

An Exploration of the Blue Code of Silence

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March 2014


Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements of the
MSc Counter Fraud & Counter Corruption Studies degree

Dissertation submitted as partial requirement for the award of MSc Counter Fraud & Counter Corruption Studies.

Title: An Exploration of the Blue Code of Silence

Submitted by: Stuart Morishita Dubois

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Date 22/03/2014

Word Count : 15,461

ABSTRACT

This study aimed to explore the Blue Code of Silence by asking police personnel directly why they would choose to report, or not report, their colleagues' unethical behaviour. An online survey questionnaire was distributed to police personnel via deliberately 'unofficial' routes to encourage honest responses. Twelve scenarios involving various types and degrees of police corruption were presented to respondents, who were then invited to answer whether they would report the behaviour or not, and more importantly, why. The results from 94 responses were presented and analysed in this study. This study concluded that the Blue Code of Silence appears to exist, in the sense that not all police unethical behaviour is likely to be reported, and in the sense that police personnel are often reluctant to report such behaviour openly. However, this study also concluded that police personnel make frequent reference to their own level of integrity, and they are very likely to report serious, harmful or repeated incidents of unethical behaviour, and are very likely to challenge their colleagues' unethical behaviour on the occasions when it is not reported.

KEY WORDS

Police Corruption, Blue Code of Silence

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thank you to my Academic Supervisor Dr Martin Tunley, University of Portsmouth. Thank you to Barry Wright, MSc graduate of University of Portsmouth, for sending unpublished material to me and discussing his work. Thank you to Dr Louise Westmarland of the Open University, for sending unpublished material to me.

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INTRODUCTION

The integrity of the police has been described as a, “Vital barometer of a healthy society” (Punch, 2000) yet concerns about police corruption are regularly expressed. Of particular concern is the Blue Code of Silence, the widespread perception that police personnel, who are expected to act with courage and integrity, are unlikely to report police corruption.

Police corruption has been the subject of much academic discussion, but has only recently been the subject of empirical research that has explored police attitudes towards, and toleration of police corruption. Statistical analysis has been employed to infer connections between a police officer’s age, rank or length of service and their attitude towards corruption, or the likelihood that they would report it. The research to date has not concentrated on asking police personnel directly why they would, or would not, report corruption.

The aim of the current research study is to critically explore the Blue Code of Silence. The objectives are: to review the existing literature and research on Police Corruption and the Blue Code of Silence, and to collect and analyse primary data from police personnel in order to better understand their motivations for the reporting, or non-reporting of their colleagues’ corruption.

Chapter One provides a review of the existing literature and research on Police Corruption and the Blue Code of Silence. The Blue Code of Silence is seen as an under-researched area and gaps in the existing research are identified, which the current research study attempts to bridge.

Chapter Two describes the methodology employed in the current study. A questionnaire survey is conducted, inviting police personnel to respond to twelve police corruption scenarios. A non-probability sample is used, and the rationale for employing the methodology is described, in particular the current researcher’s strategy to elicit honest responses from participants.

Chapter Three presents results from the quantitative data, with a summary of the key results for each of the twelve scenarios. Charts are used to visually represent correlations in the data.

Chapter Four uses the results from the quantitative data as a basis from which to discuss the themes that emerged from the qualitative data. Numerous examples are given of the qualitative data received, namely the comments made by survey respondents. The discussion is focussed towards conclusions about the nature of the Blue Code of Silence.

CHAPTER ONE – LITERATURE REVIEW

Punch and Gilmour (2010) claim that police corruption occurs in almost every force at some time and can be a “near permanent feature”. It has been estimated that between 0.5% and 1% of police within England and Wales are corrupt (Miller, 2003). Conversely, the Independent Police Complaints Commission [IPCC] which is not considered a natural ally or defender of the police, asserts that the incidence of corruption amongst police officers in England and Wales is not widespread, and is relatively rare by comparison with other jurisdictions (IPCC, 2011 and 2012).

This literature review is based within the broad subject area of police corruption, and it will commence with a discussion of the literature surrounding definitions, classifications and causes of police corruption. The importance of police officers themselves reporting corruption will then be discussed, followed by a review of the literature on the Blue Code of Silence which is believed to prevent police officers reporting corruption. Recent research into the Blue Code of Silence will be explored, gaps in the research will be identified and the theoretical context will also be discussed.

Definitions and Classifications of Police Corruption

Jones (2004) has described corruption as, “less tangible than fraud. It is a state of mind or ethos” and Sööt and Rootalu (2012) have similarly described it as, “a difficult and tricky concept to define ... a social construct”. Common elements from most popular definitions are present in Transparency International’s (2009) definition of corruption as, “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Moran (2005) states that police corruption is qualitatively different from corruption in other public sector organisations due to the unique constitutional role of the police, and that therefore much discussion on this subject seems to settle on definitions of “general unethical behaviour” by police officers. For brevity, the term ‘unethical behaviour’ will be adopted interchangeably with corruption throughout this review, and throughout this dissertation. The Association of

Chief Police Officers does not settle on such a simple broad definition however, and their working definition of police corruption is, “the abuse of one’s role or position held in the service for personal gain or gain for others” (IPCC, 2011).

Punch (2000, 2003 and Punch and Gilmour, 2010) agrees that police corruption cannot be encapsulated within the standard definition of corruption in the conventional sense, which is motivated by personal or private gain. He states that it must also include behaviour aimed at benefitting a group, organisation or even “approved goals” and that the “essential factor is abuse of power or authority” (Punch, 2000), adopting the view that one should refer to ‘police deviance’ generally, which can then be categorised under classifications and sub-headings. He provides a typology of nine classifications of police corruption, which he has adapted from previous studies (Roebuck and Barker, 1974, and Punch, 1985, cited by Punch, 2000):

- i) corruption of authority
- ii) ‘kickbacks’
- iii) opportunistic theft
- iv) ‘shakedowns’
- v) protection of illegal activity
- vi) the ‘fix’
- vii) direct criminal activities
- viii) internal payoffs
- ix) ‘flaking’ or ‘padding’.

Punch (2000) suggests that further classifications are needed to cover the full range of possible police deviance:

- x) violence
- xi) manipulating evidence
- xii) sexual harassment
- xiii) racism
- xiv) direct involvement in drug dealing

Porter and Warrender (2009) adopted these classifications in their study of 50 police corruption cases which reached the courts between 1969 and 2005. They found that in 68% of cases the incentive was personal gain,

and in the remaining 32% of cases the incentive was a “noble cause” - where the achievement of a greater good, such as the noble cause of public safety or justice, is believed, by the officer(s), to outweigh the harm of police corruption (Wolfe and Piquero, 2011). Porter and Warrender (2009) concluded that, rather than continually adding to the list of relatively specific classifications, it may be more useful to use the general term ‘police deviance’ with three broad sub-headings: corruption, misconduct and police crime. These sub-headings were originally coined by Punch (2000) to provide groupings for his nine classifications, with classifications ii), iv), v), vi) and viii) under the sub-heading ‘conventional’ Corruption; classification i) under the sub-heading Misconduct; and classifications iii), vii) and ix) under the sub-heading Crime.

Causes of Police Corruption

Doig (2012) outlines the components of corruption as being three controllable ones: opportunity, incentive and risk, and one uncontrollable component: personal honesty; each of these components will now be discussed in turn.

Opportunity is well documented as a factor or cause of corruption (Porter and Warrender, 2009) and the nature of police work certainly affords many varied opportunities for corruption, as has been indicated by the growing list of police corruption classifications already mentioned. Every police officer faces opportunities for deviance (Punch and Gilmour, 2010) but certain areas of policing such as pornography, prostitution and drugs, will persistently provide opportunities for corruption (Moran, 2005).

The opportunity for corruption within police work is increased by at least one factor which characterises the nature of police work, namely police officers’ discretionary powers. Moran (2005) states that any high-pressure job with discretionary powers may see the worker tempted to use the powers corruptly, and Marché (2009) specifies this point by adding that “coercive law enforcement powers lead to corruption because of the discretionary authority of law enforcement officials in choosing which law to enforce”. Choosing which law to enforce can be described as a de facto discretionary authority. Miller (1998) makes a distinction between de facto

and actual legal discretion; the former being situations when police officers choose which law to enforce, and the latter being when a discretionary power is granted to police officers through a law.

De facto discretion initially appears to bear less moral authority than legal discretion and even to be undesirable, yet it is absolutely necessary for police work. The law can only provide a framework within which to act, it cannot possibly cover every contingency that may arise (Miller, 1998), no law is sufficiently fine-grained to accommodate every set of circumstances (Kleinig, 2002) so police officers must constantly make choices about which laws to act within, and to how to apply them. This “messy reality of police work” contends Punch (2003) can become more than simple creativity and escalates into corruption.

The incentive to commit acts of corruption within the police can in certain cases be explained by material needs, but to an important degree it can be affected by family and friendship ties (Sööt and Rootalu, 2012). A study of 50 police corruption cases which reached the courts between 1969 and 2005 found that in 68% of cases the incentive was personal gain, and in the remaining 32% of cases the incentive was a “noble cause” (Porter and Warrender, 2009). This is where the achievement of a greater good, such as the noble cause of public safety or justice, is believed, by the officer(s), to outweigh the harm of police corruption (Wolfe and Piquero, 2011). Corruption is fostered by the incentive structures within police culture (Marché, 2009), where there is an emphasis on high performance (Miller, 2003) and where, “too often only results count and not the methods” (Punch and Gilmour, 2010).

Rule-breaking to achieve results is seen by officers as “corruption for the job” as opposed to “corruption on the job” (Punch, 2003). Kleinig (2002) declares that although the incentive to commit noble cause corruption is not self-serving, is it still nonetheless corruption and the term “noble cause” is merely an attempt to cover corruption with a “mantle of respectability”. Kleinig (2002) considers the slippery slope argument whereby, “the officer who compromises his integrity to get the bad guy

behind bars may subsequently be induced to compromise it for other reasons”.

The risk of corrupt acts or officers being discovered is relatively low. This is partly because of the “Blue Code” of silence, which is the central focus of the current research study and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, whereby, “due to the demands of cop culture, a close professional partner might not be reported” (Westmarland, 2005), and also partly because of the high autonomy of frontline policing (Punch and Gilmour, 2010). Inadequate supervision is believed to be a contributory factor in police officers becoming corrupt (Miller, 2003) but much of a police officer’s authority and power is exercised in circumstances in which close supervision is not possible (Miller, 1998). Despite 600 hours spent with police officers in close observation, in an attempt to research police corruption, Rowe (2007) did not witness any serious malpractice. One of the possible conclusions this led him to was that the officers were successfully able to conceal their malpractice (Rowe, 2007).

The ample opportunity for corruption in police work, the variety of apparently noble incentives, and the relatively low risk involved all result in “moral vulnerability [being] a fundamental defining feature of police work” (Miller, 1998). When faced with the heavy moral demands of policing situations (Kleinig, 2002) officers rely on their own personal honesty when making decisions. Wolfe and Piquero (2011) argue that the officers’ personal choice is “enmeshed in the organisation”, and that organisational causes influence individual choices. Porter and Warrender (2009) describe how the strong social forces in tightly cohesive groups, such as police units, “where groups believe in their own morality” is well researched as being conducive to corruption. Punch (2000) agrees, arguing that police culture alienates officers from ordinary citizens, enabling them to rationalise rule-bending. Thus Punch (2003) rejects the Rotten Apple metaphor, which describes a single corrupt officer within an otherwise healthy organisation; and suggests instead that a more adequate metaphor for the systemic and endemic deviance within the police organisation is a “Rotten Orchard”.

Police Reporting of Police Corruption

Internal reporting is an important source of information on corruption (Moran, 2005) and just as the police rely heavily on the public to report criminal conduct, so too do police organisations rely heavily on their members to report ethical misconduct (Miller, 2010). Anonymous whistle-blower hotlines were initially utilised in the private sector, to allow employees to report corruption without fear of suffering reprisals, and they can be a useful source of information in detecting fraud and corruption (Zipparo, 2002). This practice has also been adopted within the police service, allowing officers to report suspicions about their colleagues confidentially. Every police force now has a whistle-blower hotline, which has the potential to provide a useful source of information, particularly as police officers do not enjoy the protection of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (Moran, 2005). If an officer feels unable to report suspicions of corruption to their own force's whistle-blower line, there is a further option of reporting anonymously to the IPCC's whistle-blower line, which is independent of any police force (IPCC, 2011).

The police have an expectation that members of the public will report criminal behaviour to them, and will provide information to them when they are conducting criminal investigations. However, there is also a perception that police officers themselves are not so likely to report the criminal conduct of fellow officers, or to assist with investigations against colleagues, which prevents police corruption from being discovered or investigated effectively

Punch and Gilmour (2010) claim that serious police corruption is typically group behaviour, "behind every bent cop, then, there are *always others* ... who either took part or knew about it". Newburn (1999) lists the three primary sources of intelligence about police corruption as: citizens, police, and investigations, and claims that the "best source of intelligence is from police officers." It is important therefore, to explore this phenomenon, commonly referred to as the Blue Code of Silence, which disinclines police officers from reporting police corruption.

Blue Code of Silence

Reference is made to the code in virtually every academic work on police corruption, with varying attempts to explain its existence, such as “protecting colleagues” (Miller, 2003), a “reluctance to be disloyal to fellow officers” (Richards, 2010), or a “subcultural attitude on how one must behave to be perceived as a ‘good’ officer by peers” (Wolfe and Piquero, 2011). The Blue Code of Silence is described by Punch and Gilmour (2010) as “The social cement of corruption”. The norm of not reporting a fellow officer’s misdemeanour is described as one of the “conservative police cultural norms” (Miller, 1998) with which officers must learn to conform, through “fear of retribution” (Skolnick, 2002), and to avoid the, “harassment of reporting officers” (Moran, 2005).

Many authors refer to the ‘cop culture’, engendered by the stressful and dangerous nature of police work, which encourages loyalty and means that ignoring the misconduct of fellow officers will earn their trust and support (Marché, 2009). Skolnick (2002) writes that the Blue Code of Silence is an “embedded feature of police culture” which is sustained by loyalty. Whereas loyalty is generally a desirable characteristic for a police officer, if it is ranked above integrity then it is a misplaced loyalty which makes police reluctant to “rat on colleagues” (Miller, 2010).

Recent Research into the Blue Code of Silence

Westmarland (2005) conducted a survey into police attitudes towards police corruption, as part of an international survey across 14 countries (Klockars et al, 2004), and it was claimed to be the first time that this type of research had been conducted in Britain. 1,000 officers in one British police force were sent a printed questionnaire containing 11 scenarios depicting a variety of corrupt police behaviour, such as accepting bribes and gifts, stealing from crime scenes, and punching a suspect; the complete 11 scenarios are provided in the Appendix to this Literature Review. Each of the scenarios were followed by 7 questions, paraphrased below:

- 1) How serious do you consider this behaviour to be?
- 2) How serious would most police officers consider this behaviour to be?

- 3) Is the behaviour against your force policy?
- 4) What disciplinary sanction do you think should follow this behaviour?
- 5) What disciplinary sanction do you think would follow this behaviour?
- 6) Would you report this behaviour?
- 7) Would most police officers report this behaviour?

The respondents were not directly asked, "Why would you / wouldn't you report this behaviour?". Rather, Westmarland analysed the results from questions 1) and 2) about how serious the behaviour was considered to be, and from questions 4) and 5) about suggested or predicted sanctions. Westmarland then used this analysis, in conjunction with classifying the 11 scenarios into three categories of "rule bending", "noble cause" or "acquisitive crime", to suggest possible explanations for non-reporting of some of the behaviour.

Westmarland received 275 completed questionnaires, which she considered a small sample, and the results led her to conclude that police officers were relatively unwilling to report unethical behaviour by colleagues unless there is some sort of acquisitive motive but, importantly, that overall her findings supported the existence of the Blue Code of Silence. Westmarland described her survey as an exploratory study of an under-researched area, and concluded that all these issues needed further investigation, in particular research into the motivations behind the reporting of very serious behaviour was needed. It is submitted that there would be merit in repeating a similar survey, but with direct questions around motivations behind reporting or non-reporting, and that is what the current research survey seeks to do.

Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) conducted a similar study in Georgia in the USA. Their study compared the attitudes of a sample of 300 police officers with those of 300 civil servants. They presented scenarios to their respondents, which they adapted from Klockers et al (2004) and Westmarland (2005) to better fit both their police and non-police respondents, and then asked them questions about how willing they would be to report the behaviour in the scenarios. Rothwell and Baldwin (2007)

acknowledged that there is a perception that the code of silence is stronger with police officers than with civilian employees, but some of their results qualified this widespread belief and challenged the stereotype. Of all the variables most likely to predict a willingness to blow the whistle, supervisory status was the strongest predictor, but police officer status was also one of the better predictors. Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) concluded therefore that although the Blue Code of Silence was still a problem, their results indicated that it was actually more common in other civilian public agencies.

Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) compared the respondents' stated likelihood of reporting misbehaviour, against a number of independent variables describing their organisations' Ethical Climate, which was the particular theoretical focus of this study. They sought to predict willingness to whistle-blow, or alternatively stated, to measure the strength or weakness of the code of silence, by analysing independent variables. Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) did not ask the respondents directly why they were willing or not willing to report unethical behaviour, and again it is submitted that this question could usefully be asked, as it is in the current research study.

Wright (2010) considered that there was extensive literature on police misconduct but, apart from Westmarland (2005), the reporting of police misconduct and corruption had been overlooked, and additionally that there was a distinct gap in the knowledge relating to police staff misconduct and police staff reporting of misconduct. As the police service is becoming increasingly civilianised, Wright (2010) sought to build on the work of Klockers et al (2004) and Westmarland (2005), but to widen the survey population to include police staff as well as police officers, and to make a comparative analysis of the two groups. The research up to this point had concentrated on warranted police officers, but the 'civilianisation' of police work, at least in England and Wales, was recognised by Wright. A range of duties that were previously conducted exclusively by regular constables are now increasingly being carried out by PCSOs other civilian police staff members, blurring the lines somewhat between these different job titles. The current researcher's personal experience of police work

leads him to believe that PCSOs and police staff have just as many opportunities both to engage in, or witness, police corruption, as their warranted colleagues. It is therefore submitted by the researcher that any meaningful study into the reporting of police corruption should consider all the components of the modern police family, both in terms of the opinions to be surveyed, and in terms of the examples of corruption to be discussed.

Wright (2010) used the 11 scenarios employed by Westmarland (2005) as a basis for his questionnaire, but then improved and updated the scenarios. Westmarland herself admitted in a later study (Westmarland, n.d.) that some of her respondents considered the scenarios unlikely and the behaviour outlandish. Wright (2010) was able to draw upon his personal experience of working within a police force's Professional Standards Unit, to adapt the scenarios to a new list of 12 vignettes which reflect the type of behaviour typically dealt with by Professional Standards. Wright (2010) summarises the scenarios in his results section, so some of the updated examples of typical police misconduct behaviours can be seen to relate to issues around: unauthorised access to the Police National Computer, selling information and falsifying performance statistics. Wright was contacted directly and has sent the current researcher a copy of his questionnaire, including the full wording of his set of 12 scenarios.

Wright (2010) distributed his questionnaire electronically to 3,085 employees (both sworn officers and staff, including PCSOs) of a small rural police force, and received 723 responses, which equates to a 23% response rate. The questionnaire consisted of four parts which collated data about the respondents' gender, job classification and length of service; asked about respondents' preferred means of reporting misconduct; measured attitudes to the 12 scenarios of unethical behaviour; and finally; an examination of factors that influenced reporting.

Wright (2010) concluded that his results demonstrated that the Blue Code of Silence extended beyond police officers to include police staff, and further that it appeared to be stronger among police staff than police officers. Wright's primary focus was not on factors which influence the

decision to report or not report misconduct, he was primarily interested in the comparison between attitudes of police officers and police staff. It is submitted therefore that further research should be undertaken that specifically examines stated factors that influence reporting.

Westmarland (n.d.) recently repeated her study, which has not yet been published, but which has been reported in the media, for example Travis (2013), and has been sent directly to the current researcher. Westmarland used the same set of 11 scenarios as her previous study (Westmarland, 2005) and asked similar questions for each scenario, relating to how serious the behaviour was considered to be, and whether it would be reported. Westmarland (n.d.) again used a paper questionnaire sent out with pre-paid return envelopes, to 3000 police officers in three different police forces. This study was reportedly the first national study, Westmarland's previous study had only targeted one police force, to question a significant number of police officers about their ethics and morals (Travis, 2013). However, only 520 responses were received, which is a 17% response rate, compared to the previous study which had a 28% response rate. Additionally, any conclusions resulting from 520 responses among 3 police forces must be considered in the light of the total police population, which is 131,837 police officers in 43 England and Wales police forces (Home Office, 2013).

Theoretical Context

There is potential perhaps to apply 'control theory' (Hirschi, 1969) to suggest that police officers do not experience the constraints of ordinary citizens because cop culture alienates them from ordinary citizens and rationalises rule bending (Punch, 2000); or to apply 'routine activities theory' (Cohen and Felson, 1979) to explain the incidence of police corruption by the nature of police work which ensures a continual supply of 'suitable targets', and further, that the Blue Code of Silence results in a lack of 'capable guardians'. However, there does not appear to be any concerted effort to apply major criminological theories within the literature on police corruption or the Blue Code of Silence.

The major criminological theories are increasingly difficult to apply when one's focus moves from 'traditional' crime, towards white collar crime such as corruption, and then on towards police corruption specifically.

Discussions around police corruption have generated their own police-specific theoretical contexts, such as the Bad Apple Theory, which incidentally Punch and Gilmour (2010) reject in favour of a 'Rotten Orchard' or even a 'contaminated fruit industry'. It is expected that as more research is conducted into police corruption, and into the Blue Code of Silence, theories will continue to emerge.

Conclusion

Although police corruption has been written about for decades, the literature and research on the Blue Code of Silence is more recent and is still developing. A number of interesting studies have been discussed in this review which attempt to explain, to varying degrees and from different perspectives, the Blue Code of Silence. The existing research attempts to draw conclusions about the Blue Code of Silence primarily based on analysis of independent variables, rather than directly asking the question of 'why' some police officers would not report certain behaviour. It is submitted that this question should be explicitly asked, as in the current research study.

CHAPTER TWO – Methodology

The aim of this research study is to explore the Blue Code of Silence, and specifically to explore the reasons why police officers choose to, and choose not to, report their colleagues' unethical behaviour. Appropriate methodology was chosen in an attempt to fulfil this research aim. This chapter will describe the methodology chosen, and explain the rationale for choosing it.

Research Strategy

A classical experiment attempts to discover cause and effect relationships between dependant and independent variables in a controlled setting. It would be extremely interesting, but logistically near impossible, and certainly outside the means of the current researcher, to replicate real-life police corruption scenarios in a controlled setting.

A Case Study strategy was also considered, but rejected, by the current researcher. As Vito, Tewskbury and Kunselman (2008) point out, the feasibility of conducting research in the field, particularly in the Criminal Justice context, is severely curtailed by ethical and legal issues. Chan (2011) states that field observation is often the most appropriate method of researching policing, but describes her own field research into 'Cop Culture', in which the study was inhibited by the very phenomenon that she was studying. The current researcher considered that it would not be ethical, practical, or indeed even possible to attempt to observe police officers as they faced decisions about whether or not to report unethical behaviour.

The research strategy chosen for the current research is a survey. Vito, Tewskbury and Kunselman (2008) recommend a survey as the best method to collect data for describing attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of a population too large to observe directly. Denscombe (2010) recommends that surveys are most effective when the researcher wants to gather factual information about a large number of people, such as what they do, or what they think.

Research Technique

The current researcher chose to use a questionnaire survey, which is a common interface for members of the public with Social Science research (Guthrie, 2010) and is one of the most common methods of measuring characteristics or opinions. Questionnaires can be quick and cheap to administer to a large sample and easily allow for standardised questions and answers. Questionnaires often suffer from a low response rate, and there is limited opportunity for the questions to be explained to respondents, but they are less likely to produce socially desirable response bias than a face-to-face interview or a focus group for example. There is also evidence that self-administration of sensitive questions, such as questions in the context of the current subject matter, increases levels of reporting relative to administration of the same questions by an interviewer (Tourangeau and Smith, 1996).

It is acknowledged that survey questionnaires cannot measure social action, they only collect self-reports (Vito, Tewskbury and Kunselman, 2008). The results of any questionnaire rely on what people say they do and say they think, rather than what they actually do or think (Denscombe, 2010), but this is not considered a disadvantage in the context of the current research due to the illicit nature of police misconduct and corruption. As Gadd, Messner & Karstedt (2011) point out, Criminologists need to find ways of asking questions that uncover the nature of behaviours under investigation without leaving research participants vulnerable to adverse consequences. If the current research project were to ask respondents to confess to occasions when they had witnessed police misconduct but had failed in their duty to report it, for example, then a nil response rate would be expected. Such a survey would be unlikely to receive support from a university's Research Ethics Committee in any event.

Therefore the current research study questionnaire does not ask for any real accounts of respondents' experiences of encountering or reporting police misconduct. Instead, it asks respondents to state what they would do, and why, in twelve fictitious scenarios. The scenarios used in the

current questionnaire provide vignettes of Police Officers, Police Staff, PCSOs and Special Constables (who collectively constitute the target population for this study) engaging in unethical behaviour. The behaviours range from accepting free cups of coffee, up to selling information to criminals.

The scenarios used are exactly the same as those used in Wright's (2010) study, this will enable to results from the current study to be compared with Wright's for a measure of external validity. It is submitted by the current researcher that Wright's twelve scenarios are preferable to the set of eleven scenarios used by Westmarland (2005 and n.d.) in her similar studies which were part of an international research project. Wright (2010) works in a police force Professional Standards Department within England and Wales and he wrote the twelve scenarios to be more representative of the typical incidents that Professional Standards Units deal with.

The twelve scenarios are provided in full at Appendix A and they are summarised using the following headings:

1. Control Room Operator additional PNC checks.
2. PCSO with criminal gym associates.
3. Lift home for drunk-driver colleague.
4. Undeclared private security business.
5. Detainee punched.
6. Speeding ticket bribe.
7. Analyst discusses work with husband.
8. NPT officer accepts free meals.
9. Selling intelligence to pay off debts.
10. Inspector falsifies figures.
11. False Crimestoppers report.
12. Special after-hours drinking.

Whereas the previous studies using these and similar sets of scenarios have focused on asking respondents how seriously they consider these behaviours to be, and whether they would report the behaviour, the current research study focused on asking 'why' the respondent would choose to

report the behaviour or not. After each scenario the same three questions were asked:

1. If you witnessed this action / situation, or became aware of it, what would you do?
2. With regard to your response above, what are your main motivations for choosing this course of action?
3. Please use this space to write any explanations or further comments about your answers.

The merits of asking open-ended questions and allowing entirely unstructured answers were considered, most notably the ability for respondents to provide creative detail for this complex issue, but this was weighed against a desire to avoid irrelevant answers or respondent fatigue, and to focus responses in way that would allow for more efficient analysis. A middle ground was therefore chosen, with a list of possible answers to Questions 1 and 2 for respondents to choose from, including an “Other” category to avoid forcing respondents into an unsatisfactory answer. This was complemented by Question 3 which allows respondents to add further comments and qualify or clarify their responses if they wish.

The list of possible responses to Questions 1 and 2 are reproduced in Appendix B. Apart from the self-certification question asked at the start of the questionnaire to ensure that the respondent falls within the target group, these are the only other questions asked throughout the whole questionnaire. A consistent style of question and answer has the advantage of allowing respondents to familiarise themselves with the question style and answer more quickly (Denscombe, 2010), thus mitigating respondent fatigue or boredom.

A pilot study was conducted with a small number of the researcher’s colleagues to examine the draft questionnaire for ambiguities and omissions. The pilot study volunteers gave useful feedback on the timing of the questionnaire completion, on the wording of the questions, and suggestions for the answer options. The pilot study also tested the online

questionnaire facility, both in terms of the ease of use for the respondents and also the quality of the results data received by the researcher.

A favourable ethical opinion was received for this research study.

Medium

The questionnaire was hosted on a web-based platform, using Google.com's free of charge Form and Spreadsheet facilities. The invitations to participate in the survey were all distributed via electronic media. Internet surveys are a fast and cheap alternative to postal, telephone or face-to-face administered surveys, they require no travel, venue, or specialist equipment, they are virtually free and the data arrives ready for analysis in a spreadsheet (Denscombe, 2010). Guthrie (2010) warns of the response bias against non-email and non-internet users when conducting internet questionnaires. Other response bias issues will be discussed later in this chapter, but this specific issue is not a particular concern as every member of the target population will naturally be heavy users of the internet and email purely by virtue of the exigencies of their profession. Denscombe (2010) confirms that as the internet is increasingly becoming part of everyday life recent evidence suggests that the quality of data received through internet survey research is not significantly different from that obtained using more traditional methods. Vito, Tewskbury and Kunselman (2008) state that the advantage of an electronically administered questionnaire is that respondents may be willing to reveal more personal information and feel more at ease answering sensitive questions because their privacy is assured.

This point is crucial in the current research as it was the dominant influence in the researcher's decisions about how to administer and distribute the survey questionnaire. The researcher aimed to build on the work of the previous studies into the reporting of police corruption, notably Westmarland (2005 and n.d.) and Wright (2010). However, in each of those studies, the survey questionnaire was distributed using official police force internal mail or official police force email. The invitation to participate in the surveys would have been received, and returned, by the respondents while they were on duty, physically situated inside police

buildings, possibly wearing police uniforms. The respondents were likely to have completed the surveys at police workstations, perhaps sitting next to other police colleagues where their responses could potentially be overseen. Although the respondents would have had their anonymity guaranteed by the researcher in each study, they would also be aware of their surroundings, and so there is a concern that this may have had a psychological effect on the respondents' answers. The simple fact that the questionnaire would have been received while the respondent was in their workplace, and that the study had management support may qualify the extent to which respondents viewed participation as truly voluntary. These potential factors have been deliberately listed above to emphasise the current researcher's concern about the reliability and validity of data received from respondents who may not feel at ease answering sensitive questions, particularly about such a sensitive subject matter as the reporting of police misconduct and corruption, and particularly because police officers tend to be naturally suspicious people.

Invitations to participate in the current research questionnaire were not distributed using any police force internal mail or email system, but were distributed using a number of other media, social and professional networks. The media were:

- POLKA; the online networking and knowledge base for the policing community, which is only accessible by the policing community,
- Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn; the researcher built up his number of online 'friends', 'followers' and 'contacts' prior to the survey and paid small fees to publicise the invitation to participate and make it publically searchable,
- PoliceUK.com, UKPolice.co.uk, PoliceSpecials.com and PCSO.com; these are all online forums for the policing community. It was necessary for the researcher to fulfil various requirements before he was allowed to join certain forums and post the invitation to participate. These requirements included, for example, making at least 10 relevant discussion forum posts, sending an email from the researcher's police email address to confirm his status, and sending the forum administrators details of the research study.

Respondents would obviously be aware that they were being invited to participate due to their police status, but the invitation would be received through routes outside of their normal workplace. This distance and detachment from the respondents' workplace was intended to create a psychological space for the respondents to allow them to answer the questions completely honestly, without fear of adverse consequences if their opinions departed from the official mindset. The very people with the most sensitive information, with the opinions most divergent from official policy, or with views most likely to raise concerns about disapproval or sanctions, may be the least likely to report them (Tourangeau and Smith, 1996), therefore the current researcher's goal was to create confidence in the respondents that their managers or Professional Standards departments were not looking over their shoulders as they answered the survey questionnaire.

Chan (2011) described her challenge of penetrating a close-knit occupation generally suspicious of outsiders, and her difficulty in eliciting frank views from people whose principle reflex is to protect themselves, and who were anxious that her researchers were 'spies' working for Internal Affairs. Of particular interest to the current researcher is the fact that Chan (2011) reported that her research was deemed more worthy of resistance by suspicious 'street cops' due to the endorsement of the research study by the police management. Observations such as this caused the current researcher to reject the idea of approaching police force management for permission to distribute the survey within their force areas.

Sample

The target population in this research study was all Police Officers, Special Constable, and Police Staff including PCSO's, which is sometimes collectively referred to as the 'Police Family', and will be referred to as 'police personnel' for the purposes of this dissertation. The current researcher considered that given the opportunity all police personnel have to both engage in, or witness, corruption, that their opinions should be considered when researching the Blue Code of Silence. The scenarios used in the survey questionnaire provide examples of police unethical

behaviour being committed by a wide range of police personnel in a variety of situations.

The sample used in this research study was a non-probability sample, and this was selected for a number of reasons which will be outlined below. Due to the Blue Code of Silence being a relatively un-researched area, with very little theoretical framework, the researcher has adopted an inductive approach to this study rather than a deductive approach. There are few, if any, theories to test with regard to the Blue Code of Silence, so no hypotheses were posed for this study, rather the research was conducted and the results analysed to explore and develop new theories. The samples used in the studies by Westmarland (2005, and n.d.) and Wright (2010) were probability samples and so allowed those researchers to make generalisations about their findings because the sample was deemed to be representative of the entire target population. However, this required probability sampling techniques, and the collection of ethnographic data, both of which the current researcher wanted to avoid. Probability sampling techniques would necessarily require the permission and cooperation of one or more police forces, to access their personnel data, internal mail, email distribution lists, intranet or even their physical facilities in order to distribute the questionnaire to the sample. However, this was considered to be undesirable to the current researcher, for the reasons already discussed under the previous section heading, 'Medium'. These reasons also prompted the current researcher to forego collecting ethnographic data from the respondents. Ethnographic data would allow the sample to be tested against the population to ensure that it is representative of the population. However, a suspicious respondent, and it is submitted that all respondents to the current survey would be naturally suspicious people, would soon realise that providing details of their force, job role, gender, ethnicity, rank, length of service and age would make them more easily identifiable, and therefore less likely to be honest in their answers. The trade-off between Relevance and Generalisability will be discussed further in the next section 'Validity', but in summary, the current researcher decided that striving for honest answers from a non-probability

sample was preferable to potentially guarded answers from a probability sample, for the sake of this exploratory study.

Exploratory samples are often used in small scale social science studies to probe relatively unexplored topics as a route to generate new insights, where it is undesirable to use random sampling (Denscombe, 2010). As a result of the way the current survey questionnaire was distributed, this exploratory sample could be described as containing elements of a Purposive Sample, a Self-Drop Sample and a Snowball Sample. A Purposive Sample is selected by a researcher based on their judgement of the purpose of the study. The purpose of the current study being to explore the Blue Code of Silence by asking police personnel what motivates them to report, or not, unethical behaviour, the current researcher wanted to collect honest opinions from people who were willing to express their opinions. Users of social media, POLKA and police online discussion forums are typically desirous of expressing opinions, discussing topics and voicing concerns, as this is the *raison d'être* of such media. It was envisaged that police users of such media would be a rich resource for the researcher to access for the purpose of the current study.

The invitation to participate in the study was not sent directly to individuals, but was published on timelines, promoted, tweeted and posted as a new topic in a discussion thread. The onus was effectively on the respondent to come into online contact with the invitation and then decide whether or not to participate, thus making the Purposive Sample also a Self-Drop Sample. The participation in this type of Self-Drop Sample is truly voluntary, which the researcher considers to a distinct advantage over similar studies. Nonetheless, the researcher acknowledges the danger of an inherent bias in the data collected from a Self-Drop Sample.

During the research study, the researcher received expressions of interest in the subject and requests for the results when the study was completed. Some respondents also commented that they had completed the survey and would be passing on the questionnaire link to other colleagues and policing contacts. Although very small scale, there is some anecdotal

evidence of the sample developing the characteristics of a Snowball Sample, which was unplanned but welcome.

Validity

Guthrie (2010) states that all research involves trade-offs between Relevance, Validity, Reliability and Generalisability. The current researcher has chosen to focus on the Relevance and Reliability of the data in this research study, with acknowledged minor concessions to Validity and a major concession to Generalisability. Although these headings are not mutually exclusive, they will now be discussed in the context of the current research.

The questionnaire in the current research survey deliberately omitted any ethnographic questions, which would normally be required for testing the Generalisability of the data thus ensuring that results from the sample could be applied to the entire population being studied. By collecting ethnographic data there is a risk that respondents would not feel fully at ease to answer honestly. Even though a questionnaire promises anonymity, this promise may effectively become eroded in the minds of the respondents if they are asked to supply ethnographic information that may identify them. Vito, Tewskbury and Kunselman (2008) emphasise the importance of the guarantee of anonymity in research where individuals may be less likely to participate if they can be identified. The current researcher was willing to concede Generalisability of the data in favour of offering an unquestionable guarantee of anonymity to respondents. This decision was intended to allow respondents to answer more honestly and thus ensure the credibility and therefore the Relevance of the results.

Validity is usually discussed under the two headings of Internal and External Validity. Internal Validity relates to the 'correctness' of the data and its ability to measure what it is supposed to be addressing. The face validity of the data in the current survey is sufficiently 'correct' to allow the low level quantitative and qualitative analysis set out in Chapter Five as no formal hypotheses were being scientifically tested. External Validity is considered to be synonymous with Generalisability (Vito, Tewskbury and

Kunselman, 2008) and the concession to Generalisability has already been discussed and justified.

Guthrie (2010) describes the Reliability of research data in terms of the ability for other researchers to replicate the same results using the same techniques. The methodology and results from the current research have been set out in considerable detail in this dissertation, allowing future researchers to test the reliability of the current data through replication. Additionally, the researcher decided to use exactly the same set of twelve scenarios in the current research study that had been used in Wright's (2010) study, enabling some degree of Triangulation to test the Reliability of the current results against Wright's results.

Analysis

The data was received from the survey directly into an Excel spreadsheet. This allowed some of the nominal data, from Questions 1 and 2 in each scenario, which was already categorised as a result of the options offered to answer Questions 1 and 2, to be easily coded in preparation for quantitative analysis. This research study adopted an Inductive approach, therefore scientific statistical tests of significance were not required as no formal hypotheses were formulated to be tested. The quantitative analysis was required simply to process the raw results sufficiently to make them presentable in a report format.

In the questionnaire Question 1 asked for the likely action that would be taken by the respondent in each scenario, and Question 2 asked what motivated the respondent to choose that action. These responses have been referred to as the 'Actions' (Question 1) and the 'Motivations' (Question 2) throughout this dissertation. The quantitative analysis of the results to Questions 1 and 2 included identifying the Mode Action and Mode Motivation for each scenario, and the percentage of responses within each Mode respectively.

A simple formula was also calculated to identify whether each respondent would report the behaviour described in each scenario or not. The answer options for Question 1 were not mutually exclusive and respondents could

choose up to three answers. This flexibility was deliberately inserted into the answer options to allow respondents to provide a 'likely' answer, or answers, rather than forcing them to attempt one definitive answer to a complex question. This also precipitated the need to apply a simple formula to the results whereby any respondent who gave an answer of C) Report Anonymously and/or D) Report Openly, regardless of other options also chosen, would be deemed to be likely to report the behaviour. Using this formula, the percentage of respondents likely to report the behaviour, or not, was then calculated for each scenario, and these results in turn were used to make a comparison with Wright's (2010) results. A further result was also generated from the data, which examined the percentage of those respondents likely to report anonymously compared to those likely to report openly.

Perhaps the most interesting analyses for the purposes of the current research study were the charts generated using Excel, in which cause and effect can be easily identified using three dimensional column charts. These charts provided a simple visual correlation between the Actions and Motivations.

Question 3 invited respondents to make any comments they wished about each scenario. This generated a large amount of qualitative data which the researcher codified to allow categorisation and to enable a theoretical discussion of the results.

The Researcher

The researcher declares that he is a serving Police Officer and so falls within the target group, but did not complete the survey questionnaire himself. The researcher does not work within a Professional Standards Department or in any supervisory role. No commission or funding was sought or received for this research study.

CHAPTER THREE – Results

In total 99 responses were received between 11/11/13 and 20/12/2013. A 'self certification' question was included at the very start of the questionnaire, with an explanation that, "This survey is intended for serving, and recently retired or resigned, Police Officers, Special Constables, PCSOs, and all members of Police Staff, in England & Wales." In order to proceed with the survey respondents were asked to confirm that they fell within this group. Four of the 99 responses received were from people who chose the option, "I do not fall within the survey's target group". Selecting this option would thank them for their interest, but take them to the final page of the questionnaire, without being invited to answer any more questions. One further response was received from a respondent who confirmed that they fell within the target group, but then no further questions were answered. Therefore the total of apparently valid responses received, which will be set out in this Results chapter, is n=94.

The Home Office (2013) stated that the total England and Wales Police Workforce, which aligned with the target population for the current study to include Police Officers, Police Staff including PCSOs, and Special Constables, at 31st March 2013 was 241,698 personnel. It was impossible to calculate a response rate for the current research study sample due to the manner in which the sample was chosen. The invitation to participate was not sent directly to potential participants so a percentage response rate would have no meaning in this context. Recommended sample sizes for Social Science research study surveys range from at least 30 responses up to about 300 or 400, and Guthrie (2010) provides a table of recommended sample sizes in relation to total population sizes, which recommends a sample of at least n=384 for the current study's target population. However, this recommendation is only relevant if a representative sample is required, and it has already been established that a purposive non-probability sample was required for the current study. The researcher is satisfied that n=94 is greater than the often quoted minimum of n=30 and is sufficient for the purposes of this research study.

Over the following pages, the results will be presented as follows:

- The most common 'Action' and 'Motivation' chosen for each scenario will be identified, and their respective percentages will be provided.
- A chart will be presented for each scenario that correlates the Motivations cited by each respondent for their chosen Actions.
- Few respondents chose the answer option 'Other' to Questions 1 and 2, only 1% of all responses received were 'Other', which suggests that the majority of respondents were satisfied with the answers options provided. Therefore the free text answers received to these questions will be presented in full and unedited in this Results chapter, and they will be discussed in the Analysis chapter.
- 306 free text responses in total were received to Question 3 from the twelve scenarios. The content of these responses will not be presented in this Results chapter in its 'raw' form as it was necessary to conduct a process of sanitisation; to remove potentially identifying comments, and to conduct a process of data reduction; to allow for the qualitative data to be presented in a meaningful way. The responses were codified allowing for classification into six thematic categories, which will be discussed in the Analysis chapter.
- The cumulative results will be presented in a table, detailing the total number of responses received for each Action and Motivation across all of the scenarios.
- A chart will be presented that correlates the Motivations cited by each respondent for their chosen Actions, across all of the scenarios cumulatively.
- Some other key results will then be summarised in preparation for the analysis in the following chapter.

Scenario One – Control Room Operator additional PNC checks.

The mode Action was:

B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, n=54, percentage in mode=43%.

The mode Motivation was:

E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, n=51, percentage in mode=27%.

63% of respondents would report this behaviour, 37% would not.




Figure 1 : Scenario One Results

Scenario Two – PCSO with criminal gym associates.

The mode Action was:

B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, n=47, percentage in mode=38%.

The mode Motivation was:

E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, n=46, percentage in mode=29%.

61% of respondents would report this behaviour, 39% would not.




Figure 2 : Scenario Two Results

Scenario Three – Lift home for drunk-driver colleague.

For this scenario the mode Action was:

D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor, n=52, percentage in mode=44%.

The mode Motivation was:

E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, n=65, percentage in mode=32%.

86% of respondents would report this behaviour, 14% would not.




Figure 3 : Scenario Three Results

Scenario Four – Undeclared private security business.

The mode Action was:

B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, n=53, percentage in mode=43%.

The mode Motivation was:

G) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it fairly / proportionately, n=32, percentage in mode=21%.

44% of respondents would report this behaviour, 56% would not.




Figure 4 : Scenario Four Results

Scenario Five – Detainee punched.

The mode Action was:

D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor, n=42, percentage in mode=34%.

The mode Motivation was:

E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, n=51, percentage in mode=26%.

68% of respondents would report this behaviour, 32% would not.




Figure 5 : Scenario Five Results

Scenario Six – Speeding ticket bribe.

The mode Action was:

D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor, n=73, percentage in mode=67%.

The mode Motivation was:

F) Corrupt officers / staff deserve to be reported / punished, n=77, percentage in mode=33%.

95% of respondents would report this behaviour, 5% would not.




Figure 6 : Scenario Six Results

Scenario Seven – Analyst discusses work with husband.

The mode Action was:

B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, n=54, percentage in mode=49%.

The mode Motivation was:

B) I would be able to deal with the situation myself, n=40, percentage in mode=27%.

32% of respondents would report this behaviour, 68% would not.




Figure 7 : Scenario Seven Results

Scenario Eight – NPT officer accepts free meals.

The mode Action was:

B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, n=64, percentage in mode=51%.

The mode Motivation was:

B) I would be able to deal with the situation myself, n=45, percentage in mode=29%.

35% of respondents would report this behaviour, 65% would not.




Figure 8 : Scenario Eight Results

Scenario Nine – Selling intelligence to pay off debts.

The mode Action was:

D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor, n=75, percentage in mode=71%.

The mode Motivation was:

F) Corrupt officers / staff deserve to be reported / punished, n=81, percentage in mode=33%.

97% of respondents would report this behaviour, 3% would not.




Figure 9 : Scenario Nine Results

Scenario Ten – Inspector falsifies figures.

The mode Action was:

B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, n=36, percentage in mode=33%.

The mode Motivation was:

E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, n=39, percentage in mode=24%.

49% of respondents would report this behaviour, 51% would not.




Figure 10 : Scenario Ten Results

Scenario Eleven – False Crimestoppers report.

The mode Action was:

C) Report anonymously / confidentially to Professional Standards, n=33, percentage in mode=29%.

The mode Motivation was jointly:

E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, and:

G) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it fairly / proportionately, n=36 (each), percentage in mode=21% (each).

62% of respondents would report this behaviour, 38% would not.




Figure 11 : Scenario Eleven Results

Scenario Twelve – Special after-hours drinking.

The mode Action was:

B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, n=40, percentage in mode=41%.

The mode Motivation was:

E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, n=63, percentage in mode=30%.

84% of respondents would report this behaviour, 16% would not.




Figure 12 : Scenario Twelve Results

All Scenarios.

The mode Action was: D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor, n=466, percentage in mode=33%. NB: this was very closely followed by B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, n=461, percentage in mode=33%.

	Frequency of Response	Percentage of total Responses
A) Take no formal action	167	12%
B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator	461	33%
C) Report anonymously / confidentially to Professional Standards	298	21%
D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor	466	33%
Other	20	1%
Total	1412	100%

Figure 13 : Total Results Table – Actions

The mode Motivation was E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, n=567, percentage in mode=25%.

	Frequency of Response	Percentage of total Responses
A) The action / situation described is not serious, or does not affect me	155	7%
B) I would be able to deal with the situation myself	239	11%
C) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it unfairly / disproportionately	137	6%
D) If I reported it openly / formally, my career prospects might be adversely affected	100	4%
E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour	567	25%
F) Corrupt officers / staff deserve to be reported / punished	401	18%
G) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it fairly / proportionately	463	21%
H) If I did not report it, my career prospects might be adversely affected	150	7%
Other	16	1%
Total	2228	100%

Figure 14 : Total Results Table - Motivations




Figure 15 : Total Results

These results show that in seven out of the twelve scenarios the mode Action was B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator. This was followed by four scenarios in which D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor was the mode Action, and only one occasion in which C) Report Anonymously was the mode Action. There were no scenarios in which the mode Action chosen by respondents was A) No Formal Action.

In seven out of the twelve scenarios the mode Motivation was E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour. This was followed by two scenarios each for: B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator, F) Corrupt officers / staff deserve to be reported / punished, and, G) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it fairly / proportionately.

In eight out of the twelve scenarios, respondents were more likely to report the behaviour, than not to report it. The following table summarises the percentage of respondents for each scenario who would report the behaviour, and also the ranking of each scenario in order, from the most likely to be reported to the least.

Scenario	% would report	Ranking
1 Control Room Operator additional PNC checks	63%	6
2 PCSO with criminal gym associates	61%	8
3 Lift home for drunk-driver colleague	86%	3
4 Undeclared private security business	44%	10
5 Detainee punched	68%	5
6 Speeding Ticket bribe	95%	2
7 Analyst discusses work with husband	32%	12
8 NPT officer accepts free meals	35%	11
9 Selling intelligence to pay off debts	97%	1
10 Inspector falsifies figures	49%	9
11 False Crimestoppers Report	62%	7
12 Special after-hours drinking	84%	4

Figure 16 : Percentage Reporting each Scenario

Wright (2010) also ranked the same scenarios in his study, in order of the likelihood that respondents would report the behaviour described in each

scenario. He presented separate rankings for the results from Police Officers and for the results from Police Staff including PCSOs. He found that there was a similar ranking from each group, but specifically that the top five scenarios likely to be reported were exactly the same for both groups, namely: Scenarios 9, 6, 3, 12 and 5 in that order. Figure 16 shows that the top five scenarios likely to be reported by respondents in the current research match Wright's results exactly, suggesting that the results from both studies are reliable and cross-validate each other in this respect.

CHAPTER FOUR – ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter will discuss the quantitative results presented in the previous chapter and will also discuss the themes that emerged from the qualitative data generated by the survey respondents' free text answers.

Correlation of Actions to Motivations

The three dimensional bar graphs in the previous Results chapter were selected to provide a visual reference for the correlation between the Actions and Motivations as described by the respondents. This correlation was not based on any statistical calculation of variables, but was based on asking respondents to make the correlation themselves, namely by directly asking them why would they would take their chosen course of action in each scenario.

The nominal data collected in the survey responses can be viewed in weak ordinal data categories. Although the list of the four possible Action answer options are not ranked in any strict order, answers A) No Formal Action, and B) Discuss with Perpetrator, could be described as less desirable outcomes; and answers C) Report Anonymously, and D) Report Openly, could be described as more desirable outcomes. Similarly, the eight possible Motivation answer options are not ranked in any strict order, but answers A) Is not serious, B) Deal with it myself, C) PSD would be unfair, and D) Career affected if reported, were expected to be negative indicators; and answers E) High level of integrity, F) Corrupt officers reported / punished, G) PSD would be fair, and H) Career affected if not reported, were expected to be positive indicators. These expectations, based on the researcher's experience of discussions with colleagues and on feedback from the Pilot Study, appear to be borne out by the results.

The correlation between positive or negative indicators and desirable or undesirable outcomes can be seen most clearly in the scenarios where a particularly high or particularly low percentage of respondents would report the unethical behaviour. For example Scenarios 3, 5, 6, 9 and 12 were the top five scenarios where respondents were most likely to report the unethical behaviour described. Figures 3, 5, 6, 9 and 12 respectively

clearly demonstrate the correlation pattern for these scenarios, with a higher number of responses in the back rows and right hand columns of the chart, corresponding to desirable outcomes and positive indicators. Conversely, Scenario 8 had one of the lowest likelihoods of the unethical behaviour being reported, and Figure 8 displays a higher number of responses in the front rows and left hand columns of the chart, corresponding to undesirable outcomes and negative indicators. The bar graph in Figure 15 contains the total results from all twelve scenarios. This chart clearly shows the whole spectrum of correlations with two main groupings of responses at the front left of the chart and the back right of the chart, corresponding to negative indicators and undesirable outcomes, and positive indicators and desirable outcomes respectively.

As already mentioned, these correlations were expected by the researcher, and so are not surprising results, but the confirmation of these correlations in the quantitative data provides a sound basis from which to explore the themes that emerged from analysis of the qualitative data.

NB: Many examples of quotes from the respondents' free text comments are included to illustrate the points being discussed. All unattributed quotes within this chapter are from anonymous respondents to the research survey. Some of the quotes have been edited for minor spelling and typing errors, and sanitised to remove any potentially identifying information.

Clear Corruption versus Less Serious

Respondents chose the motivation F) Corrupt officers / staff deserve to be reported / punished, on 401 occasions. It was the third most frequently chosen option, and Figure 15 in the Results chapter shows that it correlates strongly with the action D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor. The respondents' free text comments overwhelmingly supported this correlation where it was obvious to the respondent that the unethical behaviour described in the scenario was serious and clearly corrupt. In certain scenarios a large proportion of respondents commented that the level of the corruption was reason enough for it to be reported. They offered no further explanation as to why

they were motivated to report the behaviour, but it was clear that the severity of the corruption was itself sufficient motivation to report it, for example:

“Clear case of bribery officer's integrity is clearly compromised”
“This seems a 'no brainer' to me - what other issues is the officer likely to 'cover up'”
“He's a bad'un. Get rid”
“Clear corrupt and dishonest practices must be reported”
“Criminal Offence Go to Jail. Do not pass go. Do not collect £200”
“This is clearly very serious and clear cut corruption that has no place in the Police”.

Respondents identified behaviour in which the perpetrator had acted unethically but had done so for apparently good reasons, rather than for personal gain, notably Scenarios 10 and 11. Many respondents quoted the common term for this which is “Noble Cause Corruption”. Nonetheless, respondents who condemned the unethical behaviour would be prepared to report it regardless of the perpetrator's good intentions, for example:

“Has done the wrong thing for the right reasons”
“The motivation is good but this is not the way to deal with moral issues”
“Sometimes we do misguided things in haste / for the right reasons”
“The reasons for his illicit behaviour are for an honourable cause but his actions are dishonourable”
“Noble cause corruption - but still corruption”.

Respondents condemned any behaviour that risked the safety of other police personnel, or of the public. Any safety risks identified by respondents resulted in a clear indication that the behaviour would definitely be reported. Respondents were also particularly intolerant of the type of behaviour that might undermine public trust in the police, particularly situations where police personnel were considered to be abusing their position. Such behaviour received widespread condemnation by respondents, who were strongly motivated to report the behaviour in order to protect the good reputation of the police, for example:

“... is a breach of the trust bestowed upon us in our role and any such behaviour should be dealt with robustly”

“This is a criminal in uniform and deserves to be imprisoned for a significant amount of time. I would not associate in the slightest with any officer who thought this even slightly permissible”

“This is a gross abuse of position that undermines the rule of law and is pretty much the most serious form of corruption”

“I consider this to be a serious breach of the trust placed in the police service”

“This sort of action damages the reputation of the police as a whole”

“This is clearly a very bad apple who discredits the rest of the service and deserves everything he or she gets”

The converse argument was also frequently put forward. Therefore, even behaviour that is acknowledged to be unethical conduct by the respondents would not be reported if it was considered to be not very serious or if it did not appear to harm anyone, for example:

“I wouldn't deem this serious enough to consider escalating”

“There are no immediate consequences to a third party”

“There is no harm to anyone”

“I wouldn't do this myself, but the action doesn't hurt anyone or the police reputation”.

This point is also illustrated by Figure 15 in the Results chapter, in which the motivation A) The action / situation described is not serious, or does not affect me, is clearly the greatest motivation for choosing the action A) Take no formal action.

Underlying Trend versus One Off

Figure 14 in the Results chapter shows that respondents chose the motivation B) I would be able to deal with the situation myself, on 239 occasions. Figure 15 clearly shows the strong correlation between this motivation, and the action B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator. A large number of respondents were of the view that if the unethical behaviour in each vignette was just the tip of an iceberg, then it should be dealt with strictly and would be reported, but that

conversely if it was just a one off then the respondent would feel able to challenge the perpetrator themselves without needing to resort to reporting the behaviour, for example:

"I would deal in first instance but repeated offences would be reported accordingly"

"If this was the first time I had seen this/ become aware of it, I would challenge the officer"

"I'd put that down to inexperience and warn them off in the first instance"

"I would deal if first offence"

A large number of respondents described the 'ultimatum' that would be issued to the perpetrator, to stop a continuing state of the unethical behaviour, to prevent a repeat of it, or to address unethical behaviour that has already been completed. In each instance the theme is the same: if the perpetrator abides by the ultimatum issued, then the matter will go no further and the respondent does not need to escalate or report the matter. A small but representative selection of the many examples of ultimatums that respondents stated they would issue, are provided below:

"I would encourage the person to self report or seek advice from a supervisor. If this then didn't happen I would report to a supervisor"

"I believe a warning and then if they do not desist I would report them openly"

"I would discuss the matter with the officer. If he did not comply with force policy, I would report the matter openly to his supervision"

"Give advice and if the behaviour doesn't change - then report"

"I would initially challenge this and if it carried on then I would report it to PSD"

"I would warn the officer of their behaviour ... if it occurred again I would report it openly"

"Any 'reoffending' would result in a formal report"

This raises the question of how the respondent would know whether the behaviour was part of an underlying trend or a one off. A small number of respondents, most of whom identified themselves within their answers as

supervisors, explained that they would monitor the perpetrator themselves before deciding whether to formally report the behaviour. However, a larger number of respondents acknowledged that they quite probably would not know if the behaviour was isolated, and so would not be in a position to make a judgement, therefore they would pass on the responsibility to a supervisor, who would be in a better position to make a judgement. Reporting to a supervisor was viewed by most respondents as preferable to reporting straight to Professional Standards. Professional Standards appear to be viewed as purely there to punish personnel, whereas supervisors appear able to adopt a more holistic approach to dealing with the unethical behaviour. Respondents trusted supervisors to consider whether the situation required simple guidance or advice and monitoring, or perhaps training and support for welfare concerns. Reporting to a supervisor, as distinct from reporting to Professional Standards, was a popular choice for a large number of respondents. The supervisor could then identify if the unethical behaviour was an ongoing concern or a one off, and could decide on the best course of action, rather than simply punishing the perpetrator, for example:

“Reporting it to a supervisor may result in words of advice etc. which may be more proportionate”

“A Supervisor may be able to deal with this more appropriately and take it further if required”

“I would be making his supervisor aware who is probably more aware of the individuals work ethic and vulnerability to corruption”

“This could be a training issue”

“A supervisor should be made aware in this instance, so that the analyst could be given words of advice and guidance on the terms of her role”

“the Officer may need guidance and advice”

“there may be integrity issues of which I am unaware and I might share my concerns with a supervisor”.

Relationships

The relationship between the respondent and the perpetrator was not included in the answer options as a possible motivation for reporting, or not reporting, the unethical behaviour. However, a number of respondents

described how their relationship with the perpetrator would have an influence on their decision. This was not in terms of simply protecting friends and colleagues, but more in terms of whether their relationship would allow them successfully to warn or advise the perpetrator about their unethical behaviour, and thus avoid the need to involve Professional Standards or management:

“Depending on my relationship with the PCSO I would try to encourage them to report the associations”

“To be honest it would depend on how well I knew the operator and how well we got on”

“It would depend on my relationship with the officer”

“I would probably select B [Discuss with Perpetrator] if I knew / worked with the person and had a good rapport with them, otherwise I'd tick C [Report Anonymously] if I didn't know them”.

Although the rank structure only strictly applies to the Police Officer, Special Constable and PCSO roles within the police, it still has an influence on Police Staff roles, as all roles come under a hierarchy which would include senior ranking officers at some point up to the chief officer. Working within a disciplined organisation with rank structure provides an additional factor for police personnel to consider in their relationship with a colleague, and whether to challenge or report their unethical behaviour:

“Would discuss with my supervisor rather than confronting somebody of such rank”

“I would try to convince the Inspector to stop ... I would also be incredibly aware of the fact that he outranks me”.

Open versus Anonymous

The question faced by police personnel who witness unethical behaviour, of whether or not to report the behaviour, can be distinguished from the other question faced: whether to do so openly or anonymously. This question is important in the context of the current research as it explores the social pressures faced within a ‘cop culture’ where police are encouraged to support each other. In its extreme form ‘cop culture’ would dictate that any member of police personnel who broke the Blue Code of Silence by openly reporting a colleague’s unethical behaviour should

expect their career to be adversely affected. However, the results chapter shows that answer option D) If I reported it openly / formally, my career prospects might be adversely affected, was the least often quoted motivation, at only 4% of all the responses received across the twelve scenarios, suggesting that the reasons for not openly reporting unethical behaviour are more complex than simple adherence to 'cop culture'.

Respondents to the current research survey who wanted to indicate that they would report the unethical behaviour in one of the scenarios were given two distinct choices of answer options for each question: C) Report Anonymously, or, D) Report Openly. A total of 764 responses were received across all twelve scenarios indicating that the respondent would report the behaviour, and of these 39% would report anonymously and 61% would report openly. Therefore a significant minority of respondents felt that the behaviour should be reported but for various reasons did not want to report it openly, some of the reasons given will now be discussed.

The most commonly quoted reason for not wanting to report openly a colleague's unethical behaviour was to avoid ostracism. 'The Blue Code of Silence' was not directly mentioned by any respondents, but they variously described their reluctance to report openly using the following phrases, for example:

"If reported openly then I would be sent to Coventry by other staff of same rank and known as a snitch"

"I would not report to management or PSD openly as colleagues may feel I was 'dobbing' someone in"

"The anonymity prevents bad feeling afterward with someone you might have to work with - unnecessary to go overt"

"To openly report such an instance would greatly affect the relationship of the entire team"

"I would report this matter anonymously to prevent friction within the work place"

"I would expect to be 'distanced' by other officers as a direct result of this"

“I would report this anonymously as some officers would not immediately recognise it as corruption and I would fear the backlash”

Although some respondents were concerned that the knowledge a colleague will potentially challenge or inform on them could break down trust within a unit, other respondents felt that this trust was in fact exactly the type of misplaced trust that should be broken down, “Failing to deal with this may send the wrong message to the officer, who may be tempted to raise the bar next time, in the knowledge that his colleagues won’t report him.” A number of respondents stated that the more serious matters must be dealt with openly and needed to be challenged overtly. It was simply not enough that the perpetrator would be dealt with, but it was essential that the perpetrator knew that his or her colleagues would not tolerate unethical behaviour, “Peer challenge is an extremely effective way of dealing with bad practice. It changes people’s minds not just their behaviour”.

Turning a Blind Eye

A number of respondents felt that once they knew about the unethical behaviour they had to report it. However, their reasons for arriving at this conclusion were divided between moral and practical considerations. Some respondents acknowledged that they were effectively condoning unethical behaviour by not reporting it, and they were not comfortable with this so “Would have to tell”. In seven of the twelve scenarios, the most commonly quoted motivation for choosing a particular course of action, was E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour, which was also the mode motivation across all of the scenarios and accounted for a quarter of all the responses received in the survey to Question 2.

Some Respondents described this ‘expectation’ in terms of personal or professional integrity and morals:

“Turning a blind eye is also wrong”

“By failing to report her corrupt behaviour, I make myself corrupt”

"I believe this is a very serious issue to not report this and if I didn't I would be battling my conscience"

"I would feel that I would have no choice but to report it"

"Perverting the course of justice is something to which no blind eye can be turned"

"By not reporting I would also commit an offence"

Some other respondents quoted subtly different reasons for feeling compelled to report unethical behaviour once they were made aware of it, not so much a moral compulsion to avoid condoning the behaviour, but more a pragmatic, and as one respondent admitted "selfish", desire to avoid getting into trouble themselves:

"If I didn't report I would face criminal charges as well"

"If knowing about the above incident and then choosing not to report it to PSD also came to light, the consequences for that officer would also be as serious as the officer that conducted the PNC check"

"I would not lie about it and would provide a statement or report if required"

"Partially reported out of fear of the results of a complaint"

"More selfishly, if I was there when it happened, I'd want to avoid being implicated in, or being seen to condone, the officer's behaviour by failing to report it"

As can be seen from Figure 14 in the Results chapter however, the motivation H) If I did not report it, my career prospects might be adversely affected, was one of the least often quoted. Figure 15 shows that H) If I did not report it, my career prospects might be adversely affected, was also the least popular by far of the four positive indicators likely to motivate a positive outcome, namely that the behaviour is reported.

Perceived Fairness of PSD

The remit of the police is to police the general public, and the remit of Professional Standard is to police the police. It is common among police personnel to develop an 'us and them' mentality, not only in relation to the general public but also in relation to Professional Standards Departments,

which are often viewed with mistrust and suspicion. Motivation answer options C) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it unfairly / disproportionately, and G) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it fairly / proportionately, were deliberately included on the questionnaire as polar opposites, to gain an understanding of the perceived fairness of police management and Professional Standards Departments among police personnel. Figure 14 shows that only 137 responses were received claiming Professional Standard or management would be unfair, compared to 463 responses claiming they would be fair. Within the free text answers however, there was very little support for Professional Standards and the vast majority of comments about them was negative and suggested that they acted disproportionately:

“Professional Standards often look for scapegoats. Misuse of a computer system may result in loss of job, which is wholly disproportionate”

“It may be too drastic to involve PSD at this point”

“PSD should not be the first port of call”

“There is no harm to anyone ... incidents like this can be dealt with very harshly. I would not want to be responsible for someone losing their job over such a small thing”

“the harm ... is pretty minimal whilst the punishment from management would be harsh”

“Whilst clearly not right we are all human and I would not want to see someone’s career ended for acting in a way that is to some degree understandable”

“Any investigation by PSD would no doubt rule this was an assault and the officer would be dismissed”

“I see no harm. I wouldn’t trust PSD to be as sensible”

Professional Standards Departments are starting to engage more with the people under their care to promote the positive aspects of their work and to appear more approachable to police personnel. Most Professional Standards Departments offer support, training and guidance on how to deal with, or avoid, potentially unethical situations. However, they clearly

still have some public relations work to do in convincing police personnel that they act fairly and proportionately. According to a respondent who wrote one of the only two positive comments about Professional Standards, they are changing for the better:

“Professional standards have changed over the years, some of the old ones (now retired) were bastards of the highest order, the new PSD are fair and honest, as well as very good investigators”.

Conclusion

The Blue Code of Silence conjures up a picture of corrupt police personnel conspiring to cover up each other’s unethical behaviour, with no one daring to speak out against a colleague. Such behaviour among those people whom are entrusted with authority over other members of the public would be a serious and understandable concern. This research survey concludes that many instances of police unethical behaviour would indeed not be reported by colleagues, but that conclusion is significantly qualified by a number of other factors identified in the research.

The results show that police personnel place incidents of unethical behaviour by colleagues on a sliding scale in deciding whether or not to report it. It is concluded that serious and clearly corrupt behaviour, or behaviour that is suspected to be part of an underlying trend of unethical behaviour, is almost universally condemned and would be reported on virtually every occasion, even if it appears to have been perpetrated for noble causes. Similarly, behaviour that risks officer safety, that abuses the authority given to the police, or that harms the public trust in the police is also widely condemned and is very likely to be reported by colleagues. Conversely, it is concluded that at the other end of this sliding scale, behaviour that police personnel consider to be a ‘one off’, or which causes no apparent harm to anyone, is very unlikely to be reported.

It is concluded that the Blue Code of Silence does exert some influence over police personnel. However, the survey results indicated that the influence was not simply in terms of whether or not the unethical behaviour would be reported, but also in terms of whether it should be reported

openly or anonymously. The use of confidential reporting methods is already encouraged in police forces, but it is submitted that this may be an area for policy makers to make further investments and may be an area for future research to concentrate on. Similarly, the survey results indicated that the perceived fairness of Professional Standards Departments was an influential factor in respondents' willingness to report unethical behaviour. It is acknowledged that Professional Standards Departments are already engaged in strategies to earn the trust of the personnel within their police forces, but it is submitted that this may be another area for policy makers to make further investments, or for future research to concentrate on.

Although it is concluded that police unethical behaviour may not always be reported by colleagues, it is also submitted that such behaviour would rarely be ignored. There is certainly no indication in the survey results that corrupt police personnel are routinely allowed to act beyond reproach. Very few respondents chose to take no formal action in response to the scenarios. Most respondents who chose not to report the behaviour would challenge the perpetrator themselves, particularly if they felt confident that their warning or guidance would be heeded. In their dealings with the public, the police do not formally report or prosecute every instance of criminal behaviour they witness or become aware of. The police have discretion, legal and de facto discretion, to decide on alternatives to prosecution such as a formal caution or an informal warning and words of advice. This discretion is based on factors such as the severity of the offence, the harm to the public, whether the offence is a 'one off', and whether the offender would heed any warning or advice. It appears therefore, that when deciding whether or not to report colleagues' unethical behaviour, police personnel apply similar principles to when they are deciding whether or not to report civilians' offending behaviour. The police are expected to deal effectively with civilians' offending behaviour without necessarily prosecuting each and every offence; this measured approach prevents the criminal justice system being overloaded with people being unnecessarily criminalised. The survey results show that police personnel appear to apply the same measured approach to themselves, with consideration often given to a range of alternative, less

formal routes than reporting unethical behaviour. The crucial difference of course is that police personnel are expected to have a higher than average level of integrity, which means that their wrongdoing is judged more strictly. The results from this study show that police personnel make frequent reference to their own integrity and to the expectations placed upon them. These references are equally in terms of judging their colleagues' unethical behaviour strictly, and also in terms of motivating them to deal with it, whether through formal means such as reporting the behaviour, or through informal means such as challenging the perpetrator. Future research could focus on the nature of peer challenge among police personnel, and its effectiveness in addressing unethical behaviour. Research could also focus on the levels of public confidence or concern over these informal means of dealing with colleagues' unethical behaviour.

Based on the results of this research survey it is concluded that police personnel do not always report their colleagues' unethical behaviour. It is also concluded that if police personnel consider the unethical behaviour to be serious, harmful, or repeated then it is very likely to be reported. It is further concluded that if the behaviour is not considered to be serious, harmful or repeated, then it is still very likely to be dealt with through peer challenge.

APPENDIX A : QUESTIONNAIRE SCENARIOS

Scenario One

A member of police staff working as a Control Room operator conducts a number of PNC (Police National Computer) vehicle checks that have been requested by an officer dealing with a road traffic collision. In addition to the legitimate checks requested by the officer, she also conducts an additional check on a second hand vehicle she has seen on a garage forecourt that she is interested in purchasing. NB: Focus on the Control Room Operator's behaviour.

Scenario Two

A PCSO is a member of a local gym that is also frequented by a number of individuals he knows are involved in criminal activities. Over a period of time, the PCSO and the criminals become friends and begin associating regularly outside of the gym, including going to pubs and clubs together. The PCSO does not submit intelligence on his new friends but does not involve himself in any of their criminal activities. NB: Focus on the PCSO's behaviour.

Scenario Three

At 2am, a Police Officer who is on-duty, is driving her patrol car alone on a quiet road. She sees a badly parked vehicle with the engine running and lights on, with the driver asleep at the wheel. Upon checking the driver, who is obviously intoxicated through drink, she recognises him as an off-duty Police Officer. There are signs of recent damage to the vehicle, but instead of reporting the incident, she turns off the car's engine, switches off the lights, locks the vehicle and transports the driver home. Evaluate the behaviour of the police officer who discovers the drunk driver. NB: Focus on the behaviour of the police officer who discovers the drunk driver.

Scenario Four

A Police Officer runs a private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms and locks etc. He does this work in his off-duty hours only. However, despite being aware of force policy in

respect of business interests, he doesn't notify anyone within his force of his activities.

Scenario Five

A young female Police Constable still in her first year responds to a violent disturbance at a public house with her partner. Whilst attempting to arrest those involved, the female officer receives a nasty black eye from a youth wielding a pool cue. As the youth is led to the police van after his arrest, the female's partner, who is an experienced officer, gives the youth a hard punch to the stomach and says to him, "Hurts doesn't it?". NB: Focus on the behaviour of the experienced officer.

Scenario Six

A Road Policing Officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a cash sum of half the amount of the fine from the motorist in exchange for not issuing a ticket. NB: Focus on the behaviour of the Road Policing Officer.

Scenario Seven

During the course of her duties, an Analyst views numerous intelligence reports relating to a major incident she is working on. When asked how her day went by her husband over their evening meal together, the Analyst discusses the progress of the enquiry, disclosing some information that should have remained confidential. NB: Focus on the behaviour of the Analyst.

Scenario Eight

A Neighbourhood Policing Officer routinely accepts offers of free meals, cigarettes and other items of small value from shop owners and business on her beat. She does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give them to her. She does not tell anyone that she receives these gifts. NB: Focus on the behaviour of the officer.

Scenario Nine

An IT Administrator with access to the force crime and intelligence systems owes money to a known active criminal. In order to repay this debt, the IT Administrator agrees to print off all the intelligence the police hold on the criminal, and to inform him of any future police operations that may be launched against him.

Scenario Ten

A Police Inspector in a busy urban beat is under heavy pressure from supervisors to improve results in his area. Despite the hard work and dedication of his staff, morale is very low after continual criticism from local councillors, the public and the media. The Inspector realises that the Area will not meet the performance targets set by his superiors for this month, so to protect his staff from the additional stress that would be brought upon them, he falsifies figures so that performance appears better than it is. NB: Focus on the behaviour of the Inspector.

Scenario Eleven

Police are carrying out enquiries into an individual who is thought to be supplying Class A & B drugs from his home address. Despite being fairly certain that the premises are used for dealing, the intelligence received thus far is not sufficient to obtain a warrant to search the house. Frustrated by this, an officer phones Crimestoppers anonymously from a local payphone, and reports that he has just been inside the property and is aware that there are drugs currently at the premises. Crimestoppers pass this information to the police, who subsequently obtain a warrant based on this new information. The warrant is executed and small amounts of heroin and amphetamine are recovered. NB: Focus on the behaviour of the officer who called Crimestoppers.

Scenario Twelve

A Special Constable finds a public house on his beat that is serving alcohol beyond its licensed hours. Instead of reporting the incident, the Special Constable agrees to accept the offer of some free drinks from the owner of the pub. NB: Focus on the behaviour of the Special Constable.

APPENDIX B : QUESTIONNAIRE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question 1 If you witnessed this action / situation, or became aware of it, what would you do?

(Please tick UP TO THREE of your most likely responses. If you select "Other", please explain.)

- A) Take no formal action
- B) Discuss with / express disapproval to / challenge the perpetrator
- C) Report anonymously / confidentially to Professional Standards
- D) Report openly / formally to Professional Standards or a supervisor
- Other

Question 2 With regard to your response above, what are your main motivations for choosing this course of action?

(Please tick ALL that apply. If you select "Other", please explain.)

- A) The action / situation described is not serious, or does not affect me
- B) I would be able to deal with the situation myself
- C) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it unfairly / disproportionately
- D) If I reported it openly / formally, my career prospects might be adversely affected
- E) I am expected to maintain a high level of integrity / to report such behaviour
- F) Corrupt officers / staff deserve to be reported / punished
- G) I believe that Professional Standards / management would deal with it fairly / proportionately
- H) If I did not report it, my career prospects might be adversely affected
- Other

Question 3 Please use this space to write any explanations or further comments about your answers.

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