Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavors?

Martin Gallagher

Master of Literature in Terrorism Studies

Submitted: 20/12/2011
Terrorism and Organised Crime: Co-operative Endeavors?

Martin Gallagher

Master of Literature in Terrorism Studies

Submitted: 20/12/2011

I hereby certify that this dissertation, which is approximately 15000 words in length, has been composed by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. This project was conducted by me via distance learning at the University of St Andrews from September 2010 to December 2011 towards fulfillment of the requirements of the University of St Andrews for the degree of Master of Literature in Terrorism Studies under the supervision of Peter Lehr

Date 20/12/2011

Signature of candidate ……………………………………………………………
Abstract

It has been suggested that a nexus between terrorist groups and those involved in organised crime exists. This study explores the co-operative possibilities that exist between these phenomena, focusing specifically on the level of assistance participants in organised criminal activity might provide to those engaged in terrorism, the ‘initial nexus’. This was achieved initially through interviews of subject matter experts with knowledge of the organised crime and counter terrorism situation in Scotland. Thereafter, law enforcement personnel who investigate serious and organised crime were interviewed and their opinions sought in respect of the likely actions of those they investigate. The data gathered is subject to analysis and comment provided as to what level of co-operation between those involved in organised crime and terrorism can be expected; what motivational factors may have a bearing on the level of co-operation provided; and discussion of ‘tipping points’, ethical or otherwise, where the withdrawal of co-operation could occur, providing opportunities for increasingly successful law enforcement intervention.
Chapter 1

Literature Review

Terrorism and Organised Crime are phenomena that share a number of characteristics, both in relation to academic issues concerning their study and also their operational mechanisms.

Academically, the same definitional issues that haunt the field of terrorism research bedevil work on organised crime. The problems caused by a lack of definition in terrorism research are well documented (Silke, 2001; Schmid, 2004; Sinai, 2007). Similar issues are also considered at length in relation to organised crime (Van Duyne, 1996; Jamieson, 2005; Wright, 2006; Shelley et al. 2005; Madsen, 2009), where familiar difficulties regarding the achievement of a consensus, such as competing interests, are cited.

Although early definitions of organised crime in the 1960’s focused on the hierarchical known organised crime type, typified by the United States Mafia and studied in seminal depth by Donald Cressey (1969), definitions quickly moved on and Albini provided the following:

“Rather than a criminal secret society, a criminal syndicate consists of a system of loosely structured relationships functioning primarily because each participant is interested in furthering his own welfare”

(Albini, 1971, pp. 288)

Although controversial at the time, Albini’s form of definition now appears widely accepted in academic circles, particularly through the end of the cold war and the ‘globalisation’ accompanied by widespread insecurity the world has experienced since. Through this globalising effect, and reflecting Albini’s views, organised crime organisational dynamics are acknowledged as having changed dramatically, with the hierarchy of the initially identified groups such as the Sicilian mafia having transformed with “most organised crime groups now operating as loose networked affiliations” (Perri et al, 2009, pp. 27). Ridley notes that the collapse of the Soviet Union has led, in Europe, to the fundamental altering of old crime hierarchies as “smaller, equally ruthless organised crime groups have become apparent forming confederations of associations based upon ethnic and linguistic affinity…. (with) individual groups of criminals operating, either continuously or from time to time, in some form of loose association of neo-vertical criminal structures.” (Ridley, 2008, pp. 28) In agreement Stanislawski and Herman note “criminal organisations have begun to evolve from hierarchical structures with a small cadre of leaders at the top to more network-based groups whose functions and activities are more dispersed.” (Stanislawski and Herman, 2004) In Northern Europe, in particular, “legal and criminal business patterns develop pragmatically along trusted networks of friends and connections” (Van Duyne, 1996, pp. 344).

The collapse of the Soviet Union also ushered in a period of adjustment for many established terrorist organisations as their direct or indirect sources of funding disappeared, forcing them to adapt (Roth and Sever, 2007), as to continue functioning in any capacity as a terrorist group funding is a necessity (Bovenkerek and Chakra,
Globalisation, with its loosening of state control, the end of established patterns of organised crime and terrorism structures, and the loss of conventional sources of terrorist finance have led to increasing opportunities for interaction between relevant illegal actors and groups that never occurred previously, with ever increasing ease of transportation and communication assisting this process. (Stanislawski and Herman, 2004; Makarenko, 2004; Jamieson, 2005; Bratton, 2007)

Terrorism’s reliance on organised crime for finance has been made clear by individuals such as Abdullah Ocalan, former leader of the PKK, who has stated that the organisation relies heavily on its ties to drug trafficking to finance the purchase of weapons (Roth and Sever, 2007). Similarly, official Irish Police reports make it clear that the Continuity IRA has established working partnerships with Eastern European sex traffickers, sharing smuggling routes with them and being involved in assisting with their criminal enterprises (Byrne, 2010). Indeed, terrorists have acted as illicit commodity brokers to further their own ends, with ETA ensuring the lowering the price of cocaine and guaranteeing commodity delivery to Italy through contacts with Columbian drug cartels in exchange for weapons from the Campania organised crime cartels (Saviano, 2007).

In relation to organised crime, an excellent example that highlights its truly global nature is provided by Shelley (1995) who writes of a network moving cannabis that involved criminals from Pakistan, Africa, Israel, Eastern Europe and Latin America.

The striking similarities of the operating structure of terrorists and organised criminals, in their style of co-operating and maintaining operating structures are noted by Robinson (2003), who found that in common with organised international drug traffickers, modern terrorist groups are highly compartmentalised, resilient and have the ability to make quick necessary changes. Sageman’s (2005) observations on the current jihadist terrorist structures directly correlate with the characteristics noted by Robinson. Bovenkerek and Chakra (2006) also accept that the structural similarities are striking, while drawing the reader back to the ever important distinctions of their criminal purpose of organised crime versus the politically motivated violence of terrorism, and emphasise that this is an important distinction to maintain.

Perri et al. (2009) posit that organised crime is at its most prevalent where the rule of law is at its weakest and where law enforcement performance is poor. They also note its particular prevalence where there are significant ethnic minority groups in a community that law enforcement have difficulty policing. Similarly, in relation to modern terrorism, expatriate communities are the recruiting ground of the current jihad against the west, the influence of friendship, kinship, shared isolation through expatriate experience has led to “seventy percent of the terrorists join(ing) the jihad as expatriates” (Sageman, 2005, pp. 5)

Although these similarities in structure and personnel make up are now acknowledged, in terms of definition the phenomena are very distinct, as Bovenkerek and Chakra (2006) caution. On an intellectual level terrorism and organised crime have little in common “since the former is based on ideological, religious or political principles, while the latter on profit motives” (Madsen, 2009, pp. 64). Jamieson (2005) agrees that both phenomena need to be seen as distinct concepts, while both
authors acknowledge that either phenomena can utilise the methods and tactics of the other, and do. For Madsen in analysing groups it is important to remain focussed on motivation, as “the intent for specific acts committed by two groups might overlap, their motivations do not” (Madsen, 2009, pp. 78). As Dishman also observes, “simply put, drug barons and revolutionary leaders do not walk the same path to success. Terrorists may commit kidnappings or extort local businesses, but their fundamental goal remains to shape or alter the political landscape in some manner. Transnational criminal organisations may also employ terrorism as a tactical weapon, but their end game is to avoid prosecution and make money” (Dishman, 2001, pp. 45).

Byrne notes that it is in “regions with weakened social, political and economic controls” (Byrne, 2009, pp. 11), that co-operation is often most obviously prevalent and that where it does exist it is very fluid in nature with the nature of the relationship between groups in no way formal.

Although the co-operation may be most overt in weak states it does occur in more stable regions, but particularly in “parts of otherwise viable states where law and order is absent or compromised, including urban quarters populated by diaspora communities” (Perri et al. 2009).

Co-operation often takes the form of the provision of smuggling routes by organised criminals to terrorists. Examples of this are the Mexican drug cartels allowing Hezbollah to utilise its routes to smuggle persons and narcotics (Perri et al., 2009; Conery, 2009); Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company providing smuggling routes into India to Al-Qaeda (Clarke and Lee, 2008); the Naples based Camorra Mafia moving Al-Qaeda throughout Europe (Chepesiuk, 2007); and, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan utilising Afghan criminals to move Heroin into Russia (Makarenko, 2004). Attempts to establish further co-operative routes have also been subject to law enforcement interdiction as Mali origin Al-Qaeda operatives discovered when engaging with individuals they thought represented FARC but were in fact agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (Sherwell, 2010).

Further co-operation is likely and evidence suggests “terrorists see it as logical and cost-effective to use the skills, contacts, communications and smuggling routes of established criminal networks rather than trying to gain the requisite experience and knowledge themselves” (Shelley et al., 2005, pp. 62). Specialist services, such as the provision of forged or falsified documents, such as passports (Botha, 2011); accountancy; legal advice (Robinson, 2003); access to corrupt officials (Shelley et al., 2005); people trafficking/ smuggling (Wright, 2006); and, even arms may often be provided (Makarenko, 2004). This was recently illustrated through cases where it was suspected “dissident republicans succeeded in buying ‘heavy’ weapons from terrorist arms-dealing mobsters in south east Europe” (McArdle, 2010) and an informant reporting, following the closure of the Reichstag in Berlin, that “two jihadists already located in Germany had sourced equipment they needed for an attack on the Reichstag from criminal groups in the Balkans” (Swami, 2010). The well documented case of the Medellin cartel employing terrorists of the ELN to carry out car bombings (Jamieson, 2005) illustrates how this use of specialists can lead to two way co-operation, while in Europe the provision of pipe bombs by dissident republicans to drug gangs is becoming an ever more common occurrence (Cusack, 2009).
These co-operations can in fact lead to a form of metamorphosis, and to consider where a group stands we have the distinctions outlined by Jamieson thus:

“(A) The self-financing of terrorist groups by typical ‘organised crime-type activities
(B) Pragmatic Collaboration between terrorist and organised crime groups for mutually beneficial ends
(C) The use of terrorism by organised crime groups for political purposes”

(Jamieson, 2005, pp. 165)

but which are in turn further illustrated in the literature through Makarenko’s scale,

![Diagram](image.png)

Figure 1, ‘The Crime Terror Continuum’, Makarenko (2004)

Where, in both illustrations, terrorist groups such as FARC and PIRA, increasingly become involved in criminal activity, either or initially to fund their cause where as circumstances alter they mutate into post-terrorism organisations, who now largely operate as criminal organisations driven by profit (Byrne, 2009). These organisations have fallen into Makarenko’s ‘black hole’, his point 4, and become mutated organisations, no longer serving their original purpose and utilising tactics of both phenomena. An excellent examples of organised crime’s move to the use of terror tactics for political purposes (point C for Jamieson and point 2 for Makarenko) are the earlier mentioned bombing tactics of the ELN, and the similar bombing tactics adopted by the Sicilian mafia (Jamieson, 2005).

In considering level 1 of Makarenko’s scale, which would encompass Jamieson’s point B, Madsen (2009) considers how terrorists would conceivably purchase forged documents while organised crime groups would in turn perhaps purchase explosives from terrorists. He sees advantages and disadvantages to both of such arrangements, the disadvantages perhaps leading to dissolution of the arrangement or a group
moving to point 2 on Makarenko’s scale (A or C in Jamieson’s options) as expertise is moved ‘in house’ within a group.

The similarities between terrorism and organised crime give an indication of two phenomena that have common features and pose interesting queries as to interaction on encounters. For instance, just as there are many similarities this is not to say that co-operation will in any way always be the norm. Byrne notes the rivalry that often exists between organised crime groups and terrorists when terrorist groups encroach onto established criminal activity, such as the PKK’s bloody participation in the Heroin trade in Turkey (Byrne, 2009) or PIRA’s murder of established criminals in its drive to establish hegemony over the Irish drugs market (Cusack, 2006).

Rivalry may not be the only issue causing concern over co-operation to those involved in either phenomenon. An agenda of radical political change may well lead to significant altering of the norms of a state’s functioning, to the detriment of the profit of an organised crime enterprise. (Jamieson, 2005; Byrne, 2009) Terrorist activity in a well functioning state will bring with it considerable additional law enforcement attention, attention that could, through investigative endeavour, become focussed on those co-operating with the terrorist group. This is a considerable risk factor for any organised criminal embarking on co-operation (Chepesiuk, 2007). Organised crime in any society functions with some form of law enforcement consideration on the part of the criminals, be that from carefully planned avoidance, as noted by Albini (1975) in relation to ‘successful’ Scottish organised criminals, to parasitic co-operative assistance through corruption. Where an organised crime group functions away from protection provided through state corruption any contact with law enforcement can prove devastating. However, were the activities of the terrorist group likely to adversely affect law enforcement agencies abilities to function this may prove beneficial to the organised crime group both in hiding their involvement in the interaction but also in terms of assisting their core functioning. Similarly, knowledge of a terrorists groups activities may become a very useful bargaining tool with law enforcement should an organised crime group’s core functioning be compromised; a tactic of holding intelligence on confederates for ‘get out of jail’ purposes has been utilised by organised criminals for some time (Albini, 1975). In addition, many organised criminals can be quite “dull” and despite the illicit nature of the commodity in which they trade be otherwise very risk averse (Van Duyne, 1996). The degree to which such organised criminals might become involved in any way with terrorists is highly questionable. Just as no terrorist group is identical, neither is any organised crime group.

Jamieson (2005) sees co-operative endeavours as inevitable given the specialisations available to both groups, but overall see such co-operations as wholly pragmatic and only likely to last as long as there is a tangible benefit outweighing risk to both sides in the arrangement. Clarke and Lee (2008) go further, seeing these partnerships as becoming indissoluble and insightfully question how long Makarenko’s scale will hold true, with the conflagration between what once would have been regarded as distinct groupings on such a scale becoming ever closer.

An interesting quote in respect of the interaction, reported to have been made by a senior mafia figure in relation to what level of co-operation his organisation would provide to terrorists is that “The Mafia will help whoever can pay” (Stuart, 2006).
Also of substantial interest is the suggestion that “British criminal gangs who have admitted terrorist organisations (including PIRA), flushed with cash, into their substantial black markets.” (Kochan, 2005, pp. 83-84)

Putting all matters outlined into a conceivable scale of potential co-operation is difficult; however, when one considers that Ridley (2008) quotes a UK Metropolitan Police Spokesman from the Counter Terrorist Command as saying that two thirds of the organised crime groups in the UK have an involvement with terrorism, this presents a massive potential target group.

It is hoped that this paper will further explore these assertions, taking into account with its subjects the wider aspects of criminal behaviour and long term continuance, providing greater insight into the level of co-operation that could well exist.
Chapter 2

Method

The literature review conducted raised a number of areas of interest within the possible connections between terrorism and organised crime. However, to investigate them all would far exceed the limits of this dissertation. With this in mind it was necessary to identify an area within the potential connections between the phenomena that would benefit from a level of research appropriate to this paper.

An area within the potential connections between terrorism and organised crime that was viewed as particularly lending itself to this level of research was the initial amalgam of the phenomena, the point of ‘first contact’, for Makarenko (2004) point one on the ‘Crime Terror Continuum’, for Jamieson (2005), point B where pragmatic collaboration occurs to suit both parties. For ease and clarity, these two separately described points of intersection will be collectively referred to as the ‘initial nexus’ throughout this paper.

Information regarding the functioning of such a relationship, beyond the existence of the relationship itself, is scarce. It does not appear that it has been a primary area of research focus and when incidences may occur they would be likely known primarily to law enforcement bodies, which may retain the information for obvious operational benefit. It is certainly the case that there are few prosecutions resulting from such relationships, although the United States DEA interdiction of Mali based al-Qaeda operative’s highlights law enforcement activity in the area (Sherwell, 2010).

Gaining access to anyone involved in such activities within the scope of the ‘initial nexus’ would be extremely difficult. By virtue of both activities nature their participants are secretive. A lack of prosecutions also necessarily entails a lack of individuals in custody and potentially accessible to a research project. The safety of any researcher has also to be considered.

With this in mind it was originally proposed that this would be a largely hypothetically based study. To gain a greater insight into how organised criminals might interact with a terrorist group during an ‘initial nexus’ arrangement a group of incarcerated persons were to be identified and a suitable questionnaire constructed, drawing on the information gathered during the literature review, to provide an insight into what form their interactions might take. To provide balance to the views gathered a similar questionnaire was to be constructed for police officers with experience of serious and organised crime where their opinions on how serious and organised criminals might act would be gathered in tandem. The overall results would then be compared and assessed to ascertain what insight could be gleaned into how an ‘initial nexus’ relationship might function.

The researcher was successful in gaining approval from the National Offender Management Service to interview twenty five serious and organised criminals incarcerated in England. However, a number of logistical matters, including ethical considerations resulting from the researcher’s status as a serving police officer, prevented these interviews from taking place.
As a result an alternative research strategy to investigate the ‘initial nexus’ was devised. Arrangements were made for interviews to be conducted with senior staff from Scottish law enforcement bodies, handling intelligence regarding serious and organised crime and in addition those with a similar responsibility concerning counter terrorism. For these interviews clear themes that emerged from the literature review were provided to the interviewees and thereafter their opinions, based on confidential research and intelligence reports, were gathered in a manner that was suitable for publication in a non-restricted document. By conducting these interviews the researchers aim was to gather a true picture of the Scottish law enforcement understanding of the ‘initial nexus’ within the country.

The themes that were presented for discussion were:

- Group operating structures
- The degree of known interaction between organised crime and terrorism
- The nature of any known interactions
- The participants opinions on an ‘initial nexus’ between the phenomena

Notes were made by the researcher during these interviews, which were not audio recorded, at the request of the participants.

The subject experts provided clear information on the current understanding by law enforcement of the ‘initial nexus’, by utilising confidential documents to inform their positions.

To provide depth to this information, an insight into how the ‘initial nexus’ might function were it found to exist still required contact with individuals who could provide an insight into the operations of organised crime. With the potential to interview persons incarcerated for relevant offences removed the researcher determined that interviewing police officers with expertise in this area would yield the best possible results. Consequently, interviews and a focus group were organised with

- Five senior detective officers with experience of investigating serious crime
- Nine detectives and plain clothes officers who investigate organised crime
- Two detectives who work with Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) reporting on serious and organised crime
- A detective officer with a previous career as a criminal justice social worker

To gather the relevant opinions from these police officers a questionnaire was constructed. The questionnaire began by assuring the participant that their views were being sought and information about specific individuals was not being gathered. This was intended to alleviate any concerns the participant might have, ensuring they supply information in a generic form, while knowing that it may relate to specific incidents or investigations they would not be at liberty to divulge details of.

The initial stages of the questionnaire were designed to assess how the participants perceive organised criminals make new contacts and how an initial relationship might function. These opinions were being gathered to ascertain if an understanding of how an ‘initial nexus’ might form can be discerned. These questions follow the theme ‘Organised Crime Interaction with Contacts’. The questions utilised were:
- How far from the home of those involved in organised crime are those they tend to associate with based?
- How frequently do you think they make new contacts?
- How do you think they make new contacts? (Specific premises type?)
- Is there anything about a new contact that you think would put an organised criminal off of working with them?
- What actions do you think an organised criminal would undertake to establish trust with a new contact?

To provide a break from this consideration of organised crime functioning and move to the focus on the area of exploration, the ‘initial nexus’, the following question is utilised:

- What does the term “terrorism” mean to you?

Having then moved from the sole consideration of organised crime into the area of the ‘initial nexus’ the questions are utilised to ascertain where any potential ‘initial nexus’ might come, within a theme of ‘Scottish Organised Criminals and Terrorism’. The questions were as follows:

- Is there any cause at present where the title “terrorism” is applied to methods employed that you believe Scottish based organised criminals may have strong views on, either positive or negative?
- Is there any conflict currently ongoing anywhere in the world that you believe Scottish based organised criminals sympathise with participants being described as terrorists?
- In what circumstances could you see someone involved in serious criminal activity becoming involved with terrorists?
- What form do you think that relationship might take?

To gain further understanding of how an ‘initial nexus’ relationship might function two hypothetical sets of questions were utilised. The first draws on the known use of false passports by terrorists, who were suspected of obtaining them through organised crime contacts (Botha, 2011) and attempts to gain insight into how a specialist associate of an OCG might be utilised in an interaction, within the theme ‘Specialist Services – Associate’. The questions were:

- If an organised criminal had access to the services of a specialist, such as someone very able at making false UK passports, what do you think an organised criminal would need from a new contact to make an introduction to their specialist?
- (Taking previous answer as basis) If, through subsequent personal dealings with the passport maker, an organised criminal became aware that their contact was making extensive use of their services do you think they would try to find out what their contact was using them for?
- If a terrorist incident, such as a bombing, subsequently occurred and the organised criminal learned that their specialist had provided passports to those involved what actions, if any, do you think the organised criminal would take?
The second set of hypothetical questions concern how an individual organised criminal might react as their relationship through an ‘initial nexus’ develops. As can be seen these questions follow a developing scenario for the relationship in an attempt to identify from participants at what point, if any, they think that the relationship would no longer be tenable within the theme ‘Contact Identified as Terrorist’. The questions were:

- Imagine an organised criminal has established a contact, with whom they have a good relationship and are making a fair profit from dealing with them.
- They learn that the contact has radical views
- If they suspected that through their association they were furthering the cause of their contact, how do you think they would react? (Utilise previous answers to bolster question, if appropriate)
- If their contacts group were obviously coming under increased media attention how comfortable do you think they would be with maintaining their relationship? (Utilise previous answer to bolster question, if appropriate)
- If they suspected the contacts group were known to the Police how comfortable do you think they would be with maintaining their relationship? (Utilise previous answer to bolster question, if appropriate)
- If they suspected their contacts group were involved in preparing for terrorist activities how comfortable do you think they would be with maintaining their relationship? (Utilise previous answer to bolster question, if appropriate)
- If they suspected the activities they were carrying out were indirectly assisting the preparation for terrorist activity how comfortable would they be with maintaining their relationship? (Utilise previous answer to bolster question, if appropriate)
- If they suspected the activities they were carrying out were directly assisting the preparation for terrorist activity how comfortable would they be with maintaining their relationship? (Utilise previous answer to bolster question, if appropriate)
- If the group their contact was associated with carried out a Terrorist act in the UK, what action, if any, do you think they would undertake? (Utilise previous answer to bolster question, if appropriate)
- If their contact was identified in the media as being involved in a terrorist act what action, if any, do you think they would undertake? (Utilise previous answer to bolster question, if appropriate)
- Reflecting on the answers you have provided at what point, if any, do you think that the organised criminal might approach the authorities with concerns over their contact
- At what point, if any, do you think an approach by the authorities would result typically in an organised criminal providing information on the activities they had knowledge of?

The participants were then asked if they wished to return to any particular matter discussed during the interview. After any further discussion the participants were thanked for their assistance.
The interviews were audio recorded and notes were also taken, other than with participants IK and IL, where notes only were taken.

The literature review, subject expert information based on current police reports, and the opinion of the questionnaire participants provided triangulation of evidence concerning the ‘initial nexus’. This evidence is thereafter discussed, analysed and comment given in chapter 3 of this dissertation.

A full breakdown of the participants can be found at Appendix 1.

A list of abbreviations utilised throughout the dissertation can be found at Appendix 2.

Subject Matter Expert Interviews

Interview IA

Subject IA is a senior intelligence officer with a national (Scotland) overview.

In our discussions she made clear that the matters described concerned terrorism only and did not relate to domestic extremism, which had to be viewed as a distinct phenomenon.

IA first reported on matters based on research. She thereafter provided opinion based on work in the intelligence arena and specifically concerning the possible nexus between serious organised crime and terrorism.

IA reported that in terms of structure Serious Organised Crime Groups (SOCGs) are often perceived to be hierarchical. She believed that this was sometimes the case often when there are familial or social bonds within the group. However most SOCGs would best be described as a network and are very fluid in their apparent membership and operating tactics.

Members of SOCGs often come and go, at one time being involved in serious disputes and then shortly thereafter participating together in large scale drug purchases. Non-indigenous (non-UK originating) groups have very different and varied structures and operating tactics. They are very difficult for law enforcement to penetrate and this is particularly the case where membership of groups is transient in a given geographic area.

In relation to terrorism the police’s knowledge is greater in respect of Irish related terrorism as this is where, historically, the Police have been successful.

The perceived cross over of SOCG with terrorist nominals of interest is perceived to be fairly small but this needs to be seen as indicative in the context of available intelligence.

The vast majority of cross over between SOCG and terrorist nominals is in relation to Irish related terrorism. Within this cross over by far the largest proportion of cross over related to Loyalist terrorism. There are significant Scottish links to Northern
Ireland and this is particularly the case with the west coast. The overall figures for
cross over though do indicate nominals of interest across Scotland’s central belt.

The nexus between SOCG and terrorism remains minimal in the context of current
threats.

The assessment of the cross over’s that have been identified are that they are mainly
social in nature, not terrorist related.

Some new associations between SOCGs and terrorist linked nominals have been
identified recently. These are in geographical areas where reporting had not occurred
previously.

International terrorism features some of the trends seen in relation to Irish related
terrorism. Within this area minimal crossovers are also seen to be occurring, and
where they do they relate to criminality, typically drugs importation and fraud, not
terrorism.

Individuals have been identified with connections to known commodity routes. These
individuals were suspected of involvement in drugs importation and also had
associations to terrorist investigations. However, the assessed connection was not of a
terrorist nature.

There was a known case of an individual within a SOCG being offered a criminal
commodity by individuals who were suspected sympathisers of an Asian based
terrorist group.

IA believes that the research based work discussed must be seen as indicative. She
believed that increased collaborative work is needed and suspects that through this,
further crossovers between SOCGs and terrorism will be found. She further suspected
that these cross over’s would though be likely to be concerning criminal and social
matters.

IA believes that terrorist networks with links to Scotland are very structured and
would have the potential to access documentation (such as illegitimate passports)
through corruption in state officials rather than through approaches to Scottish based
SOCGs.

Terrorist connected SOCGs working in Scotland work for money. They may well
keep any terrorist associations and sympathies secret from Scottish based SOCGs they
have connections with.

IA was of the opinion that members of SOCGs are so greedy when pursuing profit
that if an association was found to have sympathies to a terrorist group it would be
unlikely any moral conscience resulting in disassociation would occur. However, if
the terrorist group were active in Scotland this ambivalence may well change.

IA thought that if associates of SOCG were involved in terrorism in Scotland they
may well alter their relationship with them but that this would be most likely after any
incident had occurred.
IA was definitive in her opinion that some SOCGs are using terrorists for their purposes, utilising individuals with established smuggling routes and inroads into corruption for their criminal purposes, probably without the SOCG knowing of their associates actual backgrounds. It is very much in SOCGs interests to maintain these relationships. The SOCGs involved in such relationships are of significant standing, well connected and long established.

IA suspects that non-indigenous SOCG linked to terrorism are the main threat. They have no loyalty to Scotland and their only purpose is to make money. It is in this that their threat is greatest.

IA concluded the interview by reiterating that the SOCG and terrorism crossover is an area that requires greater research and analysis.

Interview IG and IH

Subject IG is a senior analyst focussing on Terrorism.
Subject IH is a senior Detective in the Counter Terrorism environment.

Both IG and IH were of the clear opinion that there are crossovers between terrorism and organised crime. Their view was that these crossovers are minimal but do exist.

For IG and IH the analysis of the link between terrorism and organised crime is an ongoing process. Analysis to date has highlighted links, although these are minimal. The majority of the identified links relate to Northern Irish centred terrorist activity. A small number of identified links relate to international terrorism.

Most links appear to be social/criminal in nature. There do not appear to be crossovers of tactics or the provision of expert advice between spheres. IG and IH were of the opinion that if this were occurring they would expect to be aware. They would not expect to see an organised crime group providing advice to persons involved in international terrorism.

IG and IH stated that, in their experience, there were significant distinctions between the behaviour of those involved in Irish related terrorism and those involved in international terrorism.

IG and IH were of the opinion that international terrorists typically utilise trusted associations to further their ends, even for behaviour that would be classed as criminal rather than terrorism related per se. They would not see facilitators for activity coming from out with international terrorists own networks.

Persons in Scotland connected to international terrorism do not associate with indigenous Scottish organised crime groups. They also do not generally feature on Scottish intelligence systems that are directed towards criminality.

It has been found that individuals who are becoming of interest in relation to international terrorism who have a criminal past have made a clear and discernible break from it. Generally, those have formed extremist views have also been found not
to have returned to criminality or continued criminal associations. As analysis currently stands the previous criminality of these individuals relates to minor offences. There are no known individuals in this category who were previously members of organised crime groups.

In relation to the Asian population in Scotland it forms a very small part of the overall demographic, both in terms of populations and in terms of criminality. IG and IH were of the opinion that this is the community that in relation to current international terrorism one may have thought there would be links between terrorists and organised crime groups. Such links are not apparent in this community.

Overall, IG and IH perceived international terrorists to be very well organised, and their behaviours would be such that they would be unlikely to make links to indigenous Scottish based organised crime groups. They believed they would establish their own facilitator networks. Due to them not wanting to draw attention to themselves they would be less likely to become involved in criminality and commitment to cause (and its consequences) is such that they would be unlikely to seek personal financial gain.

Investigations show that individuals involved in Irish related terrorism have clear links to criminality, although it has not been shown that these activities have direct links to their terrorist activities. It is suspected these activities may be purely for personal gain.

Historically, there are loyalist connections to organised crime in Scotland. Weaponry and drugs have gone from the mainland UK to Ireland, from criminal associates not connected to terrorism.

Overall, IG and IH were firmly of the opinion that loyalist terrorism is completely immersed in criminality. Typically, they are involved in counterfeiting, drugs, illegal alcohol and cigarette movement and distribution. They are not as well organised as Republican terrorists. IG and IH believed that their methods and composition meant they were more predisposed to have links to organised crime groups and are known to have made extensive use of criminal associates in the past.

Recent analysis has shown minimal links between republican related terrorism and organised crime in Scotland; however IG and IH felt that this was due to a recent refocusing onto the issue given an upsurge in republican violence in Northern Ireland, where analytical focus had been on other areas previously.

There are known links between republican terrorism and organised crime groups which include drugs, weapons and the counterfeiting of DVD’s. Republican terrorists are known to frequent public houses in Scotland that are associated to organised crime groups.

IG and IH believed that more links between republican terrorists and organised crime will become apparent as investigations continue. Attention to this area declined after the Good Friday agreement and continued to decline after the attacks of September 11th 2001 and 7th July 2005. The increased activity now ongoing is due to the upsurge in RIRA and related groups attacks.
IG and IH saw republican terrorists and some Scottish based organised criminals as being immersed in each others cultures and interlinked at various levels. Within an existent sub culture of republicanism that both function within, organised criminals raise their standing by having links to republican terrorism.

IG and IH believed that out with the west coast of Scotland organised crime groups would not have strong opinions either way whether they dealt with loyalist or republican affiliated terrorist groups, as long as they were paid for material they supplied, such as arms.

IG and IH were asked to consider how they would see members of an organised crime group reacting if they learned they had been involved in facilitating terrorist activity.

They both again drew clear distinctions between international and Irish related terrorism. Was the facilitation to have been in relation to international terrorists they thought that organised crime group members would tend to co-operate with the Police, with a good degree of self preservation at work.

IH made an analogy with an overarching perception amongst criminals of paedophilia simply being perceived as beyond the pale and an area where the most hardened criminals have co-operated with the Police in the past to bring offenders to justice, and to the treatment other criminals meet out to paedophiles whenever an opportunity presents itself. IH believed that the majority of organised crime group members he has encountered view international terrorist actions in a similar way, carrying some degree of ‘wrongness’ that cuts across established (if wholly unwritten and in no way tangible) criminal codes of behaviour.

Both IG and IH were of the opinion that Irish related terrorism would engender a very different response; with it being unlikely that co-operation with the authorities would be forthcoming. They believed that in both camps associations that exist are largely parts of wider criminal networks, and would be treated as such in the event of the investigation of organised crime group’s activities.

**Questionnaire Interviews**

‘Organised Crime Interaction with Contacts’

Collectively the participants largely believed that with an a serious organised crime group (SOCG) the immediate group – the leader, his deputies and lieutenants would either be in the same family or live in the same geographical area. They would have bonds out with these areas, formed through shared experiences such as schooling and prison. For an organised criminal to have credibility they would need to expand beyond these confines and as they move up the ‘criminal ladder’ the geographical extent of their associations increasing with their increasing influence. The leadership of SOCG may travel to meet new associates, usually though with this being with individuals of similar standing in other known SOCGs. This may involve international travel. Focus Group 1 also see modern communication methods, such as social networking sites, as a central feature of how contact is now maintained between those involved in organised crime.
The participants also thought that the frequency a SOCG would make new contacts to carry out business with would be dependent on the SOCGs overall growth strategy, although generally they would always be looking at opportunities for interactions that would maximise their profits. While some groups are content to remain small others would seek to expand. ID highlighted that many SOCGs make new contacts through using the same suppliers of illicit commodity and the utilisation of the same specialist, such as accountants.

IB sees networking amongst SOCGs occurring laterally between organisations across the UK, largely on a peer to peer basis that would be facilitated if mutual benefits to established businesses were identified by associates. Mobile phone contact would occur initially, but typical venues including social locations such as restaurants, public houses, and gyms. IE stated that nightclubs, lap dancing bars and saunas are likely points of interaction for lower level members of SOCGs, but that these will generally be avoided by the upper echelons. Sporting events also provide an ideal opportunity for interaction, with Focus Group 1 informing the researcher that organised criminals particularly frequent football and boxing matches in addition to illegal dog fighting. IJ thought that for organised criminals comfort in terms of their being assured of their safety and security in any meeting the environment was crucial. IL was a lone dissenter in respect of public houses, believing that SOCGs do not like to utilise such premises to meet.

All participants alluded to the importance of incarceration as a networking method, playing a huge part in bringing to together individuals who would not have otherwise met. Focus Group 1 also pointed out that visitors to prison often also act as couriers of information.

Trust, the essential element to any relationship involving persons taking part in organised crime activities and referred to by all participants, occurs through ‘referencing’ by trusted and established individuals. To enhance trust IC would expect SOCG members to boast about past exploits and their wider connections, facts the listener would be able to ascertain the veracity of and thereby satisfy themselves as to the status of their new contact, prior to embarking on any involvement with the individual. This is particularly easy if the new relationship is built during a period of incarceration, where the details of the new contacts past are easily checked by research and discussion amongst the wider prison population. ID and IL believe that without personal knowledge of a new contact an SOCG would likely ask for significant cash ‘up front’ for any new illicit business venture. If an SOCG were keen to establish a contact IB thought they would undertake risk, perhaps through a delivery on behalf of the new contact or through enforcement activity. All participants thought it likely that an element of testing would be a feature of any new relationship between an SOCG and a contact, with ‘dummy’ runs of illegal commodity being likely. IK thought that letting the new contact be party to information as a smokescreen to see if this feeds through law enforcement systems and perhaps results

1 ‘Saunas’ in the city of Edinburgh trade as semi legitimate brothels. Edinburgh city council provides these premises entertainment licences and it is common knowledge that sex is for sale within. This is a practice that has existed for over twenty years.
in action by police was a typical method of testing. IL was of the opinion that an
SOCG would often seek to infiltrate their contacts group to establish what their true
nature consisted of.

‘Scottish Organised Criminals and Terrorism’

IB, IC, ID, IE, IJ, IK, IL and FG thought there was no doubt there were strong links
between Scottish organised criminals and Northern Irish Terrorism. IC believes that
both Loyalist and Republican groups have sympathisers involved in organised crime
who are involved in smuggling illicit commodities such as red diesel and non-taxed
cigarettes on the west coast of Scotland.

ID believes there may be sympathies amongst Turkish origin SOCGs involved in the
Heroin trade for the PKK. There may also be other Asian SOCGs based in Scotland
with sympathetic views to other conflicts where international terrorism features.

FF was of the opinion that Muslim origin SOCGs based in Scotland probably
contributed to terrorist causes through their criminality however pointed out that there
is a great deal of disagreement over this and that these organisations may in fact
simply be profit driven.

IB believed that motivations, with pursuit of cause versus pursuit of profit making
clear distinctions between the phenomena of terrorism and organised crime. IB did
however think that were profit to be possible for an organised criminal in assisting or
facilitating terrorist activity no ‘code of ethics’ would prevent them from such
activity. IF believes that financial greed could see organised criminals assisting
terrorists, as they often do not appreciate the long term difficulties associated with
their choices, often preferring short term gain.

IB could reasonably see organised criminals providing organisation, facilitation and
planning for terrorist activity. IC and IJ both provided similar viewpoints, and could
see terrorists approaching organised criminals to support terrorist activity, through
counterfeiting, money laundering or smuggling of weapons. IB sees terrorists who
have been involved in mass fatality incidents in the past as not having the same expert
knowledge of police methods and tactics held by organised criminals. Organised
criminals through their expertise prove to, in some cases, be more difficult to
investigate. IC believes that any relationship organised criminals embarked on with
terrorists would be supportive, through the provision of services like transportation,
smuggling, safe houses and such rather than assistance with attacks. ID saw the likely
point of connection between terrorists and organised criminals being related to fund
raising, where illicit product was being moved to profit both groups. The relationship
would be criminal business.

IE had similar views and saw the possibility of organised criminals coming to be
involved with terrorists as being through funding, the procurement of weapons and
perhaps the provision of places of safety, where for example an individual may be on
the run from law enforcement in Ireland and would be placed in a safe house in
Scotland.
IE also contended that any relationship between a credible SOCG and a terrorist group would be two way. While an SOCG might support the terrorist’s through the safe house example provided this would not be for free and it is likely there would be some payment be that through money or weapons.

There was considerable debate amongst the focus group as to whether SOCGs would become involved with terrorists at all and if so what form this would take. FI thought that were a cross over to occur it would likely be due to SOCGs having access to illicit trade routes, primarily used for drugs but which were also open to people smuggling that might be required by terrorists. He thought that whoever the terrorist group were, if there was enough money on the table SOCGs would likely get involved. FA however was of the opinion that lack of intellectual capacity amongst many SOCG members he had investigated in the past would put off any potential terrorist, who he perceived would be likely to be well educated and organised. FE disagreed with FA’s analysis and contended that many SOCGs are far more sophisticated than recent examples from terrorist activity, such as those involved in the Glasgow airport bombing\(^2\).

FB pointed out that this being the case made SOCGs ripe for being duped by sophisticated terrorists as to their true motives.

Focus Group 1 thought that a likely possible point of interaction between a terrorist and SOCG would be a ‘lone wolf’ type such as the recent case in England of Nicky Reilly\(^3\), however rather than constructing explosives such an individual may instead embark upon trying to purchase a firearm from an SOCG.

Both IE and Focus Group 1 pointed out the issue of ‘kudos’, where while the SOCG can support the terrorists the terrorists can also support the SOCG, as the SOCGs reputation in criminal circles could be greatly enhanced through the association. FC thought that this type of arrangement would be most likely in relation to Irish Related Terrorism and unlikely with International Terrorism. IF had a similar view, and thought that this ‘kudos’ would be of particular import were an SOCG member to be incarcerated and would benefit in such a situation from the notoriety of such an association.

‘Specialist Services – Associate’

IB stated that the identification of criminal specialists was extremely difficult, which showed the level of secrecy maintained around such individuals. He referred to the case of Paul Alexander\(^4\), an organised crime ‘armourer’ and his detection being due to

\(^2\) The lack of guile in the preparations for the attack in London and on Glasgow airport 30/07/2007 is laid bare by the BBC report “Behind the London – Glasgow Plot” located at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7772925.stm, accessed 05/10/2011.

\(^3\) Information regarding Reilly’s behaviour and attack can be found at the Guardian online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/oct/15/uksecurity1, accessed 22/11/11

\(^4\) Further detail in respect of Alexander can be found on the BBC Website at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/essex/8345869.stm, accessed 05/10/2011.
his commission of a road traffic offence resulting in DNA identification. Alexander was previously wholly unknown to the state. Such individuals are very closely guarded with an SOCG unlikely to allow facilitation, instead third or fourth stage removed contact being permitted. Such an individual would be regarded as a unique resource to the SOCG’s business.

Any contact would require a very long process and high level of trust, perhaps indeed requiring association from childhood. IC, ID, IE, IJ and FI provided similar answers, and IC, IK and IL saw a mutual friend or mutual contact as essential in providing a middle point for a terrorist to access the specialist services available to an organised criminal, with ID believing, in agreement with IB above, that although an SOCG may be prepared to allow a contact to do business with their specialist they were unlikely in any circumstances, to allow actual access.

Virtually all participants thought that without doubt if a specialist was being used extensively SOCG members would want to know what level of risk the activity was bringing to their SOCG. For IC, IE, IK and IL SOCG’s are purely about profit and if a contact was making extensive use of a specialist such as a passport forger they believed the SOCG would want to know why, purely from the position of how profit is being gained through their use. IJ, although sharing this viewpoint also believed that the SOCG would want to be assured they were not exposing themselves to any form of compromise. FH stated that it was likely the knowledge would be retained, to be used as a bargaining tool in the future. IF pursued an alternative position, believing that if an SOCG were involved in profiting from the enterprise simply as intermediaries they would not be asking many questions.

IB believed that if an incident related to terrorism occurred and the SOCG were in a unique position regarding the link between the terrorists and their specialist they may look at relocation of the specialist and his removal from the activity to avoid detection. Were a bombing linked to their specialist to occur generally speaking IC did not think an SOCG would do anything about contacting authorities and would maintain the status quo. This was a view shared by ID who believed a SOCGs first priority would be to assess the likely impact on their operation. IE and Focus Group 1 were the only participants who thought that such an assessment would involve consideration of an approach to the authorities. For IE this would be if there was concern that it was inevitable police activity was going to result in the SOCGs detection; while for Focus Group 1 they felt that were the terrorist incident close to the SOCGs home city this may prove an important factor. IF went further than the other participants and suggested that after a terrorist incident, in the circumstances outlined the elimination of the contact would be a likely consideration for an SOCG, balanced against the financial loss this might incur to the organisation.

‘Contact Identified as Terrorist’

If an SOCG’s contacts were identified as having radical views IB thought it would be difficult to judge how they would react. He thought that some individuals would carry on regardless while some would disassociate themselves from the activity, deciding it is not an area they are comfortable in. IC thought that the views of the member of an SOCG would be an important factor in determining their position if a contact had radical views. He provided the example that an SOCG member with republican
sympathies would probably not be bothered if a contact exhibited radical Muslim views while a SOGC member with loyalist sympathies may well look dimly at a contact who exhibited radical republican sympathies. He did however caveat these examples by saying that profit would be of maximum import and if the relationship was proving profitable it would be unlikely to be discontinued despite divergent viewpoints. For IE the radical views of a contact would be based around selfish concerns within the SOCG, his opinion of them being that “If it didn’t come back to their doorstep they wouldn’t necessarily do anything”. IF concurred that radical views would be unlikely to affect the relationship, however IF did state that there is a moral code amongst criminals and made an analogy to sexual offences where what was perceived to be out with norms for criminals would be deemed unacceptable, that there are simply ‘unwritten rules’. FI was of the opinion that radical views would not alter the SOCGs opinions. If they were making profit the views of those they deal with are not an issue. FI pointed out that typically SOCGs do not care about the impact of drugs or firearms, and consequently would be unlikely to be concerned over radical views.

IC believed that if there was media interest in a SOCGs ‘radical’ contact they would likely suspend the relationship and later reassess. ID went further, and echoing a view put forward by IF above in relation to the specialist services and was of the opinion that if at this juncture the media attention forthcoming presented a significant threat to the SOCG they may well deal with the person that is causing this increased threat. I.E. eliminate their contact.

IE believed that the opinions of the cause in question would have a significant bearing on SOCG decisions at this point. If they believed in the cause this may prevent a cutting of ties with the contact however if this were not the case then media attention may well engender this. IF believed that the SOCG would want to know if their contact was bringing the media attention to themselves through a desire for publicity or through errors on their part, the latter being more likely to lead to a severing of ties.

Focus Group 1 pointed out that some SOCGs would welcome the increased notoriety media attention to their contact would bring however echoing the majority of other participants noted that sophisticated SOCGs would grow increasingly concerned as attention was focussed into matters they had strong connections to.

IB is of the opinion that SOCG members are cited on police tactics through ex police officers and other means such as infiltration of law enforcement agencies but are frightened of police action and particularly of the consequences of incarceration to their activities, whether that be personal restriction or through consequent diminished influence. Were the Police to be known to be looking at the contact, IC thought the SOCG would be very uncomfortable in maintaining their relationship, with IE contending that at this point an SOCG would be looking to distance themselves from their contact and perhaps construct alibis. IF goes further and returns to their contention above, echoed by ID that as police attention would be something an SOCG would actively want to avoid they would consider eliminating their contact. IJ, IK and IL took an entirely contrary position, believing that SOCGs operate with the belief that they are known to the police and it is very likely those they associate with will be too.
For IB each individual would have a line relating to how far they would go for profit and power weighed against the fear of detection. Were they to learn of preparation for terrorist activity the majority of SOCG members would seek to terminate their relationship with their contact. For IC at this stage an SOCG would be wholly uncomfortable, their objective typically being to make money, not generally to kill people. IC held that such preparation by a SOCGs contact may well be seen as crossing a line that exists in criminal behaviour, particularly if they were unaware of the exact nature of the activity they had been facilitating, similar to the position mentioned by IF above. IK and IL believed that the first indication of a contact being connected to terrorist acts would be the point of extraction for a SOCG.

ID saw some clear distinctions in relation to the contacts preparation for terrorist activity. If the terrorism was Irish related and concerned activity to occur in Northern Ireland or England he did not think the SOCG would object however if the attacks were to take place in Scotland this would not be tolerated.

IJ thought that for Scotland it was crucial to draw distinctions between Irish related terrorism and international terrorism. If the cause of the group was an area that had impacted on their own life, which they have grown up with, then they may be more comfortable, particularly if it was an act they concurred with. IJ thought that such a situation would exist amongst many Scottish communities in relation to Irish related Terrorism, where these causes are interwoven with many Scottish communities while international terrorism has no ‘supportive’ connection.

Indirect or direct preparation being facilitated was seen as being a massive distinction for an SOCG by both IC and ID, as they believed many SOCGs are cited on the level of police attention such activity would bring and would be wholly uncomfortable with continuing.

Were the SOCG to learn that their actions had directly assisted their contact’s preparation for terrorist activity this is the point where IE believed an SOCG may want to make an approach to the authorities, where they would give up their contact while trying to minimise the authorities insight into the workings of the SOCG.

For IF if a SOCGs relationship with a contact was directly assisting with the preparation of a terrorist act issues of conscience may be present but these would be far outweighed by a desire for profit and that the types of character within an SOCG would have no victim empathy.

If an SOCG’s contact’s group carried out a terrorist act IB thought the SOCG would put in place strategies to remove and destroy evidence of the association. Alibis regarding meetings would likely be constructed. IC thought that SOCG members would ‘lie low and say nothing’, although thought that there may well be an individual with a pang of conscience. Knowing how the Police operate would lead the SOCG to avoid communication with their contact, to avoid detection. ID concurred, although believed that if the SOCG felt it necessary due to their exposure to be proactive they might approach law enforcement. IE thought an approach from the SOCG would be almost inevitable. He also thought that along the course of the revelation of the contact’s activities to the SOCG executive action by way of murdering the contact would be a distinct possibility. Focus Group 1 provided a
similar position, where they believed an SOCG in these circumstances would be at its ‘selfish best’, in that if it was in their own interests to talk to the authorities they would. No action, in the experience of SOCGs by the group, would take place because of any moral concerns. It would only be when the individual SOCG member, their business or their family were going to be affected in a detrimental way that an approach might be forthcoming.

IC also thought that time was a crucial factor in relation to contact with the authorities: if the contact had been relatively recent then an approach may be more forthcoming rather than if the terrorist act was perpetrated by someone the SOCG had worked with over an extended period and benefited through this contact. This was a view shared by IK.

If media identification of a SOCG’s contact occurred following a terrorist act in the United Kingdom IB believed that the line of work leading to the association would be closed down, and not revisited for a considerable time. ID thought that such identification would probably cause an SOCG to engage with law enforcement, through some means. IF thought that the crucial element in a SOCGs opinion of such media identification would be whether this identification had occurred through publicity or through journalistic investigation. If it was through a strategy of the contacts group to have publicity then the SOCG would likely have known this was a possibility and taken appropriate measures while if identification was a result of mistakes the SOCG would want to take action against their contact to prevent the implication of the SOCG.

IB thought it was unlikely an organised criminal would approach the authorities with concerns over a contact. High end SOCG members tend not to engage with the authorities; however this might be affected by personal relationships. He thought that contact with the authorities through an intermediary, such as a solicitor, was potentially more likely. Many of the participants thought it very difficult to judge when an approach to an SOCG by the authorities might occur, and such a decision would require careful consideration of individuals within the SOCG, their personal circumstances, loyalties and vulnerabilities.

IB believed that if a bombing occurred this might point when an approach from the authorities might succeed. He alluded to the case of an abduction in Edinburgh. In this case criminals who it was thought would not co-operate with the Police in fact did, with the ‘criminal code’ seeing this abduction and the anticipated murder of a boy unconnected to criminality proving to be a ‘step too far’.

ID, IJ, IK and IE thought that an approach would most likely be successful from law enforcement when the SOCG first had knowledge of their contacts involvement in terrorism and they thought they could be implicated and linked to act of terrorism in

---

5 In the case alluded to a Liverpool based SOCG were duped when supplying £250,000 worth of Heroin to an Edinburgh SOCG. To exact revenge they contacted a Glasgow based SOCG they had social contact with and thereafter both groups travelled to Edinburgh with the likely intention of abducting and murdering the members of the Edinburgh SOCG. During their activities in Edinburgh they abducted an innocent party and subsequently attempted to extract a ransom for their safe return.
the UK. This is working from the premise that the SOCG is purely crime driven, and not a ‘front’ for terrorist related activity. At this point, were the impact on the SOCG minimal through cooperation then success may be forthcoming. IJ expanded this argument suggesting potential success when the SOCG are in the early stages of building their relationship, no wider connections have been built and they have not gained any profit. IF put forward a differing opinion, in that an approach from the authorities would only work on an SOCG where they knew their position was untenable and that their own incarceration was inevitable however cooperation might go some way to mitigating the length of sentence they might receive. All the participants were however clear, that an approach by the authorities would be successful where the SOCG calculated it was in their best interests, be that through early stage intervention mitigating consequence to them or through a reduction in sanction against them.
Chapter 3

Analysis

The information provided by subject matter experts shows that although small, an ‘initial nexus’ of co-operation between organised criminals and terrorists exists in Scotland. This initial nexus relates primarily to Irish related terrorism but there are a very few known connections to international terrorism. The nature of the connections to those involved in Irish related terrorism appears to be social and criminal in nature.

The initial nexus in Scotland primarily exists amongst two sub cultures, these being the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists. Seventeenth century emigration to Ireland from Scotland through the ‘Ulster Plantation’ formed a protestant émigré society there, which has retained close ties with a similar sub culture in Scotland (Magnusson, 2000). The obvious recurring travel between locations to participate in Orange Order Parades is a good indicator of this continuing bond amongst the communities. Nineteenth century immigration to Scotland formed a large Catholic expatriate community, primarily in the west coast of Scotland, where their cultural and religious differences saw them forming a distinct ghetto community (Smout, 1986). Of particular note regarding these two cultures are the findings of Perri et al. (2009) who observed organised crimes prevalence amongst ethnic minority groups, and Sageman (2005) who puts forward the position that such groups as being particularly noted as providing terrorist recruits.

Both the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists are minority groups within Scotland and although they may not fit current definitions of ethnic minority groups in the typical parameter of ‘race’, they are both distinct sub cultures within wider Scottish society. Both produce SOCGs and individuals who become involved in Irish related terrorist activity. It is therefore not surprising that the initial nexus has been found here. Individuals involved in either form of activity share common lineage, schooling, culture and associations; all the factors necessary for the safe establishment of trust for a working relationship to develop between those involved in both phenomena, in tandem with the views of Van Duyne (1996), and the participants in this study. Police awareness of these interactions is also understandable. Although particularly the pro-Republicans were an immigrant community one would expect difficult to police (Perri, 2009) this is no longer the case, with over a hundred years passing since first arrival and the overall immigrant community now largely being part of mainstream Scottish society.

It is interesting that the participants in the study largely drew clear lines of distinction between Irish related terrorism and international terrorism. They could perceive that the potential cultural and social links of the SOCG members may have an effect on their behaviour, from the ‘kudos’ association within these sub cultures that can be attained through their background, allied to the underlying sympathy they may hold with a cause.

Within these ‘common cultures’ there was though a clear opinion from the participants that echoing Stuart (2006), in his observation that the Mafia will engage with anyone they will profit from, so too will Scottish SOCGs; but only where it is in
the SOCGs continuing interests. Participants IG and IH believe that whether an SOCG was pre disposed to either cause in Northern Ireland a faction associated to the other side would be acceptable, as long as payment was forthcoming.

A clear theme that emerged from the participants was distance: the further removed from the terrorist activity the SOCG was, the easier it would be to provide ongoing co-operation. As IE stated when asked about the SOCGs attitude as the terrorist nature of their contact emerges, “If it didn’t come back to their doorstep they wouldn’t necessarily do anything.” It was clear from the answers provided that the participants felt that whoever was involved in terrorism, including those connected to Irish related terrorism, while the activity was to have an impact somewhere out with the vicinity of the SOCG they would not be overly concerned but when the actions that were to be undertaken had a more direct impact on the closer societal structures around the SOCG they would be wholly uncomfortable.

This lack of comfort did not, in the opinion of the participants, arise from any morality but instead from the view point that although driven by profit an SOCG would calculate its degree of exposure to law enforcement action and the closer terrorist activity came to the operations of the SOCG the more exposed they would become.

It emerged from participant IA that terrorists currently engaging with SOCGs are likely keeping their true purposes a secret, with the SOCGs believing they are engaging with peers rather than those carrying out criminal activity for the funding of terrorism, this behaviour including SOCGs of significant standing. The participants had pointed out that the nature of the composition of SOCGs perhaps lent itself to such an occurrence. A number of the participants felt that were such deceptions to be discovered the murder of the SOCGs contact may well be carried out. Another clear feature that emerged that may explain the position that such action may be warranted, other than to minimise detection, was that although not well known for their moral code SOCG members typically, in line with other criminals, are known to have intangible lines of standards in relation to behaviour. A number of participants referred to this, with IG citing the issue of paedophilia as an example of criminal behaviour that even for hardened criminals is seen as beyond the pale. A number of participants believed that terrorist atrocities would be perceived by SOCG members in a similar light. If, as appears to be the case, some are being duped regarding the true nature of their relationships with contacts who are involved in terrorism this becomes even more worthy of consideration as a possibility.

As the participants related that SOCGs can gain new contacts through accessing the same specialists, it is worthy of note that such an intersection may well provide an interface with terrorism. IA relates that persons with known connections to terrorism in Scotland have access to corrupt officials, a relationship SOCGs would no doubt wish to benefit from if they were to learn of it. Whichever way this access to specialists was to function the views of the studies participants were clear that were such access to occur it would be controlled; perhaps many degrees removed and likely be well known in terms of purpose by the actor providing access.

The participants were clear that if members of a SOCG were going to co-operate with the authorities such co-operation would be on their terms. Engagements with the
authorities would perhaps be by proxy and would be an effort at self-preservation, where the SOCG attempted to gain a favourable position with the authorities, as directly observed by Albini (1975) in his previous study of organised crime in Scotland. An approach by the authorities was seen as being most likely to succeed when the impact on the SOCG would be at its minimal. For this to be the case the relationship between the two groups would need to be at its early stages, with the level of connection and trust being low and the financial or other loss to the SOCG being minimal. Interestingly, very few of the participants had any reservations around whether the SOCG members would co-operate with the authorities. None put forward the position of the SOCG member adopting a position of ambivalence to the authorities, other than IG and IH in relation to a likely lack of co-operation from SOCGs who were involved in a relationship with a terrorist connected to Irish related terrorism. Other than this all thought that a calculated response from the SOCG member would be forthcoming, with their best interests being of the only concern. Of note, the contrary opinion of IG and IH relates to SOCGs and terrorist groups from the same sub culture, the implication of this being there may exist some degree of ‘loyalty’, or at least a stronger affinity, amongst SOCGs and terrorists from the same social background. These stronger ties might impact on the pragmatic desire to co-operate with the authorities when this would be in the immediate best interest of the SOCG. This ‘loyalty’ could be for a number of reasons, which might include a shared outlook but also equally may be due to a desire to maintain reputation within a common sub culture. Co-operation with the authorities to the detriment of fellow sub culture members would likely have significant negative impact on a SOCGs reputation within their social grouping.

IA sees non-indigenous SOCGs as the main threat in Scotland. This may seem at odds with the information provided by IG and IH that such groups have no known connections to terrorism and that those in Scotland known to be linked to terrorism have no known associations with such SOCGs. In fact, they report that even those with minor criminal convictions have completely disassociated themselves from such activity when becoming involved with terrorist causes. However, from the answers provided by the participants and the literature available IA’s argument is a strong one. Authors (Perri et al., 2009) point to minority immigrant communities as being difficult to police and also their being fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist participants (Sageman, 2005). IA contends that they are only interested in profit, a similar feature ascribed to all SOCGs by Dishman (2001) and the other participants in the study. Where IA appears to be particularly insightful though is in illustrating such SOCGs lack of ‘loyalty’ to Scotland. What this means is not a lack of an embracing of Scottish culture but rather that with little or no cultural bonds to the country their activities in pursuit of profit could be far more extreme than those of SOCGs with connections to the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists groups. SOCGs members with ties to Irish related terrorism have typically grown up in Scotland and have wide social networks here while recent émigré groups have no such foundation. As the participants in the study alluded to a growing discomfort amongst SOCG members when their contact brought their activities ‘close to home’ one can see how such a feeling would certainly be in no way as relevant amongst a recent émigré SOCG. The consequences of a terrorist action in Scotland would have far less impact on their wider social group and their lack of background within the community would make their detection all the more unlikely.
All the participants believed that incarceration was a key point for new interactions to occur. As recent émigré SOCGs become known to law enforcement in their new country of operation, so they may become incarcerated. Through their incarceration they are likely to encounter individuals involved in terrorist causes, likely through work as ‘front’ funding criminal work. Such interaction may have disastrous consequences for Scotland, as a new type of ‘initial nexus’, far removed from that of the pro-Republicans and the pro-Loyalists could be formed.

The findings thus far suggest the following template of ‘initial nexus’ relationships:

‘Initial Nexus Relationship A’

Within Relationship A the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from the same cultural background and the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated PIRA members and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

Such an association may have strong bonds: trust through common views, shared backgrounds and ease of ‘referencing’ through common associates or known past activities (criminal or otherwise) would be likely. The ‘kudos’ element that might occur from such a relationship within the shared sub culture would also be of relevance.

‘Initial Nexus Relationship B’

Within Relationship B the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds however the actions of both are directly relevant to their immediate social groupings.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is Scottish associated UVF members and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

There are obvious negative features of such a relationship, such as contrary viewpoints and detrimental opinions of the SOCG or Terrorist group might occur were the details of the relationship to become known in their sub cultures. However, ‘trust’ gained through known past activities (criminal or otherwise) and shared associations would be very likely.

‘Initial Nexus Relationship C’

Within Relationship C the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of one party only would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.
An example of a confluence that would meet this criterion is non-Scottish origin al Qaeda inspired terrorists and Scottish origin SOCGs from the pro-Republican sub group within the Irish past émigré community.

Trust and ‘referencing’ in the establishment of such a relationship would likely be difficult.

‘Initial Nexus Relationship D’

Within Relationship D the SOCG and Terrorist group members are from differing cultural backgrounds where the actions of neither party would be directly relevant to their immediate social grouping.

An example of a confluence that would meet this criteria are non-Scottish origin al Qaeda inspired terrorists and non-Scottish origin SOCGs, such as Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups.

As with Relationship C trust and ‘referencing’ in the establishment of such a relationship would likely be difficult.

Although one can in no way be definitive regarding how SOCGs will behave, as individuals with their own particular foibles and morality constitute each group differently, one can see how the argument that relationship D would be more dangerous is one worthy of consideration. The nature of SOCGs businesses, such as the example of Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups, inherently harm the communities in which they are based, through the illicit product they produce but also through the further criminal elements they attract to the business when it is a success and the risks their criminality brings both through disputes that may affect the wider public but also through their methods. The exemplar Chinese origin Cannabis cultivation groups typically jury rig electrical systems that are massive fire risks with no consideration of those who neighbour properties they are utilising for their businesses. When one takes the status quo elements of SOCG behaviours and couple them with a group whose members have a minimal past in a particular area the common tactics of law enforcement to track an individual are greatly reduced, which non-indigenous SOCG members are very well aware of, and align to this a lack of social connection through a ‘past’, I.E. a lack of family or friends in the host community provides an absence of impact of criminality of the non-indigenous SOCGs behaviour on persons they might feel restrained from allowing be harmed the dangers of ‘initial nexus D’ relationships become all too apparent. It is the added disconnection from the society of operation that provides the increased danger.

The ‘criminal code’ alluded to by a number of the studies participants may also be impactive regarding each of the ‘initial nexus relationships’ listed and understood better within these conceptual frameworks. Perhaps, such a code is, to a degree, in fact an innate link between the criminal and their wider community values, where although their criminality may cross the normal bounds of wider societal behaviour the ‘code’ constrains behaviour within their sub groups. If this were to be the case one can see how such a ‘code’ would impact on interactions with contacts out with the SOCG and have differing effects dependent on which of the relationships, from A to D, the SOCG were engaged in. Deception would also be key, and if the SOCG were
to perceive their relationship to be simply a criminal relationship between differing origin SOCGs, while it was instead, through deception, a relationship with terrorists, type C, this could be significantly impactive on the continuing nature of their interactions.

Deception could also be highly impactive on group D associations that might develop in prisons. As has been identified throughout this paper many terrorist groups have criminal ‘fronts’, for fundraising and other purposes. Individuals detected for such activity may well be incarcerated for criminal offences, with no detection of their terrorist links being uncovered by the authorities. Such individuals would then enter the prison system being perceived as serious criminals only. Any associations with other serious criminals that then occurred in the prison system would only be seen in this context and possible relationships would be thought of as criminal in nature, and may well appear as such even to the SOCG with whom the relationship has been formed, as discussed above.

Potential for Further Research

Extrapolating the Scottish situation into a wider world situation would be very interesting. The dynamics of connections between Scotland and Northern Ireland, with the exchange and counter exchange of communities against the background of religious conflict is unusual. It may be the case that the relationships between terrorists and SOCGs that have been formed against the background of the conflict in Northern Ireland are in no way atypical of such interactions, which wider research may provide an insight into.

Direct interaction with SOCG members would provide excellent information as to how any ‘initial nexus’ relationship might function. Ideally, SOCG members with known cultural affinity to terrorist causes and those without could be identified, both in relation to Irish related and international terrorism. Further SOCG members with no known cultural affinities could also be identified. The views of these individuals could then be gathered in relation to specific issues around an ‘initial nexus’ relationship, to test the theory of the initial nexus relationship template posited above. From this greater insight not only into how relationships might occur would be forthcoming, but also a greater understanding of where the substantial risk of such relationships might lie. Access to SOCG members would possibly be best achieved through interaction with those incarcerated or undertaking probationary work, which would give the added benefit of the potential to explore the significance of the criminal justice system, and specifically prisons, to enabling potential terrorist and SOCG relationships.

An exploration of any ‘criminal code’ amongst SOCG members and commonality of standards that might exist would be very interesting. Exploring such ‘codes’ and what effect they might have on association to terrorism and association to terrorism through the SOCG being deceived would seem to be very worthwhile areas for exploration.

Conclusions

Although this study has found there are clear links between terrorism and organised crime in Scotland, these are minimal in the overall context of terrorist and organised
crime groups known to exist in Scotland. The links between Terrorist and SOCG in Scotland are largely criminal and social in nature. Where links occur they typically concern terrorist groups linked to Irish related terrorism.

Scottish pro-Republican and pro-Loyalist sub cultures provide a very interesting insight into the potential nature of ‘initial nexus’ relationships between terrorists and organised criminals. The views of the participants, coupled with a review of the literature concerning the subject, suggest that there are four distinct types of relationship that might exist between persons involved in the two phenomena, and have consequent impact on their interactions. The background of SOCG and Terrorist group members appears to have an impact on the nature of any relationships they might become involved in and would, most probably, have an effect beyond bald calculations of risk versus reward that SOCG members would likely involve themselves in during such a relationship. Profit would remain the main driver for any SOCG; however the proximity of danger to the SOCGs area of operations a terrorist group poses would be a factor in their reasoning.

SOCG members may well take executive action against terrorist groups they have been interacting with to preserve their own ends. It is likely SOCGs are being misled in some of their relationships with those they believe to be like groups, who in fact have terrorist related motivations. Discovery of these deceptions may well affect their continuing engagement, result in action against the deceivers or assist any attempt by law enforcement to engage with the SOCG to solicit co-operation.

Interactions in prisons may well not be what they might first seem and there is a need for an open mind as to why non-indigenous SOCG members might be striking up associations, both with indigenous SOCGs and non-indigenous SOCGs from differing cultures. As the research has found, terrorist groups are using criminality as a cover for their actions and may well have members incarcerated through this cover, who would then conceivably continue to further their terrorists groups aims by increasing useful associations.

Terrorists and organised crime groups with no cultural affinity to their area of operation have less restraint upon their actions as the direct impact of their activities will not be felt by persons from within their immediate cultures, sub cultures or own circle of interaction, such as friends or family.

Co-operation by an SOCG with the authorities may be forthcoming when an SOCG calculates it is in their interests to make a proactive approach. There are a myriad of factors that would affect such a decision however SOCGs are likely to be clinical in such calculations and may only be held back if they have a cultural affinity with the terrorist group. An approach by the authorities would appear to have most chance of successes, continuing the calculated argument, when the SOCG have the least ‘invested in the relationship’, both in terms of their position perhaps within their own sub culture but also in terms of monetary or criminal activity exposure.

The natures of the phenomena make it very likely that participants in both will encounter one another, particularly when incarcerated. This study has found that although such interactions do not appear high in number in Scotland the potential harm to society that can arise from them is considerable. The area of greatest concern
that has emerged from this study is that of interaction between non-indigenous terrorist and organised crime groups, whose co-operation may be largely unrestrained, difficult to detect and lead to increased capability for action resulting from the co-operation by both parties.
Bibliography


Cusack, J. (2006, June 25). IRA Crime Godfathers are winning Drugs War, The Irish Times


Appendix 1

List of Participants

IA is a senior intelligence officer with a national (Scotland) overview.

IB is a senior detective officer with a background in the investigation of serious crime. His work is currently focussed on organised crime.

IC is a former senior police officer now working in a supporting role within counter terrorism.

ID is a senior detective officer with a background in the investigation of organised crime. He is currently working in intelligence.

IE is a senior detective officer with a background in the investigation of serious crime.

IF is a detective officer with a previous career as a criminal justice social worker.

IG is a senior analyst focussing on terrorism.

IH is a senior detective in the counter terrorism environment.

IJ is a senior detective officer with a background in the investigation of serious crime.

IK is a detective officer with a background in the investigation of serious crime. He currently works as a Covert Human Intelligence Source handler (CHIS).

IL is a detective officer with a background in the investigation of serious crime. He currently works as a Covert Human Intelligence Source handler (CHIS).

FA is an officer with a background in CHIS handling and currently investigates organised crime.

FB is a detective officer who currently investigates organised crime.

FC is an officer who currently investigates organised crime.

FD is an officer who currently investigates organised crime.

FE is a detective officer who has a background in financial investigation and who currently investigates organised crime.

FF is a detective officer who currently investigates organised crime.

FG is an officer who currently investigates organised crime.

FH is an officer who currently investigates organised crime.

FI is an officer who currently investigates organised crime.
## Appendix 2

### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCG</td>
<td>Serious and Organised Crime Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRA</td>
<td>Continuity Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIRA</td>
<td>Real Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (English - Kurdistan Workers’ Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (English - Basque Homeland and Freedom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>Ejército de Liberación Nacional (English - National Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>