a strong message to those involved in gun crime, and the wider community, about the police response and commitment to tackling gun crime.

Early media intervention can ensure messages on current police activity to reduce gun crime are conveyed in conjunction with information on proactive enforcement operations.

The development of a media strategy provides an opportunity to build relations with the local media and community. The force press bureau, in partnership with local agencies and members of the local community, should be used to communicate preventive strategies. There should be awareness from the outset of how the promotion of a gun crime prevention strategy could be interpreted as indicating the force has a problem. Measures should be put in place to counteract such arguments.
The media messages conveyed can be targeted or general. Three possible types of media messages have been identified (Jacobson and Burrell, 2007). The type of messages and target audience for each are outlined in Table 2.

### Table 2 Media Messages and Target Audience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident analysis</th>
<th>Target audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement activity targeting gang-related criminality.</td>
<td>• Gang offenders; • Potential gang offenders; • Parents and carers; • Community; • Practitioners (eg, YOT workers, social workers, youth workers, housing officers and teachers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The harm caused by gangs to self, family and friends and to the community. Sentences received, to send out a deterrent message to those who carry and use firearms.</td>
<td>• Gang offenders; • Potential gang offenders; • Parents and carers; • Community; • Practitioners (eg, YOT workers, social workers, youth workers, housing officers and teachers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to exit gangs.</td>
<td>• Gang offenders; • Potential gang offenders; • Parents and carers; • Community; • Practitioners (eg, YOT workers, social workers, youth workers, housing officers and teachers).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The form of media used to convey anti-gun crime messages should be tailored to the audience (eg, local radio, youth publications, websites, poster and leaflets at youth services venues).

### Trident media campaigns

Each year Trident devises a media campaign aimed at thirteen to nineteen year olds to dissuade them from becoming the gunmen of the future. The 2008/2009 advertising campaign features radio and TV advertisements with the message ‘Guns don’t bring respect’. For further information on media campaigns by Trident, see http://www.stoptheguns.org
A media campaign run by GMP in 2008, ‘Aiming for gun free streets’ involved the publication of a poster which showed the faces of thirty individuals recently convicted of gun crime.

5.2.5 Mediation

Mediation aims to diffuse emerging tensions between gangs to minimise the risk of outbreaks of violence.

West Midlands Mediation and Transformation Services (WMMTS) provide a team of trained and highly experienced individuals, committed to a cessation of gang-related violence. WMMTS have three broad strands:

1. Proactive intervention to facilitate negotiation between factions;

2. Post-event intervention to mediate and prevent retaliation and escalation;

3. Facilitating delivery of support to encourage those who wish to exit the gun and gang culture, to do so.

Further information on the principles of mediation and the work of WMMTS is provided in Text Box 10.
5.2.6 Education

Education is a subsection of community engagement and should have wider coverage than schools. It should include venues where young people attend and socialise (eg, sports venues and youth clubs).

Educational programmes should be tailored to different age groups. As younger age groups are becoming involved in gang and gun crime, consideration should be given to early intervention measures.

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**Text Box 10**

**Mediation and WMMTS**

When the gun goes off, who can stop or manage the potential for retaliation or indeed revenge? What do we need to do to engage those who present the most harm to life and the reputation of the town or city? There is only one way: dialogue.

This is not capitulation, it is the strength to say that we can talk to you yet continue to do that which we have to do as a society and uphold the law. Dialogue does not mean that those who choose to participate are weak.

Conflict is something we all come across; however, who teaches us to recognise what conflict is and how it sometimes spirals out of control? Who is there to help us problem solve those issues that may end up in the use of extreme violence?

West Midlands Mediation and Transformation Services (WMMTS) is an independent private company that specialises in high-risk mediation in respect of guns and gangs and issues relating to social and community cohesion. WMMTS experience is reflected in the work undertaken through the strategy ‘Birmingham Reducing Gang Violence’ (BRGV). This has now been replicated in engagements throughout the wider Midlands and other areas across the country.

WMMTS have found that on nothing more than the basis of rumour and/or innuendo, engaging local community facilitators to open doors so that mediation can take place adds to any community tension indicator process. It also promotes greater understanding for any decision-making process regarding informing the community. WMMTS work is governed through a protocol and information-sharing agreement (ISA) designed to protect all partners. WMMTS work relating to MAPPP is ahead of its time and deals with those who potentially present the most harm.

In 2002, in Birmingham there were twenty-seven gang-related murders. In 2007, there were two and the previous year there were three. High-risk conflict resolution is an integral part to Birmingham’s strategy and WMMTS provides that service.

For further information see [http://www.wmmts.org.uk](http://www.wmmts.org.uk)
Educational programmes should focus on:

- Tackling the perception of gun culture and the ‘gangster’ role model;
- Encouraging positive life routes by taking young people into work environments.

The development of risk criteria, including truancy and exclusion levels, educational attainment and the local deprivation index, can be used to identify those schools where input may be most effective.

**Manchester Multi-Agency Gang Strategy (MMAGS)**

The Manchester Multi-Agency Gang Strategy (MMAGS) is a pioneering multi-agency organisation set up in 2001. It has dedicated staff from CDRP agencies (police, probation, youth offending services, education authority, housing, social services and youth services) who provide targeted, diversionary educational, recreational and vocational activities to young people involved in, or at risk of being involved in, youth gangs.

MMAGS initiatives include:

- One-to-one working with gang members and those at risk – developing programmes of work for gang members;
- Wide ranging preventive interventions in primary and secondary schools and youth clubs.
- Group work and programme delivery in young offender institutes and prisons.
- Training of staff in affected agencies.

In October 2007, Manchester Safeguarding Children Board introduced a formal process for working with young people at risk of gang involvement, under the Every Child Matters agenda. MMAGS is the gatekeeper and convener for this process. For further information on Safeguarding Children, see http://www.manchesterscb.org.uk

**Miss Dorothy.com**

Miss Dorothy.com is a structured teaching resource aimed at eight to eleven year olds and is used by teachers to deliver messages on a range of issues such as stranger danger, gangs and weapons. Where practical, inputs are provided by representatives from relevant partner agencies (eg, Police, Fire and Rescue, and Ambulance Services) to reinforce the message. The targeted age group is of importance because it covers the transition from primary to secondary school. For further information visit http://www.missdorothy.com
School Help Advice Reporting Page (SHARP)

SHARP is a secondary school initiative developed in partnership with Merseyside Police. It enables children to report incidents that occur in school and the local community, anonymously, online through their school computer network. The system can also be used as a communication tool to deliver newsflashes and key messages to pupils. The web pages of SHARP provide information about bullying, health, community, weapons and hate crime.

Trident youth engagement work: ‘Decisions and Consequences’

Trident carry out a number of initiatives which focus on maximising engagement with young people who are involved in, or are at increased risk of becoming involved in, gun and gang-related crime. Trident prevention officers visit youth offending teams (YOTs), pupil referral units, schools and other youth settings to give their ‘Decisions and Consequences’ presentation.

The presentation contains CCTV footage of actual incidents and poses a number of scenarios whereby youths are asked to make key decisions such as: in this situation should I get involved or leave? Should I be carrying a weapon in this setting? The consequences section focuses on prison life, serious disability and death. Presentations are also given to partner professionals to outline the current problems being faced such as reluctant witnesses and the decreasing age of those involved in gun-related crime.

MPS Operation Make Peace

As of 5 January 2009, the Specialist Firearms Department (CO19) of the MPS began an anti-gun and gang initiative called ‘Operation Make Peace’. The aim of this initiative is to improve engagement with hard-to-reach young people and groups across London. Its purpose is to divert young people away from joining gangs. The negative aspects of gang membership have been identified in that gang members are more likely to become involved in crime. As a consequence, gangs are having a negative effect on London’s communities. This, in turn, is impacting on public confidence.

Operation Make Peace seeks to inform and educate young people about:

- The long prison sentences imposed on those caught carrying or using guns;
- The effects that shootings have on friends and family when individuals are severely injured or cause injury to others;
- The risk that they might lose their own life if they were involved in a shooting.
A successful pilot has already been completed. Anti-gun and gang presentations were delivered to the following organisations:

- The Black Police Association (Voyage);
- The Prince’s Trust;
- MPS Focus groups;
- The Kickz project;
- MPS IAG members.

Feedback on the presentations has been overwhelmingly positive. It is envisaged that the firearms presentation team will become a full-time, integral part of CO19 in the future. This will ensure that the negative aspects of carrying firearms and being a gang member continue to be delivered to those hard-to-reach sections of society, in an attempt to divert young people away from violence and criminality.

5.2.7 Community groups

Community based groups can engage with gang members and provide diversionary services. Groups that have direct experience of how gun crime has affected their lives can provide effective anti-gun crime messages and input to prevention strategies.

5.3 Conclusion

Multi-agency work is currently underway to develop long-term strategies for reducing and preventing gun crime. The success of these strategies will be based on the Police Service, communities, local partner and national law enforcement agencies working together and being equipped to quickly identify, react and adapt to current gun crime trends, both locally and nationally.

In conclusion, responding effectively to gun crime requires:

- Clear definition of the problem (nature, extent and causes);
- Intelligence-led business processes;
- Community engagement, trust and confidence;
- A collaborative multi-agency (including community groups, IAGs and KINs) information-sharing approach;
- Focused strategy, with clear objectives and integrated intelligence, proactive enforcement and prevention measures;
- Clear leadership and accountability;
- Integrated local and national response.
## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5x5x5</td>
<td>Intelligence Grading Matrix Model</td>
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<td>ABC</td>
<td>Acceptable Behaviour Contract</td>
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<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<td>ANPR</td>
<td>Automatic Number Plate Recognition</td>
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<td>ARV</td>
<td>Armed Response Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASBO</td>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCU</td>
<td>Basic Command Unit</td>
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<td>BRGV</td>
<td>Birmingham Reducing Gang Violence</td>
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<td>CCU</td>
<td>Complex Casework Unit</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Crime and Disorder Act 1998</td>
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<td>CDRP</td>
<td>Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Community Safety Partnership</td>
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<td>CHIS</td>
<td>Covert Human Intelligence Source</td>
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<td>CJS</td>
<td>Criminal Justice System</td>
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<td>CPS</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
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<td>CYP</td>
<td>Children and Young People</td>
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<td>EPPO</td>
<td>Emergency Police Protection Order</td>
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<td>FIB</td>
<td>Force Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>GARD</td>
<td>Guns Assessment and Response Document</td>
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<td>GMP</td>
<td>Greater Manchester Police</td>
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<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
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<td>HMPS</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Prison Service</td>
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<td>HMRC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs</td>
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<td>IAG</td>
<td>Independent Advisory Group</td>
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<td>IBIS</td>
<td>Integrated Ballistics Identification System</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>Information-Sharing Agreement</td>
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<td>JAG</td>
<td>Joint Agency Group</td>
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<td>KIN</td>
<td>Key Individuals Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCH</td>
<td>Local Clearing House</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCJB</td>
<td>Local Criminal Justice Board</td>
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<td>LEA</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
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<td>LRAMM</td>
<td>Local Risk Assessment and Management Meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSCB</td>
<td>Local Safeguarding Children Board</td>
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<td>MAGG</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Governance Group</td>
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<td>MAPPP</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels</td>
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<td>MAPPA</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements</td>
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<td>MMAGS</td>
<td>Manchester Multi-Agency Gangs Strategy</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
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<td>NABIS</td>
<td>National Ballistics Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>NCRS</td>
<td>National Crime Recording Standard</td>
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<td>NFIC</td>
<td>National Firearms Intelligence Cell</td>
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<td>NFLMS</td>
<td>National Firearms Licensing Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Intelligence Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOS</td>
<td>National Occupational Standards</td>
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<td>NPIA</td>
<td>National Policing Improvement Agency</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Policing Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCG</td>
<td>Organised Crime Group</td>
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<td>PHSE</td>
<td>Personal Health and Social Education</td>
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<td>PIP</td>
<td>Professionalising Investigation Programme</td>
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<td>POCA</td>
<td>Proceeds of Crime Act 2002</td>
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<td>POP</td>
<td>Problem Oriented Policing</td>
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<td>PPO</td>
<td>Prolific and other Priority Offender</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Public Service Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIU</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>Strategic Assessment</td>
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<td>SHARP</td>
<td>School Help Advice Reporting Page</td>
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<td>SIA</td>
<td>Security Industry Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIO</td>
<td>Senior Investigating Officer</td>
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<td>SIR</td>
<td>Security Information Reports</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious Organised Crime Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Shared Priorities Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>T&amp;CG</td>
<td>Tasking and Co-ordination Group</td>
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<td>TGAP</td>
<td>Tackling Gangs Action Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKBA</td>
<td>UK Border Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMMMTS</td>
<td>West Midlands Mediation and Transformation Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOT</td>
<td>Youth Offending Teams</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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Useful Websites

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