MULTIPLE VICTIMISATION: RACIAL ATTACKS ON AN EAST LONDON ESTATE

Alice Sampson
Coretta Phillips
Crime Prevention Unit Papers

The Home Office Police Research Group (PRG) was formed in 1992 to carry out and manage research relevant to the work of the police service and Home Office Policy Divisions. One of the major police department divisions which acts as customer for the PRG is the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit which was formed in 1983 to promote preventative action against crime. It has a particular responsibility to disseminate information on crime prevention topics.

The object of the present series of occasional papers is to present research material in a way which should help and inform practitioners, including the police, whose work can help reduce crime.
Foreword

The work reported in this paper is one part of a substantial study commissioned by the Police Department of the Home Office on the prevention of violence. It takes as its starting point the need to prevent multiple victimisation. As many police officers suspect, and as this report confirms in relation to racial attacks on an East London estate, a disproportionate amount of violent crime may be perpetrated against a relatively small number of victims. A potentially effective method by which violent crime might be prevented, therefore, is to take positive action to protect victims.

The study is located on an East London estate where the incidents of racial attack and harassment is high. The report describes the initial analysis of the problem there, with recommendations for a preventive package which is now being introduced and monitored.

A brief survey of some of the more imaginative racial attack prevention schemes from around the country is also provided. This is intended to assist police officers and others in the development of ideas to tackle this serious problem.

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Deputy Under Secretary of State
Home Office,
Police Department
May 1992
Acknowledgements

The research phase of the project could not have been completed without the co-operation of many people. To maintain the anonymity of the location, we are unable to name them personally. We hope they know who they are when we thank representatives from the police, local authority housing, the law centre, the homeless families campaign, tenants and residents’ association, victim support and the safer cities project. Our thanks also to Paul Gordon from the Runnymede Trust for his comments on the draft of the paper.

In particular we would like to thank the multiple victims who we interviewed and we hope that they will benefit, at least in some way, through sharing their often painful experiences with us, and of course to the researchers at the Liverpool end of the project, Graham Farrell and Ken Pease, who have contributed ideas and been supportive.

Alice Sampson
Coretta Phillips
June 1992
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1. Introduction

The starting point for this project was that preventing repeat or multiple victimisation can be an effective crime reduction strategy and that victims should be protected by all appropriate means within the context of their locality (Pease 1991). Support for the approach comes from the Kirkholt burglary prevention initiative in which multiple burglary victims were successfully targeted and crime was reduced (Forrester et al., 1988 1990). The relevance of preventing multiple victimisation to violent crime is generally not proven, although victims of child abuse and child sex abuse, where children are often subjected to regular attacks, can involve the establishment of case conferences to prevent repeat victimisation.

The work described in this report is one part of a larger project on the prevention of certain aspects of violent crime on two estates, one in the east end of London and one in the north of Liverpool. This report describes the research phase in relation to the prevention of racial attacks on the London estate, and recommendations for prevention which resulted from it. Racial attacks were not found to be a problem on the Liverpool site. Other reports to be published in this series will describe work on domestic violence and school bullying.

On the London estate data collated over a six month period from the local authority housing department, police, and homeless families campaign/law centre, unequivocally showed that most of the multiple victims of all violent crimes were Bengali and Somali. For example, police data (recorded crime and incident logs) showed that besides victims of racial attacks and domestic violence, no other households in the research area had reported to the police two or more crimes or other incidents. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore the nature of this racial multiple victimisation and to suggest a package of preventive measures.

The research team was very conscious that this victim-focused approach could be interpreted as victim-blaming. The aim is not to blame victims, however, but to create more opportunities for them to live safe and unrestricted lives. The emphasis is also placed on the importance of improving detection and on diversionary work with offenders. Arguments have been made elsewhere that progress to prevent racial attacks can only be achieved in the context of long term education and training and that this is essential to reducing attacks and harassment in the longer term (CRE, 1987: Report of the Inter-departmental Racial Attacks Group, 1989; the Burnage Report, 1989; Hesse et al, 1990; Bowes, McCluskey and Sire, 1990), as is anti-racist communication and dialogue with tenants (Ginsburg, 1989; Dame Colet House Community Centre, Limehouse Fields Tenants Association, Tower Hamlets Tenants Federation, 1984/5). On an estate-based project with a short 18 month implementation phase the focus has necessarily been on solutions which are likely to have some immediate impact. It has not been possible therefore to take on board these arguments in relation to longer term prevention. Nevertheless, some work is planned in local schools to prevent bullying including racist bullying, and to develop an understanding
of its consequences through increased awareness of racism. An additional element in a successful racial attack prevention programme is to ensure that police officers fully comprehend the nature of racial violence and have at their disposal ways of dealing with it at the front line. It has been possible to incorporate some of these ideas into the present project.

It is important to recognise that successful projects cannot be taken ‘lock, stock and barrel’ and replicated elsewhere. Localities are specific and crime prevention measures need to be tailored to individual areas. In East London, the history of the area has to be taken into account: successive minority groups moving into the borough, extreme poverty and deprivation, traditionally white, but also increasingly black resentment and conflict over scarce public resources, particularly council housing and education, predominantly racially segregated areas, sometimes organised fascist activity also operating politically, and gang warfare (Phillips, 1988). These factors are crucial in an implementation phase as measures and initiatives undertaken must be sensitive to other tenants and residents on the estate.

It is hoped to set up a structure that delivers a coordinated service to prevent re-victimisation which will outlive the life of the project and that our work will act as a catalyst for more profound and longer term changes in attitudes towards ethnic minorities.

This paper is divided into six sections; the first three describe the main research findings on the extent and impact of racial attacks, the statutory agencies’ procedures on racial incidents, and existing opinions on reducing racial harassment. The following section briefly discusses a number of existing schemes set up to tackle racial attacks and harassment; the last two sections outline the proposed prevention package and give a brief up-date on the initial stage of the project.
2. The extent and impact of racial attacks on the East London Estate

The estate is situated in an area where police recorded statistics for racial incidents are high compared to the rest of the Metropolitan Police District and where there is a history of racial abuse. The estate itself is comprised of 941 properties, with a limited number of shops and facilities and is poorly served by public transport.

Seven years ago most of the Bengalis and Somalis living on the estate were moved off because of the high levels of racial harassment. Three years ago, the housing department started to move Bengali and Somali families back.

For this report the analysed data refers to a six month period between September 1990 and February 1991. The findings in this section have been summarised into two main parts; the statistical results collated from agencies’ data, and interview data from the Bengali families. Some recommendations for preventive action are proposed at the end of the section.

Data sources

The definition of racial attacks is usually contested between the various agencies (FitzGerald and Ellis, 1989; Saulsbury and Bowling, 1991) but on the London site there appeared to be an agreement about who the victims were. The data collected on racial victimisation was therefore on the group commonly accepted to be victims, namely the 30 Bengali families and 2 Somali families1. Similarly, perpetrators were identified, by all groups, as whites or African-Caribbeans, mostly male and in their teens or of school-age. Nevertheless, there was potential for disagreement since the agencies did have different ideas as to what acts constituted racial harassment (Austin and Oakley, 1985; Kimber and Cooper, 1990).

Data on victimisation were collected from the police, local housing authority, a victim support scheme, and the homeless families campaign/law centre. A number of interviews with representatives from the police, housing, victim support, law centre, homeless families campaign, tenants’ and residents’ association and some discussions with tenants were also undertaken between September 1990 and June 1991. In each agency workers with a responsibility for the area were initially interviewed and subsequent contacts at regular meetings were useful for gathering research material. Police files on recorded racial incidents for the whole division were examined as were the central records held at New Scotland Yard on the use and numbers of interpreters. The homeless families campaign/law centre files were also examined.

1The term ‘families’ is used to refer to the Bengali and Somali tenants on the estate, all of whom had children. They comprised 0.04% of the households on the estate.

2The law centre and the homeless families campaign are community/pressure groups who work together on the estate to offer support on the families.
As recipients of the services, in the first two weeks of June 1991 all the Bengali families (and two Indian families who wore their traditional dress) were interviewed with the assistance of a woman interpreter (n=23). By this time eight of the most heavily victimised families had been moved off the estate. An adult member of the household (usually a woman) was asked about their command of English, if they had been racially attacked, how they responded to the incident, its effect on their lives, how they thought racial attacks could be reduced and why some Bengali families appeared to be attacked more than others.

Statistical findings

(i) prevalence of racial attacks and extent of under-reporting to statutory agencies:

By any standards Table 1 indicates a high level of attacks against a small number of families (n=23). Table 1 also clearly illustrates the level of under-reporting; the homeless families campaign/law centre have recorded over twice as many incidents as the local authority housing department, and six times as many as the police. The homeless families campaign/law centre visited a number of the families every week and asked the families if they had been subjected to any racial attacks. The police referred 30% of the racial incidents reported to them to the local victim support scheme.

Table 1. Number of reported racial incidents (by victim or family member)
September 1990-February 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months 1990-1991</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Victim support*</th>
<th>Housing Dept.</th>
<th>HFC/Law Centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>56</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *These incidents were referred from the police.

The level of under-reporting to the homeless families campaign/law centre is difficult to estimate. One might have expected, for example, a high level of minor incidents to be reported to them but this did not appear to be the case (see Figure 2). There did seem to be some under-reporting of attacks on children to parents. The children said
they did not tell their parents about incidents as their parents would stop them from playing outside.

The validity and reliability of the law centre and homeless families campaign data has been questioned by some agencies. By visiting each week they were thought to be ‘trawling’ for incidents. It was also suggested that the families made up incidents to get transferred off the estate. We found no evidence of any ‘fabrication’ of incidents by the ‘support group’ or the families. The issue of exaggerating the severity of incidents was more difficult to ascertain. We were aware, however, that in their own interests campaign groups may ‘play up’ incidents whilst housing and the police may ‘play down’ incidents (CRE, 1987; FitzGerald, 1989). This type of claim and counter-claim was inevitable since the different agencies have different roles and purposes (Sampson et al., 1988). Despite these reservations our own experiences on the estate led to the view that we were justified in our use of the homeless families campaign/law centre data.

Table 2. Multi-Victims of racial incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Victimisations</th>
<th>No. of Families*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seven</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirteen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourteen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixteen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighteen</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty-seven</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ‘Homeless families campaign/law centre data based on visits to 30 families on the estate.
(ii) repeat victimisation and the ‘seriousness’ of attacks:

The number of repeat incidents is shown in Table 2. 67% of the families were multi-victims. These findings are similar to those found in Newham and in Waltham Forest by the Panel of Inquiry (London Borough of Newham, 1987; Hesse et al., 1990).

This is of course ‘arbitrary’ in the sense that the six month period is an artificial time period and many of the families have experienced attacks before and after this period (Bowling, 1992). However it does show that within any one time period some families suffered more than others. Seven families reported no incidents during this period. The most heavily victimised family was harassed on average once every six days. The second and third most victimised were attacked on average every nine days (see Figure 1). Furthermore subsequent victimisations were most frequent within the first week of the first attack.

Figure 1. Time course of repeat victimisations

A notable proportion of incidents were serious (see Figure 2).

But what seems particularly important is that a family usually experienced both serious and minor incidents. Three case histories illustrate this over one month:

1Using the homeless families campaign/law centre data.
Family A

Stones thrown and chased
Threatened and prevented from entering flat
Punched and verbal abuse
Attempted robbery
Chased by gang of youths
Stones thrown and chased
Common assault

Family B

Pushed by 3 youths
Front door banged/kicked
Eggs thrown at window
Common assault
Arson (lit cigarette and newspaper through letter box)
Verbal racial abuse
Family C

Banging on door/stones thrown at window
Stones thrown on way to and from school
Threat to kill
Assault

Since the families suffered a mixture of ‘minor’ and ‘major’ incidents and ‘minor’ or ‘trivial’ incidents are “seriously damaging the quality of life for members of the minority communities…” (Home Office, 1989) there is a case that all types of incident should be treated seriously from the point of view of police investigations and victim protection. Preventive efforts to stop ‘minor’ incidents may also prevent a ‘major’ incident happening in the future. A full investigation of all types of incidents should give all agencies, but particularly the police, more comprehensive detection and prevent ion information upon which to act.

(iii) the location of incidents:

The data do not identify any one ‘hot spot’ for racial attacks, although there are areas where attacks occurred regularly. Over a quarter of the attacks were centred around the home, on the landing or within the block. There were also a number of attacks around the shopping areas, including local shops on the estate and a nearby market. The families most heavily victimised in their homes (n=4) tended to be housed in vulnerable flats. One family who were the victims of harassment, threats and a minor assault were housed on the ground floor with their own individual staircase. The other three families’ flats were situated near staircases where access could easily be gained without being seen. On the other hand, other families were located on the ground floor or at the end of landings or with staircases in a corner on their own (n=9), but were not heavily victimised in the home despite their flat’s vulnerable location, or were attacked outside the home. In other words, not placing people in vulnerable flats may not be sufficient in itself to reduce the total number of attacks.

Interviews with the families and data from various agencies indicated that primary and secondary schools were often the sites of violence on the estate. Indeed where data on time of attack was available it suggested around 3-4 pm and lunchtimes were the most ‘likely’ times for attacks to take place. This is in line with our knowledge that some perpetrators are of school age.

(iv) perpetrators:

The information collected on perpetrators is limited due to difficulties of identification by victims. In at least 30% of incidents’ victims cited a gang as being responsible, usually male, often consisting of white and African-Caribbean people. Where information was available on the age of perpetrators (in 40% of incidents),

1Using the homeless families campaign/law centre data.
Over 70% were secondary school age or adults. Many were identified as local to the estate or attended schools in the immediate areas.

Interviews with Bengali families

The families had recently been interviewed by a number of different researchers and by various agencies. Repeatedly they had been asked about their experiences of racial attacks. Sensitive to this, a woman Bengali interpreter was chosen who already knew the families and to minimise any further the intrusion felt by the families, the interviews were kept as short as possible.

(i) the impact of racial incidents on the lives of the 23 Bengali families:

As would be expected, given the levels of attacks, most of the women were fearful to go out during the day. This did not seem to be for cultural reasons but because of a fear of being attacked; they complained about being a ‘prisoner in their own home’. Nor was this fear confined to the women. For example, one man said he took his wife out with him as a safety measure. Generally these extreme fears were, however, limited to the estate. Only one of the families had been racially harassed prior to moving onto the estate and they all felt safe or quite safe in the predominantly Bengali area in the west of the borough where they shopped.

The continual threat of harassment and violence contributed to a sense of fear and risk even in the absence of direct racial attacks. Kimber and Cooper (1991) found this to be the case with victims of racial violence they interviewed in Camden, Newham and Southwark. We found that most of the Bengali and Somali households, if not all, had their doors bolted at all times. On those flats where there was no spyhole, the letterbox flap was usually lifted to see who was there before the door was opened.
In nine families the children were allowed to play outside regularly or sometimes (usually when no other children were around) and in eleven families the children were not allowed to play outside for fear that they would be attacked (the remaining three families had children too young to play outside). Those with young school children mostly felt very unsafe taking them to and from school.

It is likely that the women’s fear and feelings of vulnerability were exacerbated by feelings of isolation caused by their inability to speak English. Only two Bengali women felt confident in speaking English (the Sikh woman also spoke English); two thought that they could ‘get by’, but the rest did not feel confident speaking English to shopkeepers and were unable to make telephone calls or ask for help at the housing office. These women relied on their husbands or children to speak on their behalf.

(ii) identifying differences between those who were attacked more than others:

In an attempt to find an explanation for the apparent differences in the levels of victimisation of the Bengali families (see Table 2), information was collated from the interviews on family size, length of tenancy, command of English, feelings of safety, going out during the day, precautions taken to avoid attacks, and responses to attacks. If the different levels of victimisation were related to individual behaviour style, such as their response to attacks, then a logical progression would be to activate an effective crime prevention strategy by building on the precautions or behaviour adopted by the least victimised families, and disseminating information about their more effective strategies to the most victimised.

However, interviews with the families revealed few discernible differences between the least victimised and the more heavily victimised families. Those who experienced the highest number of incidents had the biggest families, especially teenage children. Thus their rate of victimisation was not in fact higher than those with smaller families. There were, however, exceptions to this pattern. One large family with teenage children were hardly victimised, whilst a family with pre-school children and a family with two school children were frequently victimised.

Similarly, some families took more precautions against being attacked than others (some of which they found restrictive). Most of the women did not leave their flats unless they had to do ‘emergency’ shopping or collect their children from school. Other families owned a car or hired taxis so that they did not have to walk on the estate. 57% had either taken extra precautions to secure their flats or thought their security was sufficient. But there is no indication from the data that those who had taken more precautions and those who had made more restrictions on their lives were less likely to be victims of an incident.

Thus, although firm conclusions cannot be drawn from a sample size of 23 families, it does seem that Bengali and Somali families were likely to be systematically and repeatedly attacked because of their race, rather than any lifestyle pattern or individual characteristic. For this reason it was difficult for families to protect themselves.
(iii) responses to attacks:

The majority of families said that they all ignored their attackers and ran away. Women with young children felt particularly vulnerable because they could not run easily. Whilst some had no opinion on how to prevent attacks, eight replied that they just wanted to move off the estate, three wanted more Bengali families to be moved on and five families wanted to learn English to ‘speak up’ for themselves. Nearly half of the families wanted action from the police, housing and parents to stop the attacks (n=10).

Recommendations for changes

The families clearly needed to be offered better protection by statutory and voluntary agencies and a support system needs to be developed to improve their coping strategies and sense of well-being.
It seemed important to:
* improve their confidence in the Police and housing
* encourage the reporting of incidents
* provide the opportunity for the women to learn English
* set up support networks between the families, between the families and their neighbours and friends
* encourage witnesses to come forward
3. Statutory agencies’ racial harassment procedures

The high rate of multiple victimisation shown in Table 1 and dissatisfaction expressed by the families suggested that both the police and the local authority housing had difficulties in protecting multiple victims. To understand why this may be the case a review of some of their procedures was undertaken.

Police

The Metropolitan Police policy document ‘Working Together for Racial Harmony’ (1990) emphasises the serious and divisive nature of racial attacks and stresses the need for priority policing. However both the reporting and detection rates appeared to be low. In 1990 of those racial incidents (n=381) that came to the attention of the police for the borough as a whole there were 33 arrests and 76 offences were cleared up.¹

A number of practical difficulties were identified in the research which impeded the achievement of the police policy.

(i) initial contact with the police:

Most of the women at home on their own during the day were unable to communicate if there was a racial incident. This has been found elsewhere (CRE, 1987). If a non-English speaker telephoned the police station there was no direct line to police operations and a silence as the caller was switched from a central line to the divisional station (there was no ringing tone). This could be confusing to the caller. Once connected or if the victim visited the station there was no person or Language Line system to speak in Sylheti or Somali. This was a difficulty for both the families and for the police staff. Several comments on the incident log data included, for example, “informant hard to understand” “caller unable to speak clearly”.

(ii) statements, investigations and follow-up visits:

A concern arising from talking to the families, which was reinforced by the low clear-up rate, related to the quality of the information on incidents obtained by the police. To assess this the police records on racial incidents (for the whole division) were examined. There were 109 addresses (i.e. files). In almost a third of these ‘poor’ or ‘no’ English was recorded (n=35). Of the visits made by the police to these addresses, an official interpreter was used three times (7%), a child (aged between 8 and 16 years) used 41% of the time, an adult 27% and no interpreter used 24% of the time.

¹This included summonses and where juveniles were below the age of criminal responsibility. There was no available data on charges and prosecutions although one police officer claimed there were no criminal prosecutions during 1990. By way of comparison, the clear up rate for violence against the person offences in the Metropolitan Police District for 1989 was 59% (Home Office).
Where no interpreter had been used, the argument for the routine use of interpreters is most clearly supported. Such statements as “informant couldn’t speak English and Therefore give a full statement” or “report was taken with great difficulty … details sketchy due to difficulty of communication” add weight to this proposal. Interpreting through young children also poses a problem for the police and probably increases further the anxiety of the children themselves (Morgan and Zedner, forthcoming). The quality of information gained from a child is also questionable, for example, one report said “it was very difficult to try and interpret through an 8 year old boy”.

Thus whilst the practices of using family members, neighbours or friends as interpreters is understandable, it lends itself to the provision of a lower quality of service to non-English speaking victims. It also limits access to crucial information concerning perpetrators which is necessary for investigative work, detection and prosecution.

(iii) policing on the estate:

When the research began there were two Home Beat officers covering two large estates and another post was unfilled. The two officers were often called to police football matches and demonstrations. The residents said they rarely saw a police officer and the Bengali Families in particular complained about their lack of protection including a slow response to their calls and perceived lack of interest in their situation.

A ‘graded response’ policing policy, was in operation at the time of the research, so that ‘minor’ incidents were rarely responded to or investigated. Since any types of incidents can produce evidence detection opportunities were missed. This policing strategy also contrasts with a response which recognises and reacts to incidents as one of a series rather than isolated ‘one-off’ incidents (Pearson et al 1989; Bowling, 1991).

Recommendations for changes

* Interpreting facilities should be available to the public when they telephone and/or visit the police on a 24 hour basis and be available quickly after an incident;

* trained interpreters should be used routinely by all police officers to collect information, take statements and for follow-up visits;

* Home Beat officers should be ‘assigned’ to the estate to build a rapport with all the tenants and to improve the feelings of safety on the estate (particularly of the most vulnerable);

* all racial incidents should be fully investigated to obtain as much detection and prevention information as possible.
Local Authority Housing Department

As landlords, local authority housing have the power to transfer people on and off the estate and could have a significant impact on the prevention of racial attacks. The policy and practice issues are summarised below:

(i) Allocations policy:

Much of the debate between local authority housing and the community groups was centred on the lettings and transfer policies. The families offered homes on the estate were typically homeless and had one offer only of a place to live. Since the project began there have been seven appeals against offers made on the grounds of racial harassment on the estate, three of which were upheld and four of which are currently being challenged. The argument centred on the extent to which families were given a choice about where they lived. Of particular concern was the allocation of ethnic minority families to areas of high racial harassment and fear and how families subjected to repeat attacks and living in extreme fear were not transferred off the estate. It was argued that a written procedure needed to be developed specifying that housing officers were to inform families of potential racial harassment in the area when viewing a flat. Levels of harassment a family had to endure before they were prioritised for a transfer should be set out as should a maximum length of time for a transfer once a family had been prioritised.

There are two particular aspects of the allocations policy relevant to the prevention of racial attacks on the estate. First, the debates on council housing policy illustrated where the concerns and conflicts around the issue of racial attacks were centred. Every time a discussion broadened out it always returned to arguments about housing allocations. They were regularly debated in the local press and were also of interest to the national media. This media attention generated such feelings of animosity that it inhibited a willingness of agencies to cooperate. It would seem that until the housing policy is perceived as being fair or until ways are found of accommodating the conflict, any co-ordinated approach between the agencies would be hard to achieve.

Secondly, some research suggests that vulnerable people tend to he located in vulnerable places (Forrester, et al., 1988). That is people least able to protect themselves are placed in flats/homes which are more likely to be prone to crime because of their ‘isolated’ position. If violence and harassment is a reason for the high turnover of a property, those at the top of the homeless persons’ waiting list are likely to be offered properties where there has previously been harassment and/or violence. Since Bengalis and Somalis represent a disproportionate number of homeless families within the borough, they are likely to be offered properties which have already been sites of harassment and violence. If there is violence across tenancies then it makes sense to place more resilient tenants, if they are willing, (for example, English speakers

In 1990/1 the homeless applicants were 46% Asian, 28% white, 16% Black, 2% other African and 8% unknown.
without very young children) where racial harassment is known to be high. A policy to protect those who feel vulnerable to attack and harassment and to make vulnerable locations more secure would also be a helpful response to the problem. Such a policy would prevent 'no-go' areas for ethnic minorities and support those who do live in areas of racial harassment.

(ii) the eviction of perpetrators:

Collecting sufficiently detailed evidence against perpetrators can be very difficult as incidents can happen without witnesses. There was also a fear of retaliation by the families if they gave evidence in court. Moreover it is unlikely that if a person is prosecuted for an offence s/he will be ‘punished’ again by being evicted (Fitzgerald, 1989). These obstacles mean that local authority housing departments have limited options in taking action against perpetrators (Fitzgerald, 1989; Bowes, McCluskey and Sims, 1990). During the research period one family of perpetrators were evicted – but for the non-payment of rent.

(iii) Racial incidents Panel:

In June 1990 the local authority housing department set up and ran a Racial Incidents Panel to which the Bengali and Somali families were invited. The homeless families campaign/law centre escorted some of the families to the meetings and argued on behalf of the families who wanted to be transferred. The latest racial incidents were discussed at these meetings and requests for transfers from the estate were heard.

The Bengalis and Somalis expressed their lack of confidence in the police and housing. The agenda and minutes were written in English although since 1991 a council interpreter has been present. The meetings were public and attended by the chair of the residents’ and tenants’ association and by the police. In May 1991 the council changed this arrangement; the meetings became semi-public and although, the police and tenants’ and residents’ association could be notified of meetings, anyone else had to be invited by the families and would not be sent minutes. There was no emphasis on the reduction or prevention of racial attacks in the discussion. Neither did any action taken as a result of the meetings appear to reduce the number of incidents (see Table 1).

(iv) The Estate Housing Office:

In September 1990 there were no Sylheti or Somali-speaking staff or Language Line services available at the office on the estate. By the beginning of 1991 a centrally-based Bengali investigations officer was available to visit any family who reported a racial incident to housing.

Recommendations for change

* a flexible allocations policy whereby vulnerable ethnic minorities are not, unless willing, allocated to properties in areas prone to racial attacks;
* improve the security of vulnerable properties or where tenants feel particularly vulnerable to attack and harassment.

* action against perpetrators; for example, the systematic use of warning letters to perpetrators and the use of ex-parte injunctions in the High Court (Forbes, 1988; DOE, 1989; Hesse et al., 1990) hacked with the power of arrest as in domestic violence cases;

* publicity in all languages perhaps done jointly with the local police and estate housing office describing action to be taken against perpetrators;

* safe accommodation/houses be offered to victims and witnesses in the lead up to court cases to address the problem of fear of retaliation;

* the Racial Incidents Panel should be open to all and all agencies informed of future meetings and receive agendas. One of its aims should be to reduce and prevent racial attacks and harassment;

* the Racial Incidents Panel should be restructured to be an inter-agency forum and include the publication of statistics from the police and law centre/homeless families campaign as well as housing. Contributions to the meetings should be encouraged from all agencies;

* minutes of Racial Incidents Panel meetings should be produced in Bengali and Somali;

* interpreting/language facilities should be available in the estate housing office.
4. Existing opinions and strategies

Experiences from other crime prevention initiatives have shown that it is important that recommendations and ideas are put across in a way that is compatible to, and builds on, existing ideas and practices in the community (for example, Rosenbaum, 1987, 1988). In the case of racial harassment this is particularly difficult due to different, and often conflicting beliefs about racial attacks which leads to a divergence of views about appropriate preventive strategies. There were a wide range of views and suggestions for preventive strategies from agencies. These ranged from overtly racist to those who thought racial attacks were a particularly pernicious form of violence which justified special action to protect the victims. The types of arguments are summarised below:

— a view that the problem was under control; either they had not witnessed a racial incident or very few had been reported to their agency;

— Bengali and Somali families wanted to be transferred off the estate and claimed they were being racially attacked to gain priority on the transfer list;

— the problem was only temporary and would ‘go away’ once Asians integrated with other residents on the estate as the African-Caribbeans had;

— the Bengalis and Somalis who were attacked found themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time. They were simply experiencing the violent East End ‘yob’ culture which East Enders had put up with for years. The suggestion was that Bengalis and Somalis had to learn to ‘toughen up’ – it was up to them to protect and defend themselves;

— the minority groups were new residents and as such did not deserve to have preferential treatment or preferential access to scarce resources over old tenants who had suffered from the consequences of urban deprivation for years (this was particularly so over the issue of council housing);

— if racial attacks were treated as a ‘special’ problem then there would be a white backlash and this might precipitate extremist right wing activities;

— if Asians decide to settle in England some felt they must accept and adopt ‘our’ lifestyle, ‘our’ customs and ‘our’ way of doing things (in reference to the dominant groups in the area i.e. whites and African-Caribbeans);

— racial attacks were only one problem alongside many other social, economic and crime problems and were relatively rare occurrences. They should be dealt with as such;

— racial attacks were just one sign of exuberant and often disaffected young people. With organised leisure activities and youth work they would ‘grow out’ of it;
— racial attacks are ‘talked up’ as a problem and politicised. This generates the real possibility of a white backlash which has to be taken into account;

— the impact of racial incidents on the workload of agencies was small and could only justify a small amount of time and resources;

— many racial incidents are minor, for example, verbal abuse or spitting, and amount to anti-social behaviour. These should be treated quite separately from criminal activities which need an immediate response;

— action to integrate Asian youths, first by forming their own group to develop their confidence;

— the atmosphere of racism will prosper unless ‘significant’ whites – tenants and workers – deliberately and publicly support minority groups;

— racial attacks were particularly insidious because people were ‘picked on’ because of the colour of their skin. Attacks had a number of unpleasant overtones, for example, minority groups were treated as second-class citizens, they were often told to ‘go home’;

— everyone had a right to live in a non-racist environment and where there was overt racism minority groups should be relocated to safer homes/environments. The response to the problem was inadequate and if victims wanted to be rehoused they should be. Perpetrators should be prosecuted.

If nothing else these different underlying beliefs about racial attacks and contrasting strategies for action suggest that any implementation strategy should take into account the expected resistances to a preventive package. The contrasting beliefs accounted for the wide range of responses to the problem; from resistance to taking any action to demands for immediate activity. Some of the implications of these perspectives for the implementation strategy are:

* resistance to tackling racial attacks impedes the implementation of a prevention initiative; it is necessary to emphasise (on a regular basis) that the aim is to reduce multiple victims of all types of crime.

* in any one organisation there are likely to be ‘key’ personnel who are reluctant to tackle racial harassment; it is essential that support is given to fostering ‘political will’ within each agency to combat the problem (this includes elected and non-elected members of a council); for example through contact with senior managers and policy-makers, and through the widespread dissemination of the research results.

* the work of those who wish to prevent the problem (either organisations or sympathetic individuals within organisations) should be supported and the effective-
ness of their work enhanced, without alienating those who are reluctant or resistant to taking action. For example, by keeping those who are sympathetic well-informed through informal communication, by encouraging comprehensive recording practices of incidents and a thorough analysis of the data they collect, by giving small community groups the opportunity to attend formal joint agency meetings.

* the conflicts between agencies with different interests should be addressed and mechanisms developed to mediate and accommodate them. A small number of agency workers might be brought together to meet on a regular basis, for example, to discuss the issues and to increase understanding of each other’s problems and the limits of their power to take action. In this way encouragement can be given for changes in policies and practices to improve services to victims.
5. Lessons from other schemes to prevent racial attacks

One of the original aims of this paper was to review the literature on racial attacks and harassment. By absorbing lessons from initiatives tried or currently underway we hoped to establish a baseline from which we could develop a set of ‘workable’ preventive proposals. Much of the literature, however, focuses on the history of race relations in Britain (for example, Troyna and Cashmere, 1983) or is more theoretically based (for example, Rex, Solomos and Ben-Tovim et al. in Rex and Mason, 1986; Miles, 1989) and as such, not directly relevant to the development of practical initiatives to reduce racial attacks. A review of some of the ‘on the ground’ initiatives (many not yet reported in the literature) did, however, help to inform our preventive strategy and a selection of these are described below.

There are relatively few initiatives which specifically aim to prevent racial attacks and harassment. They typically include target hardening measures such as improved locks, special post boxes, heat-sensitive lighting and better quality doors and fencing (Leicester, 1990; Wandsworth Safer Cities, Reading, Hammersmith and Fulham, (personal communications – pers.comms.).) Most schemes aim to heighten awareness and encourage the reporting of racial attacks to official agencies, some of which are being funded through Safer Cities programmes (for example, Bristol and Nottingham, (pers. comms.). These have tended to involve multi-agency forums meeting regularly in a partnership approach to find solutions based on shared knowledge. Other initiatives focus on victim support (Kimber and Cooper, 1990; Coventry and Bristol Safer Cities, pers. comm.).

(i) Measures to facilitate immediate reporting:

Most of the schemes are too new to assess their success whilst others have not been evaluated (for example, Leicester City Council, 1990). Nevertheless, a number of schemes seemed worth examining in more detail and several visits were made to selected projects:

* In Waltham Forest in 1987 a 24-hr emergency hotline was set up to offer a legal advisory service to victims of racial harassment and violence. There was a full-time co-ordinator during office hours with sessional multi-lingual workers employed outside these hours. The service was evaluated after 7 months and it was found to be ineffective as it existed in a vacuum where not even the housing department had a systematic policy for responding to racial attacks. This meant there was no machinery set up to deal with cases once referred. However, the service did provide a central reporting point for those unwilling to report directly to other agencies and gave some assurance to victims.

* Leicester City Council Housing Department won the Elis Fisher Award For Housing Management in 1990 with its alarm system issued to victims of racial violence. The alarm when sounded is responded to by the police and an Emergency
Support Team of trained volunteers on call 24-hrs a day. The alarm is fixed, but also has a remote trigger. It gives an immediate voice contact and the Emergency Support Team can arrange emergency repairs, find safe houses, call in relatives and friends, arrange for interpreters and stay with the victim overnight if required. The aim is also for members of the team to arrive swiftly at the scene, so they may be able to act as witnesses and go to court, recognising that victims often fear reprisals and feel distressed at having to attend court. To date, there are 67 Lifelines installed, of which 48 are operational. There are 5 Emergency Support Team call-outs per month and 4 ‘reassurance’ calls (Leicester City Council, 1990). Whilst this system has been heralded as a great success, it also has its critics. Leicester Racial Attacks Monitoring Project (LRAMP) have condemned the way the system was set up without consultation and claim there has not been a reduction in the number of attacks, nor has any legal action been taken against perpetrators. LRAMP also feel it has created a two-tier system of responding to racial attacks, so that not every racial attack is regarded as serious.

(ii) Community development:

* On one North London housing estate (the ‘Ferdinand’) claims were made that racial attacks were reduced by adopting a community development approach (unfortunately no figures were given to substantiate the perceived decrease). Meetings were held to discuss the problems of violence which affected everybody, thus making links between blacks and whites, adults and young people. A support network was established with contacts to respond immediately after an attack. There was also a high-profile publicity campaign emphasising community opposition to harassment. The community workers and tenants’ association arranged social events for victims and women’s self-defence classes. They also worked closely with the youth in the area (Buckingham and Martin, 1989).

(iii) Deterrent measures:

* Some positive initiatives are currently being implemented in Thamesmead, Greenwich to tackle organised racial violence. There is ‘estate policing’ with police foot patrols. The police and courts are also providing safe and separate environments to obtain key witness statements, so that offenders and victims/witnesses do not have to meet. Greenwich Council is also funding development work to investigate factors which support and enhance racist beliefs. The focus will be on the 10-14 age range seen to be most ‘at risk’ of transgressing from verbally-based racism to engaging in physical racist violence (London Borough of Greenwich Race Equality Committee, 1991).

* One of the main thrusts of the North Plaistow Racial Harassment Project was an Action Plan produced by a multi-agency panel to prevent racial harassment and attacks. Police targeted patrols formed part of this plan with a double deployment of Home Beat Officers per beat. However the Home Beat Officers lacked information on
and clear guidance from senior officers on how this should differ from their existing routine patrol work. The initiative also included the improvement of the physical environment. The researchers concluded, however, that the preventive strategies were not fully implemented and could not be credited with the decline in recorded racial incidents to the police (Saulsbury and Bowling, 1991). The loose implementation of the Action Plan to improve the immediate responses of the police and housing department in supporting victims and taking action against perpetrators was also seen as contributing to the fact that there was little change during the evaluation phase.

A procedure for logging racial incidents in schools was also set up as was a student poster campaign. Neither of these initiatives was evaluated by the North Plaistow Racial Harassment Project. A Racial Harassment Victims’ Information Pack was produced with details of advice agencies and what victims can do themselves. Schools in the borough also now have guidelines for counseling perpetrators of racial violence and harassment (de Concilio, 1991).

* In one area of Tower Hamlets, the estate manager aimed to ‘be seen’ with Bengali tenants and Bengali organisations on the estate. He felt a public message was needed to show other tenants how harassment and violence would be responded to and dealt with (pers. comm.).

(iv) Victim support and case-work advocacy:

* An ambitious and promising scheme is now being set up in Waltham Forest. The Anti-Racial Attacks Project aims to provide an easily accessible advice centre where victims can report harassment and violence and receive support and counselling. The project workers will also have a campaigning role and be involved in outreach work and encouraging reporting of incidents. Specifically the project aims to ensure thorough follow-up on individual cases and will thus involve liaison with statutory and voluntary agencies as victim advocate. This model aims to provide a community-based service which is semi-independent from the statutory and voluntary agencies, although their participation is ensured through a joint steering committee (London Borough Waltham Forest, Race Relations Committee, 1991).

* The Isle of Dogs Racial Harassment Panel also attempts to regularly review individual cases of racial harassment. Decisions are made on transfer requests, action against perpetrators and on how to best support the victims and their families. The panel includes senior housing officers, the Neighbourhood solicitor and representatives from a local Bengali organisation and campaign groups. The police and other agencies may be invited to panels where thought necessary. The victim is invited to be present, with an interpreter if required, and an advocate if they choose. The victim also has a right to appeal against a panel decision. This new ‘case conference style’ approach has yet to be monitored and evaluated, but aims to provide victims and agencies with greater information to provide a co-ordinated response (Isle of Dogs Neighbourhood Race Forum, 1991).
Bearing in mind none of these projects have been evaluated and most were in their infancy – some of their implications seemed to suggest –

(i) potential weaknesses in:

* having a 24 hour emergency hotline service unless it is operating within clear departmental policies and with strict guidelines for use, so that it is not used for non-emergencies or for other types of problems;

* setting up projects without consulting local community groups working around the same issues; and

* setting up initiatives without giving sufficient information and training to ground-level officers.

(ii) possible advantages in:

* supportive whites ‘identifying’ with the minority group. This can be white neighbours prepared to go to court as witnesses (Greenwich), or housing managers being ‘seen around’ with Bengali tenants (Tower Hamlets);

* a speedy response after an incident when victims need support and advice immediately (Leicester) and setting up support networks after an attack (Ferdinand Housing Estate) are strategies that could lead to preventing a future attack;

* case work with victims, involving statutory and voluntary agencies may lead to better prevention (Waltham Forest);

* attempts to fully inform victims of action resulting from their cases and allowing them or advocates on their behalf to present their own case and situation (Isle of Dogs);

* the collection of information on perpetrators by local authority housing to take action against them (Isle of Dogs);

* positive action to encourage victims and or witnesses to come forward (Greenwich), and

* policing areas to increase security and reduce fear, although the police patrols in Thamesmead, Greenwich suggest a balance is necessary after white youths in the area complained about police harassment. Clear objectives set by senior police officers seem to be important (North Plaistow project).

These possible ways of effectively preventing racial multiple victimisation have been taken into account in the recommended preventive package outlined in this paper. Many are logical solutions to the problems identified in the research phase outlined in the previous section.
6. Crime Prevention package to reduce racial multiple victimisation

A number of different intervention strategies are proposed to reduce racial attacks and harassment. The main ones are as follows;

(i) A revictimisation prevention worker

Given the conceptual framework of the project – the prevention of repeat victimisation – the first question was who was going to carry out this task and how? The rate of repeat racial victimisation (see Table 2) suggested that no specific agency or agencies in collaboration were successfully carrying out the task of protecting multi-victims, Reasons for this included under-resourcing, a reluctance to become involved (see section 4 on existing opinions and strategies) and working practices within the police, housing and victim support which were not focused on protecting victims in this way. Thus the creation of a revictimisation prevention worker post, independent of the agencies, seemed to be the most appropriate way to ensure attempts to prevent re-victimisation would actually take place. It is envisaged that it will be the responsibility of this worker to assess, in consultation with victims and statutory and voluntary agencies, how repeat victimisation for all types of crime could be prevented. In other words good victim support is perceived as effective crime prevention. Possible courses of action could include:

* ‘case’ work with victims to develop a plan of action to protect them from further attacks. This safety plan would require a co-ordinated response from statutory and voluntary agencies to deliver an effective service to victims;
* set up ‘cocooning’ with neighbours and support networks with other families on the estate, relatives and friends;
* providing a fact pack of information and key telephone numbers and addresses of those who will provide help, in the relevant language;
* encourage the reporting of crimes to the police;
* encourage witnesses to come forward and support them;
* investigate installing telephones in victims’ homes;
* inform victims about the English language classes for women, with creche facilities and an escort service;
* explore employment and training possibilities for adult victims and leisure activities for young victims;
* encourage safe/supervised play facilities for children of victims and children who are victims;
* provide emotional and practical support to victims and witnesses in the lead up to court cases.
(ii) A detached offender worker

Work with perpetrators can also be part of a strategy to protect victims and prevent further victimisation. The Department of Environment and the Home Office emphasise the importance of action taken against perpetrators but outline the difficulties involved in securing substantiated evidence to secure a conviction (Department of Environment, 1989; Home Office, 1992). Thus there appears to be a role for a detached worker where there is insufficient evidence for a court case and after a person has been convicted of an offence. It is proposed that the worker would be involved in diversionary activities through helping with employment opportunities and developing skills.

(iii ) An inter-agency project management group

A joint-agency management group will be established with two roles. The first, to support and advise the workers on how to reduce repeat victimisation, and the second, to monitor the policies and practices of the agencies with a responsibility to reduce racial attacks and harassment. Sub-groups may be set up to discuss specific issues of concern. Other agencies and individuals can be invited to discuss particular problems or 'cases' for example, solicitors, social services, school heads and school support staff, all of whom have important roles in developing a preventive strategy.

(iv) Creating an initial impact

A crime prevention initiative is primarily about initiating change, and ‘priming’ or giving a prevention initiative a 'kick start’ is an important part of this process (Morgan, 1991). A number of activities need to be launched which are visible or which can have an ‘immediate’ impact or result. To achieve this various specific strategies are proposed, for example:

- analysing data collected from each agency and giving it back to them and disseminating the results. This can illustrate where some of the weaknesses lie in agencies’ practices.

- Publicity using leaflets can communicate that racial violence is a concern of the agencies and perhaps, act as a deterrent.

- Installation of immediate response alarms in the homes (or shops) of the most heavily victimised. Alarms act as a symbolic signal of a change in policy and practice by the agencies particularly to the most heavily victimised families and offer some reassurance to victims, albeit only in the short-term. There are too many incidents against too many families for all the families to have them on a ‘permanent’ basis and they are unlikely to prevent more than a few attacks.

- English language classes with creche facilities and an escort service in the project area are further visible signs of change.
The preventive strategies can therefore be summarised as follows:

* a revictimisation prevention worker to protect multiple victims from repeat attacks by setting up safety plans for victims and a system of ‘cocooning’ and support networks for victims with their neighbours and friends;

* a detached offender worker to protect multiple victims through work with offenders;

* the establishment of ‘case’ work panels with victims and relevant agencies to develop a joint strategy to reduce attacks through more effective preventive actions and the identification of perpetrators;

* English classes for women (with creche facilities) to encourage them to report incidents, reduce their isolation through improved communication and improve their feelings of safety;

* immediate response alarms to be placed in homes (or shops), to improve the feelings of safety of multiple victims and to indicate that the police are treating the problem seriously;

* interpreting services to be made available to the police and local authority housing to improve detection and prevention and to offer a better service to non-English speaking victims;

* Home Beat Officers to be ‘assigned’ to the estate to improve community relations with the police service and to improve the feelings of safety of the tenants and in particular the most vulnerable;

* full police investigations of all racial incidents;

* encouragement to victims and witnesses to come forward by offering safe alternative accommodation and support to overcome fears of retaliation;

* an inter-agency Racial Incidents Panel to promote a coordinated prevention strategy to reduce racial attacks;

* local authority housing action to be taken against perpetrators;

* a flexible allocations policy so that more resilient ethnic minorities (i.e., English speakers without very young children) are offered flats in areas of the estate more prime to attacks;

* development of a local authority policy to protect those vulnerable to repeat attacks and harassment and to secure properties particularly prone to crime;

* identify ‘significant’ and sympathetic whites who live and work on the estate to be seen with, and to support, the Bengalis and Somalis.
Work has also started in the local schools to develop a Code of Practice to prevent bullying, including racial bullying and it is proposed to link this initiative with the activities on the prevention of racial attacks on the estate.
7. Postscript

A number of changes have taken place; The police have changed their policing arrangements, there are now two active Home Beat Officers on the estate and two detectives have been assigned the full-time task of investigating racial attacks and harassment in the division. The law centre and homeless families campaign have improved their recording practices and regularly disseminate the information to other agencies; the tenants’ and residents’ association have made available a ‘shop’ they were no longer using for community activities; and the local authority housing department have offered an office to the project workers.

Perhaps most importantly, statutory agencies and community/pressure groups have met face-to-face regularly to discuss the issues. A joint-agency management group for the two workers has been set up. What – to date – is still lacking however is the ‘political’ will in some organisations to tackle the problems faced by the victims of repeat racial attacks and harassment.

1 ‘An evaluation of the impact of this work will take place in December 1992.'
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