Guidance on

POLICING AT AIRPORTS

2011

Produced on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland by the National Policing Improvement Agency
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First published 2011
National Policing Improvement Agency
Fry Building, 2 Marsham Street
London SW1P 4DF

The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) is committed to making a valuable contribution to improving public safety. ACPO and the NPIA would like to express their thanks to all those involved in the drafting of this document. All of the responses during the consultation phase of this project were appreciated and contributed to the final document.

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Contents

Foreword 7

1 Introduction 9

2 ACPO 2010 Minimum Standards for Ports Policing 11

3 Airport Policing Differences 13

4 Policing Standards at Airports 17

Appendix 1
Relevant Standards 31

Appendix 2
Directed Airports under the Single Consolidated Direction (Aviation) 2010 33

Appendix 3
Abbreviations and Acronyms 35

Appendix 4
References 37
Foreword

This guidance will assist police officers, aerodrome managers and other security stakeholders at National Aviation Security Programme (NASP) airports to understand the diverse resources and range of capabilities police officers can bring when dedicated to policing an airport. It has been prepared at the request of the Airport Policing Programme Board.

Airports are key economic locations and potential targets for terrorists. They are often crowded places and part of the transport infrastructure which can be dramatically affected by the disruption an attack, or threat of an attack, can bring. Airport security is a shared responsibility where all stakeholders must work together to determine the best means of mitigating identified potential risks.

In 1974 nine airports were designated. This meant that the airport operator was required to pay for the full costs of dedicated uniformed policing. There have been a number of reviews since which have modernised the general approach to airport security. The review of airport security in Sir John Wheeler (2002) Aviation Security introduced the multi-agency threat and risk assessment process and Boys Smith, S. (2006) Independent Review of Policing at Airports led to the new Airport Security Framework introduced in the Policing and Crime Act 2009. These have modernised the general approach to airport security. The 2009 Act also included a requirement for aerodrome managers at NASP airports to pay for any agreed levels of dedicated policing.

The Airport Security Framework provides a national approach that has sufficient flexibility to maintain the balance between national policing standards and local accountability. It also helps to develop a shared understanding of the added value policing can bring to the security environment.

This guidance sets out the various elements of uniformed policing at airports and includes electronic links to general policing standards. It also identifies and advises on policing functions that are unique to an airport environment. The guidance sets a common standard for policing at airports across the UK and is useful to all staff, whether experienced or new to the aviation environment.
1

Introduction
This guidance is particularly relevant to police officers, staff, airport operators and other stakeholders involved in policing directed airports. Directed airports are listed in annex two of the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP) Single Consolidated Direction (Aviation) 2010. Appendix 2 contains a list of these airports.

It will also be of interest to police officers and staff involved in policing other airports, aerodromes and airfields and all members of Risk Advisory Groups (RAG) and Security Executive Groups (SEG).

This guidance details the standards of service delivery that police forces work to across the UK and highlights those areas where policing at airports differs from policing in other environments.

*ACPO (2011) Reference Handbook: Guidance on Policing at Airports* provides material that will be of use to police officers and staff with a responsibility for airport policing, supports this guidance.
ACPO 2010 Minimum Standards for Ports Policing

Table 1: Minimum Standards for Ports Policing
Table 1 outlines the seven minimum standards for ports policing already present in ACPO (2010) Protective Services Minimum Standards: Standards and Definitions [Restricted].

Although the document above outlines national standards, it is important to remember that the local Airport Security Framework will generate standards for service delivery.

The minimum standards in Table 1 are also directed at Special Branch and are relevant to policing of airports.

Table 1: Minimum Standards for Ports Policing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STANDARD</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>DEFINITION NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force ports policing assets are operating to agreed protocols and procedures.</td>
<td>Force has assessed its ports policing requirement, which has been informed by risk assessment.</td>
<td>PS/10/CT/17/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force and/or BCUs can evidence that ports policing officers contribute to wider Counter-Terrorism policing activity through the T&amp;C process.</td>
<td>PS/10/CT/17/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force and/or BCUs have protocols/Information Sharing Agreements for the sharing of ports specific information, intelligence products and data with partners eg, SyS, UKBA. These are reviewed in accordance with MoPI and the force IMS.</td>
<td>PS/10/CT/17/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force and/or BCUs support and contributes towards ports specific joint risk assessments with partners eg, Airport Security Plan, Maritime Port Security Authority Risk Assessment process.</td>
<td>PS/10/CT/17/04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force and/or BCUs can demonstrate operational working at ports with partners eg, UKBA, Port Authorities.</td>
<td>PS/10/CT/17/05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force and/or BCUs can evidence support for and alignment to ports specific National ACPO (TAM) Strategies eg, Police National Maritime Security Strategy, MANPADS Strategy.</td>
<td>PS/10/CT/17/06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force and/or BCUs liaise with the e-Borders programme and processes for dealing with alerts issued by the National Borders Targeting Centre.</td>
<td>PS/10/CT/17/07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3

Airport Policing Differences

Overview 14
Commercial 15
Terrorist Threat 15
Border Policing 16
Major and Critical Incidents 16
Airport Safety 16
Policing an airport has much in common with policing other environments. Officers and staff will come to an airport already in possession of much of the knowledge and experience and many of the skills required; this guidance identifies those areas where there is a difference.

International terrorist organisations have had an interest in aviation as a target for many years. As a result, counter-terrorist policing has a higher priority at airports than many other locations. Officers and staff at airports must consider threats from terrorists when engaged in all aspects of policing. Airport police units have an essential role to play in deterring terrorist acts at airports, preventing attacks on aircraft and reassuring the public and those working in aviation.

The police are one of the control authorities at an airport (the others are the UK Border Agency (UKBA), TRANSEC, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)). Policing at airports can be divided into three broad areas.

- **Policing the border**, which is generally carried out by Special Branch officers (or Counter Terrorism Intelligence Section (CTIS) in Scotland) and the UKBA;

- **Protective security**, carried out by uniformed officers, detective officers and police staff in partnership with the airport operators’ own staff and contractors;

- **General policing**, normally delivered by uniformed officers, detective officers and police staff who are not attached to Special Branches.

This guidance is designed primarily for officers and staff involved in protective security and general policing. Special Branch (SB) activities are not described in detail. It has been produced as part of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 implementation programme, which provides the framework for all airport policing, and stresses the importance of partnership working at airports. It requires all agencies involved in airport security to work together to identify risks and develop the appropriate mitigation, which may include a police input. The Act also requires that this is recorded in an Airport Security Plan (ASP).

Officers working in an airport environment for the first time will find that commercial pressures are very apparent. Airport operators pay directly for policing and so, quite legitimately, hold police commanders to account with a degree of detail that is very different from stakeholders in other environments. Police airport commanders are accountable to their own chief officer and subject to inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). They have a key relationship with the Security Executive Group (SEG). Commanders are responsible for the delivery of policing services agreed in any Police Service Agreement (PSA) with the airport operator. The SEG representative is accountable on behalf of the chief officer.
Most of the UK airports covered by the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP) 2010 contain a UK border. Airport police units face a unique set of challenges in supporting the agencies that control the border.

Safety and security standards at airports are described and defined in a number of documents, including:

- EC 300, which sets standards for the aviation industry across the European Union;
- NASP, which includes the consolidated single direction and defines the standards required to be met by UK airports.


In compliance with the Policing and Crime Act 2009 the police support these standards, which are agreed using the process described in the *Department for Transport/Home Office (2010) Airport Security Planning Guidance*, and recorded in the ASP. If a need for a dedicated policing presence is identified, this will be recorded in the PSA.

Police officers and staff at airports will find that there are differences from other environments which they need to take into account. The following section identifies some of these differences.

### Commercial

Airports in the UK are commercial operations and must return a profit for their owners. Airport operators are bound by law to pay for many of the policing services that elsewhere would be funded by taxation. Airport operators, therefore, have a strong and legitimate interest in police service delivery.

Senior officers and police staff managers will be involved in commercial negotiations that are almost unique in British policing. Police should expect to be scrutinised and held to account by the airport operators, who seek to ensure they are receiving an effective and efficient service.

Airport commanders may need a higher level of financial management skills and support than commanders of other units.

### Terrorist Threat

Historically, the aviation industry has been a key aspirational target for terrorist organisations. Airports may also become targets because they are:

- Crowded places;
- Part of the critical national infrastructure;
- Key economic targets;
- Part of the UK transport infrastructure;
- Places where people from many different racial groups gather.
Airports may also host individuals and organisations who are representatives of states threatened by terrorists. These factors combine to make counter-terrorism an essential element of policing an airport.

**Border Policing**

Many of the airports covered by this guidance contain a UK border. The existence of a border provides a number of unique challenges for the police, including:

- Human smuggling;
- Responding to information from e-Borders;
- International criminality;
- Opportunities for intelligence gathering.

**Major and Critical Incidents**

There is a legal requirement on airport operators to develop, exercise and review major incident plans in response to aircraft accidents and emergencies. As a result, major incident preparation has a higher profile at airports than in most other police environments.

The high-profile nature of airports means that many incidents and crimes will become critical incidents in circumstances which would not have merited this had the event occurred elsewhere.

The transient nature of many people travelling through an airport brings challenges in providing victim care and locating witnesses.

**Airport Safety**

Airports present a unique series of hazards to people. Some of these hazards may appear obvious, for example, the high speed of aircraft on the ground. Great care must be taken around jet engines and propellers, but proper training is essential. There are other hazards to people to consider such as volatile fuel, dangerous cargos and high-level access to aircraft. It is important, therefore, that all those working at airports receive appropriate training in airport safety.

Officers must also be trained to avoid compromising the safety of aircraft, through accidents on the ground, being on the wrong part of the airfield or inadvertently interfering with navigation aids.

Police officers and staff who are required to drive in the airside area will require training. Police vehicles taken airside require appropriate insurance.
Policing Standards at Airports

Crime Investigation 18
Counter-Terrorism 20
Firearms 22
Incident Management 23
Support to Central Search 24
Licensing 25
Operational and Contingency Planning 25
Public Order 26
Roads Policing 27
Training and Development 28
Performance Management 29
Neighbourhood Policing 29
Uniform Patrol 30
Policing at an airport has much in common with policing anywhere else. Officers should police airports in accordance with the law, ACPO policy, local policy and procedures. Officers and staff working at airports should use the knowledge, skills and experience they have acquired from their experience of policing elsewhere. The principles of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) should be followed throughout the strategic assessment of policing at airports.

This section identifies the main additional airport considerations for the following areas of policing:

- Crime Investigation;
- Counter-Terrorism;
- Firearms;
- Incident Management;
- Licensing;
- Operational and Contingency Planning;
- Public Order;
- Roads Policing;
- Training;
- Neighbourhood Policing;
- Uniform Patrol.

A checklist for each of these airport functions is also included. These checklists are based on good practice recommendations and are not ACPO standards.

Appendix 1 contains a table highlighting these relevant standards.

Crime Investigation

Crime at airports should be investigated to the same standards as crime committed in any other location, and in accordance with the ACPO publications shown in Appendix 1.

Crime Differences

Officers should consider the following specific points when investigating crime at airports.

The geographical boundaries of policing responsibilities should be clearly defined to identify areas of responsibility of the Airport Unit and that of surrounding Basic Command Units (BCU).
Security vulnerabilities that are identified, developed and exploited by criminals can offer benefits to terrorists. Forces should work with the airports Risk Advisory Group (RAG) to mitigate against vulnerabilities identified by criminal investigation.

Crime that occurs in flight may be the responsibility of airport units, or the wider force to investigate. UK officers may need to investigate crimes committed on board British registered aircraft anywhere in the world. UK officers will also be required to investigate allegations of crime committed on foreign registered aircraft if their airport is the aircraft’s first landing place after the incident.

In cases of theft of property in transit, whether freight, hold baggage or hand luggage, it may be difficult to identify whether the crime took place in the UK or abroad. The owners of freight that has been stolen may be reluctant to declare that the theft occurred within the UK as they will be liable for any tax or duty due on the stolen items. Forces should work closely with the airport operators and other commercial organisations to develop methods of dealing with theft.

The commercial effects of delaying flights means airlines may be reluctant to allow their staff to provide witness statements or delay flights to allow statements to be taken from passengers. Officers should consider efforts to expedite investigations. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) should also be developed with airlines and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to allow for effective and timely investigation.

The transient population of an airport means that in many cases police officers will only have one contact with victims of crime, many of whom may live some distance from the airport or will not be resident in the UK.

Some covert investigative techniques are more difficult to carry out in the airside environment. Surveillance can be compromised by officers needing to pass through security points when moving between airside and landside. The large, open nature of airport aprons also makes physical surveillance challenging. The placing of technical evidence gathering equipment in aircraft is problematic as it must be demonstrably safe in relation to interference with avionics and other aircraft systems. Forces need to work closely with airport operators and airlines to develop MoUs on covert policing techniques.

Crime data should be shared with airport security managers to support effective working relationships.
Checklist 1: Crime

- The force has defined the geographical area of policing that airport police units are responsible for.
- The force has procedures in place to investigate crimes committed in flight.
- The force has procedures in place to investigate theft of freight.
- The force has procedures in place to investigate travelling Organised Crime Groups (OCG) and share relevant intelligence with other airports.
- The force has procedures in place that provide an effective service to transient victims and witnesses.

Counter-Terrorism

There are two closely related but discrete areas of counter-terrorist policing at airports:

- Protection of the UK as a whole by identifying people entering the country at the UK border who are engaged in the commission of, preparation for, or instigation of acts of terrorism. This is primarily the responsibility of police Special Branch (SB) ports officers.

- The protection of people using the airport from acts of terrorism. This includes protecting passengers, employees and visitors from terrorist attack either at the airport or on aircraft departing from the airport. All four strands of the CONTEST strategy contribute to airport safety. Airport police units have a key part to play in supporting each strand.

Counter-terrorist policing at airports should follow the standards set out in the documents shown in Appendix 1.

Counter-Terrorism Differences

A key counter-terrorism difference at airports is that in some areas the police are not the lead agency. One example of this is that the search regimes in place to prevent terrorists taking items on board aircraft are the responsibility of the airport operators or their contractors.

Assessment of the terrorist threat at an airport should be based on nationally produced and disseminated material – currently the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) assessment and the common threat assessment, which is circulated by TRANSEC. Forces should not add their own local assessments without additional intelligence or evidence. Any local assessments should be openly discussed in the airport’s RAG meetings so that all parties can understand the threat and consequent risk.
Officers and staff will be engaged in aspects of counter-terrorist policing which are tailored to the needs of an airport environment. Examples include:

- Overt armed policing;
- Prevention of attacks on aircraft by terrorists using man portable air defence systems (MANPADS);
- Intelligence gathering and sharing;
- General counter-terrorism training for staff, covering a wide range of issues.

Checklist 2: Terrorism

- The force can evidence that airport officers contribute to wider counter-terrorism policing activity through the tasking and co-ordination process.
- The force supports and contributes towards the Airport Security Plan by active participation in the RAG and SEG.
- The force can evidence support for and alignment to ports specific National ACPO (TAM) Strategies, eg, the MANPADS Strategy.
- The force has procedures in place for making airport staff aware of their roles in preventing terrorism.
- Airport police forces share intelligence as far as possible with security cleared members of the RAG and SEG.
- The force considers putting in place an intelligence sharing protocol with other agencies to facilitate the flows of information at airports.
- The force has Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for activations for each type of radiological detection equipment portal. (Further information about radiological detection equipment can be found in ACPO (2011) Reference Handbook: Guidance on Policing at Airports, Section 13 Security Technology.)
- The force has a procedure in place for radiological detection equipment activations that escape from the port.
Firearms

The risk assessment process carried out by the RAG may identify a need for armed policing at an airport. If there is an agreed need, this should be recorded in the ASP and PSA. The force Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (STRA) and control strategy should also support this need.

If armed officers are to be deployed at an airport as part of regular policing, a standing authorisation is required. In common with all police firearms deployments, those at airports must be conducted in line with the national standards agreed by ACPO.

**Firearms Differences**

The public accept that they will see armed police at some airports and so the impact of deploying armed officers will be less than in many other environments.

The force firearms STRA needs to reflect the reasons for armed officers at the airport and there must be a clear audit trail in place.

The requirements of training and qualification, together with the costs of procuring, storing, and maintaining weapons and equipment, will result in firearms officers being more expensive to deploy than unarmed officers. The need for dedicated protection at the airport must, therefore, be identified by the RAG and included in the ASP.

Forces should ensure that there is an evidence-based procedure in place for deploying armed officers. When planning the daily deployment of armed officers, commanders should take the following into account:

- Vulnerabilities identified by the RAG and SEG;
- Agreed deployment in line with the ASP;
- Intelligence;
- Passenger movements;
- Flights of interest.

Officers working in an airport environment may be required to take possession of firearms from a number of sources. Firearms may legitimately come in to the UK as freight, as sporting goods in luggage or in the possession of foreign personal protection teams or aircraft protection personnel. Firearms in the latter two categories may need to be safely stored while their owners are in the UK.

Although in most cases the UKBA have primacy for securing firearms, the police may need to become involved at airports with no permanent UKBA presence. Forces should ensure that MoUs and SOPs are in place with the UKBA, airlines and airport operators.
Tactics may need to be amended for use in an airport environment. Any amended tactics should be exercised in an airport environment. Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) who could be deployed to an airport should train for tactical deployments there in order to become familiar with working in an airport environment.

**Note:** An example of firearms differences would be the tactics used for managing the release of a large number of hostages from an armed siege on an aircraft. **Forces should ensure their firearms tactics are fit for purpose for use at their airport.**

**Checklist 3: Firearms**

- STRA reflects the reasons for deploying armed officers at the airport.
- Local differences in tactics in the airport environment are identified and addressed.
- In conjunction with the UKBA, the force has a procedure in place for managing firearms entering the UK.
- The force has an evidence-based procedure in place for the deployment of routinely armed officers.
- There is a plan in place to manage risks imposed by using incapacitants, Taser and other less lethal options in an airport environment.

In common with all police deployment, the standards in the documents shown in **Appendix 1** should be followed:

**Incident Management**

**Incident Differences**

Officers working at airports need to be mindful of the commercial pressures on airport operators. An airport is an extremely time-critical environment. Delays and cancellations to flights can cause significant financial costs. Routine incidents need to be dealt with expeditiously, effectively and in line with force policy. Public and media interest in airports may result in greater scrutiny of police actions.

To ensure that incidents are managed effectively, it is essential that there is effective collaboration and liaison between the police and airport and airline staff at operational, tactical and strategic levels.

Forces should exercise incident plans to test and improve them. Exercises can be conducted as table top or live play, depending on the circumstances.

**Forces should consider including representatives of commercial organisations within their critical incident command structures.**
Checklist 4: Incident Management

- The force critical incident policy is embedded at the airport.
- The force takes account of commercial issues in delivering effective incident management with partners.
- The force can evidence support for, and alignment to, ports specific National ACPO (TAM) Strategies, eg, the MANPADS Strategy.
- The force liaises with the e-Borders programme and has processes in place for dealing with alerts issued by the National Borders Targeting Centre.

Support to Central Search

As part of the general security measures, the airport operators and staff operate one or more central search facilities where passengers and their baggage are searched prior to being admitted to the airside area. Trained security search officers make use of different techniques and equipment to search travellers.

While the main purpose of central search is to protect aircraft from terrorism, other offences may well be disclosed. Forces should ensure that they have agreed a policy with the airport security team on how officers and staff will support central staff. Airport commanders should consider the circumstances in Checklist 5 and develop appropriate procedures in conjunction with the airport security team.

Checklist 5: Procedures in Place

Does the force have procedures in place to manage the following contingencies in central search?
- Terrorist weapons found;
- Material suggesting a person is involved in terrorism found;
- Firearms found;
- Offensive weapons found;
- Prohibited articles found;
- Stolen goods found;
- Drugs found;
- Large amounts of currency found;
- Disruptive passenger in central search;
- Assault on members of central search;
- Public order offences in central search.
Licensing

Officers at airports should follow local force policy and procedures in relation to working with premises licensed to serve alcohol.

Licensing Differences

Alcohol is a significant factor in many incidents involving disruptive passengers.

Officers may have the opportunity to identify people who are drunk before they have boarded an aircraft, thereby preventing them from becoming disruptive passengers.

Airport units should consider working with airport operators and concession holders involved in the supply of alcohol at airports to educate the travelling public on the effects of alcohol at altitude and the consequences of being drunk on aircraft.

Checklist 6: Licensing

- The force has agreed a multi-agency procedure to identify and deal with people who are drunk before they board an aircraft.
- Premises which consistently supply alcohol to people who go on to become disruptive passengers are identified and appropriate action taken.
- The force should consider having an alcohol and flying awareness strategy in place.

Operational and Contingency Planning

In common with all police planning, the standards in the documents shown in Appendix 1 should be followed.

Planning Differences

There is a statutory requirement for airport operators to have plans for incidents and accidents involving aircraft. This requirement extends to exercising these plans. Forces should work closely with the airport operator in developing plans and should remember that for many airport contingency plans the Police Service will have a role to play but will not be the lead agency.
Checklist 7: Operational and Contingency Planning

- The force demonstrates effective operational and contingency planning with partners, eg, the UKBA and the airport operator.
- There is a contingency plan in place to manage an aircraft hijack.
- There is a contingency plan in place to manage an aircraft accident.
- There is a contingency plan in place to manage large-scale flight disruption.
- There is a contingency plan for the evacuation of a terminal.

Public Order

Public order policing at airports should be delivered in line with the standards outlined in Appendix 1.

Public Order Differences

Public order incidents at airports may be directly related to the airport, for example, during strikes or cancellations the airport may become overcrowded and people may become angry. The police may need to assist the operators in managing overcrowded terminals and facilities such as marquees provided to manage larger than normal queues. Officers may also need to take into account the crowding and special needs of travellers during events such as the Hajj.

Direct action protests targeted at airport expansion or animal exports may also bring additional challenges owing to the airport environment.

Public order incidents may also occur at airports as a result of events elsewhere such as large football tournaments.

Public order incidents at airports are likely to draw considerably more public and media attention than similar events elsewhere. Officers will also need to balance the rights to peaceful protest against the needs of the operator to run the airport effectively. Given the funding arrangements at airports, this may require particular sensitivity as many airports’ bylaws preclude peaceful protest on their premises.

A key difference of airport public order policing is that situations can arise very quickly and with little build-up. Often such incidents will be resolved equally quickly. Officers at airports need to respond to changing situations such as:

- VIPs moving through the airport and attracting large numbers of press and public;
- Problems should check-in reach capacity causing anxiety in crowds about missing flights;
- Temporary overcrowding in arrivals areas should flights arrive in an unusual pattern.
Checklist 8: Public Order Policing

- The force has a contingency plan in place to manage protest at the airport.
- The force has a contingency plan in place to manage public disorder at the airport.
- The force has a contingency plan in place to manage an airside incursion by protestors.

Roads Policing

All airports road policing should be undertaken in line with the standards shown in Appendix 1.

Roads Policing Differences

There are two major differences in roads policing at airports.

Airside Roads

The hazardous nature of the airside environment requires that all drivers who take vehicles airside will need to undergo a course of training and be examined on their skills and knowledge. Additional training is required to drive vehicles on the manoeuvring area. At some airports the police will be authorised to conduct this training and authorisation, whereas at others officers and staff will be trained and examined by representatives of the operator.

Road traffic collisions airside may require an investigation by the police in accordance with both the appropriate road traffic legislation and also any airport bylaws.

Police officers may need to investigate collisions between vehicles and aircraft on the ground in support of the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB).

In all collision investigations officers should be mindful of the high costs of any aircraft delays caused.

Road traffic collisions airside can also be investigated and managed by the Airfield Operations unit of the airport operator. Operators may enforce airside driving legislation and speed management. The Health and Safety Executive are also linked into this process.

Privately Owned Landside Roads

With a few exceptions, the majority of airports are privately owned. One consequence of this is that illegal parking cannot be de-criminalised as has been the case in most large towns and cities. As a result, the police will be responsible for enforcing parking regulations and bylaws. Close
liaison with the operators is essential to ensure security, safety and smooth running of the airport. Police officers may need to become involved in traffic management to a greater extent than in other environments.

**Checklist 9: Roads Policing**

- The force has sufficient police officers and staff trained in airside driving.
- The force has procedures in place to investigate airside collisions or to support partner agencies in doing so.
- The force works closely with the operator to ensure effective traffic management at the airport.

**Training and Development**

Training at airports should comply with force policies and procedures and should support the force’s agreed training strategy and the airport PSA.

Police forces with responsibility for airports should ensure that officers and staff working at airports have the skills and knowledge they need. This may include training delivered to members of airport units and training delivered to officers and staff who respond to incidents at the airport.

Training can be delivered by force training officers, by officers or staff attached to the airport or through commercial arrangements with the airport operator to use the operator’s staff.

Induction and continuation training for police supervisory staff with responsibility for airport policing is provided through the UK Airports Commanders Group (UKACG) conferences.

Development and supervision of staff should follow local force policy and procedure.

**Checklist 10: Training and Development**

- The force has completed an aviation training analysis for its officers and staff.
- The force provides regular training to officers and staff in line with aviation training needs analysis.
- Senior officers and staff attend the UKACG airport commanders’ conference.
- Supervisors and key post holders new to airport policing attend the UKACG training workshop.
Performance Management

A performance management framework should be set in accordance with local force policy and procedure but will also take into account the RAG and SEG. Aims and objectives should support the ASP. The ASP may set some delivery standards directly.

In order to provide greater transparency, forces may need to share information about overtime, sickness levels and other relevant information with the airport operator and members of the RAG and SEG.

Airport units are subject to inspection by HMIC, and the minimum standards set in *ACPO (2010) Protective Services: Minimum Standards and Definitions [Restricted]* will apply.

Checklist 11: Performance Management

- There is a performance management framework in place.
- There is an agreed process for sharing performance data with the airport operator.

Neighbourhood Policing

The principles of neighbourhood policing apply equally at airports where police officers and staff need to work with the communities who work at the airport.

The principles and standards for neighbourhood policing are set out in *Home Office (2008) From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing Our Communities Together*. Further information can also be found in *Casey (2008) Engaging Communities in Fighting Crime: A Review by Louise Casey*.

Neighbourhood Policing Differences

Forces will have to demonstrate the value added by neighbourhood policing initiatives to the airport operators, given the costs involved in neighbourhood policing. An agreement will also need to be reached on the extent of airport policing as many stakeholders will not be based within the direct footprint, eg, catering companies, off airport parking and transport hubs.

The model of neighbourhood policing adopted will depend on the size of the airport. Where there is a dedicated police presence, neighbourhood policing should be delivered by the airport policing team and not by a separate team from the host BCU. Forces need to ensure that neighbourhood police teams are fully apprised of the ASP and PSA, and can deliver protective security while engaged in neighbourhood duties.

A key partner in any airport neighbourhood policing model will be the airport operator’s security team.
Checklist 12: Neighbourhood Policing

- Policing at the airport supports the force neighbourhood policing strategy.
- The airport neighbourhood policing model takes the operator’s views and needs into account.

Uniform Patrol

Uniform patrol at airports requires the same skills and knowledge as elsewhere. Some of the key documents outlining the standards to be delivered by patrol officers are shown in Appendix 1.

Uniform Patrol Differences

Some patrol officers may be routinely armed at the airport. Forces should have policy and procedures in place to provide guidance for armed officers dealing with incidents that do not require firearms, to ensure the security of weapons.

Levels of policing and workforce mix should take into account the risk assessment process carried out by the RAG and SEG, and should directly support the delivery of the ASP. When developing the workforce mix, forces should consider the roles of the airport operator’s security staff and be conscious of the possibility of duplication of effort.

Checklist 13: Uniformed Patrol

- There are procedures in place to guide armed officers attending incidents that do not require them to be armed.
- There are risk-based and locally appropriate integrated patrol regimes for:
  - landside roads;
  - airport rail and bus stations;
  - airport car parks;
  - terminal landside areas;
  - cargo areas;
  - fuel farms;
  - security restricted area and critical part;
  - airport perimeter fence.
Appendix 1

Relevant Standards
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPO (2004) Code of Practice on the National Intelligence Model</td>
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<td>ACPO (2005) Hate Crime: Delivering a Quality Service</td>
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<td>ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical Incident Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on the Policing of Roads</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO (2008) Guidance on The Lawful and Effective Use of Covert Techniques – The Legal Framework and Covert Operational Management (RESTRICTED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO (2008) Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO (2009) Guidance on Command and Control</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>ACPO (2009) Practice Advice on Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO (2009) Practice Advice on the Management and Use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO (2010) Guidance on Police Mobilisation (RESTRICTED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home Office (2008) From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing our Communities Together</td>
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Appendix 2

Directed Airports under the Single Consolidated Direction (Aviation) 2010
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**RAF Stations**

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<td>Odiham</td>
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<td>Leuchars</td>
<td>Valley</td>
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Appendix 3

Abbreviations and Acronyms
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAIB</td>
<td>Air Accidents Investigation Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPOS</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPO (TAM)</td>
<td>ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFO</td>
<td>Authorised Firearms Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Airport Security Plan</td>
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<td>BCU</td>
<td>Basic Command Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Civil Aviation Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTIS</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Intelligence Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
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<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>Man Portable Air Defence System</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memoranda of Understanding</td>
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<td>NASP</td>
<td>National Aviation Security Programme</td>
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<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Intelligence Model</td>
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<td>OCG</td>
<td>Organised Crime Group</td>
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<td>PSA</td>
<td>Police Services Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAG</td>
<td>Risk Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SB</td>
<td>Special Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEG</td>
<td>Security Executive Group</td>
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<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious Organised Crime Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRA</td>
<td>Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment</td>
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<td>UKACG</td>
<td>UK Airport Commanders Group</td>
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<td>UKBA</td>
<td>UK Border Agency</td>
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Appendix 4

References


ACPO (2008) Practice Advice on Stop and Search in Relation to Terrorism. London: NPIA.


