

**Who Are the Dissidents?
Analysing Changes in the
Sociological Profile of Violent
Dissident Republicans in
Northern Ireland**

**Professional Doctorate in Policing,
Security and Community Safety**

**Student: Francis Taylor
Number: 11046971**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>PAGE NUMBERS</u>
<u><i>Abstract</i></u>	3 - 4
<u><i>Statement of Objectives</i></u>	5 - 7
<u><i>Glossary of Terms</i></u>	8 - 16
<u><i>Introduction</i></u>	17 - 21
<u><i>Chapter 1 – Terrorism: The Wider Perspective</i></u>	22 - 41
<u><i>Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature</i></u>	42 - 77
<u><i>Chapter 3 – Research Methodology</i></u>	78 - 94
<u><i>Chapter 4 – Research on the Dissidents</i></u>	95 – 128
<u><i>Conclusion</i></u>	129 – 136
<u><i>Appendix 1 – Eligibility Criteria</i></u>	137
<u><i>Appendix 2 – VDR Personnel Database</i></u>	138 – 149
<u><i>Bibliography</i></u>	150 – 163

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents an empirical analysis of a unique data set of 427 men and women who have been charged with criminal offences as a result of suspected involvement in dissident republican activity in Northern Ireland between 1998 and 2014. The charges result from involvement in the four main dissident groups currently active in armed struggle in Ireland namely Continuity IRA (CIRA), Real IRA (RIRA), Oglagh Na h'Eireann (ONH) and most recently the New IRA (NIRA). Both official Government publications and open source dissident news material was used to create a violent dissident republican personnel database. This database was then used to compare the dissidents with the Old IRA of the Irish Revolution between the years 1916-1923. This study is primarily comparing and contrasting the IRA and how it has changed in 100 years. Conclusions are made on gender and religion, age and marriage and status and class. It contains policy implications for both practitioners and academics on how to counter the contemporary violence of dissidents in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Key words: IRA, dissident republicans, terrorism, terrorist.

STATEMENT OF **OBJECTIVES**

This research project is a final thesis submitted as part of a Professional Doctorate in Policing, Security and Community Safety. The intention of this research has four main objectives:

1. The identification of all literature on dissident republican violence in Ireland between 1998 and 2014. This includes all published and unpublished work but is limited to only that written in the English language.
2. The identification of all those men and women (regardless of age) who have been charged with a politically motivated crime linked to dissident republicanism in Northern Ireland between the years 1998 and 2014. An eligibility criteria has been developed and is reproduced at Appendix One.
3. To compile a database of all those persons identified and populate it with the following information, where available. This will include age, gender, marital status, place of birth, occupation, dissident group, prior affiliation and date of arrest. This database will be compiled using open source official records, media material and dissident republican written material. The Violent Dissident Republican Personnel Database is reproduced as Appendix Two.
4. To identify all academic studies which have collated individual information on those involved in armed struggle during the years 1916-1923 in Ireland or what has become commonly known as the Irish Revolution.

The material gathered in objective four will then be compared with the violent dissident republican database and similarities and differences will be analysed. This research will assist informing academics and practitioners alike and will provide much needed information on who the dissidents are.

In order to complete this research, all sources of material used have been included in the bibliography.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

32 County Sovereignty Movement (32 CSM) – A dissident Irish republican political movement created in 1997 by a section of the Sinn Fein membership that did not support the acceptance of the Mitchell Principles. This group is widely believed to be the political wing of the Real IRA, a belief regularly refuted by 32 CSM. It was originally known as the 32 County Sovereignty Committee (32 CSC). Since the formation of the New IRA, it is not clear what this groups' role is as the New IRA have stated they have no political wing.

Abstentionist Policy – A policy historically adopted by the Irish Republican Movement whereby elected representatives do not take their seats in Dail Eireann (Irish Parliament), Westminster or Stormont. This was adopted due to the belief that these three Parliaments actively promoted the partition of Ireland and it was a major factor behind some of the most significant splits in republicanism. Sinn Fein still retains its abstentionist policy to Westminster but abolished the similar policies with respect to Dail Eireann in 1986 and Stormont in 1998, respectively.

British Labour Party/Labour Party – The centre left democratic socialist political party of Great Britain.

Conservative Party – A centre right British political party that actively supports British unity. They successfully fielded joint candidates with the Ulster Unionist Party in the 2008

European Election and 2010 General Election under the banner Ulster Conservative and Unionist New Force (UCUNF).

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) – A dissident Irish republican paramilitary organisation created in 1986 by senior Provisional IRA (PIRA) members dissatisfied with Sinn Fein’s decision (under Gerry Adams) to abandon its abstentionist policy, and the PIRA’s support of this. It is widely believed to be the paramilitary branch of Republican Sinn Fein. Among its most recent activity has been the murder of Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) Officer Stephen Carroll in Craigavon in March 2009.

Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – A Northern Irish Unionist Party founded by the Reverend Ian Paisley, Desmond Boal and fellow members of the Protestant Unionist Party in 1971. It withdrew from the negotiations that resulted in the Belfast Agreement because Sinn Fein was allowed to participate (despite the PIRA continuing to retain its weapons). The party campaigned against the passing of the agreement but eventually accepted the St Andrew’s Agreement in 2006.

District Policing Partnerships (DPP) – These are partnerships between the District Council, Councillors and local communities in Northern Ireland created to monitor the effectiveness of policing in each area. They also act as a consultative forum on matters concerning policing in the Districts. This is not to be confused with the Director of Public Prosecutions (also DPP) in the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain. In Northern Ireland the Public Prosecuting Body is called the Public Prosecution Service. On 1 April 2015, District Policing Partnership’s became Police and Community Safety Partnerships (PCSP) and are aligned to Northern Ireland’s 11 Councils.

Eirigi – A Socialist Republican Political Movement in Ireland formed in Dublin in 2006. It opposes the British presence in Northern Ireland and seeks the establishment of a United Ireland. It is not considered a paramilitary organisation, but is based on revolutionary socialist principles. The word “**Eirigi**” is Irish for “rise.” Some members have joint membership with Eirigi and other dissident groupings.

Fianna Na h'Eireann – The former youth wing of the Old IRA and PIRA. This name has been used by numerous Irish republican organisations for their youth wings in both the twentieth and twenty first centuries.

Fianna Fail (FF) – One of the two main political organisations, alongside Fine Gael in the Republic of Ireland. It was established in 1921 in opposition to the “Treaty”. Traditionally it is the largest Irish political party; however, after the 2011 general election it was for the first time in its history the third largest party behind Fine Gael and the Labour Party.

Fine Gael (FG) – One of the two main political organisations in the Republic of Ireland. It was originally formed in 1921 from the wing of Sinn Fein that supported the “Treaty.” It is traditionally the smaller of the two main parties; however, in the 2011 general election it became the largest party in Dail Eireann for the first time in its history.

Garda Síochána/Gardaí – The Police Force of the Republic of Ireland. The name means “Guardians of the Peace” in Irish.

Good Friday Agreement/Belfast Agreement/Stormont Agreement – A political agreement in the Northern Ireland peace process that signified the end of the troubles. The

agreement represented the culmination of two years of multi-party negotiations. The agreement sought to create a representative Northern Ireland Assembly and develop a doctrine for the disposal of paramilitary weapons. This was ratified by two separate referenda in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on May 23rd, 1998. Among other provisions this saw the abolition of the Republic of Ireland's territorial claim to Northern Ireland via the alterations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution.

Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) – A group established on 26 August 1997 to oversee the decommissioning of the weapons of paramilitary groups, both republican and loyalist in Northern Ireland. The IICD disbanded in 2010. Only days before its disbanding the INLA and OIRA announced the decommissioning of their weapons.

Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) – A group created by the Irish and British Governments in 2004 to help promote the establishment of stable and inclusive Government in Northern Ireland by reporting on the activity of paramilitary groups and security normalisation measures. The IMC's final report was published on 2 March 2011 following the recent murder of Kevin McGuigan in Belfast. Unionists have called for the IMC to be reinstated to monitor PIRA violence.

Irish Citizens Army (ICA) – A smaller group than the Irish Volunteers which was formed in 1913 to protect striking workers involved in the Dublin Lockout of the same year. The ICA largely consisted of Trade Union members and encouraged female membership.

Irish Free State – The Irish Free State came into existence in 1922 under the Anglo Irish Treaty (also known as The Treaty). The Free State ceased to exist in 1937 when a

referendum was voted through to replace the 1922 constitution. The Free State was succeeded by the Sovereign State of Ireland and in 1949 under the Republic of Ireland Act the office of President of Ireland replaced the King of England as head of the state, thus cutting the final tie to British rule. Although the Free State is no longer in existence the term is often used, sometimes in a derogatory manner by republicans to refer to the 26 Counties of the Republic of Ireland.

Irish Labour Party – A centre left political party in the Republic of Ireland.

Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) – A movement formed in 1974 after breaking away from Official Sinn Fein. It is considered to be the political wing of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a paramilitary group decommissioned in 2010. It supports the establishment of a 32 County Socialist Republic in Ireland and opposes both the Good Friday Agreement and the Peace Process. In 2009, it ordered an end to the armed struggle.

Loyalist – A term referring to an individual who gives tacit or actual support to the British Crown and state for the union of Northern Ireland with Great Britain (ie the United Kingdom). “Loyalist” sometimes is used to describe those who support the use of paramilitary force to defend that union.

MI5 – The British Internal Security Service, otherwise known as the “Security Service.”

MLA – Member of Legislative Assembly. The Northern Ireland equivalent of MP or TD.

Nationalist – A term used in Northern Ireland to describe those who support the reunification of Ireland, the majority being from the Catholic community. Not all Nationalists support republican groups.

New Irish Republican Army (NIRA) – In July 2012, the Real IRA (RIRA) and Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) publicly announced an amalgamation to form the New IRA. This grouping has been responsible for the majority of attacks since its formation. They have claimed responsible for high profile murders of a police officer, Ronan Kerr and a prison officer, David Black in 2011 and 2012 respectively.

Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) – This is one of 11 devolved Northern Ireland Departments created in December 1999 under the Northern Ireland Act. It has the overall responsibility for running the Northern Ireland Executive and is run by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The two positions share equal power.

Official Republican Movement (ORM) – This is the collective term used to refer to the Official IRA and Official Sinn Fein from which the Provisional Republican Movement split in 1969. It has also more recently been adopted by a small grouping that split from the Worker's party in 1991 when it viewed the party as drifting away from its republican heritage.

Oglaigh Na h'Eireann (ONH) – Irish republican paramilitary organisation that formed in 2006 and is believed to be a faction of the Real IRA. It recruits and trains members in Northern Ireland and has been responsible for high profile attacks on the PSNI and British Army. This is a name used by a number of Irish republican paramilitary

organisations, including the splinter group of the CIRA that broke away in 2006. It is also a name used by the legitimate army of the Republic of Ireland. It can be translated variously as soldiers of Ireland, warriors of Ireland or Irish Volunteers.

“Old” Irish Republican Army – For the purposes of this research the Old IRA is defined as those involved in militant republicanism in the name of the IRA between 1917-1923.

Police and Community Safety Partnerships (PCSP’s) – See District Policing Partnerships (DPP’s).

Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) – A loyalist political party with links to the paramilitary group, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) – The main republican paramilitary group, founded in January 1970 after a split within the republican movement. It is announced an end to violence in 2005.

Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) – Dissident Irish Republican paramilitary organisation formed in 1997 by disaffected senior Provisional IRA members. It is opposed to the Good Friday Agreement and is believed to be in effect the military wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement. This group was responsible for the Omagh bombing in 1998, the murder of two British Soldiers at the Masserene Barracks in 2009 and multiple additional operations. In 2012 it was renamed the New IRA.

Republican – In the Northern Ireland context, the term traditionally refers to an individual who supports the use of violence to establish a United (32 County) Ireland.

Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) – An Irish republican vigilante group targeting alleged drug dealers largely via paramilitary attacks, intimidation and arson. They are most active in Northern Ireland across Derry, Strabane and Newry.

Republican Network for Unity (RNU) – A coalition of dissident republicans opposed to the twenty first century direction of Sinn Fein. Although it does not have a military wing it did send “comradely greetings to Oglagh Na h’Eireann” at their 2011 Ard Fheis and would therefore be currently linked with ONH.

Republican Sinn Fein (RSF) – An Irish republican political party that broke away from Sinn Fein in 1986 out of opposition to its policy to end abstention from the Dail. RSF opposed both the PIRA ceasefire and the Peace Process and it is widely regarded as the political wing of the Continuity IRA.

Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) – The Police Force of Northern Ireland from 1922 to 2001. It has been succeeded by the heavily reformed Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

Sinn Fein – The left wing republican political party, advocating Irish unity and self-determination. It is widely regarded as the political wing of the PIRA, though the leadership of the party denies these claims.

Six Counties – The term republican used to refer to Northern Ireland since they do not acknowledge it as a state. The counties include Antrim, Armagh, Derry (Londonderry), Down, Fermanagh and Tyrone.

Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) – Nationalist political party in Northern Ireland that has traditionally opposed the violent campaign of the PIRA, though it is committed to the unification of Ireland through political and peaceful means.

St Andrews Agreement – This 2006 agreement was the result of multiparty talks held between the British and Irish Governments and the main Northern Irish political parties. The most significant outcomes of this agreement were the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the formation of a new Northern Ireland Executive and the acceptance by Sinn Fein of the PSNI. The signing of the agreement saw the DUP and Sinn Fein entering into a power sharing agreement with Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness, elected First Minister and Deputy First Minister respectively.

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) – Traditionally the largest Unionist Party in Northern Ireland, but it has recently been surpassed by the DUP. It is considered to be the most centrist of the Unionist Parties and has had strong ties with the British Conservative Party.

Unionist – A term in Northern Ireland that refers to those who support the union of Northern Ireland with Great Britain.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is submitted as part of a Professional Doctorate in Policing, Security and Community Safety. Militant Irish Republicanism is not new and has had a long history dating back to a series of uprisings in the 18th Century but this study does add something new to the literature.

For the first time research has examined the current form of militant republicans and compares them to the original IRA which came into existence almost one hundred years ago. The research question here is simply are the IRA of then the same as now. Are they the same religion, gender, age and marital status? Do they come from the same social class and are they primarily urban or rural dwellers? These and many more questions are attempted in this in-depth analysis of both generations of violent republicanism.

It is accepted that many things in Ireland have changed since the Easter Rising of 1916. Ireland is now divided with a Republic in Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland an integral part of the United Kingdom. This research looks for similarities and differences in those who continue with armed struggle despite all the social, economic and political changes 100 years has brought to the island.

Of course Ireland is not alone in the change it has seen. Terrorism has changed considerably in the same period. This thesis starts with setting this research in the wider context of worldwide terrorism. The contemporary debates in terrorism studies are introduced and the contested concept of terrorism and its many definitions are discussed.

It was necessary to make this a starting point for this research as the term terrorist is not an agreed concept. Indeed many believe it will never be agreed and cannot be a static position. The terrorists of the Easter Rising in 1916 are now widely accepted in Ireland

and beyond as Irish patriots and not terrorists. It may be the case that one hundred years from now the dissidents are viewed very differently for making a stand against continued British involvement in Ireland. Even among republicans, dissidents are currently labelled as criminals, micro groups or traitors to Ireland by Sinn Fein who now share government with the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland. Similar examples are found in South Africa, Columbia and the Middle East, where former adversaries come together to form a Government. Therefore the international terrorism debates are very much evident in modern day Ireland.

The purpose of this research is to add value to the debates within terrorism studies. By examining the individuals involved in terrorism it will assist practitioners understand why some people get involved in terrorism, some don't and may even assist in adding to the debate as to what brings terrorism to an end.

The work of this research focuses on the individual where there is currently "a disturbing lack of good empirically grounded research." (Gurr, 1988, p115.) By looking closely at the individuals involved we can determine that whilst terrorism and society as a whole has changed those involved may not have changed very much.

It is acknowledged that terrorism in Ireland has changed and evolved like terrorism across the globe but the question this research will answer is how much this has affected the individuals involved.

Over the 100 years of the IRA's existence (in various forms) many myths have emerged as to who makes up their membership and what they are like. This research will provide an accurate database from which these myths can be challenged. Even the very

existence of the dissidents and what the various factions stand for needed to be examined in this research as there is much confusion as to the make-up of the various groups. Chapter 2 as well as providing a review of the literature also provides a detailed account of who the groups are and where they came from. It can be seen from this research that the dissidents are unlike PIRA a number of small divided groups.

The literature review introduces the leading academics on the old and new IRA. It shows a shift from journalistic material which charts the early days of the dissidents prior to 2009 and the renewed interest in Irish terrorism post a rise in dissident activity in 2009. One leading scholar states it is a “far from complete picture.” (Frampton, 2011.) Some significant contributions from Sanders, Morrison and Horgan are discussed in the review but this study provides details on 427 dissidents who have been militarily involved and charged in relation to dissident activity since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

The research methodology outlined in Chapter 3 shows how difficult it was to obtain data which could be compared with the surprisingly large amount of material on the IRA of 1916. The research question and plan is carefully laid out in this chapter which commences with a review of all the existing literature.

The final chapter provides a comparison between the Old IRA utilising excellent studies by Hart, Coleman and McGarry with the violent dissident republican database created from this research. The entire database minus the names of the dissidents is reproduced at Appendix Two.

One of the objectives of this research is to inform practitioners involved in countering the threat from dissidents and it was therefore important to set the research within the context of the wider terrorism debate. As it will be seen in the next chapter similar themes and debates exist with terrorism worldwide.

CHAPTER ONE

Terrorism – The Wider Context

In this, the first chapter in a thesis on violent dissident republican terrorism in Ireland the reader will be introduced to the theories and arguments which prevail in contemporary research in the study of terrorism. This will have a dual purpose. First to set the contemporary research on dissident republicans in context with the wider debates in terrorism studies and secondly to introduce the contested concepts which already exist in the study of terror.

Indeed the term terrorism itself is a highly contested concept and this chapter will provide a brief overview of the current debates. There will then be a brief introduction to the academic theories on why terrorism happens and a summary of the different types of terrorism. Finally this chapter will examine a number of theories as to what causes terrorism to end.

In both the academic literature and official documents there are literally hundreds of definitions of what terrorism is. The definitional quagmire as it was called in Jackson et al (2011) showed it was impossible to find any agreement on a definition. In one large study of the definitions several hundred were found. It was established that generally political elite's definitions tended to be ambiguous and over generalised. This it is was argued allowed the authorities and courts flexibility in applying the law to a variety of situations. On the other hand academic definitions added complexity to the concepts making them almost unusable. (Schmid and Jongman, 1988. Badey, 1998.) The Schmid and Jongman Survey consisted of a questionnaire which they e-mailed to academics. The responses when collated provided 109 separate definitions of terrorism. Schmid then listed twenty two "definitional elements" which he marked in the order of frequency they appeared in the questionnaires. From this, Schmid provided a definition which contained sixteen of the twenty two elements.

Expanding on the work done by Schmid and Jongman, Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hoefler (2004) similarly asked the experts what definitions they relied upon. They examined three leading professional journals – *Terrorism*, *Terrorism and Political Violence* and finally *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* from 1977 through to 2001. From this work a total of twenty seven definitions were established. Clearly the longer time period of the latter study provided different results in that since 1977 the phenomenon of “new terrorism” had changed the way terrorism was defined. This led Weinberg et al to conclude that little consensus existed but they stressed that the vague definitions which did exist risked a very large group of violent activities being recorded as terrorism and “we may be better off finding another governing concept or looking elsewhere for a definition.” (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hoefler, 2004.)

In response to these concerns some academics have argued that there will never be definitional agreement and it is pointless pursuing it. (Laqueur, 1987) Others argue that to understand current events and influence future ones it is vital that a consistent definition of terrorism should be pursued. (Meisels, 2006.) This becomes particularly relevant in this thesis when defining which individuals to examine in this study. Some studies into militant republicanism have previously included those individuals who are politically opposed to Sinn Fein and the 1998 peace agreement. This current project examines only those who have been charged with a criminal offence related to dissident republican activity. Therefore the very definition of who is a terrorist or in this case a dissident republican can have a major influence on the outcome of the research.

Terrorism is therefore arguably a matter of perception, seen differently by different people at different times in history. Powell (2014) argues that the term has been so

overused that it has virtually lost all meaning. He illustrates his point with two examples. When in 2000 Nelson Mandela was interviewed on the Larry King Live programme in the United States, he stated that he was a terrorist one day (when still in prison) but when he came out of prison he was embraced by his enemies. Mandela argued he was no longer perceived to be a terrorist because he had been released from prison and had been welcomed by a new South Africa. The second example cited by Powell involved Yasser Arafat who when he spoke to the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 as leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation he said, “The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot possibly be called a terrorist.” (Powell, 2014, p9.)

Terrorism unlike terms such as war and sovereignty may never be defined in a way which will receive international agreement. (Cronin, 2009.) Cronin goes on to argue (like Laqueur did previously) that perfect consensus is not required but certain aspects must be present before terrorism is present. First, terrorism must be politically motivated. Terrorist acts, argues Cronin, are carried out to encourage political change. According to Cronin the second element which must be present is that other forms of political violence by states in a time of war cannot be viewed as terrorism and therefore terrorism by its nature involves non-state actors. Cronin qualifies this by making it clear that states involved in war, at times, carry out acts much worse than terrorism but when they do they are labelled crimes against humanity or a violation of the laws of war or genocide. The third factor always present in terrorist acts is that they do not comply with international laws or norms and the activities are intended to intimidate or to inspire change. The final factor present in Cronin’s definition of terrorism is that it is aimed at civilian non-combatants otherwise considered to be illegitimate targets in ‘normal’ rules of warfare. (Cronin, 2009.)

The definitional debate does not always follow academic or non-academic lines with English (2009) demonstrating that there is a difference in the United States as to how various groups define terrorism. The US State Department defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” On the other hand the Federal Bureau of Investigation define terrorism as “the use of serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use such violence to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public in order to promote political, social or ideological objectives.” (English, 2009, p8.) English goes on to say that the connection between state and non-state actors was sometimes not clear and gave the example of an academic Adrian Guelke who the Ulster Freedom Fighters (a loyalist paramilitary organisation) tried to murder in Belfast in 1991. In this case following the incident it was alleged that the South African Security Forces had provided intelligence to the UFF to the effect that the academic was involved in republican paramilitarism. Therefore in this case English comments, “even in this apparently unambiguous case of non-state terrorism, a non-state group had in fact acted at the prompting of a wing of a state and such instances reflect the varied intricacy of the relationship between states and terrorism around the world.” (English, 2009, p8.)

In an attempt to add clarity on the definition of terrorism, Hoffman (2006) took an historic approach. In his account Hoffman dates early terrorism back to the French Revolution where he claims the term had a positive connotation. The regime de la terreur of 1793-1794 from which the English word terrorism came “was adopted as a means to establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that followed the uprisings of 1789.” (Hoffman, 2006, p3.) Hoffman suggests that terrorism differs

from other criminality and irregular warfare in that the fear or threat of violence is not only in pursuit of political change but it creates power where there is none and through publicity seeks to leverage or influence the powerful.

Before leaving the problems of defining terrorism it may be worth approaching the term not as a “brute material fact” which exists out there but is a social fact “that comes into being within and is dependent upon the contextual, historical and political dynamics that structure its interpretation thus.” (Jackson et al, 2011, p119.) Therefore Jackson et al argues that terrorism as a concept is characterised by ontological instability. Its meaning will always contain the possibility of change and will depend on who speaks of it and for what purpose. (Jackson et al, 2011.)

To summarise, the definition of terrorism is highly contested and ever changing. In the limited space available some of the definitional debates have been probed. Several concepts have been identified and some of the tensions between official government definitions and academic studies have been explored. Many of the definitions are in the view of Martin, 2011 “value laden and can depend on one’s own perspective as an actor in a terrorist environment.” (Martin, 2011, p19.) Values and perspectives are also influenced by the individuals involved in terrorism and it is therefore before going any further in this research necessary to gain some understanding as to why people involve themselves in terrorism.

Many reasons have been given for terrorism. Both scholars and experts have developed models which consider factors such as political history, government policy, contemporary politics, cultural tensions, ideological trends, economic trends and individual idiosyncrasies. (Martin, 2011.) Martin argues that terrorism follows from social

movements within which change is promoted in the case of militant republicanism or to preserve something which is perceived to be threatened, such as the case in violent loyalism in Northern Ireland. Dramatic events whether they occur to an individual, a nation or an ethnic national group can have a lasting effect. Such psychological explanations of terrorism concentrate on the effects of internal psychological dynamics on an individual and on group behaviour. A presumption is held by many that terrorism is carried out by insane or mentally ill people. Proponents of the psychological theory of why terrorism occurs do not agree. Whilst it is accepted that groups and individuals do act out of idiosyncratic psychological processes their behaviour is neither insane or irrational. (Martin, 2011.)

Such psychological explanations are used to explain why Governments involve themselves in terrorism. According to Jackson et al (2011) their specific aims and goals include “isolating, demoralising and terrorising individuals and groups who voice opposition under colonialism, dictatorship, military occupation or post-revolutionary rule.” (Jackson et al, 2011, p191.) The key point which Jackson et al puts forward is that for a state, terrorism has a rational basis and has a particular purpose. In countries such as El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and Argentina, the state used terrorism to undermine social movements which may have threatened the ruling elite. (Raphael, 2009 and Blakeley, 2009.)

While some academics and experts have explained terrorism by broad conceptual theories others have focused on the groups involved in terrorism, arguing that they are so diverse that one explanation cannot explain why terrorism occurs in many different settings and carried out by many types of different groupings. English (2009) concentrates on the importance of examining what groups say about what they are doing and why they are

doing it. It is, English argues only when you focus on these aspects of terrorism that observers understand clearly what in each case the motivations are. English uses the example of the IRA as a group who only when an understanding of their particular goals in the 1990's was established meaningful dialogue between the group and the state took place. In this case the purpose of the state was "to know and to be clear about the specific contextualised reasons for the violence occurring rather than to lump together all such acts as terrorism as though there were some generalised template of causation impulse and action which was universally applicable across the planet." (English, 2009, p55.)

This focus on the particular group has been used to explain terrorism from Muslim communities around the world who unlike the PIRA of the 1990's Al Qaeda presented a very different organisation. It is worth using the Al Qaeda example to show the complexity of terrorism and the causes of it. This grouping is of particular interest given its (at one time) large base and appeal throughout the world. Patrick Sookhdeo provides such analysis. Sookhdeo is an academic attached to the George C Marshall European Centre for Security Studies and has advised the UK Government as a cultural adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan. It is argued by Sookhdeo that it is only when a particular group of terrorists are examined closely that the reasons for terrorism taking place can be obtained.

In the case of the Muslim world the legacy of colonialism is still a great source of bitterness with 20 of the top 40 most at risk states in the Failed State Index in 2006 being Muslim. This shows that Muslim countries are well behind non-Muslim countries. The resulting poverty and demographic pressures from growing populations argues Sookhdeo adds to a growing resentment of the West in the Muslim world. This leads to a loss of identity particularly among young Muslims and a feeling of humiliation and shame at the way Muslims have been treated by the West. Events in Palestine and more recent events in

Afghanistan and Iraq are seen by many Muslims as an attack on Islam itself. The foreign policy of the United States and secular Western countries is seen as having a polluting impact on the Muslims worldwide because it undermines Islam. A number of other reasons have been cited as reasons for terrorism coming from the Muslim world including loyalty to the Umma – the global Muslim community rather than a nation state, a crisis in weak autocratic Muslim States, eg Libya, Egypt and climate change which may affect Muslim countries more severely, eg increased desertification in North Africa and the Middle East leading to water shortages or a rise in sea levels leading to flooding in countries such as Bangladesh.

When one combines these diverse and complex explanations there is little doubt, argues Sookhdeo that “Muslims across the world face serious pressures and hardships. Muslim countries face enough real adversity and suffering for their populations to seek strong resentment and anger which can manifest itself in support for violence against perceived enemies.” (Sookhdeo, 2007, p43.)

But not all academics take such a view and seek to explain the individual’s motivation for becoming involved in terrorism. Cottee and Hayward (2011) make the case that there are three existential motivations for individuals to become involved in terrorism. These were identified as the desire for excitement, the desire for ultimate meaning and the desire for glory. The question posed by this research was what makes terrorism existentially attractive? The researchers argue “that the attraction to terrorism is centrally related to its hectic excitement, the edgy glamour of terrorist organisations and their driving mythologies, the sense of intense belonging and deep enthrallment they create among their members.” (Cottee and Hayward, 2011, p966.) The research methodology used by Cottee and Hayward involved examining existing academic articles on military

combat and war, juvenile delinquency, crowd violence, contract killing and voluntary risk tasking. They also examined terrorists' memoirs and academic research on various terrorist groups.

Their tentative conclusions (a great deal of further research is suggested) are that terrorism offers a solution to feelings of existential frustration. This research argues that terrorism studies need to focus on normalising the terrorist and humanising them however morally reprehensible their actions are. This work on the individual as opposed to the group is further explored in the work of Martha Crenshaw, *Understanding and Explaining Terrorism* (2011). Crenshaw argues that terrorists make up a small number of people from similar backgrounds who experience the same conditions. Crenshaw cautions however that there is limited data on individual terrorists but what is available indicates they are normal human beings. Quoting the work of Franco Venturi in *Russia*, Crenshaw argues that terrorism can link a wide variety of individuals with different personality types together in a common cause. Venturi's work focused on 19th Century populist groups in Russia. (Venturi, 1960.) Crenshaw argues that terrorism does not occur in answer to some inner call but rather results in a gradual growth of commitment and opposition. This lack of research on the individuals involved in terrorism is further advanced in research conducted by Gurr who said that there was "a disturbing lack of good empirically grounded research." (Gurr, 1988, p115.) Therefore the focus on the individual is crucial to advancing research in this area. This current project seeks to close some of the gaps on who dissident republican terrorists in Northern Ireland are and provide a comparison with what the IRA of 100 years ago was like. The research will examine in detail the individuals who make up the violent dissident groups. It is therefore necessary to set the type of terrorism experienced in Ireland in the wider context. Terrorism in Ireland has changed but how does this compare with terrorism elsewhere?

Terrorism has indeed changed in the 21st Century. In the previous century terrorism was largely characterised by nationalist and anti-colonial movements. Groups such as the Front De Liberation due Quebec, a Quebecois separatist group, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army are examples of the old hierarchical, top down terrorist groups whose attacks were primarily directed at government forces. While the terrorist groups of this century have inherited some of the characteristics of these groupings they take a much broader approach and as a result present a much more serious threat. Al Qaeda whilst not the only terrorist group operating today it is perhaps the best personification of how the terrorist threat has evolved. In the past terrorist groups could be recognised as a group of individuals belonging to an organisation with a structure and command and control exercised from above. Today's groups are more loosely connected through a network of individuals some of which may never have met. Some individuals who have no direct link with Al Qaeda are prepared to carry out attacks in support of a radical jihadist agenda. What links these individuals and groups is an ideology. A recent example of this in the United States was Najibullah Zazi. Zazi was born in Afghanistan and moved to Colorado as a teenager. He later trained in Al Qaeda camps and returned to New York City where he planned to blow up the Subway. Before doing so he was arrested and after pleading guilty he stated he was motivated by avenging what US troops were doing to civilians in Afghanistan. (Martin, 2011.)

This shift to Islamist ideology has seen a dramatic change in the make-up of terrorist movements in that they have loose structures, diverse membership and they are geographically separated. While this ideology is not the only driving force behind modern day terrorism, it plays a significant part in what is now defined as "new terrorism." One of the significant developments on how "new" terrorism has grown is the evolution of how

propaganda is spread through the widespread use of the internet. This has expanded opportunities to gain publicity, spread propaganda and recruit members. The targets of new terrorism have also seen change. Modern day terrorists have evolved from attacks on government targets to deliberately targeting civilian populations. In many cases, this is with tragic consequences with a large loss of life. (Martin, 2011.)

Other scholars, Copeland, (2001), Tucker, (2001) and Spencer, (2006) argue that many of the structures thought to distinguish new terrorism can also be found in the terrorism of old. The presence of amateurs has been argued to be a new development in terrorism but can also be found in the secular left wing groups of the 1970's and the anarchist terrorists of the late 19th Century. Mass casualty attacks are also not unique to "new" terrorism and the increase in casualties may be explained by technological changes, globalisation, changes in the media and the public receptivity rather than a new breed of terrorism. (Jackson et al, 2011.)

State terrorism whilst a contested concept has also been described as terrorism from above. (Martin, 2011.) State terrorism is carried out by governments or quasi-governmental agencies against perceived enemies. It can be carried out against foreign states or on internal domestic enemies. Because of the resources available to a state this type of terrorism can be more violent and far reaching than terrorism carried out by religious groups.

States can sponsor terrorism by actually promoting terrorist groups or enable their operations by "being part of the problem means not just failing to co-operate fully in countering terrorism but also doing some things that help to enable it to occur." (Pillar, 2001, p178.)

State terrorism can also be politically motivated violence within its own borders against perceived enemies of the State. South Africa is one example of a State who when faced with anti-apartheid reformist agitation, mass unrest and terrorist attacks they implemented a covert campaign against the African National Congress which involved the assassination by death squads called Askaris of key members of the ANC both inside and outside South Africa. (Martin, 2011.)

Therefore terrorism today and in the future can take the form of many varying types. As Powell put it, “What has happened in recent years demonstrates how quickly these groups can appear out of a clear blue sky, from ISIS in Iraq and Syria to the MUJAO in Mali, and form and reform in different shapes and with different names.” (Powell, 2014, p357.) This makes the task of countering terrorism all the more difficult in the modern age. As Hoffman put it, “Terrorism, similarly, is constantly changing, evolving indeed far more rapidly and consequentially during the period of time since 9/11. Winning the war on terrorism will take decades, not years, to accomplish if we are to succeed, our efforts must be as tireless, innovative and dynamic as those of our opponents.” (Hoffman, 2006, p295.) These words appear somewhat prophetic given the changes in terrorism since Hoffman wrote this in 2006.

Academic attention focused recently on the threat from lone wolf terrorism and weapons of mass destruction which now seem less farfetched than even a decade ago. (Ellis, 2013.) Eco terrorism has received some study but it is largely felt at this stage to be confined to the Radical, Environmentalist and Animal Rights (REAR) Movement. While the threat of a weapon of mass destruction in the hands of a lone wolf terrorist may never happen, it does seem to be more of a risk now than it was in the previous century.

Traditional weapons of mass destruction may be acquired by illegitimate actors but a more clear and present danger exists from radiation, bacteria and other chemicals which are now available in most communities. These potentially destructive new weapons pose increasing threats to the Security Services who need to continue to adapt to meet the threat. (Ellis, 2013.)

Recent studies have explored the threat from cyberterrorism and a survey was conducted of researchers in this field. This research has shown there is considerable disagreement among the academic world on the extent of the threat from cyberterrorism and the potential targets for attack. There is in fact disagreement on whether cyber terrorism has ever actually occurred. It therefore has the same definitional disagreements as the parent concept – terrorism. (Jarvis et al, 2013.)

Having examined the definitional debates on what terrorism is briefly summarised the causes of terrorism and the different types of terrorism it is now necessary to critique the academic theories on what ends terrorism and what is the ideal response by a state to terrorism.

Why and how terrorism ends is relevant to the current research project. One of the first conflicts in the 20th Century between a government and a terrorist grouping to end was the settlement in Ireland with the British Government and the IRA in 1921. Jonathan Powell in “Talking to Terrorists” says, “The parallels between events then and today are almost eerie.” (Powell, 2014, p309.)

The response by the British to the IRA campaign in the 1920’s was as typical a Government response then as it would be now argues Powell. The British responded with the use of irregular forces called the Black and Tans to terrorise the terrorist. By 1920 the

British Military were convinced they were winning the campaign but in November, Michael Collins' squad assassinated 14 suspected British Intelligence Agents in Dublin and a short time later the IRA killed a patrol of 17 auxiliaries in Kilmichael, Co Cork. A stalemate then resulted and it wasn't until 1921 that Collins admitted the IRA did not have the equipment or ability to force the British from Ireland. (Powell, 2014.)

With both sides accepting they could not win the war, politics took the lead in trying to negotiate a settlement. As was the case in recent negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement the United States administration played a pivotal role. In 1917 President Woodrow Wilson communicated to the US Ambassador in London that before completely cordial co-operation between the US and Britain could be achieved, self-Government would have to be resolved in Ireland. (Powell, 2014.) Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, began by stating he would not talk to terrorists but later realised that he had to. The key to the negotiations (as they would be 80 years later) was securing the right interlocutor. In 1920, it was the American correspondent, Carl Ackerman. In the long running and stuttering talks between 1974 and 1992, it was Derry businessman, Brendan Duddy. The talks in the 1920's led to a settlement which included the partition of Ireland and ended the violence for 50 years. With the outbreak of violence in the 1970's, it would be almost 30 years before a settlement occurred again in Ireland with the Good Friday Agreement.

Whilst the peace process in Ireland in 1998 has been largely a success story for diplomacy not all negotiations end in complete success. In some cases social reforms have occurred which remove some of the causes of terrorism. In Spain the ethno national sentiment in the Basque region had been suppressed by the regime of Francisco Franco. Following his death in 1975, the Basque region was granted semi-autonomous status with

ETA being legalised as a political party. Whilst the violence continued it had a counterproductive effect and the Spanish commitment to social reform undercut the Basque support for ETA violence. (Martin, 2011.)

The liberty versus security debate is a live one among academics of terrorism. Some argue that terrorists exploit the freedom and liberty offered by a democratic state and that it is necessary to secure society against terrorism by restricting the movements of citizens. (Meisels, 2005; Wilkinson, 2006; Yoo, 2010.) This view is based on the belief that democratic societies because they respect individual freedom this makes them vulnerable to attack as opposed to the view that such freedom makes a society robust and strong and that it is the skill of the Security Services that is crucial to safety. (Jackson et al, 2011.) Opponents of the security argument state there is little conclusive evidence that the restriction of liberty enhances security against terrorism. There are, argues Jackson et al no clear examples of where terrorism has ended or reduced due to the restriction of civil liberties alone. On the other hand there are plenty of examples to show that restrictive terrorist counter measures have led to a deeper sense of grievance and increased the support for terrorist groups.

One strategy which has a contested effect on terrorist is decapitation. That is the removal of the leadership which results in the demise of the group. The success of this as a strategy will depend on how much popular support the group has and how much that support relies on the leader. As we shall see later in this thesis, the removal of the leader, Michael McKevitt by imprisonment had a large impact on the Real IRA in the decade after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The arrest and imprisonment of a leader has shown to be more detrimental to the group than killing him. (Cronin, 2009.)

Che Guevara is probably one of the most notable examples with his death leading to international and enduring support for his cause.

Organisations which have been crippled by the removal of a leader tend to be hierarchical and lack a viable successor. Cronin argues the primary aim of decapitation is to “discredit the engines of popular mobilisation that drive this movement.” (Cronin, 2009, p177.) In the case of Al Qaeda the focus on killing Osama Bin Laden has had little or no effect on the threat from new terrorism. Cronin’s arguments in 2009 were made before the death of Bin Laden in 2011. This proved to be the case as his death had little effect on the threat from international terrorism albeit it did provide an increased esprit de corps on the Western side which was being challenged by Bin Laden’s ability to avoid capture. Cronin argues that decapitation must be part of a six part framework which also includes negotiation, success, freedom, repression and reorientation. This provides a wide range of options on how to deal with terrorism from a state crushing a terrorist organisation to the organisation imploding due to the removal of their credibility and every combination in between. (Cronin, 2009.)

English has argued that one of the first considerations for government when dealing with terrorism is to learn to live with it. Terrorism has been present in one form or another for centuries and English contends “such violence is too tempting a form of warfare to be likely to dissolve...and so we are going to have to live with terrorism as part of our political reality.” (English, 2009, p120.) By way of example, English cites the United Kingdom’s lengthy experience of Irish terrorism. Irish terrorism he contends dates back to the 19th Century with many forms of the IRA coming and leaving the stage prior to the peace agreement in 1998. It leads English to conclude “terrorism itself is not going to evaporate, even though specific terrorist groups and threats will eventually do so. Particular terrorist campaigns end, terrorism does not.” (English, 2009, p122.)

Some argue the best way to live with terrorism is to accept that it is going to happen and acquire foreknowledge to counter the surprise. Ormond, 2010 in his work “Securing the State” argues it is crucial that government is alerted to possible dangers through intelligence. This can be done according to Ormond by having a strong analytical threat assessment community which make them less likely to bias and falling into pitfalls such as those uncovered in the public inquiry into the war in Iraq. In what he describes as “living with surprise”, Ormond suggests a number of approaches which governments can take to improve their chances of not getting caught out by surprise. The first step is they need a system to detect strategic notice of new developments such as new ideologies or technological threats. Secondly government needs operational warnings or alerting which trigger contingency plans particularly on hardening key facilities before any specific intelligence is received. Finally Ormond argues a government needs to ensure it gets tactical warnings of attack planning. Describing it as the guard dog that barks, he contends that whilst sometimes ambiguous having any warning is better than be caught totally by surprise. (Ormond, 2010.)

In order to increase the opportunities to get these tactical warnings, there is therefore a need to explore the individuals involved in terrorism and their motivation. This current research project examines the individuals currently involved in armed struggle in Ireland and asks what has changed in their social structure in one hundred years and what can researchers of terrorism learn from this. This research focuses on quantitative research carried out remotely but qualitative research including the interviewing of ex-combatants in other studies has provided in-depth information on recruitment and motivation. These studies have not been without their methodological challenges.

In 2002, the Columbian Government commenced a programme of de-briefing ex-combatants involved in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). This continued for ten years providing 15,000 interview transcripts. Whilst this has not been fully exploited by academics, it provides a useful database for further analysis. However, the data has its limitations. It was gathered by Columbian Security Forces under diverse conditions. The records are inconsistent and incomplete. It is therefore important at the outset to get the research methodology right. (Rosenau et al, 2013.) Interviews were considered in this research project but were ruled out for the many reasons that make the Columbians research of limited value. As a serving PSNI Officer, the primary researcher would not be in a position to interview those involved in armed struggle. This is explored further in the research methodology.

A lack of any credible research in the terrorism field is argued to lead to a higher threat from terrorism. In the case of how terrorism is handled in the “new” media (media since the turn of the Century), research has shown that jihadist terrorists have used the internet to greater effect than the state Security Services who try to counter them. In one study, the research recommends government develop a target centric approach to monitoring jihadist media output. Due to the size of the internet, the research recommends targeting techniques, similar to those used in other areas of surveillance should be applied to the internet. (Amble, 2012.) While the use of the internet has been widely used in international terrorism its propaganda effect has been realised particularly among young republicans. See Chapter Two – The Review of the Literature.

On the other hand, some academics argue the focus on terrorism and the terrorism industry is part of the problem. They argue that fear of terrorism is “stoked” by various parts of the industry including risk entrepreneurs, the media and almost all politicians. One

example is the re-election campaign of President Bush in 2003 when his Chief Political Adviser, Karl Rowe, made it clear that the war on terror was central to the campaign. The strategy appeared to work with President Bush's re-election. (Horgan and Braddock, 2012.)

Academics are of course not on the outside of this terrorism industry. As Bruce Hoffman described, "Many academic terrorism analysis are self-limited to mostly lurid hypotheses of worst case scenarios, almost exclusively involving CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear) weapons, as opposed to trying to understand why with the exception of September 11th terrorists have only rarely realised their true killing potential." (Hoffman, 2002, p311.)

Indeed the deaths from terrorism in any Western Country form only a tiny fraction of the sudden deaths of its citizens. With deaths from domestic violence, farm accidents and road traffic collisions accounting for many more. This Chapter has shown that the terrorism problem is worldwide but similar to terrorism elsewhere in Ireland it is evolving and changing. This research project will show how much change has taken place in a century of militant republicanism but before examining the individuals involved it is necessary to research where violent dissident groupings have emerged from. By looking at the groupings first, it will provide some context as to why the individuals have become involved in a renewed campaign of violence. As the research in this project will show for many individuals involved in dissident republican violence it is not their first campaign. It is necessary to now examine how the various dissident groupings have evolved and the literature already available on them.

CHAPTER TWO

Review of the Literature

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. To provide context to the term dissident republican and to review the literature already available on violent dissident republicans since their origins in the mid 1980's. This review will be structured in line with a traditional review in that it will deal in detail with the existing knowledge and show how this research project builds on the theories and arguments which have gone before. It will also set this current research project in the wider context of terrorism studies. In order to explain the contemporary dissident Irish problem, it was helpful to set it in the wider context of 'new' terrorism and current debates in terrorism studies. Prior to examining the literature it is necessary to look more closely at the term dissident republican and what is meant by it. There is considerable irony in referring to dissident groups as such due to the numerous splits in republicanism throughout its history. Indeed the IRA volunteer and playwright, Brendan Behan, has been famously quoted as saying that at any IRA meeting, "The first thing on the Republican agenda is the split." (Morrison, 2013, p13.) Therefore the term dissident is a crude description for a number of groupings who we shall see have had as many disagreements as ideals which hold them together. Given the organisational complexity and heterogeneity of dissident groups to say that splits have been the norm in the development of violent dissident groups is an understatement.

Dissident groups vary in size, geographic location, strategies, ideologies, structures and overall personal rivalries. All these factors have played a part in dividing the armed struggle with leading republicans such as Marion Price claiming, "After the various splits which occurred there are many who feel a lot of resentment and mistrust to those on the other side of the split." (Frenett and Smith, 2012, p380.)

Indeed many dissidents themselves disagree with the Gerry Adams (President of Sinn Fein) trend of republicanism which is put forward as true republicanism. Dissidents believe their struggle is as it has always been therefore why should they be described as

dissenters? Republican Sinn Fein have been consistent in this point calling their first Ard Fheis following their split from Sinn Fein their eighty third. In so doing they portrayed themselves as the true voice of Sinn Fein. (Sanders, 2012.) It is therefore worth acknowledging that many people and groups described in the media as dissidents are groups who believe that as PIRA volunteers they were cheated rather than defeated. Anthony McIntyre takes the view that as a PIRA volunteer he was lied to by the Sinn Fein leadership and whilst he does not believe the time right now for armed struggle is anti-Sinn Fein and therefore badged as dissident by the media. (Currie, Taylor, 2011.)

Whilst dissident groups do not represent a monolithic entity and the term is a vague and imprecise one they do share common objectives not dissimilar to the objectives of the Provisional IRA and the Old IRA at the beginning of the 20th Century. British withdrawal, the end to partition and a United Ireland are the main goals of contemporary republicanism. Where the groups differ from the Provisional IRA and others is the strategy adopted to gain these goals. (Edwards, 2011.)

Simply put “violent dissident republicans are committed to the conduct of an armed campaign in Northern Ireland. Their aim is to prevent normalisation, undermine the peace process and ferment political instability.” (Frampton, 2010, p2.) The focus of this research is on the four most active dissident republican groups and their political affiliates. The Continuity IRA (CIRA) and Republican Sinn Fein (RSF), the Real IRA and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32 CSM), Oglaiigh Na h’Eireann (ONH) and Republican Network for Unity and finally the New IRA (NIRA) who as yet have no political voice but are linked with the 32 CSM. There are other smaller lesser known groups and there is considerable confusion about their significance or allegiances. (Horgan, 2013.)

The first split in the Provisional Republican Movement did not occur until 1986 when Republican Sinn Fein was formed by Ruairi O'Bradaigh and others following a two thirds majority vote at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis in favour of Sinn Fein contesting seats in the twenty six county Dial Eireann, the Irish Parliament. However the seeds of dissent had been sown many years before when rivalries emerged between the old traditional republican leadership in Southern Ireland and the 'Young Turks' leadership of PIRA in the North under the command of Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness and Danny Morrison. The old guard of O'Bradaigh and Daithi O'Conaill were blamed by the young guard for the perceived failure of the PIRA ceasefire in 1975.

In January 1979, Danny Morrison then editor of An Phoblacht, the Northern Provisional Newspaper, moved a team of staff to Dublin and took over the Southern Republican News. Having control of both papers gave the Northerners control of PIRA's propaganda machine making it Ireland wide. From the 1980's on PIRA and Sinn Fein pursued a joint strategy of military action by PIRA and electoral success by Sinn Fein. This was strongly opposed by O'Bradaigh, O'Conaill and others who stood down from Sinn Fein's Ard Comhairle (Ruling Executive) in 1983. With these resignations, Adams took control of the republican movement and forged ahead with his politicisation of the republican leadership. (Horgan, 2013.)

By 1986, Adams had enough support in the PIRA General Convention and the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis to gain a vote in favour of Sinn Fein taking their seats in the Dial Eireann in Dublin. Following this vote, O'Bradaigh and others walked out and after a brief consultation announced to the media they had formed a new grouping called Republican Sinn Fein. For O'Bradaigh and others the ending of the abstention policy was not a tactical matter but a central tenet of republicanism on which there could be no compromise. In the view of RSF to recognise the 26 County Parliament of the

Irish Republic was a betrayal and would ultimately lead to the acceptance of a second partitionist institution in Northern Ireland. This argued RSF duly occurred following the Good Friday Agreement when Sinn Fein took their seats in Stormont. This took place despite Martin McGuinness making a commitment in 1986 that the IRA would continue its armed campaign and that Sinn Fein had no intention of taking seats in Westminster or Stormont and he insisted “ultimately it is not votes but the cutting edge of the IRA that will bring freedom and justice in Ireland.” (Evans and Tonge, 2011, p65.)

Asked by the media if the RSF had a military organisation, O’Conaill replied, “We have no military organisation at this stage.” (White, R., p309.) This may well have been true as the Continuity IRA did not come to the public attention until 1994 when they carried out a salute at the graveside of Tom Maguire, a member of the old IRA and the last survivor of the all-Ireland Dail. Tom Maguire in October 1986 had stated, “I do not recognise the legitimacy of any Army Council styling itself the Council of the Irish Republican Army which lends support to any person or organisation styling itself Sinn Fein and prepared to enter the partition parliament of Leinster House.” (English, R, 2003, p251.) Tom Maguire believed the Provisionals had broken faith by ending the abstensionist policy and credited the CIRA as the legitimate inheritors of the republican flame. Since 1994, CIRA and RSF have been intrinsically linked with dual membership and the RSF newspaper Saoirse used as a conduit for CIRA media statements.

Since its formation, CIRA has consistently refused to move away from violence. They have carried out a number of attacks largely confined to border areas, the most notable of which was the murder of PSNI Constable Steven Carroll in 2009. The Independent Monitoring Commissions reports in 2004 and 2005 showed a largely inactive grouping with the leadership having little control over its units. (Frampton, 2010.)

In 2010, the grouping themselves suffered a split with the Limerick Branch of Republican Sinn Fein moving to form a group known as Real Sinn Fein. This group wants a broad front approach to dissident republicanism with RSF joining other dissident groupings. The O’Bradaigh leadership refused to work alongside anyone who had agreed with the dropping of the abstensionist policy in 1986. Both groups, the original RSF led by Des Dalton and the Real Sinn Fein led by Des Long have went to great lengths to discredit each other since their acrimonious split in 2010 and these disagreements have severely impacted on their operational capability. (Horgan, 2013.)

A study of the publications issued by RSF gives an indication of where they see their priorities from November 1986 to April 1987. O’Bradaigh and his supporters published three editions of the Republican Bulletin. In May 1987 this was replaced with Saoirse (Freedom). Criticism of the 26 County State in these publications is almost as frequent as criticism of British rule in Northern Ireland. The 26 County State is viewed as neo colonial and Northern Ireland as a British Colony. RSF demand a complete withdrawal of the British from Ireland and the formation of a federal Ireland (Eire Nua) meaning a parliament should be established in each of the four main provinces of Ireland. RSF disagrees with a pan nationalist alliance as this dilutes republicanism and gives a Unionist veto over change. Unionists are viewed as fellow Irishmen who will accept Irish Unity when the British withdraw.

RSF like CIRA retained a Dad’s Army like image due to its association with elderly diehard republicans wedded to the anti treatyism of the early 20th Century. (Tonge, 2010.)

This image was reinforced with recent arrests in Newry, Co Down, when seven alleged members of CIRA were arrested following a PSNI/MI5 operation. The seven were

aged 30, 43, 44, 58, 59, 73 and 75. All were believed to be members of the Des Long faction of CIRA and were charged with a series of offences including conspiracy to possess explosives with intent to endanger life, conspiracy to possess firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger life and five were charged with directing terrorism. The age range of those arrested showed an aging group. (McDonald, H, 2014.) This is a theory reinforced by this study which has established that the average of the dissident is some ten years older than the Old IRA.

Despite their differences RSF and CIRA have remained consistent in their messaging that they are not there to take steps towards a United Ireland but want a complete British withdrawal. They also remain consistent in their view that they will not work with groups who supported Provisional Sinn Fein in their ending of the abstentionist policy. RSF refer to themselves as the true republicans who continue with the historic campaign to force a British withdrawal from Ireland. Nowhere was this more evident than the oration given by O’Bradaigh on 20 September 2003 in Dublin on the 200th Anniversary of Robert Emmett’s execution when he said, “We of RSF who have gathered here today, hold true to Tones and Emmett’s teaching and purpose, to break the connection with England and establish an independent Irish Republic.” (English, R., 2006, p122.)

Unlike RSF and CIRA the RIRA and the 32 CSM did not break away from PIRA/Sinn Fein until the mid 1990’s. These republicans stayed with the Adams/McGuinness strategy to end the abstentionist policy but split from PIRA/Sinn Fein in opposition to the direction the peace process was taking. The groupings tried to downplay their differences with Marion Price in 2010 claiming that the only difference between CIRA and RIRA was timing. She claimed it took some longer than others to realise they were being sold out. (Sanders, 2012.) As stated earlier despite their similar

objectives there were clear differences in strategy which prevented them working closely together. Personal rivalries had also a big part to play in this.

RIRA came into existence in October 1997 following a split in the PIRA. The catalyst was the acceptance of the Mitchell principles by Sinn Fein. The RIRA split was led by the PIRA's Quarter Master General Michael McKeivitt, husband of Bernadette Sands McKeivitt. Sands-McKeivitt was the sister of former hunger striker, Bobby Sands. She stated, "Bobby did not die for cross border bodies with executive powers." (English, 2003, p317.) McKeivitt took with him from PIRA allies such as Seamus McGrane and Liam Campbell. (Moloney, 2002 and Mooney and O'Toole, 2003.) The split followed an earlier separation of leading Sinn Fein members who went on to form the 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32 CSM) in opposition to Sinn Fein. The 32 CSM has been seen as the political voice of RIRA since they amalgamated with RAAD to form the New IRA. The relationship between 32 CSM and the New IRA is unclear at present.

RIRA emerged from a politicisation process which continued in PIRA/Sinn Fein following the 1986 split. A document entitled, "Scenario for Peace" published by Sinn Fein in 1987 changed republicans central demand from one of British withdrawal to one of national self-determination. This allowed talks to open up between Adams and John Hume, leader of the main nationalist party at the time, the Social Democratic Labour Party. Through into the 1990's secret talks between Martin McGuinness and a British Government contact, Adam Ingram, led to a direct back channel for negotiations between Sinn Fein and the British Government. Overt negotiations led to the signing of the Downing Street Declaration, an agreement between the British and Irish Governments in 1993.

Originally this document was seen as a backward step by Sinn Fein as it showed the Irish Government were comfortable to deal with the British Government directly, to the exclusion of republicans in Northern Ireland. It also reaffirmed the need for Unionist consent prior to constitutional change. Adams convinced PIRA not to reject the document immediately but ask for points of clarification. He then used this time to visit all parts of Ireland and consult with grass roots members on their future direction.

The following year Adams was granted a visa to visit the United States and the media ban imposed on Sinn Fein was lifted. The ban had been put in place on both sides of the Border on the grounds that allowing Sinn Fein a voice in the media supported the cause of terrorism. In response to these acts of 'good faith' and as a temporary trial, a ceasefire was announced by PIRA in August 1994. Negotiations between the SDLP, Sinn Fein and the Irish Government continued in this period and a future republican strategy was devised. It was during this period that the republican leadership were accused of telling the membership one thing and the negotiators another. This led to future resentment and personal rivalries which have lasted to this day.

Whilst the ceasefire was accepted with great relief throughout the island of Ireland, it was treated with suspicion by some leading PIRA figures. They suspected Sinn Fein were moving away from the goal of Irish Unity toward a negotiated settlement which left the island partitioned. This discontent was felt most in the PIRA Army Executive who elects the Army Council. Michael McKevitt led the dissent in the Executive and was supported by other key figures including Brian Keenan.

In January 1996, the Executive called an extraordinary General Army Convention. The intention of this Convention was twofold, first to end the ceasefire and secondly to finish Adams and his strategy. Before being allowed to succeed in their second intention,

the PIRA Army Council ended the ceasefire on 19 February 1996 with the bombing of Canary Wharf in London's docklands area.

The General Army Convention took place in October 1996 in County Donegal. Despite attempts by the Executive to vote in an anti-Adams Council at the Convention, a number of key personnel changed their minds and voted for continuance of the peace process. Brian Keenan was one such member and according to Horgan his role cannot be underestimated. (Horgan, 2013.) The vote resulted in a majority Army Council which supported the Adams strategy.

Despite the Adams victory, tension was high in the months following the Convention but two events allowed Adams/McGuinness to continue with their strategy despite the dissent. The election of Tony Blair led to the appointment of Marjorie 'Mo' Mowlam as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Following her appointment, Mrs Mowlam assured Sinn Fein that they would be omitted into talks following a further ceasefire. This renewed the Unionist precondition of decommissioning but the newly elected leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, David Trimble, succeeded in selling this to his followers. (Taylor, 1998.)

Another ceasefire was called in July 1997 but did not have the support of the Executive. This ceasefire was believed by McKeivitt and others to serve no purpose other than to weaken the PIRA and deepened the mistrust of Adams and his leadership.

It was not until the Mitchell principles were accepted that an actual split occurred. The six core Mitchell principles of non-violence drafted by Senator George Mitchell were a framework which all participants would have to agree before entering into the political process. All participants had to agree to among other things committing to democratic and

exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues. The PIRA Executive was clear that signing up to these principles was unconstitutional and contradicted the very purpose of the PIRA. In the First Executive meeting that followed a last minute change of heart by Brian Gillan, a leading Belfast Provisional, led to support for the Adams strategy but only by the slimmest of margins, two votes. Five key figures including Michael McKevitt resigned and set up a separate organisation naming it Oglagh Na h'Eireann (Irish Volunteers) but became commonly known as the Real IRA to identify them as separate from PIRA.

Whilst the Mitchell principles and their acceptance was the excuse for the split it was clear that the direction of travel away from armed struggle was viewed by the dissenters as a mistake. Later in 2003, a RIRA statement included the words, “the peace process is a misnomer and is grounded on a false premise that it is a road to a final settlement... the Belfast Agreement and the full participation of the Provisional Movement in that process is a classic example of a successful counter insurgency strategy practised on the part of the British and Dublin Governments.” (RIRA televised interview, 2003.) The RIRA’s publication, the Sovereign Nation, claimed rightful ownership of the title Oglagh Na h'Eireann. The publication first seen in 1998 primarily honed in on the so called u-turns of Sinn Fein in their negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement. The compromise of the acceptance of the Mitchell principles and decommissioning led the Sovereign Nation to accuse Sinn Fein of no longer belonging to the republican family. Sovereign Nation also contains domestic and foreign news as well as news on the activities of RIRA. (Whiting, 2012.)

32 CSM and RIRA identified that the control of An Phoblacht/Republican News was a key factor in the Adams/McGuinness strategy in winning support from grass roots republicans. The rise of the internet throughout Ireland provided a platform for 32 CSM to

regularly update members with news and events. You Tube has also been used by RIRA to great effect with propaganda videos of RIRA training exercises in rural settings. These methods allowed 32 CSM/RIRA to penetrate wide audiences and younger people with their limited resources. (Frenett and Smith, 2012.)

Despite the split, PIRA and Sinn Fein through An Phoblacht/Republican News denied any split had taken place. They put it down to the fact that during a protracted campaign, individuals will change direction for a variety of reasons including personal, political and imprisonment. (An Phoblacht/Republican News, 1997.)

Despite these denials, leading ex-members of Sinn Fein in December 1997 formed 32 CSM blaming the Mitchell principles as the catalyst. The group led by Francie Mackey from Omagh set itself up as a political pressure group and sought to unify republicans but as we saw earlier this was with limited success. Unlike RSF, 32 CSM took a short time to announce to the media that they had a military side. In May 1998, the RIRA announced that the old ceasefire was over and the war machine would be once more directed against the British. (Breen, S., 1998.)

The original estimates of numbers in the group were small but the calibre of the membership was unquestionable. At the time the Garda Commissioner, Pat Byrne, warned the Irish Prime Minister that RIRA posed the biggest threat to the peace process. (Brady, 1998.) This proved tragically accurate when RIRA set off a bomb in Omagh killing 29 people and injuring over 300 others in August 1998. As James Dingley writing in 2001 stated, “If the intention of the bombers was to make themselves internationally known they certainly succeeded.... but they failed in one of the most important aspects of political military terrorist strategy, that is to use just enough violence to be known and feared, but not enough to involve excessive counter-reaction.” (Dingley, 2001, p461.)

In the public outrage that followed, RIRA called on an end to violence and stated they were embarking on a process of consultation.

This ceasefire was short lived with a call to arms in 2000 followed by an attack on the MI6 building in London and small bombings throughout Northern Ireland. In October 2000, a RIRA volunteer, Joe O'Connor, was murdered in Belfast which led to the PIRA publically being blamed by ex-republican prisoner, Anthony McIntyre. Tensions in Belfast between the groups was never higher. (Sanders, 2012.)

In 2001, RIRA carried out a bombing campaign in Great Britain with the most notable attack being outside the BBC Headquarters. This was believed to be RIRA's response to a BBC Panorama programme by John Ware in relation to who was responsible for Omagh. (Frampton, 2010.) This pattern continued however RIRA did struggle in the aftermath of the Omagh bomb with significant arrests and seizure of munitions. These included the arrests of leading figures, Michael McKevitt, Liam Campbell and Colm Murphy, who by October 2002 were all in prison. In May 2001, the US State Department designated the RIRA as a terrorist organisation. This made fundraising in the United States more difficult. In October 2002, McKevitt called for RIRA to end their campaign but rather than leading to the end of RIRA it led to another split with some forming a separate organisation, Oglaiigh Na h'Eireann.

Despite this split, RIRA continued its campaign into 2012 when it merged with other groupings to form the New IRA. The threat level in Northern Ireland was raised to severe in early 2009 just before the 7 March 2009 when the RIRA murdered Sappers Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar while they collected pizzas outside an Army Base in Co Antrim. The Independent Monitoring Commission described the murders and that of

PSNI Officer, Constable Carroll, as “by far the most serious incidents but there were many others involving extreme ruthlessness.” (IMC, 2009.)

Similar to CIRA, the RIRA has suffered from a split of its own. The reasons for the split are not as well known at least in public and the naming of the ‘new’ group Oglagh Na h’Eireann (ONH) added more to the confusion. Oglagh Na h’Eireann is the title used by the IRA since its early days at the start of the 20th Century. All republican militant groups have used this title in one guise or another therefore the actions of the breakaway group ONH were not always directly attributed to them.

This secretive organisation had limited engagement with the media other than to claim attacks and did not have publications similar to their counterparts in 32 CSM and RSF. The exception to this was a one off publication ‘Republican Forum’ in February 2003. This quite professional production was used by McKeivitt and his followers to attack the RIRA leadership outside Portlaoise Prison and accused them of criminality, not supporting their prisoners and having no strategy. As will be seen later this journal was seen as an attempt by McKeivitt and others of securing their release from prison and that of the other 39 RIRA prisoners in the Republic by announcing a ceasefire. That said the Forum article did not get mentioned at McKeivitt’s Trial. (Tonge, 2010.) Until recently ONH did not have a political voice but as we shall see they did form a close alliance with Republican Network for Unity (RNU). ONH is believed to be strongest in Belfast, South Armagh and North Louth, but have had pockets in Derry and Strabane.

The group severed from RIRA in the aftermath of the Omagh bomb and the split is believed to have occurred for two reasons. Firstly and primarily there was a leadership struggle of RIRA between Michael McKeivitt and Liam Campbell. This was caused by McKeivitt releasing a statement from prison calling on all armed activity by RIRA to end.

In the statement which was attributed to McKeivitt and his followers he stated the time for armed struggle was at an end and those continuing with struggle had been corrupted. The statement said that they, “Feel duty bound to state that this army leaderships financial motivations far outweigh their political commitment to our struggle at this time.” (Irish Independent, 2001.)

This statement claimed to represent the leadership of RIRA in Portlaoise Prison in the Republic of Ireland. Its claims were strongly rejected by the leadership of RIRA outside the prison and in a 2003 television interview they claimed the statement was treachery which had been issued by two individuals who had their own self-serving agenda. The splinter group, ONH, remained loyal to McKeivitt albeit he remained in prison. McKeivitt’s critics accused both he and Bernadette Sands – McKeivitt of dissension due to trying to further their own personal aims. Primary for McKeivitt was his release from Portlaoise Prison. (Morrison, 2013.)

A second factor in the formation of ONH in 2005/2006 was the continuing disquiet among senior members of PIRA to the peace process. The issue of decommissioning was causing concern in PIRA ranks and as time passed many did not see republicans any closer to their goal of a United Ireland. This grouping with membership in Strabane and County Armagh met with dissident RIRA members and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) to discuss the formation of a new grouping. They were suspicious of existing dissident groups because in their view they were not organised and had been infiltrated by the security forces. (Horgan, 2013.) Although this group was formed in 2005 they did not become active until 2008. In May 2008, the IMC discussed the group separately from both RIRA and CIRA when they connected ONH to its first murder, that of one of their own members Andrew Burns in County Donegal on 12 February 2008. (Sanders, 2012.) The

IMC continued to report on this group as a sub-group of RIRA and acknowledged the confusion the name created for the media and security forces alike. (IMC Report 25.)

It was not until 2011 that the political pressure group, RNU, publically announced their alliance to ONH at their Ard Fheis. RNU was initially set up to harness all dissident voices and provide an umbrella grouping for prisoner issues. It received little or no support from CIRA and RIRA. This led to their connectivity with ONH. RNU claims not to support an armed campaign and its membership is largely made up of ex-republican (mainly PIRA) prisoners. (Evans and Tonge, 2012.)

Despite the sometimes, mysterious and confusing image of ONH, the sophistication and frequency of their attacks led the IMC to call them the most dangerous of the dissident groups in their final report in 2011. (IMC Report 25.) This showed that ONH had managed to acquire experienced membership from former senior PIRA personnel. Evidence of this was apparent in the 2010 attacks, the attempted murder of Constable Peador Heffron with an under car bomb and a car bomb attack on Palace Barracks, the base of MI5 in Northern Ireland. The timing of this second attack was significant in that it coincided almost exactly with the devolving of Policing and Justice Powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly from Westminster. The same modus operandi was used in another ONH attack on Derry's Strand Road Police Station in August of the same year. Both attacks involved the use of a bomb being transported in a hijacked taxi with the driver being forced at gunpoint to deliver the bomb to its intended target. (Frampton, 2010.) Following these attacks, ONH carried out a rare interview with the Belfast Telegraph in which they claimed, "the vast, vast majority of people who were recruited were deliberately selected for their skills, experience and know how." (Rowan, 2010.)

ONH have (like other dissident groupings) carried out punishment attacks on individuals in republican communities for ‘anti community’ activities such as drug dealing and anti-social behaviour. These attacks undermine the PSNI in these areas and feed into gaining trust and support in the community for ONH. In so doing they claim the PSNI like their predecessor the RUC is an unrepresentative and ineffective police force for republican areas. (Horgan, 2013.)

While ONH were suspected at one time of being a unified organisation in which all dissident groups could come together under one banner, this has not come to pass with the group remaining small, distinct but effective and dangerous.

In 2012, yet another group of dissidents was publically announced. On 26th July of that year a short article by Henry McDonald appeared in the Guardian newspaper entitled, “Republican dissidents join forces to form a New IRA.” In a statement released to the Guardian, a group called the IRA had “unified under a single leadership” and was subservient to the constitution of the Irish Republican Army. (McDonald, 2012.) The article claimed that RIRA, Republican Action Against Drugs and a coalition of independent armed republican groups had come together leaving only CIRA on the outside. In reality, CIRA and ONH remained outside this grouping but the inclusion of RAAD in this merger was seen as a significant move by them.

RAAD originated in Derry in 2008 and focused their activities on alleged drug dealers in the City, Donegal and Strabane areas. In a 2009 interview they stated, “Our objectives are very simple. We are determined to rid the local community of these individuals. We view them as career criminals whose activities have ruined the lives of so many young people in the past and we’re not prepared to tolerate that any longer.” (Derry Journal, 2009.) RAAD was also involved in expulsions of young people from Derry and

were constantly trying to convince the community that they were a more effective alternative to the PSNI. They were also critical of PIRA who they claimed had given the criminals a free hand and left the community defenceless. Whilst a small grouping they were the most active of the dissident groups and their merger with the other groupings saw a rise in dissident activity throughout Ireland in 2012/2013.

This new form of dissident attempted to resonate with the wider republican community now perceived to be tired of a peace process which had not delivered. The New IRA portrayed themselves as a reasonable group who had given peace a chance and were not in support of violence for violence's sake. They tried to convince others that they wanted a united group and were not interested in petty personal grievances and were focused entirely on the final goal of a United Ireland. This new phase they agreed was about doing something different and creating an organisation under a similar structure as PIRA. (Morrison, 2013.)

The grouping (particularly in Dublin) was most visible in sustaining high levels of criminal activity. The group has been linked with extortion rackets, drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling and the arms trade with other criminal networks throughout Ireland. During its short history the group has had leading members murdered following feuds with criminal gangs. The murders of members Alan Ryan in Dublin on 3 September 2013 and Peter Butterly in Garmanston, County Meath, in March 2013 being the most significant. (Morrison, 2013.)

The group has also been beset with a series of high profile arrests with an article in the nationalist newspaper, the Irish News, claiming, "Dissidents in Disarray – Militant Republican Groups hit by Security Force Actions." The article noted New IRA successes as the murders of Constable Ronan Kerr, Prison Officer David Black and Kevin Kearney, a

republican from North Belfast, but it did go on to say that, “A series of high profile arrests and an unprecedented level of surveillance on senior members has significantly curtailed the organisations activities.” (Morris, 2014.)

Speaking on 7 November 2013 during the first public evidence session of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Mr Andrew Parker, Director General of the Security Service (MI5) spoke of the residue of terrorism in Northern Ireland but stated this was reducing year on year. Mr Parker was confident it would one day end and allow the people of Northern Ireland to get on with building on the peace. (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, 2013.)

The objective here has been to introduce the origins of the main violent dissident republican groupings. This context now allows for a deeper analysis of who makes up the membership of these groups. Closer analysis will follow in this thesis in Chapter Four. The central tenant of the formation of new groupings has been the demilitarisation or politisation of the parent group. On one hand part of the parent group wants to forge ahead with a political strategy to the detriment of armed struggle and others in the group see armed struggle as the only way to achieve the goal of a United Ireland. This has led to a split occurring.

That said in this albeit brief summary of these groupings and their origins it can be seen that personal rivalries and prevailing social issues appear to play a larger role in their formation than strategic and organisational issues. This chapter has examined the group dynamics before looking closer at the individuals to provide understanding of how the groups came into existence.

Having examined how the dissident groupings have evolved it is necessary to review in detail what literature is already available on this subject. In addition to merely identifying the relevant research, this review will deal in detail with those areas of research which are most connected to the current research project. The following key sources will be referred to: English (2003), Reinares (2004), Frampton (2011), Horgan and Gill (2011), Horgan (2013) and Morrison (2013). Where identified this existing knowledge will be explored, expanding on the purpose of the research, how it is connected to the current project and will include an investigation of the resources and the arguments used. In taking this approach this review will show the unique contribution this current project offers to the existing research knowledge on dissident Irish Republicanism. (Kamler and Thompson, 2014.)

This review seeks to map the literature by putting the groups and patterns of research together and to set out the geography of the research. It will show what research has been done, when it has been done, the methods used but crucially it will show how the thinking has influenced the methodology for this project. The strategy used in this review is that of feature mapping. (Hart, 1998.) Feature maps will essentially show the arguments proposed by the study and similarities/differences with other studies on this subject.

This review will position the project in the previous research and in essence will locate the project within that literature. This will inform what we now know about dissidents that we didn't before and why that is of importance. (Kamler and Thompson, 2014.)

This thesis started with an introduction to the main concepts in terrorism studies. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First it sets this research project on dissident

republicans in the wider context of the ongoing debates in terrorism studies and secondly it introduces the highly contested concepts within the study of terror.

It is not practical to view the events in Ireland of the last one hundred years without taking account of the impact of terrorism worldwide. Whilst the limitations of this research project by both time and resources does not allow for an in-depth study of terrorism the first chapter draws out the main theories and is divided into four key areas.

Starting with the definitional quagmire of the term terrorism, a number of theories and definitions are explored. The research of Jackson et al 2011, Schmid and Jongreen, 1988 and Bodley, 1998 show how there are literally hundreds of definitions for both academics and governments on what constitutes terrorism. Parnell 2014 and English, 2009 show there can be no agreement on the definition of terrorism as the concept continues to change.

Secondly the chapter introduces the main theories as to why terrorism exists and what are the causes of terrorism.

Martin, 2011, Raphael and Blakeley, 2009, Sookhdeo, 2007 show that the causes of terrorism vary from historical, colonial reasons to religious ethnic nationalist concepts. This varies from state to state with some explaining the reasons for terrorism as individual existential notiveitous, see Cottee and Hayward, 2011.

Thirdly the chapter examines how terrorism has changed and discusses new terrorism as opposed to the old terrorism of the 20th Century. It examines how different groups have changed their methods and tactics to take account of technological advances. Hoffman, 2006 poses the challenge that the terrorist is more adaptable and innovative than

those countering it. The new technologies of eco terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and lone wolf terrorism are briefly discussed. Powell, 2014 shows how relevant this is to the present research project with the parallels between the old IRA and the ‘new’ dissidents.

Finally, the chapter concludes with discussion on the contemporary theories on how terrorism ends. Cronin, 2009 introduces the theory of decapitation and how effective it can be but only when the circumstances are right.

English, 2009 argues terrorism will always be with us and it is something we will have to get used to. Ormand, 2010 expands this theme and advises on how a state can protect itself against terrorism and the chapter concludes with commentary on how important the terrorism industry is to Western economies.

The examination of the wider debates in terrorism studies reminds us that it is individuals who take part in terrorism either operating alone or as part of a group. The more we focus on the individual level of activity then the better placed we are to counter the threat. In the next chapter, the focus shifts to what research has taken place on violent dissident republicans in Ireland post the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

Writing in 1991, John Whyte claimed that “Northern Ireland is the most heavily researched area on earth.” (Whyte, 1991, p:vii.) For the extent of research which exists in relation to the “old” IRA and the Provisional IRA a good reference point is Richard English’s bibliography in “Armed Struggle. The History of the IRA” 2003. It is evident much research has been carried out on the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’ and the major players in it but what about the dissidents of the last two decades?

There are two significant periods which focused on dissident republicanism, namely post 2004, when academic interest was aroused and secondly from 2009 to 2013, when more substantial works were produced. Despite this, the focus on dissident republicanism produced a comparatively scant amount of data and research on the nature of the individual dissident republicans themselves.

Chapter One shows that there were violent dissident groupings formed in opposition to the mainstream republican movement since the mid 1980's. Despite the emergence of these groups, there was little academic research until 2011 onwards. Much of the material in the early years was documented by journalists. Investigative journalism produced useful accounts such as "Black Operations: The Secret War Against the Real IRA" (2003) by John Mooney and Michael O'Toole, well known journalists in the Republic of Ireland. Whilst the book provides a history of the Real IRA up to 2003 it focuses on the activities of its leadership, Michael McKevitt and Liam Campbell and their arrests and imprisonment. The account in Black Operations is firmly focused on the intelligence war between the Republic of Ireland, Crime and Security Division of An Garda Siochanna and the RIRA. Writing in 2011, Frampton states, "While this episode is undoubtedly important and Rupert's insights are an invaluable resource for understanding the Real IRA, the resulting picture is thus a far from complete one ... there are occasions too in Mooney and O'Toole's analysis where the evidential basis for some of the books assertions is far from clear." (Frampton, 2011, p2.) Frampton here makes reference to David Rupert. Rupert was an undercover agent employed by the British, American and latterly the Irish Government to infiltrate the RIRA. He did so successfully and the resulting court case against Michael McKevitt provided much of the material used in the 2003 book by Mooney and O'Toole.

It was 2004 before academic research focused on dissident republicanism. This was in an article written by Jonathan Tonge named prophetically “They Haven’t Gone Away You Know.” (Tonge, 2004.) This article focused on the splits from PIRA and how instability in the Northern Ireland institutions had created a renewed interest in the militaristic tradition in Irish republicanism. Interestingly Tonge concluded that the odds were stacked against the dissidents due to their lack of equipment, support and membership. (Tonge, 2004.) This largely descriptive piece when it was written provided much lacking information on the dissident groupings but merely examined their progress as paramilitary groupings and did not consider the ideological evolution of the groups or their political strategy. The research did not examine who the individuals were that were involved in dissident activity. This may well have been due to a lack of information available at that time.

Indeed it was not until 2009 that Ruth Dudley Edwards provided an account of the dissident republicans involved in the Omagh bombing. Edwards examined the Omagh bombing in the context of a wider struggle. Whilst her article, “Aftermath: The Omagh Bombing and the Families Pursuit of Justice” (Smith, 2011) did focus on the civil case brought by the families against those responsible for the bombing it also provided significant detail on the Real IRA in and around 1998. Again the article did not seek to examine the individuals involved in dissident activity but does provide an interesting account of how the RIRA arrived at bombing Omagh.

Other articles written about the bombing tended to focus on the horrific events of that day and whether the terrorists achieved their objectives. A good example of this type of research is “The Bombing of Omagh, 15th August 1998. The Bombers, Their Tactics, Strategy and Purpose Behind the Incident” (Dingley, 2001). This study provided a detailed account of the Omagh bombing and argued that this was not an unusual event when set

against the back drop of 30 years of violence. Dingley argued it is an ideal terrorist operation due to the media coverage gained. While Dingley did ask the question who was involved he answered this with the grouping RIRA and provided a brief account of their history. There is no analysis of the individuals involved.

With the exception of the work of Tonge and Edwards up until 2011 there was only limited examination of dissident republicans and much of the research focused on mainstream republicans and those working within the Sinn Fein peace strategy. The overwhelming focus of the attention of the media and academia until 2007 was the stop/start nature of the peace building in Northern Ireland. (Powell, 2008.) This may explain the lack of focus on dissident republicans until later in the decade. (English, 2003.)

This focus on mainstream republicans ensured that dissidents “enjoyed only peripheral attention.” (Frampton, 2011, p3.) Frampton goes on to argue that the predominant narrative of the history of Northern Ireland during that period was that the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 put an end to the troubles in Northern Ireland. Violence argues Frampton was therefore a thing of the past. The dissident activities of the 1990’s and onwards were being carried out against a back drop of the PIRA decommissioning its weaponry and announcing an end to its campaign in 2005. This led the Independent Monitoring Commission stating in a report in October 2006 that the IRA leadership “was committed to the peaceful strategy and that it was wanting to ensure full compliance with it.” (Independent Monitoring Commission, 2006.)

This allowed the Northern Ireland Executive to return to business in Stormont in May 2007 under the joint authority of old adversaries, Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein and Ian Paisley of the Democratic Unionist Party. These events together with devolution of policing and the reduction in violence across Northern Ireland therefore provided

evidence of a highly successful peace process. What happened in 2009/2010 to change that view was an upsurge in violence which led to the death of Police Officers and British Soldiers. This had not been seen in Northern Ireland since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. This upsurge in violence to many appeared out of the blue although the Chief Constable of the PSNI had warned of an increased threat at the beginning of 2009. With the renewed interest in Northern Irish affairs, the academic spotlight switched to the little researched dissident republicans who were responsible for these attacks. A review of the research literature up to 2011 therefore shows there is little which can assist this current project which seeks to illuminate those involved in dissident violence. Although not directly linked to dissidents there has been some research on previous IRA campaigns and those involved in the violence which provided considerable methodological assistance to the current project.

In 2003, Peter Hart published, “The IRA at War 1916 – 1923.” (Hart, 2003.) This research represented sixteen years of work on the history of the IRA, from the Easter Rising through to the War of Independence and the Irish Civil War. Hart’s research focused on the social origins and nature of the IRA, the origins and dynamics of violence and the role of ethnic identity and conflict in shaping both. (Hart, 2003.) Hart produces twenty one statistical tables which include details on the social structure of the IRA and the geography of the revolution in Ireland. The research methodology used by Hart has very much influenced the current research project as the same quantitative data (where available) has been gathered. The research shows how membership of the IRA ebbed and flowed as popularity for them fell and then rose after the 1916 Rising only to fall again during the Irish Civil War in 1922 when one third of volunteers left the IRA. This research showed that membership of the IRA was not static.

Research of the National Archives showed the employment of volunteers in clerical government jobs was predominant and the lack of representation of fishermen and dock labourers in the IRA was notable. For the first time systematic research showed an in-depth breakdown of what age the IRA were what their occupations were, where they lived and their marital status. This type of focus on the individual and on micro level issues is very relevant to the contemporary research project which has learned a great deal from it. Hart's research shows that many common held beliefs such as once in the IRA always in the IRA and that the majority of volunteers are unemployed or employed in semi-skilled occupations are not reflected in the evidence. Clearly the current research project will show how Irish rebels have changed (or not) in one hundred years. How similar or different are the men and women of the original IRA to those of the present day is the question at the centre of the current research project and Hart's research provides a useful benchmark to compare and contrast. It is this type of evidence based research, argues Horgan that is particularly useful for counter terrorism practitioners and operators. (Horgan, 2013.)

It is interesting to note that in other accounts of the pre 2011 period there is an almost non-existent focus on the micro level research issues such as who the individuals are that are involved in the conflict. In many publications there is little or no reference to the dissidents with almost all the attention focused on the mainstream IRA. In "Armed Struggle The History of the IRA" (English, 2003) an excellent history of the republican movement little space is dedicated to the dissidents. Out of 500 pages the Continuity IRA are mentioned on only two occasions and the Real IRA on four. This is interesting given the former organisation was in existence at the time of writing for just under ten years and the latter for six years. It is accepted of course that the micro groups who make up the dissidents form a small part of the history of rebellion in Ireland.

This review did not just examine studies relating to Irish terrorism. The research methodology utilised by academics of terrorism was examined to identify theories and research practices. The most notable of these was where individual terrorists were profiled was research carried out in 2004 by Reinares. “Who are the Terrorists? Analysing changes in Sociological Profile among members of ETA.” (Reinares, 2004.) ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna of Basque Homeland and Freedom) was a terrorist organisation formed in the 1960’s with their main objective of obtaining a Basque homeland separate from Spain.

This research took quantitative data from a wide sample of ETA militants and then used oral testimonies to help interpret the statistics. Similar to Hart, 2003, Reinares provides a useful insight on age, gender and marital status of the membership of ETA activists. Also like Hart, Reinares’ research shows the changes in membership across the life cycle of a terrorist organisation. Again argues Reinares it is this micro level research which helps inform what we know about a terrorist organisation and its membership. The research showed that ETA’s membership was largely single men recruited in their late teens in urban areas. Geography played a part in ETA’s membership with over half of the militants originating in Guipuzcoa. An area which contains only a quarter of the Basque population. Interestingly as the organisation became more militant in the 1970’s, both rural dwellers and female membership increased. As the terrorist attacks decreased in the mid 1980’s, the membership became younger (in their late teens). This research methodology mixed quantitative data with qualitative interviews. Reinares gathered quantitative evidence from a wide sample of ETA militants which allowed empirical assessment but the oral testimonies helped to interpret the statistics. By combining those methodological approaches it gives a greater understanding as to who makes up the grouping.

The study of terror groups and academic research had largely focused on international terrorism post the 9/11 attacks on New York City and Washington DC in 2001. The magnitude of these attacks changed how the world viewed terrorism and whilst academic research increased, it was overwhelmingly directed toward the threat from international terrorism. This shift of focus from ethno nationalist terrorism to international 'religious' terrorism together with the previously mentioned ongoing peace process shifted the focus of researchers away from what the dissidents were doing in Ireland.

The research on dissident republicans increased and changed dramatically from 2009 onwards. The reason for this was the upsurge in dissident activity which occurred in particular from 2008 to 2010. Attacks by dissidents had stayed at a level below 50 per year until 2009 when they took a steep rise to just under 150. This trajectory upwards continued rising to a peak of 250 in 2010, before falling to just above 150 in 2011. (Horgan, 2013.) While the number of attacks shows a rise in dissident activity the nature of these attacks changed as well. In March 2009, British Soldiers, Patrick Azimkar and Mark Quinsey who were collecting pizzas outside an Army Barracks in Antrim were murdered by the RIRA. Two days later, Constable Steven Carroll was murdered in Lurgan by the CIRA. These attacks were lethal in their intent and ruthless in their execution. Republicans had not murdered members of the security forces in Northern Ireland since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

The publications which followed in the four years after the murders of 2009 have added significantly to the research on dissident republicans and gave a much greater understanding of who they are and why and when they evolved. Despite this as we shall see much of the research focused on what had happened and on the splits of the various groupings with little or no focus on the nature and composition of the individuals involved in violent dissident activity. The current research project unlike many that have gone

before focused on the individuals involved in violent dissident activity and shone a spotlight on the individuals as opposed to the events or the groupings.

Martyn Frampton in *Legion of the Rearguard* (2011) provides the first comprehensive account of who the various groups are and deals in detail with the group's ideological arguments. Frampton's research was sourced from speeches and media releases made by the various groupings and analysed in detail publications from the groups and their leading figures. The author also conducted interviews with "leading figures from that world." A list of those interviewed is provided as an appendix. The central question was who are the dissidents and what are their central arguments? (Frampton, 2011.) The research provided a narrative of the debates which consumed the republican movement from the signing of the Good Friday Agreement up to 2011. The interviews carried out by the author provided a context which had not been previously seen in research relating to dissident republicans. This approach added to the understanding of the ideological and organisational world of dissident republicans, but the research did not provide quantitative focus on the individuals involved. (Frampton, 2011.)

The first research on individuals involved in dissident republican terrorism was published in "Dissident Irish Republicanism" edited by Currie and Taylor. (Currie, Taylor, 2011.) This series of papers was published following a workshop at the University of St Andrew's, by the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. The focus of the workshop was to explore the rise in dissident activity at that time and what this violence meant for Ireland and the United Kingdom. (Currie, Taylor, 2011.) The resulting papers focused on subjects including why people became dissidents, catalogued dissident activity and examined propaganda of the dissidents and in particular their use of the internet.

This thorough research provides detailed quantitative studies which add greatly to the knowledge of why people become dissidents and who they are. The International Centre for the Study of Terrorism Violent Dissident Republican Project is introduced in this publication and provides initial findings of their research. This research was fully published in 2013 and will be dealt with later in this chapter but it is suffice to say that the VDRP was the first time that in-depth quantitative research had been carried out on individual dissident republicans. (Horgan and Gill, 2011.)

It is interesting that in the publication the editor's caution in the introduction that "one notable omission from the discussions presented by all authors is an emphasis on structural determinants of the dissident response. In part this may be because the necessary data to explore this is lacking (eg socio economic details of dissident membership, etc)." (Currie, Taylor, 2011, p8.) It is this data gap which this current project will close by carrying out micro level research on those involved in violent dissident activity. Not surprisingly, given the year of publication this research (by academics involved in terrorism studies) also focuses on the similarities and differences between Irish dissident terrorism and Al Qaeda type international terrorism. Many of the academics involved in the workshop had previously written extensively on international terrorism.

Other publications at this time take a similar approach and their research focuses on the threat posed by dissidents particularly to British Security but this type of research does not focus on the individual involved purely on the threat posed. (Edwards, 2011.)

The use of propaganda by the dissidents has been the subject of much research. The use of the internet by dissidents as a cost effective means of communicating their message was highlighted in research by Nalton, Ramsey and Taylor in 2011 where it was established that, "Dissident republican propaganda material is easily available on social

networking sites.” (Nalton, Ramsey and Taylor, 2011, p134.) Studies also point to the propaganda success of using more conventional means such as newspapers, particularly Republican Sinn Fein’s “Saoirse” and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement’s “Sovereign Nation.” (Frenett and Smith, 2012 and Whiting, 2012.) Whilst it is sometimes difficult to gauge whether this propaganda is effective in drawing attention to and sympathy for dissidents from the wider population, research conducted by Jocelyn Evans and Jonathan Tonge in an article titled, “Menace Without Mandate? Is there any Sympathy for Dissident Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland?” shows that a mandate continues to elude dissidents but there is some evidence to show that they are not as isolated as was previously considered the case. (Evans and Tonge, 2012.) This research is included in this review as it may help explain why young people in particular become radicalised to join dissident groupings.

Much of the research of dissident republicans in the post 2010 period focused on explaining why the dissidents split from their parent organisations. The foremost of these, John Morrison’s, “The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism” carried out a detailed analysis of the role and impact of the splits from the parent organisation. The narrative then turns to PIRA/Sinn Fein and how these splits will impact on a decade of centenaries in Ireland starting with the one hundred years anniversary of the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force in 2012 and including the anniversary of the Easter Rising in 2016. This research involved the author carrying out a large number of semi structured interviews and then analysing them using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). IPA is a qualitative research technique used mostly in the world of health psychology. This methodology allowed the researchers to “gain an insight into how individuals make sense of their social circumstances.” (Morrison, 2013, p10.) The use of IPA in the researcher’s views allowed them to establish why and how the splits took place in the

opinion of the individuals interviewed. The focus of this research was on why and how the splits took place but did not focus on who was involved.

A list of interviewees who were the source of this research is contained in the publication. Not all are named for reasons of confidentiality. From those that are named it is evident they would not fall into the eligibility criteria for this current research project. None of them have been charged in relation to dissident republican activity. Many are mainstream republicans with significant Sinn Fein credentials, eg Danny Morrison, Pat Doherty and Martin McGuinness. A number of others are anti Sinn Fein but are also outspoken against dissident groups, eg Anthony McIntyre, Martin McMonagle and Sean O'Callaghan. The views may then be largely from one side of the split. It is accepted that the interviews of forty two republicans and their views on why their organisation had split is a significant contribution to the research on the republican movement. It is also noted that of the forty two interviewees, nine remain anonymous and could be active dissident republicans who have been charged with a criminal offence and would therefore be included in the current project. (Morrison, 2013.)

Similar to Morrison's work Sanders "Inside the IRA. Dissident Republicans and the War for Legitimacy" provides an account of why the splits took place. This research was based on a combination of archival documentary examination and interviews of dissident republicans, loyalists and security force members. (Sanders, 2011.) This publication focuses entirely on Irish Republican division and the influence of Irish America on this. Again there is no focus on the individuals involved other than historical reference to leading figures such as Michael McKevitt or Sean O'Bradaigh. The current research project will add to and build upon this type of historical reference point and provide future researchers with detailed quantitative evidence to assist in answering the question: Who are the dissidents?

Indeed mixed research methodology has been successfully used in research focused on the Provisional IRA. (Gill and Horgan, 2013 and Shanahan, 2009.) In the former a total of 1,240 members of PIRA were profiled using documentary and secondary interview sources. While this and the latter research was on a disbanded terrorist organisation, they like Reinales research on ETA have broad methodological implications when researching dissident republicans. While the article only provides a descriptive analysis of the researcher's findings, it provides the basis for further research projects such as breaking the research down to PIRA Brigades and examining the grouping over a period of time. The researchers of PIRA conclude "that shifting sociological profiles impact upon group effectiveness, resilience, homogeneity and the turn toward peaceful means of contention." (Gill and Horgan, 2013, p 435.)

As stated previously in this chapter, this type of micro level research can be of more relevance to practitioners and counter terrorism operators. (Gill and Morgan, 2013.) Again this research shows the strength of examining fine grain information and the micro level approach adopted in this current project will add benefit to the existing knowledge on terrorist organisations but particularly on dissident republican groups. The studies on PIRA and ETA provide an interesting comparison with the data collected here on dissident republicans. For more see Chapter Five.

As mentioned earlier the research on dissident republicanism has greatly benefited from the Violent Dissident Republican Project carried out by Pennsylvania State University's International Centre for the Study of Terrorism. John Horgan, the Director of the Centre has led research on this project since 2007. The results published in 2013 in "Divided We Stand – The Strategy and Psychology of Ireland's Dissident Terrorists" is a huge contribution to the understanding of the dissident groups since 2007. This research is divided into analysis of dissident activity and close examination of the individuals

involved. The latter provides in-depth analysis on when people become dissidents, where they come from, when are they first convicted, what is their occupation, are they arrested/convicted alone or with others and what activities they participate in and if this changes over time? (Horgan, 2013.) This research includes those involved in political dissent and those charged with criminal offences. The research transcended all groupings and a database was populated with biographical data, residential data, occupational and educational data, VDR affiliation, VDR activity and position, status and acquaintances. (Horgan, 2013.)

The findings from this research are significant and of great benefit to the current research project. This current project will build and add to the findings of the VDR project by providing focused micro level analysis only on those who have been charged with a political motivated crime carried out in relation to dissident republican activity. The current research project will not take account of those who are political dissidents. It will focus entirely on those involved in paramilitary campaigns. This will produce very different results from the VDRP. As of 8 July 2011, the VDR project identified from open source information, 662 individuals involved in dissident activity. Of these, 283 were described as political dissidents, three community activists, 35 alleged members of VDR groups and five facilitators of VDR groups. This is a total of 326 individuals who appear to have never been charged with an offence. This is almost 50% of the total figure of nominals involved in the study. The VDR project makes it clear that not all of the individuals analysed were involved in illegal activity. Dissidents involved in legal activities were included “to provide a broader understanding of the movement and whether there are discernible, differences between those engaged in legal and illegal forms of dissident activity.” (Horgan, 2013, p16.)

As Jarman, 2013 has shown there is a growing number of republicans who are anti Sinn Fein and do not agree with the Sinn Fein peace strategy but who do not believe the time is right for the return to armed struggle. (Jarman, 2013.) Many of these individuals may be politically at odds with the mainstream but are not involved with any dissident group or in armed struggle. As articulated by Martin Galvin, the prominent Irish American former Chair of Noraid recently in County Donegal, this group of dissenters is a growing and influential group of republicans. Galvin during an interview with the Irish Central News stated his position that he did not support armed actions today. (Irish Central.com 26.12.2014.) Galvin and many others in this group of disillusioned but not militant republicans may be included in the VDR project. The current research project looks to filter out those purely involved in anti Sinn Fein politics but to focus in on the militants who are continuing with armed struggle.

Undoubtedly, research such as Reinares, 2004 and Horgan, 2013 provide valuable starting points but this current project will show how research can benefit from taking a fine grain approach in examining a smaller data base. From that researchers can draw conclusions about who is involved in dissident republican terrorism and provide practitioners with facts and trends which can drive policy making. Having reviewed the literature and identified the gaps in the research, the next chapter will provide details on the research plan which was used to answer the research question – Who are the Dissidents?

CHAPTER THREE

Research Methodology

In this chapter it is intended to outline a number of research methods which will be employed to help answer the question: Who are the violent dissident republicans who continue armed struggle in Ireland? In order to do so this chapter will be divided into two parts.

The first part will discuss the research methodology. In other words the goals and objectives will be set which are planned to be achieved with this research project. It is vital to set this strategy first, as this will determine what research methods will be the most appropriate and more importantly the most effective to gather the right information which will help answer the research question.

Secondly the research methods will be outlined which will be used in order to implement the research strategy or plan. This part will demonstrate what tactics will be deployed to collect the information and analyse the data. This section will also outline the merits and demerits of each of the methods used.

This research project will use quantitative methods. This will help triangulate the data gathered from the official and unofficial records. In this project the data will be gathered and compared with similar data from one hundred years ago. Consideration was given to carry out interviews with members of the public who in the past have worked closely with dissidents however this proved problematic. The primary researcher is a member of PSNI and the interviews would therefore be difficult to carry out with individuals who would not want to be openly supportive of dissident republicans. Any research conducted in this way by a member of the PSNI would be difficult to portray as unbiased and it would be almost impossible to secure the co-operation of anyone who could talk with authority about dissidents. For these reasons and in consultation with the study supervisors, this research was completed using quantitative data alone.

As with any such project prior to embarking on it the researcher set the strategy as to how the project was going to be managed and what data was and was not going to be gathered. This was also impacted on by what resources were available and what the timeframes for completion of the research was. Prior to carrying out this exercise and as part of the research process the researcher conducted extensive initial literature research. At this scoping stage it was evident that although VDR's were active before and after the Good Friday Agreement, (signed in 1998), very limited academic research had been carried out until 2008 onwards. This Literature Review or definition stage was carried out with this research design in mind however it was modified as my understanding of the subject matter and the research process improved. At all stages prior to changing the research design, I consulted with my supervisors. All these variables have had a major influence on the direction the research has taken and what tools have been utilised to achieve the goals set out in this strategy.

In setting goals it is worth outlining at this stage the reason for asking this question and for carrying out this research. Contemporary counter terrorist strategies in the UK have been criticised for their ineffectiveness. (Shelley et al, 2006.) In order to better inform an effective counter terrorist strategy research gaps have been identified in the literature review which indicated that only limited research has been conducted on the individuals involved in VDR activity. This research aims to capture the information which will allow practitioners to make informed decisions around countering the threat currently posed by dissident groupings in Northern Ireland.

Despite extensive research having been conducted on previous forms of the Irish Republican Army, (Hart, 2003 and English, 2003) there has been limited research conducted on the contemporary brand of violent republicanism. Indeed there is not only limited research on who is involved in terrorism but also the effect counter terrorist

policing has on terrorism and public confidence in the United States. (National Research Council, 2004.) This has been further evidenced in research conducted by the Police Foundation in the United Kingdom. (Police Foundation, 2009.) However this effectiveness or not of counter terrorism strategies is a very different research question from the one being asked here but may be worth pursuing in another evidence based project. As Horgan (2013) has outlined, practitioners need to know more about the individuals involved in terrorism to assist preventing the ranks of terrorist organisations from swelling.

In any Police Service with Policing with the Community as their central style (PSNI Policing Plan 2011 – 2014) it is crucial that the sometimes firm tactics of counter terrorist policing are not counter productive and that they do not undermine the objectives of engaging with communities and increasing public confidence. Previously the Royal Ulster Constabulary was accused of being an “anti-Catholic paramilitary force”, (Faul D, 1975: p170) for upholding the constitutional order and primarily being involved in a counter insurgency policing mission. (Hayes, 2010.)

It is therefore essential that the counter terrorist efforts of the present day Police Service of Northern Ireland are focused on those who seek to harm the communities of Northern Ireland without alienating the very communities they seek to protect. “Clearly the main agency for serving public support for the backing of the police in any society must be the police themselves”, (Hayes, M. 2010, p59). This research seeks to assist informing the future shape and direction of the counter terrorist strategy in Northern Ireland.

First it is therefore important that the researcher decides the parameters of the research and is very clear about what they can or cannot achieve with the limited resources

available to them. There are a number of limiting factors to the scope of this research. It is worth highlighting from the outset that to having adequate time to complete the research is as always a challenge. This research will combine a number of strands of quantitative data. The researcher has carried out the process on his own with some assistance from a research assistant. Balancing private and work life with academic study has been assisted greatly by the fact that the area of research is 'job' related. This has helped with support from his employer, access to newly published material and having internet access at work as well as at home. Being aware of the problems part-time research sometimes presents from the start has allowed the researcher to maximise their effort by targeting the research process as it progresses. The question posed in this research is who are the violent dissident republicans and how do they compare with their predecessors in the IRA of 1916 to 1923.

The history of violent armed struggle in Ireland is a long and complicated one. Whilst there is not the time and space to allow historical analysis of armed struggle in Ireland here it is worth highlighting the conceptual and theoretical challenges this presents to this research project. For a wider discussion on terrorism and its wider context, see Chapter One and on the origins of VDR's see the Review of the Literature in Chapter Two.

Throughout history all splits in the republican movement could have been described as producing dissident republicans. This includes different religious and ethnic groupings as diverse as Irish Presbyterians in the late 18th Century during the United Irishmen rebellion who joined with the native Catholic Irish to rebel against the constitutional government in Ireland. Ireland at that time was ruled by an English parliament with strong links to the Church of England. (Bardon, J. 2005.) The definition of dissident republican could also extend to the contemporary view of some which exists of mainstream republicans since 1998 in Sinn Fein and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. They have been accused of being dissident for abandoning the path of violent

armed struggle and replacing it with a peaceful, political strategy to achieve their objectives. This is the view held of Sinn Fein by the Real IRA and other groupings still engaged in armed struggle.

Indeed the study of terrorism and terrorist organisations has revealed that it often “erupts and flourishes in different places at different times due to an often idiosyncratic combination of factors.” (Hoffman, B. 1992 p26.) The campaign of Irish republican violence is not dissimilar to other nationalist terrorist campaigns which have ebbed and flowed depending on the prevailing political situation. Terrorism as a concept is itself highly contested and the academic study of terrorism crosses a number of social science disciplines. (Schorkopf, F. 2003.) It therefore follows that a varied field of academics have made tremendous contributions to the study of terrorism including historians, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, lawyers, philosophers, criminologists and economists. (Wilkinson, P. 2007.) For more on the definitional debate see Chapter One.

With such a complicated definitional academic base it was therefore a starting point for this research to make a series of decisions on the group of people this research will focus on. In considering the types of research methods which are appropriate for this project it was necessary to first ask the appropriate research questions. The next series of paragraphs will underpin the methodology which was used in this research. The hypothesis from the outset of this research is that the current brand of violent republicanism is simply a rerun of previous campaigns dating back to the Easter Rising of 1916. It therefore follows that those involved are of a similar social background, gender, age and marital status. This research tested that assumption and examined the dissidents in detail to establish if this is simply a case of history repeating itself or is the current membership different to that of one hundred years ago.

There are several key stages to addressing the research question. It has already been presented in this chapter the background to the question posed and why it is an important topic to research. Before discussing the research methods however it is important to define the boundaries of this research (Wisker, 2008).

This is not the place for a descriptive analysis of violent republicanism. As already alluded to the limits of this project does not allow it. As the most recent period of violence in Northern Ireland known as “the troubles” came to an end in the late 1990’s and mainstream republicans largely chose a path of peace dissident groupings such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA emerged.

The dissident campaign continued throughout the decade following the Good Friday Agreement only suffering a minor setback with the Omagh Bomb. In September 1998, when the Omagh Bomb which was meant to target the town courthouse seen by the dissidents as a symbol of the British occupation of Ireland and therefore a legitimate target actually exploded some distance from the courthouse killing 29 civilians. The Real IRA who detonated the bomb, in the immediate aftermath and in the face of international condemnation called a cease fire. As a result of the bombing there was a brief lull in dissident activity until the Real IRA re-emerged in 2000 and carried out a series of attacks throughout Northern Ireland.

It is this period that this research question will focus on from 1998 to 2014. This research will be updated with data from 2015 and 2016 as it becomes available so that a comparison across 100 years can be achieved. The dissident groupings formed during this time have remained reasonably static albeit there have been a number of splits and resulting name changes. Their clear intention is to continue with a long term, low level campaign of attrition against what they see as legitimate targets of British rule in Ireland.

Therefore the shape and direction of dissident republicanism in the past 15 years is expected to change little in the years to follow. (Shanahan, 2009.)

The timeframe for the quantitative research will be the 1st January 1998 to 31st December 2014. It is the intention to update this research with 2015 and 2016 data when available.

The next question for the methodology of this project is the definition of what is a dissident republican. Some individuals are purely politically motivated in support of armed struggle (or anti Sinn Fein) and are not actively involved in military action. Every republican proscribed organisation has a political wing eg. RIRA has links to 32 County Sovereignty Movement and Oglagh Na h'Eireann similarly are linked to the Republican Network for Unity. As the ultimate goal of this research is to inform on who is involved in military action this project will focus on those directly involved in armed struggle such as members of RIRA, ONH, CIRA, NIRA or unaffiliated groups responsible for terrorists attacks. This leads to a further definition of who is or who is not involved in military action. Is it individuals who are suspected of involvement through intelligence or who have been arrested for offences but not charged due to a lack of evidence? Alternatively is it those arrested and charged but not convicted or a final group could be those arrested, charged and convicted in a court?

Discussions on definition exist throughout the social sciences and can be seen in defining what organised crime is and who are those involved in organised crime. (Fijnaut, 1996, Shelley et al, 2007, Albenese, 2002 and Stephenson, 2011.) It is at this stage the researcher must again examine the goals they are seeking to achieve and evidence the most effective way of achieving them.

Relying on details of who the Security Service/Police Service in Northern Ireland/An Garda Síochána believes to be militarily involved in dissident republican activity is problematic. In the past two decades all three organisations have made press releases which put numbers at between 300 and 1000 (BBC News, 2011).

These figures rely on intelligence which may relate to politically active dissidents as well as those directly involved in violence. Due to the sensitivities of the intelligence and how it is collated, the researcher cannot access it. Even if accessed it would be difficult probing its veracity and credibility due to source sensitivities. To rely on intelligence would create ethical issues around disclosure of information and legal issues relating to protection of the sources of that information. One of the crucial qualifiers for this research was that the information would need to be accessible within the timescale of the project and the resources at the disposal of the researcher. This was further clarified during the literature review when it became apparent what was and more importantly what was not readily available.

On the other hand if the researcher were to rely solely on data of those successfully convicted this would not only supply a very limited data set but it would be difficult to establish at the point of conviction whether it was a politically motivated crime due to the manner in which the data is collected by the Court Service. This would involve individual research of cases which have been successfully prosecuted in court. Whilst the number of cases would be low the classification of the cases does not allow the researcher to filter by politically motivated crime types. It is considered that for the purposes of this research those arrested and charged with politically motivated crimes during the research period allows a better picture for analysis of the persons involved. These figures are provided annually by the PSNI. They do not come without their challenges in that a great deal of additional research was required to gather the material needed for the comparison with the

data gathered on the Old IRA. Much of this data was gathered for pension and commemoration purposes in an Irish Free State which was no longer under British rule. This data was volunteered by the ex-combatants of the IRA. Compare with that gathering information on the present day dissidents who are still involved in armed activity which is illegal and could attract a lengthy prison sentence.

Just before moving forward with a detailed analysis of the research methods to be considered for use in this project it is worth also considering the geographical parameters. Dissident republicans are active on both sides of the Irish border. Many have been arrested and charged in the Irish Republic. In some cases those arrested are residents of Northern Ireland. From the outset the researcher had identified that getting data from the Irish Republic; a different jurisdiction would be problematic. Figures are not gathered by An Garda Siochanna in the same way they are by PSNI. AGS provide figures on those arrested but not charged. PSNI provide both in order to comply with legislative requirements of the Terrorism Act. The researcher wanted to compare data from those who had been charged as this provided some evidence of actual involvement rather than involvement being merely suspected. The only alternative to relying on official sources was to examine media reports. Due to the limited research resources available and the jurisdictional issues this research will focus on dissidents charged in Northern Ireland. Those charged in Northern Ireland form the vast majority of the numbers anyway and therefore the amount of data gathered allowed comparisons to be drawn.

Having set the question and defined some of the strategic parameters of the research the researcher can set the techniques to be used to implement the plan.

The primary quantitative research method for this project was the locating and extraction of data in relation to dissident republicans charged with politically motivated

crimes between 1998 and 2014. This data was drawn from records held by Her Majesty's Government, Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Court Service. It was considered that by the researcher obtaining this quantifiable research material it would assist in interpretation and would capture a database of results which could be used by any researcher in this field in the future.

With such a wide body of potential research material it is essential that the broad methodological parameters were tied down to specifics. In order to assess what individuals would be examined an eligibility criteria was set. This eligibility criteria outlined the types of subjects who were included in this research. The data was extracted from official PSNI records and caution was exercised to ensure it was only individuals involved in dissident activity who were included. PSNI under terrorist legislation have an obligation to produce details of how many persons are arrested and charged on an annual basis. These reports are scrutinised by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, currently David Anderson QC. It is important to note that whilst all of the persons who were subject to this research were arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 and its predecessors The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, not all were charged with offences under those Acts. Following the arrest and interview process in many cases there is sufficient evidence to charge for other offences not included in the Terrorism Legislation.

For the purpose of this research subjects met the Eligibility Criteria when they were arrested under terrorist legislation in relation to violent dissident republican activity and subsequently charged. For example republicans involved in mainstream PIRA activity were not included in this research, eg entries 01/1998 to 06/1998. These crimes were carried out by PIRA and not dissidents and were therefore not included in the research.

For investigative and operational reasons many arrests are carried out under Terrorist Legislation. This is determined by the intelligence available to the Investigation Team. If the intelligence indicates the crime was carried out by or on behalf of a proscribed organisation then arrests will be made under terrorist legislation. After gathering evidence and interviewing the suspects on many occasions the evidence points to the commission of an offence which is not contained within the Terrorism Act but is on the statutes in other “domestic” legislation. The subject will then be charged in relation to these offences. For example subjects 01/2006, 02/2006 and 05/2006 were all arrested under terrorist legislation in close vicinity to a bomb factory. They were subsequently charged in relation to explosives offences under the Explosives Substances Act 1883. Both males and females were eligible as were adults and juveniles.

When a subject was determined to be eligible their information was transferred onto the VDR Personnel Database. It was clear that in many cases the information was not all readily available from the official data and further open source research was required. It is recognised that open source research is an effective research tool which is being increasingly used by Intelligence Agencies. (Rhodes, 2009.) Open source research was utilised in support of the information provided by official data.

The VDR Personnel Database was used to collect information on the person with regard to age, gender, family history, employment, marital status and where available antecedent history. This allowed a direct comparison with data collected by Hart (2003) on the old IRA. The date the person was charged was also recorded as this provided opportunities for comparative analysis across the sixteen years examined. As mentioned earlier where possible corroboration was sought from open source research.

It is acknowledged that there is a risk of bias in over reliance on government statistics, eg many persons charged with criminal offences say they are unemployed when they are not. This is due to social benefit fraud and perceptions regarding access to free legal advice.

This is therefore an independent variable which the researcher has no control over other than being aware of it and ensuring it is acknowledged when the research results are being interpreted.

The usefulness of such quantitative research cannot be underestimated. In a study of the IRA between 1916 – 1923 carried out by Peter Hart in 2003 it was found “the appeal of militant republicanism crossed all occupational boundaries including “carpenters, plasterers, bricklayers, printers, drapers assistants, hairdressers and teachers.” (Hart, 2003, p113.) Remarkable similarities were found in the present day.

In addition to the gathering of data on persons charged in relation to dissident republican activity one further quantitative research method was considered but discounted. The research method of surveys was examined however it was not considered to be a viable option as the researcher works in the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland and therefore securing the cooperation of the dissidents was considered unrealistic and could have posed ethical and legal issues.

When the data was gathered and analysed, 456 nominals were placed on the database. It was only when further research was carried out into the 456 republicans charged with terrorist offences, it was established that 427 were dissidents. The remaining 29 were made up of duplicate entries (in one case one person had been charged three times

in the period) and some were members of PIRA arrested and charged in relation to offences which had occurred prior to 1 April 1998.

From the outset it was essential that this research project was realistic about what it could achieve given the resources available to it. This research question was examined utilising one primary researcher albeit with supporting supervisors. It was important to recognise that the “gold plated” research such as discourse analysis was not possible with the resource limitations of this project. That said qualitative research could be concluded in the future by another researcher with this quantitative data. A number of qualitative research methods were considered as part of this project. All were discounted and deemed inappropriate for this research. It is worth examining the methods which were deemed not to be appropriate for this project first.

It is important to note that the subject matter of this research question revolves around violent dissident republican activity. Therefore the subjects of this research were and possibly still are involved in an armed struggle against the UK to force a withdrawal of the British from Ireland. The subjects of the research are therefore routinely involved in serious crime such as murder, attempted murder and accompanying explosives and firearms offences. They therefore go to great lengths to avoid detection and keep their dissident activities a secret. This is therefore a group of research subjects who did not lend themselves to interview, focus groups or observation. This is further compounded by the fact that the primary researcher works in the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Members of PSNI are the primary target of the dissident republican campaign. It must also be borne in mind that this research continued against the back drop of a high profile case in the United States where two researchers Ed Moloney and Anthony McIntyre on behalf of Boston College carried out interviews of 26 former IRA members and loyalist paramilitaries. The United States Government are currently being sued by Boston College

for handing these interviews over to UK Law Enforcement Agencies who are investigating the IRA murder of Jean McConville in 1972. An assurance was allegedly given by Boston College that these interviews would not be released until the interviewees had died. (Boston Globe, 2009.) This controversy will continue with a pending court case and will have implications for future research but for this project it effectively ruled out the co-operation of combatants.

It is however important to recognise that, this type of ethnographic research does not always supply accurate information due to poor memories, misunderstandings between the researcher and the interviewee and the possibility of the researcher being misled by the interviewee. In White, R. W. 2007, the researchers found that when former IRA activists were interviewed twice, ten years apart they had difficulty in remembering what they had said the first time around. Interestingly the subjects who had a family history in republicanism had the most consistent accounts while those who had a more generic path toward recruitment offered the least consistent accounts of how they became involved. (White, 2007.)

It is therefore evident that this research project must be conducted without interactive research between researcher and the republicans involved. It is also important to note that given the researchers occupation they cannot ethically give any participants in interactive research an understanding that information regarding criminality and illegal activity will be treated in confidence. As a serving Police Officer this would not have been ethical, would have breached the PSNI's Code of Ethics and depending on the information gained could have been a breach of the criminal law. Unlike other researchers of organised crime and terrorism (Stephenson, 2011) the police officer is bound by a Code of Ethics which means any criminality must be reported and investigated. Going into such

qualitative research with this principal would be extremely restrictive to the point where it would lead to a research outcome of very limited value.

Finally there would be security implications for a police officer to communicate or interact with dissident republicans. Research of this nature by the author can be ruled out however now the quantitative data is available for other researchers to assist future research in this area.

In the methods chosen as part of this project it was acknowledged that such a complex research question cannot be tackled by relying purely on one method. The data gathered in this study will help inform this area which has received little attention to date and can be used by scholars in the future. The data presented as Appendix One is the final results of all the data gathered. It includes details of 456 republicans charged with terrorist offences from January 1998 to December 2014. The names of those individuals involved have been removed and replaced with an identifying number. This is to prevent any future targeting of these individuals by loyalists or other groupings. The primary researcher has all the names but it was believed if the information was presented with the names included this may pose a risk to the individuals involved. The names can of course be made available as required and in consultation with the researcher and London Metropolitan University. In order to carry out meaningful interpretation of the data gathered in this research a data gathering structure was utilised from the beginning. This permitted a consistent and structured approach and limited the opportunity for bias as the project progressed. It was considered that by structuring the collection process by eligibility criteria that the researcher had limited ability to discriminate on the material selected for inclusion in the study or the findings made from that material during the interpretation phase.

In conclusion this research question did pose very difficult challenges to the researcher. Counter terrorism has been described as “taking a series of time lapse photographs, the image captured on film today is not the same as the image yesterday, nor will it be the same tomorrow.” (Raufer, X., as quoted in Hoffman, B., 2006 p295.) The researcher accepts that terrorism generally and republican terrorism in particular does change but the more we know about who poses the contemporary threat then the better equipped the Police and Security Services will be to tackle the threat in the future. The next chapter will provide an analysis of those individuals involved in dissident activity since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.

CHAPTER FOUR

Research on the Dissidents

In this chapter the IRA of 1916 will be compared and contrasted with the dissident republicans who have continued an armed campaign since the Belfast Agreement in 1998.

Prior to making direct comparisons it is necessary to briefly examine why the Old IRA came into existence and why this research has focused on the years 1916 to 1923.

Finally this chapter will examine the differences and similarities between the IRA almost one hundred years ago and that of the organisations who use that name in the present day. This is the central focus of this thesis and such a comparison has never been done before. The comparisons will be made from the following key areas: Gender and Religion, Age and Marriage and finally Status and Class.

Geographic location was a difficult area to compare. The overwhelming majority of the violence in the Irish Revolution was concentrated in the 26 Counties of what is now the Republic of Ireland. Due to the large Protestant population in the North the revolution had very limited support. Therefore the IRA of old were very much a Southern entity. Some comparisons can be made on whether the old IRA/Dissidents were urban or rural organisations.

On the other hand, the dissident republicans of the 21st Century have been largely concentrated in the six counties of Northern Ireland with a support base in the Republic. Therefore to compare the geographic location of the largely Southern Old IRA with the Northern dissidents of the present day would add little to this study. However, to examine the individuals involved – their age, marital status and employment trends – provides an informative insight into the two organisations from which we can draw some conclusions.

Before examining the individuals in detail it is necessary to briefly set the Old IRA in its social context and explain the reasons for their existence. This may help understand some of the differences between them and the present day IRA.

Between the years 1916-1923, a rising occurred followed by an election, a war of independence, a truce, a treaty, a second election and a civil war. None of these events lasted longer than two years and resulted in the creation of an Irish Free State in what is now the 26 counties of the Republic of Ireland. As stated previously the history of Northern Ireland took a very different course. (Hart, 2003.)

Oglaigh Na h'Eireann or Irish Volunteers first came into existence at a public meeting in Dublin's Rotunda on the 25 November 1913 in direct response to an article published by Eoin MacNeill, the Vice President of the Gaelic League. The article advocated the setting up of a militia which could respond to the Ulster Volunteer Force which had also been formed in 1913 to counter the third Home Rule Bill which had been placed before the British Parliament. The Volunteers (later to become the IRA) were initially made up of 1,500 members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, a secretive armed group but members increased dramatically to 150,000 by July 1914 when John Redmond called on people to join to support the Home Rule Movement.

The Irish Volunteers and the smaller Irish Citizen Army were the two main armed groups involved in the Easter Rising in 1916. The ICA were a smaller group which had been formed in 1913 to protect striking workers during the Dublin lockout of the same year. They largely consisted of trade union members and actively supported female membership. The working class movement in Ireland had until 1907 been largely unorganised. Despite one hundred years of trade union activism they were divided and had

limited membership with a total of ninety three different associations with 17,476 members by the turn of the 20th Century.

The arrival of the Liverpool activist, James Larkin in Ireland in January 1907 gave the movement an energetic and enthusiastic leader. By 1913 the Unions had amalgamated into the Irish Transport General Workers Union. The lockout of 1913 in Dublin began when William Murphy, the owner of the Irish Independent Newspaper and Dublin Tramway Company began dismissing employees who had joined the ITGWU. The strike which followed put the Irish working class against their employers. This had ramifications not only for the Irish working class but for their British counterparts as well. Any workers rights won in Ireland would benefit their counterparts in Britain as well. At its height, 20,000 Irish workers were involved in the strike which ended with much resentment felt by the working class toward the employers. The Irish Citizen Army was formed in the aftermath. (Boyce, 1988.)

By 1916 the Irish Volunteers under the leadership of Patrick Pearse had become the Irish Republican Army and alongside the ICA fought in the Rising of that year. The Rising occurred over six days during Easter with the rebels taking control of a number of key buildings in the Dublin area. The swift defeat of the rebels was seen by many of them as a significant blow. Many of those also fought in the Rising were less aware of the propagandist purposes of the Rising and had been more optimistic about a military victory. In the end it was the British over reaction to the Rising which gave the rebels a victory which they had not achieved during the six days of Easter in 1916. In the weeks and months following the defeat of the rebels the leaders were executed and large numbers of Irish men (many who couldn't have been involved) were arrested and imprisoned. (McGarry, 2011.) This was seen by many historians as the start of a revolution. The Rising began a leadership and ideology of revolution and violence which ended with a

British withdrawal from the southern counties of Ireland. As Hart puts it, “This, and not 1912, is Ireland’s 1789 or 1917 the Dublin GPO its Bastille or Winter Palace”, (Hart, 2003, p12) when he compares the Irish revolution to events in Russia and France.

Following the Rising Britain remained in control of the Island of Ireland, but what followed was a period of multiple sovereignty until the 1920’s when the power shifted to the Dail ministries while the IRA were engaged in a war with the Royal Irish Constabulary. The War of Independence set the IRA against the British Authorities in Ireland between 1919 and the signing of the Truce in July 1921. During this period the IRA fought a guerrilla style war against a largely embattled and beleaguered RIC who were supported by Auxiliaries and ex-British Servicemen known as “Black and Tans.” The latter two groups were brought to Ireland to support the RIC whose members resigned in large numbers during this period. Unlike the Easter Rising, the War of Independence was fought throughout rural Ireland except the North and therefore it provides this study with a much wider group of individuals to use as a database. (Barry, 2013.)

Therefore what began in 1916 did not come to a close until 1923 when the IRA lost popular support to oppose the Treaty settlement and ended its campaign of resistance against the Treaty in the spring of that year. It would be many years before the Constitution in the Republic of 1937 and the British response in 1949 of the Northern Ireland Act. This Act guaranteed Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom for as long as its population wanted it but by 1923 the period of multiple sovereignty had ended and the Dail was in control of the twenty six counties. (Townshend, 2013.) Or as Garvin puts it, “1923, the year in which fundamentalist republicanism was defeated both politically and militarily by the moderate wing of the revolutionary movement.” (Garvin, 1987, p33.)

Following a bitter civil war during which more Irish men were killed by each other than the British executed following the Rising in 1916 the fact remained that part of the island of Ireland remained in British hands. The volunteers of the Anti Treaty IRA would never recognise a peace treaty negotiated in London which did not leave Ireland in its entirety totally independent of Britain. (Geraghty, 2000.) The legacy of the revolution and unfinished business of the peace treaty have served to legitimise the actions of the IRA in subsequent campaigns in 1956, 1970 and the actions of dissident republicans to the present day. (McGarry, 2011.)

It is important to acknowledge the reasons for the revolution taking place in Ireland at the start of the 20th Century as this has an effect on who became involved. The economic situation in Ireland has already been mentioned and the effect of the Dublin Lockout on being the catalyst for the Easter Rising cannot be overlooked. This gave the Rising one group of armed activists and one of its most prominent leaders, James Connolly. The Dublin working class still felt aggrieved with the way they had been treated both during and after the lockout. Many of those aggrieved joined to ICA and swelled the ranks of the Irish Volunteers. (Boyce, 1988.)

Britain was at war in 1916 and had been at war for two years in the largest conflict it had ever seen. Many Irish men had already gone to war encouraged by John Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party to do so. The grass roots of those involved in the Easter Rising believed that Britain's distraction with World War 1 would give them the upper hand and that a military defeat of the British could be executed with little loss of life. (McGarry, 2011.)

In addition, the IRA of 1916 believed that German support could be counted on after the first few days of the Rising. This would give the Rising additional support in

numbers and with equipment. This is why the IRA believed they needed to strike in 1916 so that they could count on this German support and maximise it. (Jeffrey, 1999.) It was only after several days into the Rising that it became apparent this support was not going to be forthcoming and the Rising ultimately failed.

The Irish Home Rule Movement had been in existence since 1886 when Gladstone's Liberal Party advocated Home Rule for Ireland for the first time. The third Home Rule Bill was presented to the British Parliament just before the First World War in 1911 and was placed in abeyance until the end of the war. There was a real expectation that Home Rule would be achieved for Ireland but it was not happening quick enough and Irish nationalism shifted their position to one of Home Rule not going far enough in ending the British involvement in Ireland. (Coogan, 2000.)

The Irish at the turn of the century inspired by revolts in France and South Africa began to promote Irishness and anti-British sentiments increased in popularity. This is evidenced by the increase in membership of the Gaelic League and the support by the Irish for the Boers in its war against the British. Many in Ireland believed the British would leave Ireland if they were challenged violently. (English, 2006.)

In examining some of the accounts provided by those involved in the early days of the revolution, education had an influence on many of them. In his study "Rebels", McGarry claims that, "Many separatists regarded education as a radical influence. The introduction of a choice between Irish or British history failed to placate nationalists teachers, a profession often associated with feminism and the Irish Christian Brothers, where schools inculcated a patriotic Gaelic ethos." (McGarry, 2011, p5.) McGarry also notes the importance of commemorations to the volunteers of 1916 with many attending

the 100 year commemorations associated with the 1898 centenary of the Wolfe Tonne insurrection of 1798.

Finally British Government policy made it difficult for the moderate Irish Parliamentary Party. The British handling of the Rising, of Home Rule and of conscription for the war effort effectively destroyed the IPP and drove the Gaelic League and others into the hands of Sinn Fein. This gave Sinn Fein the command of the Irish electorate. The Catholic Church like moderate nationalism was lost as a counter revolutionary bulwark and the majority were in the separatist camp by 1919. (Hart, 2003.)

The world order had changed at the end of the war and Ireland like the rest of Europe was on the edge of a new era. President Woodrow Wilson's "fourteen points" including national self-determination had profound implications for the British Empire and the Union of Britain and Ireland which had been established in 1801. This Union had never been accepted by Irish nationalists. The attempts to integrate Ireland into the remainder of Britain had been a failure and Irish nationalists and republicans alike seized the opportunity to force change. This had largely been achieved by 1923. (Townshend, 2013.)

So who were the individuals involved in armed struggle almost one hundred years ago? At the time of the revolution, this question was answered in terms of moral or national character. They were "selfless patriots, nihilist fanatics or depraved thugs", (Hart, 2006, p111) depending on your viewpoint. As stated earlier in this thesis historians have rarely concentrated on the social identity of those involved and many assumptions remain untested. Surprisingly since the Revolution an extraordinary paper trail has been left of what was ostensibly a secret army. A number of sources have been left including their own and their opponent's records and daily press articles. The gathering of information on

those involved continued long after the revolution was over as volunteers claimed pensions, wrote memoirs and received commendations for their involvement.

The most recent opening of new archives particularly the Bureau of Military History statements collected from veterans in the 1940's and 1950's but locked up in archives until 2003 provides rich detailed accounts of those involved. Even more recently the release of documents by the Military Services Pension Collection in 2014 records the applications of those who applied for pensions for their military service during the revolution.

The pension applications and the 1,700 statements from those involved in the Easter Rising and the War of Independence provide a rich resource of the individuals involved and has allowed recent analysis to take place.

Dublin Castle, the seat of British power in Ireland also had its own records. The RIC's Crime Department Special Branch and the Dublin Metropolitan Police's Detective Division from 1899 to 1921 had 19,000 pages of secret documents on 500 republican suspects. (Ferriter, 2015.)

These primary documents have allowed academics to gather information on those involved in the Irish Revolution which informs this study of details on the individuals. This study will break down this analysis and examine the similarities in the IRA of the Revolution and compare it with the new data gathered on dissident republicans as part of this research. This will be broken down into the following three categories. Gender and Religion, Age and Marriage and Status and Class.

The information used in this comparison is contained at Appendix 2 in the “VDR Personnel Database.” The years 1998 through to 2014 have been compiled separately. Each nominal has been identified by an ID Number, the names are available from the researcher if required. The gender, date of birth, marital status, children, place of birth, occupation, VDR Group, prior affiliation and date of arrest are all recorded. This information has been gathered from Government statistics and open source research. The figures consist of all republican arrests made under terrorist legislation which resulted in a charge. Additional information was gleaned from media publications and media releases by the various dissident groupings. As a result not all information was available in respect of each nominal.

The database collated 456 nominals on republican persons charged. A filtering process reduced the nominals to 427 as the remaining 29 were established to be PIRA members or names which appeared twice or some three times in the database. PIRA individuals were included in the 1998 and 1999 figures as this was shortly before and after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The figure 427 included 23 females who had been charged with terrorist offences.

“Gender and Religion”

From 1912 to 1922 a military volunteer force swept Ireland. Whilst the IRA was only part of this they quickly became the largest grouping. Men joined the Irish Volunteers, women joined Cumann Na mBan, republican boys joining Fianna Eireann and for republican socialists there was the Irish Citizens Army. During the Rising women in the IRA provided a supportive role carrying messages, providing meals and passing munitions between the Volunteers but not actually engaging in military activity. Notably the ICA had women fighting in their ranks with Countess Constance Markievicz being one

of the best known. Despite their involvement and the carefully documented history of those involved no research has specifically been carried out on the individual women who made up the Cumann Na mBan during the revolution.

To say that the IRA was ostensibly a “boys club” may seem like stating the obvious but when one examines the revolution as a whole there is clear evidence to show that particularly in the early stages, women played an equally violent part in the uprising. As the campaign shifted from street fighting and canvassing in 1917 to ambush and assassination in 1919 and 1920, women increasingly took a less active role. As Hart put it, “It took time for the IRA to emerge as a distinctive entity within the republican movement, and masculinisation was an integral part of this militarisation.” (Hart, 2003, p122.)

Following the truce of 1921 when politics emerged with many of the male republicans on the run or interned, women played a vital role in the elections and prisoners’ rights. Gender was never at a fixed point for the republican movement and was an element which changed with the prevailing circumstances. Women in Cumann Na mBan voted against the Treaty with the British (419 votes to 63) which led to much bitterness afterwards. The civil servant and pro-treaty historian in, “The Victory of Sinn Fein (1924)” devoted a chapter to the role of women in the civil war saying, “left to himself, man is comparatively harmless. He will always exchange smokes and drinks and jokes with his enemy It is a woman adrift with her white feathers With her implacability, her bitterness, her hysteria, that makes a devil of him.” (O’Hegarty, 1924, p104.) This is one of a number of examples where women were side-lined in the new Free State and promises of equality of 1916 were ignored not to mention the reduction of the role they played in the War of Independence. (Ferriter, 2015.) Perhaps it is for this reason that the individual analysis of women did not receive the same attention as it did for the men.

The role of women in the current dissident campaign shows similar trends to that of the early IRA. The current study revealed twenty three women charged in relation to dissident activity out of a total of 427 or 5.3% examined. Such small numbers did allow further analysis into the type of offending involved. Many of the 23 charged were involved in a supportive role with charges relating to the movement of munitions, making speeches supporting dissidents and providing false alibis. In one case a female was involved in organising a training camp and another provided a Sim card for a mobile phone which was used in a claim of responsibility for a RIRA murder.

Small numbers of female involvement in the PIRA campaign in the 1970's to the 1990's has also been examined in research by Gill and Horgan (2013). This research examined 1,240 individuals who were either convicted of PIRA related activities or died on active service on behalf of PIRA. Throughout the three decade long campaign female involvement varied from a low of 1.7% in the period 1995-1998 to a high of 6.3% in 1981-1989. This put female involvement at the rate of one for every 20 males. Gill and Horgan offer the following three reasons. First, men are typically more attracted to high risk behaviour, second recruiter's targeted males and finally women who were involved tended to be behind the scenes in a supportive role. This type of supportive role was less likely to lead to a conviction in court. This is not to say that some high profile females were convicted for their part in violent activity for example the Price sisters were found guilty of their part in a co-ordinated bombing campaign in London in 1973. The spike of 6.3% female involvement includes the period of the Republican Hunger Strikes when the involvement of females was encouraged to support the prisoners. (Gill and Horgan, 2013.)

When compared with terrorism elsewhere similar patterns emerge. In a study of over 600 members of Euskadi to Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, Reinares found nine out of ten members of ETA were men. This study found that many women were emotionally

involved with men in ETA and particularly those in exile in France. Again the study found women involved in a supportive role and few held a command position. Reinares research was based on court documents of those suspects examined during a court process in Spain from the 1970's through to the 1990's. It shows that ETA like the dissidents have a low female membership and their role tends to be more supportive rather than carrying out attacks. (Reinares, 2010.)

In a similar comparison from the Middle East up to the mid 2000's, Palestinian groups engaged in the intifada kept women operatives strictly to a non-front line supportive role. It was only by unforeseen accidental circumstances and contrary to the general rule that the advent of the first female suicide bomber occurred. This resulted in a wave of female volunteers and one group facilitating the issuing of a fatwa permitting female fighters on front line operations.

Whilst women form a small percentage of the social structure of the dissidents they (like their counterparts 100 years ago) are an important element to sustaining the armed campaign. In 1972 the Report of the Commission on the Status of Women was an effort by Margaret McCurtain to try to give women a new narrative. However details of their age and occupations at the time of the revolution were not documented. The dissident women currently involved in armed struggle have an average age of 28.3. This is the average age at the time of charging. This compares with an average age for men of 34.1 which are some six years younger. The difference in age is difficult to explain. One possible explanation is from history. Despite the rebels of 1916 having little support in the early stages of the Rising there was increased support from women after the Rising. One study mentioned that when men were imprisoned following the Rising younger women who were attracted to the rebels blew the prisoners kisses as they were sent to England by boat. (Ferriter, 2015.) Perhaps younger women are attracted to the rebel cause more so than

older ones. The dissidents occupations were known include housewife, caterer, hygienist, clerk, waitress, retail florist, factory worker, retail assistant, mobile phone salesperson, machinist and classroom assistant. In 16 cases the women charged are noted as unemployed or the information is not available. Unfortunately the information is not available from one hundred years ago to contrast their occupations with that of the dissidents.

It appears that politics in 20th Century Ireland was not shared across religious lines as easily as it was across men and women. Hart notes, “Non Catholic guerrillas were almost non-existent ... in this most religious of countries, there were far more pagans or atheists or non-practising Catholics more often known – than Protestants in the IRA. A survey of 917 prisoners convicted under the Defence of the Realm Act in 1917-1919, produced one declared agnostic and no Protestants.” (Hart, 2003, p123.)

Despite tensions at times with the Catholic Church particularly during the Irish Civil War, republicans remained practising Catholics. Their religion was part of their republican politics and of the volunteer’s self-image. (McGarry, 2011.) Education and the teaching of history was key to underlining the belief that the Irish people had a superior spirituality and Catholicism underpinned the republican movement. In Helena Concannon’s “Irish History for the Junior Classes: The Defence of our Gaelic Civilisation, 1460-1660,” she emphasized the Irish as a distinct race from the English and accused the English of an attempt to use all forms of aggression and religious persecution to assimilate the two races. Written in 1921 this formed part of the newly established Irish history curriculum taught to the children of volunteers. The message was clear resistance, was religiously influenced and was much more than a political movement. (Ferriter, 2015.)

The contemporary study did examine religion and could find no evidence of any of the 427 dissident republicans being Protestant. The information regarding whether they were practising Catholics or not was not available for the researcher.

Age and Marriage

In the research conducted by Hart in 2003, he found the Irish Volunteers were typically in their late teens or early twenties in any given year during the Revolution and less than five per cent were 40 years of age or older. (Hart, 2003.) Officers were less likely to be in their teens and were older than their men albeit only slightly. The average age of the male volunteer in 1917 was 24 years of age. Between 1917 and 1923 the membership of the volunteers matured by one year. This, according to Hart showed that as new recruits joined they replaced members who left as they got older. This kept the average age fairly constant throughout the campaigns of the Revolution.

It is worth remembering that the Irish Volunteers of 1916 were a small group of nationalists who had split from the National Volunteers. John Redmond, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party had encouraged young Irish men to fight in the First World War. Redmond believed Germany threatened Europe and threatened the implementation of the Third Home Rule Bill in Ireland which had been enacted in 1912 but postponed on the outbreak of war. Speaking in Maryborough on 16 August 1914 Redmond said, “For the first time in the connection between England and Ireland sons of Ireland themselves, North and South standing shoulder to shoulder, would defend the good order and peace of Ireland and defend her shares against any foreign foe.” (Dooley, 2015.) As a result 140,000 Irish men joined the National Volunteers which formed regiments of the British Army. 9,700 Irish men remained in the Irish Volunteers and did not go to war. It was those who remained who were involved in the Irish Revolution from 1916. Possibly

the age profile of the IRA was lower as a result of the vast majority of men going to fight in France. Whilst difficult to evidence it must be a distinct possibility.

In her study in County Longford during the same period, Marie Coleman found most of the volunteers she examined were born in the 1890's.

These findings seem to be borne out in an in-depth study of those involved in the Kilmichael ambush during the War of Independence. On 21 November 1920 West Cork Brigade of the IRA ambushed a patrol of British Auxiliaries at Kilmichael in Co Cork which resulted in the death of 16 members of the Crown Forces. The IRA men who carried out the attack became known as the Boys of Kilmichael. Indeed when one examines their ages they were little more than boys with the range in ages between 16 and 35, the average age being 24. It was not just in this attack that youth was associated with rebellion. Even the enemies of the IRA were struck by the extreme youth of its membership. Many police officers saw the volunteers as mere boys and their rebellion as much directed against their parents as the British State. This was even to the extent that during the elections of 1917 and 1918 police reports noted youths intimidating their parents to vote for an abstentionist candidate Count Plunkett. (Hart, 1998.)

By June 1917 the Inspector General of the RIC referred to the movement as having captured all of the young Nationalists. This is borne out by official records of the time such as records of those imprisoned under the Defence of the Realm Act in 1918, 1920 and 1921. They show the average age of those imprisoned respectively as 23, 24 and 25. (Hart, 2003.)

The contemporary research shows a very different set of results. As previously stated the overwhelming majority of dissidents 94.6% were male but the age profile is

much higher than that of their predecessors, 34.1 years old. Interestingly when one examines the age from 1998 through to 2014 it appears to rise after 2011. Between 2011 and 2014 the average age is over 35 years. Before 2011 the only year which had an average age of 35 or more was 2008. It should be noted that in 2008 it had the lowest number of dissidents charged at 13 compared to the highest year 2012 when there were 47 charged. The lowest average age for dissidents is 27 in 2006 which is still three years older than the average of the Old IRA. This increase in age could be explained by the fact that dissidents were concerned about the large numbers of young members being arrested and charged. As a result they may have used more experienced, older volunteers on active service. Perhaps these older (ex-PIRA) volunteers would have had more experience in forensic awareness and anti interrogation techniques. (Young, 2014.)

Indeed from the current research it has been established that 110 of the study group were ex-members of PIRA. Given that the research was open source it was not always possible to determine if the dissidents had previous affiliation but where it could be established from previous offending it revealed almost 26% of the study had previously been members of PIRA. This may go some way to show why the dissidents were an older organisation because their membership was made up of PIRA members who had been “stood down” in the late 1990’s.

From Gill and Horgan’s research, PIRA were (similar to the Old IRA) a much younger organisation than the dissidents. The average age from their research of the PIRA Volunteer was 24.9. This is very similar to the Old IRA age of 24 but not the older dissident of 34.1 years.

Similar results were found in the ETA study with just under 70% of its membership being under 23 years of age. Reinares explanation for this is that young people have more

time, less responsibilities and therefore could devote more attention to ETA. (Reinares, 2010.)

It is worth considering the general age trends in Irish Society one hundred years ago and comparing them with those of today. Since 1916 there has been a remarkable growth in life expectancy across the developed world. Advances in longevity in the 20th Century were of the order of three years per decade and there is little sign of this trend falling. (Delaney, McGovern and Smith, 2010.)

In 1916 Ireland a total of 71,391 men and women died. The life expectancy in 1911 the year of the last census of Britain and Ireland the life expectancy rate for men was 50 years and for women 53 years. (HMSO, Dublin, 1912.) Since then the period of life expectancy has become the most commonly used measure to describe the health of a nation and provides a useful indicator of relative mortality. For the purpose of this study it shows how the age of the general population has changed in the past one hundred years. Period life expectancies are calculated using age specific mortality rates for a given period. They provide an estimate of the average number of years a person would survive if they experienced the age specific mortality rates at that time and in that area for the remainder of their life.

The period life expectancy rates available for Ireland show that from 1925-1927 a person born between those years could expect to live to 57.4 years for a man and 57.9 for a woman. For a person aged 65 years old in 1925 they could expect to live a further 12.8 years if a man and 13.4 years if a woman. By 2012 an infant born in Ireland could expect to live to 78.7 if a man and 83.2 if a woman. In the United Kingdom for 2012 the expectancy for a man is 79.1 and a woman 82.8 years. (Central Statistics Office, 2015.)

The statistics for Northern Ireland show that if a man was born there between 2011 and 2013 they could expect to live to 78.1 and a woman 82.4. If they were aged 65 years old between those years a man could expect to live for a further 18.1 years and a woman 20.6 years. (NISRA, 2015.) Therefore on average a person born in Northern Ireland living in 2011-2013 could expect to live 20.7 years more than their counterparts in 1925-1927 if a man and 24.5 years longer if a woman. These statistics are in keeping with data from other countries such as the United States. (Cutler and Meara, 2001.)

For the purposes of this research it must be considered when comparing the age of the dissident with the Irish volunteer this is comparing individuals who are living in an ageing society in 1998 to 2014. Indeed men and women now are expected to live 20 plus years more than they could have expected to live at the time of the Revolution.

The typical Volunteer was not only young but also unmarried. The two of course in the general population normally go together but when examined against the norms of the time IRA men were less likely to be married. In 1926, 4% of men aged between 20 and 24 were married rising to 20% of those aged 25-29. When this is compared to 572 IRA prisoners in 1923 whose marital status is known, the average age was 25 with less than 5% of them married. This marital gap is probably larger as the proportion of men living in urban areas in that period were married. As this is where most Volunteers came from at the time the gap between republicans and the general population is likely to be greater.

In the Boys of Kilmichael example all 47 members of the ambush party (including scouts) where facts could be checked were unmarried. Likewise in Marie Coleman's study in County Longford the majority of the Volunteers were unmarried. Therefore the evidence from all relevant studies shows the old IRA as being on average 24 years of age and the vast majority of them unmarried.

With regard to the marital status of the dissidents from the 404 male dissidents it is difficult in many cases to establish if they were married or had children from the data available. The research has shown that at least 160 of the men in the study were married and 93 of them had children. The information was limited and this figure with more detail is likely to be much higher. The information available shows that at least 39% of the 404 men were married. Therefore even with the limited information available dissidents are much more likely to be married and have children than their predecessors. The average age for a male to get married in Northern Ireland is 34 which coincide with the average age of the dissident. The 39% of men married in the study would be in keeping with the general population albeit slightly lower than the average. Therefore unlike their predecessors in the Old IRA, PIRA and when compared with ETA, the dissident is more likely to be married and have children. This of course could be explained by the increased age of the dissident which is on average ten years older than the other groups mentioned above.

Status and Class

“The IRA draws members from every walk of life and from every sector of the Irish economy. The appeal of militant republicanism crossed all occupational boundaries.” (Hart, 2003, p113.) Hart established from official and unofficial sources that the occupations of the IRA were across the class spectrum. See Table One which shows the occupations of volunteers in provincial Ireland between 1917 and 1919. The occupations have been grouped under broad headings which have been repeated in Table Two (occupations in Dublin Volunteers 1917-1919) and Table Three (occupations of Dissident Republicans 1998-2014).

Caution must be exercised when viewing occupations under such broad groups. In Tables One and Two labourers were grouped as farm labourers. In the contemporary figures the definition of a labourer had changed to meaning a labourer for a skilled tradesman in the construction industry. The distinction between farmer and farm labourer now would not be what it was one hundred years ago as those working on farms are categorised as farmers. The occupation labourer is one used to describe those employed in an unskilled capacity in the construction industry.

The definition of 'professional' is one also open to interpretation. For the purposes of this research professional includes any occupation which requires membership of a profession or requires the obtaining of a certain standard of education and training necessary to perform the role of that profession. This includes teachers and occupations such as Probation Officers. (Gilbert, 1998.) The information contained on Tables One and Two was obtained from media sources such as the Irish Times and Cork Examiner, 1917 to 1923, Royal Irish Constabulary reports, National Army prisoners' location books, charge records and prison ledgers. The occupational categories follows Guy Routh, Occupations and Pay in Great Britain 1906-79, London 1980 (as cited Hart, 2003).

The details in Table Three were obtained from media open source research and online dissident publications. The occupational categories have followed similar broad groupings. The grouping 'other' has included such occupations as taxi driver (which made up 13% of the dissidents), community workers and those employed in the security industry as door security. Those occupations did not fit into the other categories and are examples of how employment practises have changed in Irish Society over the past one hundred years.

Table One

Occupations of Volunteers in Provincial Ireland 1917-1919

Sample 1439

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Farmer/Son	40
Farm Labourer	11
Unskilled/Semi-Skilled	9
Skilled	16
Shop Assistant/Clerk	12
Professional	1
Merchant/Son	7
Student	1
Other	2

Table Two

Occupations of Volunteers in Dublin 1917-1919

Sample 201

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Farmer/Son	0
Farm Labourer	0
Unskilled/Semi-Skilled	43
Skilled	33
Shop Assistant/Clerk	17
Professional	0.5
Merchant/Son	1
Student	3
Other	1

Occupations which were very popular at that time were consistently under-represented. Fishermen and Dock Labourers are almost completely missing from the statistics and Farmers (as the main occupation in Ireland at the time) are under-represented. When compared with the census figures of the time the statistics illustrate further anomalies. Shop assistants and clerks outside Dublin made up 4% of the

general workforce but only one tenth of the IRA were in this work category. Skilled tradesmen were also twice more likely to be found in the IRA.

The census figures of 1911 and 1926 show that Catholic men were more likely to be engaged in agriculture, 42% were farmers and their sons. The gap therefore widens between the IRA and the wider population. Between 1917 and 1919 less than half of the Volunteers worked on farms which are significantly different from the predominantly agricultural nature of the economy in Ireland at that time.

The Old IRA was therefore disproportionately skilled, trained and urban. This didn't just represent the Dublin IRA but was a similar picture throughout the country. Interestingly in a study of fathers of volunteers in Co Cork, it was found that the majority were farmers but of their sons only half had stayed on the farms. (Garvin, 1986.) As the revolution progressed the influence of the rural volunteers became less so with the movement becoming more urban orientated.

This is at odds with what the IRA at that time thought of themselves. In the instant histories of W. Alison Phillips and Sir James O'Connor an early social description of the rebels, provides a typical if totally inaccurate description of the social status of the rebels. Phillips in "The Revolution in Ireland" describes the rebels as "shop assistants and town labourers." (Phillips, 1923.) In O'Connor's, "A History of Ireland 1798-1924" he puts the revolution down to "the work of low grade society including farm hands, shop hands and the like." (O'Connor, 1925, p296.) Despite the obvious caution the researcher must use in viewing these "unfriendly" descriptions it is notable that neither have mentioned the involvement of farmer's only farm hands.

Hart's examination of the farmers in the IRA in County Cork shows that their farms were well above the county average in rateable value and therefore he concludes that "IRA farms tended to be substantially larger than average as with other occupations, the IRA tended to draw its members not from the highest or lowest in society, but from the middling ranks in between." (Hart, 2003, p118.)

It does not appear that social status mattered as to who joined a particular unit although officers and men's occupations did differ with the former being more likely to be professionals or involved in shop keeping but tradesmen were spread across all ranks. The one exception to this was the Limerick IRA who following the Easter Rising split forming two Battalions. The old guard of the first Battalion were described as being confined to the rugby clubs while the new 2nd Battalion were more working men. This division along social status lines was unique in IRA terms. (Fitzpatrick, 1995.)

In Marie Coleman's study in County Longford, she found that IRA Volunteers were drawn from the rural townlands and villages of North Longford and were largely literate Catholics. Likewise a study of Dublin Volunteers who had been arrested following the Rising found 55% were labourers, shop assistants, salesmen and clerks with another 30% tradesmen. (Laffan, 1992.) This is borne out with the accounts provided by Dublin Volunteers in their statements to the Bureau of Military History. One volunteer describes his company as having "tradesmen post office workers, labourers, a painter, a butcher, clerical workers and students." (Carroll, A Company, 1st Battalion quoted in McGarry, 2011.)

There is little doubt the Old IRA came from a broad spectrum of society. If we return to the "Boys of Kilmichael" research it shows that one third of the men worked on their father's farms, some of which were a substantial 174 acres. Another one third were

apprentices and the remainder were made up of shop assistants, an ex-policeman, a publican's son and an ex-British Army soldier. As a group compared with their peers they were more likely to be educated and employed in trades. (Hart, 1998.)

Therefore the IRA Volunteers of the early 20th Century were more likely to be skilled than unskilled and worked in shops or clerical jobs than on farms but militant republicanism attracted all occupations of the day with the exception of fishermen and dock labourers. Farmers were under-represented in a huge rural economy.

In the almost one hundred years since the Irish Revolution Society in Ireland has changed considerably and the occupations have changed with it. The North East of Ireland had traditionally an industrial economy with ship building, rope manufacture and textiles production being the most notable. Most of this heavy industry which would have been predominant at the time of the Irish Revolution has been replaced with more service industry jobs. Since the end of the troubles following the Good Friday Agreement tourism has become an increasingly important area of economic growth. In 2004 tourism revenue rose 7% to £325m and the Northern Ireland 2012 Our Time, Our Place campaign netted the Northern Ireland Tourism Board profits of £31m. (NIE, 2006.)

The troubles and the security apparatus that it brought with it generated a large public sector in Northern Ireland's economy. In December 2008, the public sector accounted for 30.8% of the total workforce. This is much higher than the United Kingdom average of 19.5%. Scotland the nearest region to Northern Ireland has a public sector workforce of 24%. The public sector in Northern Ireland is decreasing. When compared with 1992 the public sector accounted for 37% of the workforce. In 2014/2015, 1,600 public sector jobs were lost in Northern Ireland and this trend is set to continue. (Department Trade and Investment, December 2015.)

The wider effect of the troubles and the large public sector cannot be overlooked in this research. All of the public sector employment in Northern Ireland are jobs working for the British Government. Those involved or sympathetic to dissident republicanism would not want to work in employment which supported the maintenance of British rule in Ireland. Indeed many jobs in the Police or Prison Service would not be open to them due to security vetting. Therefore quite a large proportion of the Northern Ireland economy in the public sector would either be not open to the dissident republican or would not be an area in which they would want to work. This may change over time as the private sector grows and the economy becomes less reliant on the public sector. The latest figures published in October 2015 show the public sector jobs index has decreased by a further 0.8% to the lowest level since the index began in 2002. (NISRA, 2015.)

Another factor worth considering before looking at the dissidents employment (or rather lack of it) is the huge regional disparities present in the United Kingdom economy. Eurostat figures show that the GDP per capita in the United Kingdom ranges from £11,000.00 in West Wales to £130,450.00 in Inner London West. There are 26 areas in the United Kingdom where the GDP per person is under £14,500.00. 1.1 million, 60% of the population live in these deprived areas. Three of them are in Northern Ireland: Outer Belfast, North of Northern Ireland, West and South of Northern Ireland. ([appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submit view table action.](https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submit_view_table.action)) When compared with France and the Republic of Ireland the areas where dissidents reside are the most socially deprived in Western Europe. In France the GDP per capita ranges from £13,700.00 to £67,000.00 with four areas under £14,500.00. This suggests that social equality is greater in France than the United Kingdom. In the Republic the GDP per capita ranges from £14,600.00 to £41,500.00 with no regions where the GDP per capita is under £14,500.00.

Not surprisingly agriculture is still the biggest industry in Northern Ireland but many of the jobs from the start of the 20th Century have either disappeared, changed considerably or new industries such as technology have emerged. Despite its limitations some comparisons can be made from the data gathered one hundred years ago and that gathered in this study.

From the cohort of 427 dissident's employment status could be extracted in relation to 391 persons or 91%. In the remaining 36 cases, it was unknown. This 91% formed a much higher percentage of the study group than similar studies. In Gill and Horgan (2013) only 34% of the individual's occupations could be determined. Therefore this study provides some useful data on the dissidents work patterns.

Below is a breakdown of the employment status of dissidents at the time the persons were charged. The data was gathered in June 2015 from open source material involving court/police records and media publications:

Table Three

Occupations of Dissidents in Northern Ireland 1998-2014

Sample 391

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Farmer/Son	0.2
Farm Labourer	0
Unskilled/Semi-Skilled	16.8
Skilled	22.7
Shop Assistant/Clerk	5.8
Professional	3.8
Merchant/Son	2.3
Student	1
Unemployed	28.3
Other	17.2
Retired	1.2

The vast majority of the unskilled category were those in the construction industry including labourers. Those in the unskilled category did not state they had a trade or training in a particular skill set. Many in this category would have worked to or under the supervision of tradesmen. They could be further defined as unskilled manual labourers. The skilled section was predominantly tradesmen also in the construction industry including bricklayers, plasterers and painters. The skilled category also included mechanics, engineers and butchers. The skilled category included any occupations which required a special skill, training, knowledge or the job required an ability to work in that occupation. A skilled worker may have obtained their skills from attendance at a College or obtained “on the job” training. Skilled workers in this research could be further categorised as blue collar or white collar workers depending on their level of training or education. To assist in the categorisation of what is skilled and unskilled recognised definitions were used. (Foner, 1976.)

A number of occupations which did not fit into the broad definitions were included in “others.” They included community workers, doormen and taxi drivers who made up 68 of the total or 17.2%. Taxi drivers appeared to be disproportionately represented. At first this may seem surprising however many are arrested following the movement of munitions. On many occasions they are with dissidents and although jointly charged many taxi drivers are not convicted in court or face less serious charges. The highest category in this table were the unemployed with a total of 111 or 28%. Therefore almost one third of the dissidents (where employment status is known) were unemployed. It should be acknowledged that the cohort researched was a group of people facing in most cases very serious criminal charges. There is a belief among many people faced with that situation that they will not be entitled to legal aid unless they declare they are unemployed. Some may work but are also claiming benefits and would not want to disclose this to the authorities but on the face of it the unemployed group is the largest group. Dissidents

showed an unemployment rate of 28% compared with 6.1%, the current unemployment rate in Northern Ireland which shows that those involved in dissident republican activity are over four times more likely to be unemployed than the general population. (DETI, 2015.) The 6.1% unemployment rate is a regional average and as stated earlier many of the dissidents reside in areas of heightened deprivation. In one study of claimants of Jobs Seekers Allowance by the Office for National Statistics in November 2012 it showed that between 2008 and 2012 between 7.6% to 8.7% of men and women in Belfast and Derry aged between 16 and 64 were unemployed. This was the highest in the United Kingdom and the highest in Northern Ireland where some areas had a rate of unemployment as low as 2.3% to 3.2%. Therefore this shows that dissidents due to where they come from are more likely to be unemployed but so too are those living in their neighbourhoods. (ONS, 2012.)

Despite agriculture being the main business in Northern Ireland only one farmer out of 391 dissidents declared their occupation as such. At 0.2% this formed the lowest occupational group in the study. One explanation for dissidents being underrepresented in this group could be that increasingly farming in Northern Ireland is becoming a family business. The latest figures published in October 2015 show that of the 51,174 persons who worked on farms in the 12 months ending in March 2013, 90% of them lived on the farm or were family members. For the largely urban dweller this is becoming an occupation out of their reach. Only 191 farm businesses in Northern Ireland were owned by a company out of a total of 24,503. The remainder are family owned and managed. On 99% of farms the principal occupier (or a member of his family) was the manager. Therefore for dissidents living in the urban areas of Northern Ireland like many others in their communities farm work is not likely to be an employment option. (Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2015.) Militant republicans in Northern Ireland today are five times more likely to be retired than in the farming sector. The main block of

dissidents were involved in either skilled or unskilled work in the construction industry. This trend of involvement in the construction industry has also been seen in the PIRA with 35.7% of the study group being involved in the construction industry. (Gill and Horgan, 2010.) The construction sector of the Northern Ireland economy employs over 30,000 people. It is one of the large employers and construction firms in Northern Ireland provide employees to the Republic and Great Britain. The financial crisis of 2008 impacted particularly hard on the construction industry particularly in the Republic where many Northern Ireland builders were employed. It is interesting to note that during the worst years of the financial (and construction) crisis in the United Kingdom and the Republic 2009-2011, Northern Ireland seen its worst levels of violence and more dissidents were charged with offences in Northern Ireland.

Professionals made up a small percentage of dissidents with 3.8% of the total and students only 1% of the total. The definition of professional for the purposes of this research included only those with suitable training or membership of professional bodies and therefore they would form a very small percentage of the population generally.

So how does the contemporary brand of militant republicans compare with the IRA of old? Dissident republicans can still attract support across the Northern Irish economy and every walk of life is represented in this study. This is similar to the patterns found by Hart, Coleman and others in the IRA one hundred years ago. Like those studies the construction industry is well represented and contributes more to the IRA than any other sector. Joiners, bricklayers, painters and plasterers 100 years on make up the majority of those involved in militant republicanism but this may vary with the prevailing economic conditions and the effect this has on the construction sector. The unemployment figures of the dissidents is a category which cannot be compared with the volunteers of 1916. The term unemployed did not exist and figures are not available as there was no financial

benefits under a welfare state. When compared with the PIRA campaign when benefits were available there does appear to be more dissidents out of work. The unemployed in the PIRA study were found to be third highest category at 11.4% in Gill and Horgan's study of 1,240 PIRA members. It should be noted however that in Gill and Horgan's study the subjects were not facing criminal charges and the study was looking back in time. The subjects of the study therefore did not face the same pressures as the subjects of this study who were possibly in need of legal aid or concerned that they would face prosecution for benefit fraud. One further observation is that the economic situation was not in crisis in the 1980's in the way it was during the time of this study. This has particularly effected socially deprived republican areas which have been worst affected by the economic downturn. Skilled and semi-skilled workers in the PIRA study were categories higher than the unemployed category so the levels of unemployment among dissidents may be significant when compared with their predecessors. (Gill and Horgan, 2013.)

Setting the similarities aside there were still some notable differences. There were slightly more professionals in the Old IRA. They made up 7-9% of officers from 1917 to 1923 and 4% of men in the same period. The dissidents have 3.8% in the study. Notably the larger difference is with the officers of the Irish Volunteers who are not represented in the dissidents study. Information was not available in the dissidents study as to which of the subjects was in a leadership position. Dissident groupings have a leadership but they are not structured like an army in the way the Volunteers were. Therefore the data gathered on the dissidents did not distinguish between officer and volunteer.

The most striking difference is in the almost non-existent presence of the farming community among the ranks of the dissidents. As noted previously farmers were under-represented in the Irish Volunteers but now they are no longer represented with just 0.2% of the total cohort. This can be partially explained when the place of birth of the

dissidents is examined. Where known 226 of the dissidents were born in Belfast or Derry. At 54.9% this is over half of the study group. This compares with 24.4% of the general population of Northern Ireland who live in these two cities. PIRA was similarly an urban organisation. Gill and Horgan examined which counties PIRA members were born. County Antrim (which includes Belfast) provided 40.3% of the PIRA members with County Derry providing 13%. This gave a total of 53.3% which is slightly less than the dissidents who had 54.9% of their members located in these two cities. (Gill and Horgan, 2013.) Therefore more than ever violent republicanism is an urban phenomenon. It should be also noted that unlike one hundred years ago those who manage farms in Northern Ireland are likely to also own them and very few people are employed in the farming sector who do not have a familial link to the farm.

The percentage of the Old IRA who worked behind counters in shops and as clerks was 4%. The dissidents had 5.8% of the total in this category and therefore this was not statistically significant. Students formed a very small part of the Old IRA at 1% and dissidents were exactly the same. It is not possible to tell how many students were in Ireland in 1916. The 1911 census in Ireland only asked the question how many people in the household could read or write. In 2013/2014 56,395 students enrolled in Universities in Northern Ireland. (HESA, 2015.) It is notable that only four persons in the study described themselves as a student from this potential pool. When viewed with the average age of the dissident it seems that violent republicanism is attracting older people. While there is now a larger student population in Northern Ireland it is still significant that this section of the community has remained the same throughout a century.

A simple comparison of occupations does not provide all the answers when examining the class and status of the members of the IRA then and now. The term class status can be defined on examining three areas according to Max Weber, the German

liberal sociologist. Weber argued on three probabilities that of the (a) provision of goods; (b) external conditions of life and (c) subjective satisfaction or frustration will be possessed by an individual or group. It is these probabilities which define class status. Weber also points out the difficulty in separating one class from another. It is only if a person is completely unskilled, without property and dependant on employment without regular income they could be defined in an identical class. In the dissidents database there will be unskilled workers who may earn more than some of the skilled workers. This is not uncommon in the construction sector where unskilled labourers are paid well to travel outside Ireland to work on building projects. This is just one of many examples which show that social class is highly relative and variable. Another example would be if a professional was out of work and on unemployment benefit when charged with an offence. They would not be shown as a professional but as unemployed. This would not translate across to the studies of the Irish Volunteers as they never classed themselves as unemployed. Caution must therefore be exercised before making assumptions about the class and status of the dissidents from this data. As Weber warns it remains a highly relative and variable state. (Parsons, 2012.)

Therefore the dissidents in some ways look very similar to their predecessors in the Old IRA in that the majority are employed in skilled and unskilled jobs with significant representation in the construction industry. Similarities also exist in the extent of involvement from shop assistants, clerks and students. Involvement by professionals has remained reasonably consistent but involvement of the farming community has diminished. Dissidents appear to be four times more likely to be unemployed than an average person living in Northern Ireland. Although it is worthy of note that unemployment rates vary across Northern Ireland and are particularly high in socially deprived areas of Belfast and the North West.

To conclude this study of occupation groups has shown that militant republicanism is not the same as it was hundred years ago. The next chapter will explore the similarities and differences, discuss the issues and reach a final judgement.

CONCLUSION

This research project - Who are the Dissidents? Was commenced with four objectives. Firstly to identify all literature in the English language which has been written on dissident republicans in Ireland. Secondly to identify all men, women and juveniles who had been arrested under terrorist legislation in relation to dissident republican activity and were subsequently charged with a criminal offence. Thirdly to compile a database on those identified at objective two and include where known personal details on each individual. Finally to collate individual information in relation to those republicans involved in the Irish Revolution almost one hundred years ago. These objectives were set to answer the research question: Who are the Dissidents? The general literature on this subject is inconclusive and the review of the literature in Chapter Two has identified a number of research gaps. This study has sought to fill some of those gaps and provide empirical findings with regard to the research objectives.

This study commences with research on the wider debates in terrorism studies. It recognises that Irish Republican violence does not operate in a vacuum. Public opinion at home and particularly abroad influence and dictate the pace of violence in Northern Ireland. The events of 9/11 and more recently in Paris define terrorism to the international community in a way which makes it repulsive to many. This makes it more difficult for the (more traditional) ethno nationalist terrorists to mount and sustain a campaign. Terrorism in Ireland is not as popular as it once was too many in the international community but in particular to those in the United States, where previously armed campaigns against the British in Ireland were supported politically and financially. Chapter One shows that countries throughout the world are now working together to combat international terrorism. This focus has brought together European countries to work closer together to combat all forms of terrorism. The Republic of Ireland where historically republicanism had a large base now works very closely with the United Kingdom Government in combating the dissident groups.

On the other hand there is an inevitability about continued violence in Northern Ireland. Many republicans see the partition of Ireland as unfinished business and armed struggle is the only way to remove the British once and for all. As Chapter One shows some academics share this view and suggest the only way to deal with terrorism is to accept it is always going to be there and build the structures in place to get early warnings of attack planning and remove the threat by arresting and detaining those involved. This will allow time to get to a political settlement which will always normally occur, it is just a question of when. It is recognised that with so many disparate dissident groups this may be some time off yet in present day Northern Ireland.

This study has highlighted the number of dissident groups. It has examined their origins which demonstrates the many splits and diverse opinions within violent republicanism. Chapter Two shows that since 1998 this is not a static position. Dissident republicanism has ebbed and flowed since the agreement. This can be evidenced in the research with spikes in academic interest in and around 2010 with the upsurge in the number and nature of their attacks. Similar results can be found in the individual research where many more dissidents were charged after 2009 than before. The research on the groupings also shows that while ideological differences were evident in the origin of the different faction's personality differences and rivalries played an equal if not greater part in the splits occurring and new groups emerging.

The review of the literature has shown that little has been done on research into the individuals involved in armed struggle in Ireland since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. This provided evidence that this research project was necessary to fill a research gap.

The methodology was carefully considered to provide a sound research plan to answer the research question. The data was collated and added to the database from which empirical findings were summarised and analysis carried out in Chapter Four. This analysis has taken account of the prevailing social circumstances of the time and is summarised under the following sub headings Gender and Religion, Age and Marriage and Status and Class.

The database has shown that the majority of dissidents are male of the cohort of 427 dissidents only 23 were women. This appeared to be the case with the Irish Volunteers and when compared with other terrorist organisations such as ETA. What is clear is that despite the small number facing criminal charges since 1998 women still played a vital role in the continuance of armed struggle. History has shown that women played a vital role in the Irish Citizen Army where their participation was encouraged through to the War of Independence where the majority voted against the Treaty. The small number of dissident women charged would suggest they like their counterparts one hundred years ago play a more supportive role and that the changing role of women in society as a whole has not transferred to a major operational role in the dissident groupings. Religion was also examined in this section but there is no evidence of non-Catholic involvement in violent republicanism in the 20th or 21st Century unlike previous Centuries. The research carried out on the Irish Volunteers and the IRA of the War of Independence did show the rebels were not always in agreement with the Catholic Church but there was no evidence of them leaving the Church or going to another denomination. The history of Irish nationalism and the Catholic Church in Ireland are very much intertwined as evidenced elsewhere by Irish scholars.

One of the key findings of this research was the age gap between IRA Volunteers and the dissidents. The dissidents on the database were found to be on average 10 years

older than their counterparts. Whilst this is significant it should not be overstated when account is taken of the wider Irish Society. The period life expectancy of men and woman in Northern Ireland is now approximately 20 years older than what it was at the time of the Irish Revolution. This is also the case in the Republic of Ireland and indeed throughout the developed world. It therefore follows that an ageing society has an ageing cohort of people involved in violence however when ETA and PIRA are examined in the last two decades, it was found that they were similar to the volunteers in that they were largely young men in their early 20's. This is a point worth noting that unlike other nationalist terrorist groupings the dissidents are older. Probably because of the age difference dissidents are more likely to be married and have children (from the data available). The average age of the dissident was the same as the average marrying age of men in Northern Ireland therefore it was not surprising to see more dissidents married with children.

The examination of status and class of the dissidents posed challenges to the researcher due to the highly relative and variable nature of class and status. To put an individual into a class at any particular period in their life poses great theoretical difficulty. The work of Max Weber was drawn on to demonstrate how challenging this can be. The research therefore focused on the occupations (where known) of the dissidents. Research in this area whilst challenging did provide details on employment for 91% of the dissidents in the study. This compared favourably with other similar studies in this field. A number of similarities and differences could be observed when contrasted with the data from one hundred years ago. Again the passage of time has greatly influenced the type of employment and the numbers involved in the different occupations. Key employment groups now did not exist one hundred years ago or were defined differently and therefore did not show up on the data gathered then, eg community workers, taxi drivers. Other groups were defined differently with the passage of time, eg labourers one hundred years ago were persons who worked on farms as farm hands. Today they are recognised as those

who work to and for tradesmen in the construction industry. It is also difficult to compare and contrast occupation groups over one hundred years which have seen the formation of a welfare state creating the terms “unemployed” and “retired”. Again these terms would not have existed at the time of the Rising.

On the other hand some comparisons could be effectively drawn out and compared with contemporary Irish Society. For instance the unemployment rate is much higher among dissidents than the adult population of Northern Ireland. Initially the case could be made that the unemployment rate is staggering when compared with the remainder of society but when the figures are compared with the unemployment rate in the areas where dissidents come from it becomes less so. Dissidents are more likely to reside in areas of social deprivation in Counties Londonderry, Armagh and Belfast City. These areas have some of the highest unemployment rates in Europe.

Farming is an occupation underrepresented in the database and appears significant at first glance. Only when one examines the farming trends in Northern Ireland including who owns and works on farms it becomes clear that the majority of dissidents and men/women in their communities could not access work on farms as this has become a business owned and managed by the farmers themselves who employ very few people from outside the farm. The construction sector remains a feature of those involved in violent republicanism and it is notable that during the worst economic crisis in the construction sector in Ireland (both sides of the border) dissident republican activity increased with tragic consequences. On the other hand as improvements in the construction sector have been felt then less dissident activity has been experienced. This is not unique to the construction sector but may have policy implications which will be discussed later in this conclusion.

Before examining policy implications it is worth looking at the theoretical implications of this research. This research contrasts with that of Reinares (2014) and Gill and Horgan (2011) in that it appears to differ from their findings that combatants are less violent as they get older than they were when younger. Both these studies examined the combatants when their campaigns had come to an end. In both cases political accommodation had been reached and the groupings moved into the mainstream political arena. It is therefore maybe not the age of the combatants which is significant but where the campaign is at the time of the study. This study took place during the dissident campaign which is still continuing. The theoretical case for analysis of the individuals involved has been made in this research. While time intensive and difficult to obtain the data this research provides information which can be compared and contrasted. Once gathered it can be revisited and updated. This will have implications for policy makers in the years to come.

One particular policy programme with extended theoretical underpinnings is the United Kingdom's Counter Terrorism Strategy CONTEST with its four strands pursue, prevent, protect and prepare. (HMSO, 2011.) This has been supplemented by the Policy Paper 2010-2015 Government Policy: Counter Terrorism and has been viewed by government as a success since its introduction in 2003. Its implementation in Northern Ireland has been somewhat different from the remainder of the United Kingdom and the PSNI adapted an Engagement Strategy in 2009 in the place of CONTEST. The central tenant of this engagement has been Youth Diversion away from dissident activity. Evidence from this thesis seems to point to the fact that diversionary schemes may be better focused on older men in their 30's who are more likely to involve themselves in dissident activity. This study has shown that the Engagement Strategy is not likely to make the anticipated impact if it remains focused on youth diversion as it may miss the target audience.

This study also shows the dissidents heavily focused on urban areas of social deprivation such as Belfast and Derry. Funding streams since the Good Friday Agreement have focused on the rural border communities. Perhaps this focus has diverted republicans from the border areas reinvolving themselves in violent activity? With the majority of those charged coming from Belfast and County Londonderry, the focus maybe should shift to those communities.

The scale of this research was therefore extensive and multi-faceted even when looking at the rather narrow field of the dissidents in Northern Ireland. To generate achievable policy strategies in this area this research needs to be tested and more case studies at a local level carried out and assessed. This research project has:

- Identified all the relevant literature between 1998 and 2014;
- Identified all those men and women charged with offences relating to dissident activity;
- Produced a database with individual details of those charged and;
- Identified all academic studies in relation to those involved in the Irish Revolution.

By achieving these four objectives the project has added to the literature on, “Who are the Dissidents?” This research has shown the defeat of terrorism is a complex and ever-changing phenomena but good research with sound methodology can show that standard viewpoints on who are believed to be the dissidents can be wrong and finite resources targeted in the wrong place.

Appendix One

Eligibility Criteria

Are the following inclusion criteria present?

Name of Subject:.....

ID Number:.....

Date eligibility determined:

Subject arrested for an offence under Terrorism Legislation and subsequently charged:

(For full explanation and examples. See pages 79-80) Y/N

Was the person charged between 1st January 1998 and 31st December 2014 Y/N

Subject status: Eligible
Non Eligible

Appendix Two

VDR Personnel Database

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2005

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2005	Male	15-Feb-1983	32	N/K	Ballymena	Plasterer	RIRA	PIRA	05-Feb-2005	19-Jun-2015
02/2005	Male	03-Oct-1975	40	N/K	Ballymena	Driver	RIRA	IRA	05-Feb-2005	19-Jun-2015
03/2005	Male	09-Apr-1984	31	N/K	Cloughmills	Butcher	RIRA	-	05-Feb-2005	19-Jun-2015
04/2005	Male	10-Jul-1984	31	Married	Cloughmills	Baker	RIRA	-	05-Feb-2005	19-Jun-2015
05/2005	Male	13-Sep-1982	43	N/K	Ballymena	Dental Nurse	N/K	N/K	05-Feb-2005	19-Jun-2015
06/2005	Male	03-Jun-1970	45	Married 2	Dundalk	Labourer	INLA	-	07-Feb-2005	19-Jun-2015
07/2005	Male	14-Apr-1967	48	N/K	Newry	Painter	RIRA	PIRA	22-Feb-2005	19-Jun-2015
08/2005	Male	09-Feb-1971	Deceased	-	-	-	-	-	21-Mar-2005	19-Jun-2015
09/2005	Male	02-Feb-1970	45	Married	Belfast	Labourer	N/K	N/K	21-Mar-2005	19-Jun-2015
10/2005	Male	13-Jan-1954	61	Married 1	Newtownbutler	Painter	CIRA	PIRA	22-Mar-2005	19-Jun-2015
11/2005	Male	08-Feb-1970	45	N/K	Dublin	Investigator	N/K	N/K	07-Apr-2005	19-Jun-2015
12/2005	Male	09-Nov-1970	45	Married	Dungannon	Painter	ONH	CIRA	07-Apr-2005	19-Jun-2015
13/2005	Male	31-Jan-1969	Deceased	-	-	-	-	-	01-Sep-2005	19-Jun-2015
14/2005	Male	03-Jun-1988	27	N/K	Strabane	Student	ONH	-	28-Sep-2005	19-Jun-2015
15/2005	Male	20-Dec-1985	30	N/K	Strabane	U/E	RIRA	-	28-Sep-2005	19-Jun-2015
16/2005	Male	02-Feb-1982	33	N/K	Newry	Joiner	N/K	N/K	01-Nov-2005	19-Jun-2015
17/2005	Male	02-Feb-1975	40	N/K	Newry	U/K	N/K	N/K	02-Nov-2005	19-Jun-2015
18/2005	Male	23-Jan-1963	52	N/K	Dungannon	Salesman	N/K	N/K	03-Nov-2005	19-Jun-2015
19/2005	Male	22-May-1984	30	N/K	Ballymena	Joiner	RIRA	-	13-Nov-2005	19-Jun-2015
20/2005	Male	11-Oct-1981	34	N/K	Belfast	Bank	PIRA	-	29-Nov-2005	19-Jun-2015
21/2005	Male	12-May-1972	43	N/K	Dungannon	Fitter	CIRA	-	05-Dec-2005	19-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2006

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2006	Male	14-Jul-1987	27	N/K	Ballymena	Roofer	RIRA	-	05-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
02/2006	Male	05-Apr-1990	25	N/K	Ballymena	Painter	RIRA	-	05-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
03/2006	Male	16-Jul-1985	29	Not Married	Lurgan	U/E	RIRA	-	05-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
04/2006	Male	24-Nov-1987	27	N/K	Belfast	U/E	RIRA	-	05-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
05/2006	Male	15-Dec-1986	28	N/K	Ballymena	Painter	RIRA	-	05-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
06/2006	Male	12-Apr-1982	33	Not Married	Belfast	U/E	RIRA	-	05-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
07/2006	Male	06-Dec-1974	40	Not Married	Dungannon	Labourer	RIRA	-	05-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
08/2006	Male	18-May-1979	36	Not Married 1	Lurgan	U/E	CIRA	-	19-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
09/2006	Male	24-Feb-1984	30	Not married 1	Lurgan	U/E	CIRA	-	19-Apr-2006	17-Jun-2015
10/2006	Male	02-Apr-1956	59	Married	Armagh	Motor Trader	RIRA	PIRA	31-May-2006	17-Jun-2015
11/2006	Male	29-May-1969	46	Married 2	Dungannon	Local Authority	RIRA	PIRA	31-May-2006	17-Jun-2015
12/2006	Male	13-Jan-1965	48	Narried	Lurgan	Taxi Driver	RIRA	PIRA	19-Jun-2006	17-Jun-2015
13/2006	Female	19-Feb-1969	46	Married	Lurgan	Housewife	RIRA	PIRA	19-Jun-2006	17-Jun-2015
14/2006	Male	01-Jul-1966	48	Married 1	Lurgan	Taxi Driver	RIRA	PIRA	19-Jun-2006	17-Jun-2015
15/2006	Male	07-Aug-1968	46	N/K	Armagh	Scrap Metal Dealer	RIRA	PIRA	17-Jun-2015	17-Jun-2015
16/2006	Male	21-Oct-1967	37	Married 3	Downpatrick	Catering	RIRA	-	27-Jun-2006	17-Jun-2015
17/2006	Male	03-Oct-1964	50	Married	Dungannon	Motor Trader	RIRA	PIRA	17-Jun-2015	17-Jun-2015
18/2006	Male	22-Dec-1963	51	Not Married 1	Armagh	Motor Trader	RIRA	PIRA	02-Aug-2006	17-Jun-2015
19/2006	Male	18-Feb-1978	37	Married 2	Dungiven	Motor Trader	INLA	-	24-Aug-2006	17-Jun-2015
20/2006	Male	28-Feb-1976	39	Married	Dungiven	Joiner	INLA	-	24-Aug-2006	17-Jun-2015
21/2006	Male	06-May-1962	53	Not Married	Dungiven	Labourer	INLA	-	24-Aug-2006	17-Jun-2015
22/2006	Male	21-Oct-1967	47	Married 3	Downpatrick	Catering	RIRA	-	01-Nov-2006	17-Jun-2015
23/2006	Male	20-Jul-1984	30	Not married 1	Derry	N/K	RIRA	-	24-Nov-2006	17-Jun-2015
24/2006	Male	17-Jul-1988	26	Married	Belfast	Joiner	ONH	-	12-Dec-2006	17-Jun-2015
25/2006	Male	27-Mar-1978	37	N/K	Belfast	Labourer	ONH	-	12-Dec-2006	17-Jun-2015
26/2006	Male	11-Dec-1971	43	Not Married 1	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	-	12-Dec-2006	17-Jun-2015
27/2006	Male	02-Nov-1975	39	Married	Belfast	U/E	ONH	-	12-Dec-2006	17-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2007

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2007	Male	26-Dec-1985	29	Married 1	Strabane	Factory Worker	RIRA	-	05-Jan-2007	19-Jun-2015
02/2007	Male	12-Aug-1969	46	N/K	Dungiven	Joiner	INLA	-	10-Jan-2007	19-Jun-2015
03/2007	Male	25-Apr-1968	47	Married 1	Strabane	U/E	ONH	INLA/PIRA	17-Jan-2007	19-Jun-2015
04/2007	Male	08-Dec-1986	28	N/K	Belfast	U/E	CIRA	-	27-Jan-2007	19-Jun-2015
05/2007	Male	29-Sep-1972	42	Nor Married	Belfast	Taxi Driver	CIRA	-	27-Jan-2007	19-Jun-2015
06/2007	Male	22-Jan-1963	-	-	-	-	-	-	08-Mar-2007	19-Jun-2015
07/2007	Male	02-Sep-1958	-	-	-	-	-	-	08-Mar-2007	19-Jun-2015
08/2007	Male	14-Apr-1984	31	Not Married	Belfast	Joiner	N/K	N/K	21-Mar-2007	19-Jun-2015
09/2007	Male	09-Mar-1973	42	Not Married	Armagh	Labourer	ONH	PIRA	14-Apr-2007	19-Jun-2015
10/2007	Male	03-May-1983	32	Married 1	Armagh	U/E	CIRA	-	16-Apr-2007	19-Jun-2015
11/2007	Male	13-Nov-1984	30	Not Married 1	Lurgan	Painter	RIRA	-	16-Apr-2007	19-Jun-2015
12/2007	Male	29-Sep-1985	29	Not Married 1	Lurgan	Joiner	RIRA	-	17-Apr-2007	19-Jun-2015
13/2007	Male	05-May-1987	28	Not Married 1	Strabane	Bricklayer	ONH	INLA	24-Apr-2007	19-Jun-2015
14/2007	Male	11-Dec-1971	43	Not Married 1	Belfast	Labourer	ONH	-	18-Jul-2007	19-Jun-2015
15/2007	Male	15-Dec-1971	43	Married	Lurgan	U/E	CIRA	-	11-Oct-2007	19-Jun-2015
16/2007	Male	24-Aug-1965	49	Married 1	Strabane	U/E	ONH	PIRA	31-Oct-2007	19-Jun-2015
17/2007	Male	26-Nov-1969	45	Married 2	Belfast	U/E	CIRA	None	15-Dec-2007	19-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2008

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2008	Male	11-Sep-1972	43	Married	Newry	U/E	CIRA	None	05-Feb-2008	19-Jun-2015
02/2008	Male	08-Dec-1966	49	Married	Belfast	Security Guard	RIRA	None	15-Apr-2008	19-Jun-2015
03/2008	Male	27-Jul-1968	37	N/K	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	-	15-Apr-2008	19-Jun-2015
04/2008	Male	03-Nov-1950	65	N/K	Newry	U/K	PIRA	None	20-May-2008	19-Jun-2015
05/2008	Male	11-May-1990	25	N/K	Londonderry	Bricklayer	INLA	-	30-Jun-2008	19-Jun-2015
06/2008	Female	16-May-1990	25	N/K	Londonderry	U/K	INLA	-	30-Jun-2008	19-Jun-2015
07/2008	Male	12-Sep-1982	33	N/K	Belfast	Engineer	PIRA	None	18-Jul-2008	19-Jun-2015
08/2008	Male	04-May-1975	40	N/K	Belfast	Driver	INLA	None	23-Jul-2008	19-Jun-2015
09/2008	Male	15-Apr-1979	36	N/K	Belfast	Joiner	INLA	None	23-Jul-2008	19-Jun-2015
10/2008	Male	20-Nov-1955	60	Married	Londonderry	Driver	INLA	None	11-Sep-2008	19-Jun-2015
11/2008	Male	22-Oct-1974	41	N/K	Armagh	Roofer	RIRA	None	14-Sep-2008	19-Jun-2015
12/2008	Male	05-May-1987	28	N/K	Dunmurry	Sales Assistant	CIRA	None	30-Sep-2008	19-Jun-2015
13/2008	Male	13-Jan-1945	70	N/K	Londonderry	Farmer	N/K	-	11-Nov-2008	19-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2009

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2009	Male	03-Mar-1945	70	N/K	Enniskillen	Labourer	CIRA	PIRA	29-Jan-2009	17-Jun-2015
02/2009	Male	02-May-1987	28	N/K	Belfast	Sales Assistant	ONH	-	01-Feb-2009	17-Jun-2015
03/2009	Male	01-Jun-1979	36	Married	Belfast	Joiner	INLA	-	03-Mar-2009	17-Jun-2015
04/2009	Male	19-May-1971	44	Married	Lurgan	U/E	CIRA	PIRA	10-Mar-2009	17-Jun-2015
05/2009	Male	15-May-1991	24	Not Married	Lurgan	Student	CIRA	-	10-Mar-2009	17-Jun-2015
06/2009	Male	14-May-1989	26	Not married 1	Lurgan	Student	CIRA	-	13-Mar-2009	17-Jun-2015
07/2009	Male	21-Nov-1967	47	Married	Lurgan	U/E	RIRA	PIRA	25-Mar-2009	17-Jun-2015
08/2009	Male	12-May-1965	50	Married	Magherafelt	Storeman	RIRA	PIRA	21-Jul-2009	17-Jun-2015
09/2009	Male	03-May-1972	43	Married 1	Derry	Doorman	RIRA	PIRA	12-Aug-2009	17-Jun-2015
10/2009	Male	23-Aug-1976	38	Married	Dungannon	Builder	RIRA	PIRA	22-Sep-2009	17-Jun-2015
11/2009	Male	28-Jan-1964	51	Married	Belfast	U/E	ONH	PIRA	15-Oct-2009	17-Jun-2015
12/2009	Male	27-Dec-1976	38	N/K	Enniskillen	U/E	RIRA	-	21-Nov-2009	17-Jun-2015
13/2009	Male	05-Oct-1983	31	N/K	Donegal	Bar Staff	RIRA	-	22-Nov-2009	17-Jun-2015
14/2009	Male	26-Mar-1992	23	Not Married 1	Strabane	U/E	ONH	-	09-Dec-2009	17-Jun-2015
15/2009	Male	27-Dec-1990	24	Not married	Derry	Doorman	RAAD	PIRA	18-Dec-2009	17-Jun-2015
16/2009	Male	03-Sep-1966	48	Married 3	Derry	Doorman	RAAD	PIRA	18-Dec-2009	17-Jun-2015
17/2009	Male	12-Oct-1989	25	Not Married	Derry	Roofer	RAAD	PIRA	18-Dec-2009	17-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2010

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2010	Male	07-Apr-1989	26	N/K	Newcastle	Plumber	RIRA	-	13-Jan-2010	18-Jun-2015
02/2010	Male	15-Jun-1988	27	N/K	Armagh	Mechanic	CIRA	-	17-Feb-2010	18-Jun-2015
03/2010	Male	23-Oct-1989	26	N/K	Belfast	Coach	ONH	-	09-Mar-2010	18-Jun-2015
04/2010	Male	03-Mar-1980	35	N/K	Belfat	Factory Worker	ONH	-	09-Mar-2010	18-Jun-2015
05/2010	Male	02-May-1991	24	N/K	Belfast	Door Staff	ONH	-	09-Mar-2010	18-Jun-2015
06/2010	Male	18-Mar-1975	40	N/K	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	-	09-Mar-2010	18-Jun-2015
07/2010	Male	13-Jan-1987	28	N/K	Armagh	Call Centre	CIRA	ONH	11-Mar-2010	18-Jun-2015
08/2010	Male	28-Sep-1988	27	N/K	Armagh	Courier	CIRA	-	11-Mar-2010	18-Jun-2015
09/2010	Male	28-Sep-1988	-	-	-	-	-	-	11-Mar-2010	18-Jun-2015
10/2010	Male	07-Feb-1987	27	N/K	Belfast	Joiner	N/K	-	05-Apr-2010	18-Jun-2015
11/2010	Male	09-Dec-1975	40	N/K	Belfast	Butcher	PIRA	-	16-Apr-2010	18-Jun-2015
12/2010	Male	07-Jun-1968	47	n/k	Newry	Trainee Solicitor	N/K	-	07-May-2010	18-Jun-2015
13/2010	Male	13-Nov-1982	33	N/K	Derry	Taxi Driver	RIRA	-	18-May-2010	18-Jun-2015
14/2010	Male	18-Aug-1958	37	Married	Belfast	Mechanic	N/K	-	24-May-2010	18-Jun-2015
15/2010	Male	22-Jul-1971	44	N/K	Cookstown	U/E	NIRA	-	03-Jun-2010	18-Jun-2015
16/2010	Male	12-Jul-1970	45	Married	Lurgan	Taxi Driver	ONH	-	23-Jun-2010	18-Jun-2015
17/2010	Male	01-Jul-1966	49	Married 1	Lurgan	Taxi Driver	RIRA	PIRA	25-Jun-2010	18-Jun-2015
18/2010	Male	10-Dec-1977	38	N/K	Belfast	Plastereer	CIRA	-	27-Jun-2010	18-Jun-2015
19/2010	Male	01-Oct-1957	58	N/K	Newry	U/E	CIRA	-	27-Jun-2010	18-Jun-2015
20/2010	Male	01-Aug-1968	47	Married 1	Derry	Taxi Driver	NIRA	PIRA	16-Jul-2010	18-Jun-2015
21/2010	Female	18-Jun-1961	54	N/K	Belfast	U/K	N/K	-	16-Jul-2010	18-Jun-2015
22/2010	Male	07-Sep-1969	46	N/K	Belfast	Driver	ONH	-	22-Jul-2010	18-Jun-2015
23/2010	Male	05-Dec-1976	39	N/K	Belfast	U/ER	ONH	-	22-Jul-2010	18-Jun-2015
24/2010	Male	16-Sep-1962	53	N/K	Belfast	Barman	ONH	-	22-Jul-2010	18-Jun-2015
25/2010	Male	22-Dec-1975	40	N/K	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	-	22-Jul-2010	18-Jun-2015
26/2010	Male	14-Aug-1993	22	N/K	Belfast	U/E	N/K	-	22-Jul-2010	18-Jun-2015
27/2010	Male	04-Aug-1968	47	Married	Derry	Joiner	RAAD	-	07-Aug-2010	18-Jun-2015
28/2010	Male	30-Jul-1957	58	Married	Derry	Mechanic	N/K	-	09-Aug-2010	18-Jun-2015
29/2010	Male	19-Nov-1970	45	Married	Derry	U/E	PIRA	-	18-Aug-2010	18-Jun-2015
30/2010	Male	21-Jan-1972	43	Married	Strabane	Dooman	IRA	RAAD	24-Aug-2010	18-Jun-2015
31/2010	Male	01-Jan-1977	38	N/K	Belfast	U/E	PIRA	-	31-Aug-2010	18-Jun-2015
32/2010	Male	31-May-1956	59	Married 1	Newry	Publican	N/K	-	24-Sep-2010	18-Jun-2015
33/2010	Male	27-Jul-1956	59	N/K	Maghera	Bricklayer	PIRA	-	27-Sep-2010	18-Jun-2015
34/2010	Male	08-Jan-1978	37	N/K	Derry	Tiler	N/K	-	30-Sep-2010	18-Jun-2015
35/2010	Male	13-Mar-1988	27	N/K	Derry	U/E	ONH	-	11-Oct-2010	18-Jun-2015
36/2010	Male	08-May-1988	27	N/K	Derry	U/K	ONH	-	11-Oct-2010	18-Jun-2015
37/2010	Male	08-Mar-1984	31	N/K	Omagh	U/K	ONH	-	11-Oct-2010	18-Jun-2015
38/2010	Male	20-Sep-1980	35	N/K	Omagh	Engineer	ONH	-	11-Oct-2010	18-Jun-2015
39/2010	Male	26-Feb-1970	45	Married	Belfast	U/E	N/K	-	10-Nov-2010	18-Jun-2015
40/2010	Female	29-Jan-1989	26	N/K	Belfast	ASDA	CIRA	-	03-Dec-2010	18-Jun-2015
41/2010	Male	08-May-1988	27	N/K	Derry	U/E	N/K	-	15-Dec-2010	18-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2011

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2011	Male	29-Apr-1988	27	N/K	Belfast	U/E	CIRA	-	18-Feb-2011	22-Jun-2015
02/2011	Male	18-Mar-1970	45	Married	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	PIRA	25-Feb-2011	22-Jun-2015
03/2011	Male	09-Feb-1990	25	N/K	Newry	Plumber	N/K	-	07-Mar-2011	22-Jun-2015
04/2011	Male	06-May-1971	44	N/K	Belfast	Roofer	CIRA	-	30-Mar-2011	22-Jun-2015
05/2011	Male	11-Jun-1977	38	N/K	Omagh	Welder	IRA	-	08-Apr-2011	22-Jun-2015
06/2011	Male	20-Nov-1975	40	N/K	Dungannon	U/K	RIRA	PIRA	22-Apr-2011	22-Jun-2015
07/2011	Male	15-Nov-1976	39	N/K	Armagh	Driver	RIRA	-	22-Apr-2011	22-Jun-2015
08/2011	Male	05-Jan-1972	43	N/K	Armagh	Driver	RIRA	-	22-Apr-2011	22-Jun-2015
09/2011	Male	29-Oct-1982	33	N/K	Belfast	Bar Staff	N/K	-	28-Apr-2011	22-Jun-2015
10/2011	Female	03-Feb-1954	61	Married 2	Belfast	U/E	PIRA	IRA	13-May-2011	22-Jun-2015
11/2011	Male	16-Jul-1985	30	N/K	Armagh	U/E	CIRA	-	14-May-2011	22-Jun-2015
12/2011	Female	15-Aug-1984	31	N/K	Armagh	Vodafone	CIRA	-	14-May-2011	22-Jun-2015
13/2011	Male	22-Apr-1968	47	Married	Belfast	Groundsman	ONH	-	26-May-2011	22-Jun-2015
14/2011	Male	28-May-1974	41	N/K	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	-	26-May-2011	22-Jun-2015
15/2011	Male	09-Aug-1983	32	N/K	Derry	Seagate	INLA	-	31-May-2011	22-Jun-2015
16/2011	Male	15-Apr-1962	53	Married	Derry	U/E	RIRA	-	07-Jun-2011	22-Jun-2015
17/2011	Male	03-Nov-1982	33	N/K	Derry	Taxi Driver	RIRA	-	13-Jun-2011	22-Jun-2015
18/2011	Male	04-Aug-1968	47	Married	Derry	Joiner	ONH	-	14-Jun-2011	22-Jun-2015
19/2011	Male	17-Jan-1970	45	N/K	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	-	21-Jul-2011	22-Jun-2015
20/2011	Male	07-Dec-1942	73	Married	Armagh	Retired	ONH	-	02-Aug-2011	22-Jun-2015
21/2011	Male	28-Aug-1987	28	N/K	Derry	Doorman	NIRA	ONH	02-Aug-2011	22-Jun-2015
22/2011	Male	18-May-1968	47	Married	Derry	Care Assistant	ONH	-	02-Aug-2011	22-Jun-2015
23/2011	Male	09-Apr-1964	51	Married 1	Armagh	U/E	CIRA	-	10-Aug-2011	22-Jun-2015
24/2011	Male	20-May-1975	40	Married 3	Dungannon	Welder	N/K	-	24-Aug-2011	22-Jun-2015
25/2011	Male	22-Jun-1965	50	N/K	Strabane	U/E	N/K	-	01-Sep-2011	22-Jun-2015
26/2011	Male	09-Nov-1970	45	Married	Cookstown	Plasterer	NIRA	RIRA	04-Sep-2011	22-Jun-2015
27/2011	Male	26-Aug-1962	53	Married	Derry	U/E	ONH	-	26-Sep-2011	22-Jun-2015
28/2011	Male	06-Jun-1957	58	Married 1	Derry	U/E	ONH	-	26-Sep-2011	22-Jun-2015
29/2011	Male	25-Dec-1964	51	N/K	Derry	U/E	ONH	-	26-Sep-2011	22-Jun-2015
30/2011	Male	04-Feb-1970	45	N/L	Derry	Taxi Driver	NIRA	RIRA	12-Dec-2011	22-Jun-2015
31/2011	Male	19-Feb-1952	63	Married 5	Newtownbutler	Retired	CIRA	-	20-Dec-2011	22-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2012

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2012	Male	29-Jan-1971	44	N/K	Belfast	Fitter	ONH	-	13-Jan-2012	23-Jun-2015
02/2012	Male	29-Nov-1973	42	N/K	Dungannon	Factory Worker	CIRA	-	14-Jan-2012	23-Jun-2015
03/2012	Male	12-Mar-1964	51	N/K	Dungannon	U/K	N/K	-	14-Jan-2012	23-Jun-2015
04/2012	Male	17-Sep-1959	56	N/K	Derry	Photographer	N/K	-	23-Jan-2012	23-Jun-2015
05/2012	Male	08-Jan-1985	30	N/K	Downpatrick	U/E	N/K	-	25-Jan-2012	23-Jun-2015
06/2012	Male	18-Jan-1980	Deceased	-	-	-	-	-	11-Feb-2012	23-Jun-2015
07/2012	Male	26-Aug-1962	52	Married	Derry	U/E	ONH	-	13-Feb-2012	23-Jun-2015
08/2012	Male	15-Nov-1984	31	N/K	Belfast	Chef	N/K	-	29-Feb-2012	23-Jun-2015
09/2012	Male	24-Jan-1970	45	Married 1	Strabane	Bar Staff	PIRA	-	12-Mar-2012	23-Jun-2015
10/2012	Male	14-Apr-1969	46	N/K	Belfast	U/E	RIRA	INLA	21-Apr-2012	23-Jun-2015
11/2012	Male	18-Oct-1978	37	N/K	Belfast	U/E	N/K	-	21-Apr-2012	23-Jun-2015
12/2012	Male	06-Jan-1958	57	Married 1	Belfast	Welder	INLA	-	21-Apr-2012	23-Jun-2015
13/2012	Male	21-Jun-1977	38	Married	Omagh	U/E	N/K	-	12-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
14/2012	Male	30-Aug-1978	37	N/K	Omagh	Architect	N/K	-	12-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
15/2012	Male	25-Aug-1965	50	N/K	Antrim	Taxi Driver	NIRA	-	12-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
16/2012	Female	08-Apr-1975	40	Married 1	Dungannon	Machinist	RIRA	-	12-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
17/2012	Male	23-Jun-1970	45	N/K	Craigavon	U/E	NIRA	PIRA	14-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
18/2012	Male	12-Oct-1969	45	N/K	Lurgan	U/E	PIRA	-	14-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
19/2012	Male	06-Feb-1965	50	N/K	Lurgan	Joiner	NIRA	PIRA	14-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
20/2012	Male	23-Jun-1981	34	N/K	Derry	Taxi Driver	RIRA	-	21-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
21/2012	Male	12-May-1972	43	N/K	Dungannon	Fitter	CIRA	PIRA	28-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
22/2012	Male	20-Nov-1971	44	N/K	Dungannon	Joiner	CIRA	PIRA	28-May-2012	23-Jun-2015
23/2012	Male	16-Apr-1956	59	N/K	Derry	Bar Staff	N/K	-	01-Jun-2012	23-Jun-2015
24/2012	Male	07-Jun-1988	27	N/K	Derry	U/E	RIRA	-	26-Jun-2012	23-Jun-2015
25/2012	Male	20-Nov-1975	40	N/K	Dungannon	U/K	RIRA	-	02-Jul-2012	23-Jun-2015
26/2012	Male	09-Nov-1970	45	Married	Magherafelt	Plasterer	NIRA	RIRA	02-Jul-2012	23-Jun-2015
27/2012	Male	18-Jan-1980	34	Married	Dungannon	Engineer	RIRA	-	02-Jul-2012	23-Jun-2015
28/2012	Male	15-Nov-1976	39	N/K	Armagh	Driver	RIRA	-	02-Jul-2012	23-Jun-2015
29/2012	Male	05-Jan-1972	43	N/K	Armagh	Labourer	RIRA	-	02-Jul-2012	23-Jun-2015
30/2012	Male	01-May-1965	50	N/K	Belfast	Bricklayer	PIRA	-	16-Jul-2012	23-Jun-2015
31/2012	Male	11-Jul-1986	29	N/K	Derry	U/E	NIRA	-	25-Jul-2012	23-Jun-2015
32/2012	Male	29-Nov-1990	25	N/K	Derry	U/K	RIRA	CIRA	30-Jul-2012	23-Jun-2015
33/2012	Male	01-Jan-1955	60	N/K	Belfast	Youth Worker	ONH	PIRA	06-Aug-2012	23-Jun-2015
34/2012	Male	07-May-1983	32	N/K	Derry	Joiner	RIRA	-	22-Aug-2012	23-Jun-2015
35/2012	Male	17-May-1966	49	Married	Belfast	U/E	N/K	-	30-Aug-2012	23-Jun-2015
36/2012	Male	26-Apr-1977	38	N/K	Belfast	Probation Officer	N/K	-	30-Aug-2012	23-Jun-2015
37/2012	Male	19-Nov-1959	36	N/K	Derry	U/K	N/K	-	10-Sep-2012	23-Jun-2015
38/2012	Male	11-Jul-1977	38	N/K	Belfast	U/E	CIRA	-	20-Sep-2012	23-Jun-2015
39/2012	Male	10-Nov-1990	24	N/K	Belfast	U/E	NIRA	-	05-Oct-2012	23-Jun-2015
40/2012	Male	05-Feb-1973	42	N/K	Claudy	U/E	CIRA	-	11-Oct-2012	23-Jun-2015
41/2012	Male	19-Jul-1959	56	N/K	Belfast	U/E	PIRA	IRA	31-Oct-2012	23-Jun-2015
42/2012	Male	29-Nov-1983	32	N/K	Newry	U/E	CIRA	-	29-Nov-2012	23-Jun-2015
43/2012	Male	02-Jul-1965	50	Married 1	Derry	Caretaker	RIRA	-	06-Dec-2012	23-Jun-2015
44/2012	Male	11-Jan-1965	50	Married 1	Cork	Tiler	NIRA	RIRA	06-Dec-2012	23-Jun-2015
45/2012	Male	10-Nov-1972	43	N/K	Derry	Airtricity	NIRA	RAAD	06-Dec-2012	23-Jun-2015
46/2012	Female	20-Sep-1991	24	N/K	Belfast	Care Assistant	N/K	-	11-Dec-2012	23-Jun-2015
47/2012	Male	23-Aug-1976	39	Married	Dungannon	Builder	RIRA	-	18-Dec-2012	23-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2013

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2013	Male	31-Oct-1969	46	N/K	Belfast	U/K	ONH	-	03-Jan-2013	24-Jun-2015
02/2013	Male	23-Nov-1983	32	N/K	Newry	U/E	CIRA	-	20-Feb-2013	24-Jun-2015
03/2013	Male	06-Jan-1962	43	Married	Newry	Bricklayer	PIRA	-	27-Feb-2013	24-Jun-2015
04/2013	Male	24-Mar-1989	26	N/K	Larne	Bricklayer	CIRA	-	28-Feb-2013	24-Jun-2015
05/2013	Male	31-Aug-1977	38	N/K	Derry	Painter	RAAD	IRA	03-Mar-2013	24-Jun-2015
06/2013	Male	24-Jul-1975	40	N/K	Derry	Mechanic	RIRA	-	03-Mar-2013	24-Jun-2015
07/2013	Male	19-Nov-1970	45	Married 3	Derry	Social Worker	NIRA	PIRA	13-Mar-2013	24-Jun-2015
08/2013	Male	09-Apr-1985	30	N/K	Derry	Taxi Driver	NIRA	-	13-Mar-2013	24-Jun-2015
09/2013	Male	15-Apr-1962	53	Married	Derry	Labourer	RIRA	-	13-Mar-2013	24-Jun-2015
10/2013	Male	22-Oct-1988	27	N/K	Belfast	Driver	ONH	-	04-Apr-2013	24-Jun-2015
11/2013	Male	10-Nov-1980	35	Married	ROI	U/K	N/K	-	04-Apr-2013	24-Jun-2015
12/2013	Male	05-Sep-1948	67	N/K	Belfast	U/K	N/K	-	10-Apr-2013	24-Jun-2015
13/2013	Male	09-Nov-1992	23	N/K	Derry	Call Centre	NIRA	-	12-Apr-2013	24-Jun-2015
14/2013	Female	06-Jul-1985	30	N/K	Belfast	U/E	ONH	-	29-May-2013	24-Jun-2015
15/2013	Male	26-Oct-1984	31	N/K	England	U/E	ONH	-	01-Jun-2013	24-Jun-2015
16/2013	Male	28-Jul-1973	42	Married 1	Derry	U/E	NIRA	-	10-Jun-2013	24-Jun-2015
17/2013	Male	06-Jul-1980	35	Married 1	Amereica	Zumba Classes	N/K	-	10-Jun-2013	24-Jun-2015
18/2013	Female	14-Sep-1976	39	N/K	Enniskillen	U/E	NIRA	-	06-Aug-2013	24-Jun-2015
19/2013	Male	09-Nov-1973	42	n/k	Craigavon	Plasterer	CIRA	-	07-Aug-2013	24-Jun-2015
20/2013	Male	08-Jan-1964	50	N/K	Belfast	Plasterer	RIRA	-	24-Sep-2013	24-Jun-2015
21/2013	Male	28-Jul-1958	57	Married	Belfast	U/E	RIRA	-	23-Oct-2013	24-Jun-2015
22/2013	Male	25-Apr-1988	27	N/K	Belfast	Driver	N/K	-	23-Oct-2013	24-Jun-2015
23/2013	Male	25-Mar-1974	41	Married	Belfast	U/E	CIRA	-	23-Oct-2013	24-Jun-2015
24/2013	Male	17-Aug-1967	48	Married	Belfast	Painter	PIRA	-	15-Dec-2013	24-Jun-2015
25/2013	Male	31-Oct-1961	44	Married	Belfast	Roofer	ONH	PIRA	15-Dec-2013	24-Jun-2015
26/2013	Male	21-Nov-1967	48	Married	Lurgan	U/E	PIRA	-	15-Dec-2013	24-Jun-2015
27/2013	Male	01-Dec-1968	47	N/K	Portadown	Electrician	NIRA	-	16-Dec-2013	24-Jun-2015
28/2013	Male	25-Aug-1994	21	N/K	Dundalk	U/E	ONH	-	17-Dec-2013	24-Jun-2015
29/2013	Female	20-Sep-1995	20	N/K	Newry	u/e	ONH	-	18-Dec-2013	24-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2014

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2014	Male	29-Apr-1988	27	N/K	Belfast	Clerical Assistant	CIRA	-	31-Jan-2014	25-Jun-2015
02/2014	Male	20-Apr-1975	40	N/K	Newry	Driver	ONH	-	31-Jan-2014	25-Jun-2015
03/2014	Male	29-Jan-1981	34	N/K	Lurgan	Joiner	NIRA	-	03-Feb-2014	25-Jun-2015
04/2014	Male	18-Jul-1994	21	N/K	Craigavon	U/E	CIRA	-	24-Feb-2014	25-Jun-2015
05/2014	Male	18-Dec-1936	79	Married	Belfast	U/E	PIRA	-	18-Mar-2014	25-Jun-2015
06/2014	Male	02-Feb-1992	23	N/K	Belfast	Mechanic	ONH	-	27-Mar-2014	25-Jun-2015
07/2014	Male	16-Sep-1970	45	Married	Monaghan	Driver	N/K	-	07-Apr-2014	25-Jun-2015
08/2014	Male	01-Apr-1967	28	N/K	Scotland	U/E	N/K	-	01-May-2014	25-Jun-2015
09/2014	Male	17-Jan-1976	39	N/K	Derry	Taxi Driver	NIRA	RIRA	06-Jun-2014	25-Jun-2015
10/2014	Male	04-Mar-1965	50	Married	Belfast	U/E	INLA	-	12-Jun-2014	25-Jun-2015
11/2014	Male	11-Jul-1986	29	N/K	Derry	U/E	NIRA	-	23-Jun-2014	25-Jun-2015
12/2014	Male	05-Dec-1976	39	N/K	Belfast	U/E	ONH	-	24-Jun-2014	25-Jun-2015
13/2014	Male	26-Jan-1956	59	Married	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	RIRA	25-Jun-2015	25-Jun-2015
14/2014	Male	20-Oct-1966	49	Married	Belfast	Painter	ONH	PIRA	24-Jun-2014	25-Jun-2015
15/2014	Male	15-Nov-1966	49	N/K	Belfast	Taxi Driver	ONH	-	24-Jun-2014	25-Jun-2015
16/2014	Male	08-May-1971	44	N/K	Belfast	Mechanic	NIRA	-	08-Oct-2014	25-Jun-2015
17/2014	Male	10-Nov-1980	35	Married	ROI	U/K	N/K	-	27-Oct-2014	25-Jun-2015
18/2014	Male	26-Nov-1969	46	Married 1Belfast	Belfast	Chef	CIRA	-	10-Nov-2014	25-Jun-2015
19/2014	Male	29-Nov-1955	60	N/K	Newry	Fitter	CIRA	RIRA	10-Nov-2014	25-Jun-2015
20/2014	Male	16-Feb-1941	74	N/K	Limerick	Retired	ROI CIRA	-	10-Nov-2014	25-Jun-2015
21/2014	Male	24-Feb-1971	45	Married 1	Newry	U/E	CIRA	-	10-Nov-2014	25-Jun-2015
22/2014	Male	27-Jul-1984	31	N/K	ROI	Carpenter	N/K	-	10-Nov-2014	25-Jun-2015
23/2014	Male	18-May-1939	76	N/K	Limerick	Retired	N/K	-	10-Nov-2014	25-Jun-2015
24/2014	Male	30-Sep-1955	60	Married	Newry	U/E	RIRA	-	10-Nov-2014	25-Jun-2015
25/2014	Male	18-Jan-1985	30	N/K	Belfast	U/E	NIRA	-	20-Nov-2014	25-Jun-2015
26/2014	Male	20-Aug-1973	42	N/K	Newry	Painter	NIRA	-	15-Dec-2014	25-Jun-2015
27/2014	Male	07-Jul-1960	55	N/K	Newry	U/E	NIRA	IRA	15-Dec-2014	25-Jun-2015
28/2014	Male	18-Dec-1969	46	Married	Newry	U/E	N/K	-	15-Dec-2014	25-Jun-2015

VDR PERSONNEL DATABASE - 2015

ID Number	Gender	Date of Birth	Age 16.06.2015	Marital Status Children	Place of Birth	Occupation	VDR Group	Prior Affiliation	Date of Arrest	Date of Status Update
01/2015	Male	01-Jun-1962	53	Married 1	Belfast	U/E	CIRA	PIRA	24-Jan-2015	18-Sep-2015
02/2015	Male	28-Dec-1995	20	N/K	Newry	U/E	NIRA	-	04-Feb-2015	18-Sep-2015
03/2015	Male	12-Jul-1970	45	Married	Lurgan	Taxi Driver	CIRA	PIRA	19-Mar-2015	18-Sep-2015
04/2015	Male	25-Feb-1982	33	Married	Belfast	U/E	ONH	-	20-Apr-2015	18-Sep-2015
05/2015	Male	15-Aug-1996	19	N/K	Belfast	U/E	NIRA	-	07-May-2015	18-Sep-2015
06/2015	Male	23-Dec-1974	41	N/K	Belfast	U/E	ONH	-	30-Jun-2015	18-Sep-2015
07/2015	Male	18-Jun-1965	50	N/K	Rathcoole	U/E	NIRA	PIRA	30-Jun-2015	18-Sep-2015
08/2015	Male	13-Oct-1961	54	N/K	Belfast	U/E	NIRA	PIRA	18-Aug-2015	18-Sep-2015
09/2015	Male	29-Oct-1969	46	N/K	Belfast	U/E	NIRA	PIRA	20-Sep-2015	18-Sep-2015
10/2015	Male	22-Feb-1976	39	Married	London	Community Worker	ONH	PIRA	16-Oct-2015	18-Sep-2015
11/2015	Male	02-Feb-1992	23	N/K	Belfast	U/E	ONH	-	13-Oct-2015	18-Sep-2015

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abanese, J. (2002) "*Organised Crime.*" Prentice Hall.

Alonso, R. "*The Modernization in Irish Republican Thinking Toward the Utility of Violence.*" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 4, 2 (2001), 31-144.

Amble, J.C. (2012) "*Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment.*" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 35: 339-353.

An Phoblacht/Republican News (1997) "*Split Stories Slammed: IRA talks to An Phoblacht.*" 13th November 1997.

Arlar, L.J.J. (2013) "*Violent Dissident Republicanism. A Persistent Spectre of the Past.*" Unpublished L.J.J.Arlar@uu.nl.

Badey, T. (1998) "*Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach.*" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 10(1): 90-107.

Bardon, J. (2005) "*A History of Ulster.*" The Blackstaff Press, Belfast.

Barry, T. (2013) "*Guerrilla Days in Ireland.*" Mercier Press.

Bean, K. (2012) "*New dissidents are but old Provisional's writ large?*" *The Dynamics of Dissident Republicanism in the New Northern Ireland* (pages 210-218). *The Political Quarterly*. April-June 2012. Volume 83, Issue 2.

Blakeley, R. (2009) "*State Terrorism and Neo Liberalism. The North in the South.*" *Critical Terrorism Studies*, Routledge.

Boston Globe, (2009) "*IRA Researchers at Boston College File suit against US Government.*" (3rd September 2011).

Boyce, D.G. (1988) *"The Revolution in Ireland. 1879-1923."* Gill and MacMillan.

Bowman-Grieve, L. (2010) *"Irish Republicanism and the internet: support for new wave dissidents."* Perspectives on Terrorism 4(2): 22-34.

Bowman-Grieve, L. and Conway, M. (2012) *"Exploring the Form and Function of Dissident Irish Republican Online Discourses."* Media, War and Conflict. 5(1) 71-85.

Brady, T. (1998) *"Dissident Provo's Decline New War."* Irish Independent, 9th May 1998.

Breen, S. (1998) *"Military Attacks to Resume say IRA Dissidents."* Irish Times, May 9th.

Breen, S. (2010) *"The Bloody Rise of the Dissident IRA."* Sunday Tribune, 4th April 2010.

British Broadcasting Corporation, (2011) *"Who are the dissidents?"* 25th March, 2011.

Bryce, (2002) *"Back to the Armed Struggle? The Dissidents Analysed."* Irish Marxist Review.

Cabinet Office (2008) *"Security in an Interdependent World. The National Security Strategy of the UK."* Cabinet Office, March 2008.

Central Statistics Office, Cork (2015) www.cso.ie Accessed 13 January 2016.

Clarke, L. (2014) *"The Endgame for Dissident Republicans? Running out of semtex, hardly any guns and only 30 members."* Belfast Telegraph, 25th February 2014.

Coogan, T.P. (2000) *"The IRA."* Harper Collins Publishers.

Copeland, T. (2001) *"Is the New Terrorism Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism."* Journal of Conflict Studies, (2): 91-105.

Cottee, S. and Hayward, K. (2011) *"Terrorist (E) Motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism."* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 34: 963-986.

Crenshaw, M. (2011) *"Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences."* Routledge.

- Cronin, A.K. (2009) *“How Terrorism Ends.”* Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
- Culter, D. and Meara, E. (2001) *“Changes in the Age Distinction of Mortality over the 20th Century.”* National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series No 8556.
- Currie, P.M. and Taylor, M. (2011) *“Dissident Irish Republicanism.”* Continuum.
- Delaney, L., McGovern, M. and Smith, J.P. (2010) *“From Angela’s Ashes to the Celtic Tiger: Early Life Conditions and Adult Health in Ireland.”* Journal of Health Economics E published 3 November 2010.
- Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (2015) *“EU Farm Structure Survey 2013 Northern Ireland.”* Policy and Economics Division, October 2015.
- Department of Trade and Investment (2015), *“Monthly Economic Update.”* December 2015.
- Derry Journal (2009) *“Only Way to Eradicate Drugs Scourge is to Remove the Dealers.”* 18th August 2009.
- D.E.T.I. (2015) *“Labour Force Survey, Department of Northern Ireland, Government of Northern Ireland.”* 12th August 2015.
- Dingley, J. (2001) *“The Bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: The Bombers, their Tactics, Strategy and Purpose behind the Incident,”* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24(1): 451-65.
- Dooley, C. (2015) *“Redmond – A Life Undone: The Definitive Biography of John Redmond, the Forgotten Hero of Irish Politics.”* Gill and McMullan.
- Edwards, A. (2011) *“When terrorism as strategy fails: dissident Irish Republicans and the threat to British security.”* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34(4): 318-336.
- Edwards, A. (2012) *“Lessons Learnt. Dissident Irish Republicans and British Security.”* Arts and Humanities Research Council, Wiltshire.
- Edwards, C. (2007) *“National Security for the 21st Century.”* Demos, London.

- Ellis, P.D. (2013) “*Lone Wolf Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An examination of Capabilities and Countermeasures.*” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26: 211-225.
- Ellison, G. and Shirlow, P. (2008) “*Community Attitudes to Crime, Anti-Social Behaviour and Policing in the Greater New Lodge.*” (Belfast: Queens University School of Law, September 2008.)
- English, R. (2003) “*Armed Struggle. The History of the IRA.*” MacMillan.
- English, R. (2006) “*Irish Freedom. The History of Nationalism in Ireland.*” Pan Books.
- English, R. (2009) “*Terrorism How to Respond.*” Oxford University Press.
- Evans, J. and Tonge, J. (2012) “*Menace Without Mandate?*” *Is There Any Sympathy for “Dissident” Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland?*” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24(1): 61-78.
- Faul, D. and Murray, R. (1975). *The RUC: The Black and the Blue Book* available at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk>.
- Ferriter, D. (2015) “*A Nation and Not a Rabble. The Irish Revolution 1913-1923.*” Profile Books.
- Fijnaut, C., Bovenkerk, F., Bruinsma, G. and Van de Bunt, I. (1998) “*Organised Crime in the Netherlands.*” Klumer Law International, The Netherlands.
- Fitzpatrick, D. (1995) “*The Logic of Collective Sacrifice: Ireland and the British Army, 1914-1918.*” *Historical Journal*, 38, 1029-30.
- Foner, P.S. (1976) “*History of the Labour Movement in the United States.*” International Publishers.
- Frampton, M. (2010) “*The Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicanism.*” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR).
- Frampton, M. (2011) “*Legion of the Rearguard: Dissident Irish Republicanism.*” (Dublin: Irish Academic Press).
- Frampton, M. (2012) “*Dissident Irish Republican Violence: A Resurgent Threat?*” *The Political Quarterly* 83(2): 227-237.

- Frenett, R. and Smith, M. (2012) “*IRA 2.0: Continuing the Long War – Analyzing the Factors Behind Anti-GFA Violence.*” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24(3): 375-395.
- Gaffin, R. (1991) “*The Nature of Fascism*”. Routledge.
- Garvin, T. (1986) “*The Anatomy of a Nationalist Revolution: Ireland 1858-1928.*” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 28, 485.
- Garvin, T. (1987) “*Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland. 1858-1928.*” Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Geraghty, T. (1998) “*The Irish War. The Military History of Domestic Conflict.*” Harper Collins Publishers.
- Gill, P. and Horgan, J. (2013) “*Who were the Volunteers? The Shifting Sociological and Operational profile of 1240 Provisional IRA Members.*” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 25:3, 435-456.
- Gilbert, D. (1998) “*The American Class Structure: In the Age of Growing Inequality.*” Belmont C.A.: Wadsworth Press.
- Gilmore, M. (2009) “*No Way Back? Examining the Background and Response to the Rise of Dissident Terrorist Activity in Northern Ireland.*” *The RUSI Journal* 154(2): 50-55.
- Guardian, (2011) “*Real IRA Claim Responsibility for City of Culture attacks.*” 28.10.2011.
- Guelke, A. (2007), “*The Northern Ireland Peace Process and the War Against Terrorism: Conflicting Conceptions? Government and Opposition.*” 42: 272-291. doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00224.x
- Gurr, T.R. (1988) “*Empirical Research on Political Terrorism: The State of the Art and How it Might be Improved.*” PP. 115-154 in *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*, edited by R.O. Slater and M. Stohl. London: MacMillan.
- Hall, M. (2010) “*Republicanism in Transition. The Need for Debate.*” Regency Press, Belfast.
- Hanley, B. (2010) “*The IRA. A Documentary History 1916-2005.*” Gill and MacMillan.
- Hart, C. (1998) “*Doing a Literature Review.*” Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hart, P. (1998) *"The IRA and its Enemies. Violence and Community in Cork, 1916-1923."* Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Hart, P. (2003) *"The IRA at War 1916 – 1923."* Oxford University Press.

Hayes, M. (2003) *"Building Cross Community Support for Policing"* in J. Doyle ed. *Policing the Narrow Ground: 59 – 76*, Royal Irish Academy.

Hayes, B. and McAllister, I. (2001) *"Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland."* *Political Studies*, 49, 901-22.

Higher Education Statistics Agency (2015) *"Overview of Student Data."* www.hesa.ac.uk/stats.

H M Government (2010) *"A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy."* Crown Copyright, October 2010.

Her Majesty's Stationary Office (2011) *"Counter Terrorism Strategy: CONTEST."* Published 12 July 2011.

His Majesty's Stationary Office, Dublin (1917) *"53rd Annual Report Registrar General for Ireland: A General Abstract of Marriages, Births and Deaths Registered in Ireland in 1916."* HMSO, 10 July 1917.

Hoefler, S.H. and Mudde, C. (2014) *"Ecoterrorism: Terrorist Threat or Political Ploy."* *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 37: 586-603.

Hoffman, B. (1992) *"Current Research on Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict."* *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 15: p. 26.

Hoffman, B. (2002) *"Rethinking Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Since 9/11."* *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*: 25, 311-312.

Hoffman, B. (2006) *"Inside Terrorism."* Columbia University Press, New York.

Horgan, J. (2013) *"Divided We Stand. The Strategy and Psychology of Ireland's Dissident Terrorists."* Oxford University Press.

Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (2012) *"Terrorism Studies: A Reader."* Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.

Horgan, J. and Gill, P. (2011) *“Who Becomes a Dissident? Patterns in the Mobilisation and Recruitment of Violent Dissident Republicans.”* Continuum Press, New York, 63-64.

Horgan, J. and Morrison, J.F. (2011) *“Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident Republicanism in Northern Ireland.”* Terrorism and Political Violence, 23:4, 642-669.

Independent Monitoring Commission (2004) *“The Second Report of the IMC.”* Crown Copyright, London: The Stationary Office. 20th July 2004.

Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) (2009) *“Thirty Second Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (HC 1085).”* 4th November 2009.

Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) (2010) *“Twenty Fifth Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (HC 565).”* 4th November 2010.

Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) (2011) *“Twenty Sixth and Final Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission 2004-2011 – Changes, Impact and Lessons (HC 1149).”* 4th July 2011.

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2013) *“Uncorrected Transcript of Evidence,”* given by Sir Iain Lobban, Mr Andrew Parker and Sir John Sawers. 7th November 2013.

Irish Central Website (2014) *“Northern Irish Police May Refuse to March behind Martin Galvin on St Patrick’s Day.”* 26th December 2014.

Irish Independent (2001) *“Republican Prisoners Statement Portlaoise.”* 20th October 2001.

Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J. and Smyth, M.B. (2011) *“Terrorism. A Critical Introduction.”* Palgrave MacMillan.

Jarman, N. (2004) *“From war to peace? Changing patterns of violence in Northern Ireland, 1990-2003.”* Terrorism and Political Violence 16(3): 420-438.

Jarman, N. (2013) *“Neither Sinn Fein, nor Dissident Other Republican Voices.”* Institute for Conflict Research, Belfast, May 2013.

- Jarvis, L., Macdonald, S. and Nouri, L. (2013) “*The Cyber Terrorism Threat: Findings from a Survey of Researchers.*” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 37: 68-90.
- Jeffrey, K. (1999) “*The Sinn Fein Rebellion as they saw it.*” Irish Academic Press, Dublin. Portland Oregon.
- Kamler, B. and Thomson, P. (2014) “*Helping Doctoral Students Write. Pedagogies for Supervision.*” Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York.
- Karman, E. (2010) “*Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicans in Northern Ireland – Lessons for the Middle East.*” International Institute for Counter Terrorism, 22nd November 2010.
- Kilpatrick, C. (2014) “*Dissident Republicans Behind Bars: Police and MI5 Surveillance – the weapon disrupting terror plots.*” *Belfast Telegraph*, 31st January 2014.
- Knox, C. (2002) “*See No Evil, Hear No Evil. Insidious Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland.*” *British Journal of Criminology* 42(1): 164-185.
- Laffan, M. (1999) “*The Resurrection of Ireland. The Sinn Fein Party, 1916-1923.*” Cambridge.
- Laqueur, W. (1987) “*The Age of Terrorism.*” Little Brown Publishers.
- Le Bon, (2002) “*The Palingenic Political Community: rethinking the legitimation of Totalitarian Regimes in Inter War Europe.*” Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bologna.
- Lynn, B. (2011) “*Dissident Republican Groupings and a Chronology of Dissident Republican Activity.*” 1994-2011.
- Martin, G. (2011) “*Essentials of Terrorism Concepts and Controversies.*” 2nd Edition Sage Publications.
- Martin, G. (2011) “*The Sage Encyclopaedia of Terrorism.*” 2nd Edition Sage Publications.
- Meisels, T. (2005) “*How Terrorism Upsets Liberty.*” *Political Studies*, 53(1), 162-81.
- Meisels, T. (2006) “*The Trouble with Terror: The Apologetics of Terrorism – A Refutation.*” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18(3): 465-83.

- McDonald, H. (2012) “*Republican Dissidents Join Forces to form a New IRA.*” The Guardian, 26th July 2012.
- McDonald, H. (2014) “*Irish Dissident Groups thwarted by Surveillance Technology.*” The Guardian, 28th January 2014.
- McDonald, H. (2014) “*Martin McGuinness met Republican dissidents to urge end of Violent Action.*” The Guardian, 7th February 2014.
- McDonald, H. (2014) “*Seven Appear in Court Charged with Terror Offences.*” The Guardian, 17th November 2014.
- McGarry, F. (2011) “*Rebels. Voices from the Easter Rising.*” Penguin Books.
- MacGinty, R., Muldoon, O. T. and Ferguson, N. (2007) “*No war, no peace: Northern Ireland after the agreement.*” Political Psychology 28(1): 1-11.
- Moloney, E. (2002) “*A Secret History of the IRA.*” W.W. Norton and Co.
- Mooney, J. and O’Toole, M. (2003) “*Black Operations: The Secret War against the Real IRA.*” (Ashbourne: Maverick House, 2003).
- Morgan and Morrison, (2011) “*Here to Stay the Rising Threat from Violent Dissident Republicanism in Northern Ireland.*” Terrorism and Political Violence. Volume 23, Issue 4, 2011.
- Morris, A. (2014) “*Dissidents in Disarray.*” The Irish News, 3rd February 2014.
- Morrison, J. F. (2013) “*The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism. The Role and Impact of Organisational Splits.*” Bloomsbury.
- Mowlam, M. (2002) “*Momentum: The Struggle for Peace, Politics and the People.*” Coronet Books, Hodder and Stoughton.
- Nalton, J., Ramsey, G. and Taylor, M. (2011) “*Radicalisation and Internet Propaganda by Dissident Republican Groups in Northern Ireland since 2008.*” Continuum Press, New York.
- National Research Council, (2004) “*Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing – The Evidence.*” National Academies Press, Washington D.C., Edu.

- Nic Craith, M. (2003) *“Culture and identity politics in Northern Ireland.”* Palgrave: Macmillan Connect.
- Nolan, P. (2012) *“Peace Monitoring Report Number One.”* Community Relations Council, Belfast.
- Nolan, P. (2013) *“Peace Monitoring Report Number Two.”* Community Relations Council, Belfast.
- Nolan, P. (2014) *“Peace Monitoring Report Number Three.”* Community Relations Council, Belfast.
- Northern Ireland Executive (2006) *“Economic Performance Briefing – 25.1.2006.”* E Turbo News, 27 June 2013.
- Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2015) *“NI Composite Economics Index Report.”* 15 October 2015.
- Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2015) *“Period of Life Expectancy in Northern Ireland.”* Published 2 October 2015.
- O’Bradaigh, R. (2006) *“The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary.”* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press).
- O’Connor, J. (1925) *“A History of Ireland 1798-1924.”* Volume 2, London.
- Office of National Statistics (2012) *“Claimants of Jobseekers Allowances in the UK by Local Authority.”* December 2012.
- O’Hegarty, P.S. (1924) *“The Victory of Sinn Fein. How it Was and How it Used it.”* University College, Dublin Press (21 October 1998).
- O’Loan, D. (2010) *“Engaging with Dissident Republicanism.”* The Pensive Quill, on line August 2010.
- Ormond, D. (2010) *“Securing the State.”* Oxford University Press.
- Parsons, T. (2012) *“The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation: Max Weber.”* Martino Publishing, Mansfield Centre, CT.

Phillips, W.A. (1923) *“The Revolution in Ireland 1906-1923.”* Second Edition (London 1926).

Pillar, P.R. (2001) *“Terrorism and US Foreign Policy.”* Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Police Foundation (2009) *“Policing Terrorism and Review of the Evidence.”* www.police-foundation.org.uk.

Police Service of Northern Ireland (2011) *“The Policing Plan.”*

Powell, J. (2008) *“Great Hatred, Little Room. Making Peace in Northern Ireland.”* Vintage Books, London.

Powell, J. (2014) *“Talking to Terrorists.”* Bodley Head Publishers.

Raphael, S. (2009) *“In the Service of Power. Terrorism Studies and US Intervention in the Global South,”* in Critical Terrorism Studies. A New Research Agenda. Routledge.

Reid, C. (2013) *“Dissident Republicans: Does Counter Terrorist Policing Help or Hinder Radicalisation?”* Queens University, Belfast. Unpublished dissertation for MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security.

Reilly, P. (2006) *“Civil society, the internet and terrorism: case studies from Northern Ireland.”* In: Oates S et al. (eds) *The Internet and Politics: Citizens, Voters and Activists.* London: Routledge, 118-135.

Reilly, P. (2008) *“Googling Terrorists: Are Northern Irish Terrorists Visible on Internet Search Engines?”* Information, Science and Knowledge Management, 14, 3, 151-75.

Reinares, F. (2004) *“Who are the Terrorists? Analyzing Changes in Sociological Profile among Members of ETA.”* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 27, 465-88.

Reynolds, P. (2009) *“The IRA’s History of Splits.”* BBC News Website, 10th March 2009.

Rhodes, C. (2009) *“Inference Approaches to Constructing Covert Social Network Topologies.”* Mathematical Methods in Counter Terrorism, Part II, 127 – 140.

Richards, A. (2014) *“Conceptualising Terrorism.”* Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37: 213-236.

Rosenau, W., Espach, R., Ortiz, R.D. and Herrera, N. (2013) “*Why they Join, Why they Fight and Why they Leave. Learning from Colombia’s Database of Demobilised Militants.*” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 26: 277-285.

Rowan, B. (2003) “*The Armed Peace. Life and Death after the Ceasefires.*” Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh and London.

Rowan, B. (2010) “*Dissidents: Interview with Terror Splinter Group.*” *Belfast Telegraph*. 2nd December 2010.

RTE (2003) “*RIRA Televised Interview, February 2003.*” Irelandsown.net/rira3.html.

Sanders, A. (2011) “*Inside the IRA. Dissident Republicans and the War for Legitimacy.*” Edinburgh University Press.

Schmid, A. and Jongman, A. (1988) “*Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature.*” Oxford and New York, NY.

Schorkopf, F. (2003) “*Behavioural and Social Science Perspectives on Political Violence.*” Bergin/Heidelberg: Springer 2003.

Shanahan, T. (2009) “*The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism.*” Edinburgh University Press.

Shelley, C. (2006) “*Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organised Crime and International Terrorism.*” National Criminal Justice Reference Group, US Department of Justice.

Slavens, K. (2013) “*Violence Returns to the Streets of Northern Ireland.*” Pennsylvania State University, 27th March 2013.

Smith, M.L.R. (2011) “*The Real Dissidents: The People Who Didn’t Shut Up and Go Away: Ruth Dudley Edwards: Aftermath: The Omagh Bombing and the Families Pursuit of Justice.*” London: Harvill Secker, 2009.

Sookhdeo, P. (2007) “*Global Jihad. The Future in the Face of Militant Islam.*” Isaac Publishing.

Spencer, A. (2006) “*Questioning the Concept of New Terrorism.*” *Peace, Conflict and Development*, 8:1-33.

Stevenson, R. and Crossley, N. (2013) *“Change in Covert Social Movement Networks. The Inner Circle of the Provisional IRA.”* Social Movement Studies, Taylor and Francis Group.

Stevenson, S. (2011) *“The Kazan Leviathan: Russian Street Gangs as Agents of Social Order.”* Sociological Review, Vol. 59, Issue 2, pages 324 – 347, May 2011.

Taylor, P. (1998) *“The Provo’s: The IRA and Sinn Fein.”* Bloomsbury Publishing PLC.

Tonge, J. (2010) *“They Haven’t Gone Away You Know. Irish Republican Dissidents and Armed Struggle.”* Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 16, Number 3 (Autumn 2004), pp 671-693.

Tonge, J. (2012) *“No one likes us; we don’t care’: ‘Dissident’ Irish Republicans and Mandates.”* The Political Quarterly 83(2): 219-226.

Townshend, C. (2013) *“The Republic. The Fight for Irish Independence.”* Allan Lane.
Tucker, D. (2001) *“What is New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is it?”* Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(3): 1-14.

Venturi, F. (1960) *“Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in 19th Century Russia.”* Grosset and Dunlop.

Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. and Hoefler, S.H. (2004) *“The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism.”* Terrorism and Political Violence.

White, R.W. (2000) *“Issues in the Study of Political Violence: Understanding the Motives of Participants in Small Group Political Violence.”* Terrorism and Political Violence 12, 1 (Spring 2000), 95-108.

White, R.W. (2006) *“Ruairi O’Bradaigh. The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary.”* Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis.

White, R.W. (2007) *“I’m Not Too Sure What I told you the last Time: Methodological Notes on Accounts from High Risk Activists in the Irish Republican Movement.”* Mobilization: An International Quarterly Issue: Vol. 12, Number 31, September 2007, pages 287 – 305.

White, R.W. and Fraser, M.R. (2000) *“Personal and Collective Identities and Long-Term Social Movement Activism: Republican Sinn Fein’, in Stryker, S., Owens, T.J. and White,*

R.W. (eds), *Self, Identity and Social Movements.*” (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

Whiting, S.A. (2012) “*The Discourse of Defence*”: “*Dissident*” Irish Republican Newspapers and the “*Propaganda War.*” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24(3): 483-503.

Whyte, J. (1991) “*Interpreting Northern Ireland.*” Oxford University Press.

Wilkinson, P. (2006) “*Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response.*” 2nd edn, London: Routledge.

Wilkinson, P. (2007) “*Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack Since 9/11.*” Routledge.

Wisker, G. (2008) “*The Post Graduate Research Handbook,*” *Second Edition,* Palgrave, Macmillan.”

Yoo, J. (2010) “*Yes: The United States Needs to Reasonably Limit Civil Liberties and Bolster Executive Powers,*” in Gottlieb, S. ed, *Debating Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts and Responses.* Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Young, C. (2014) “*Dissident Says No Appetite for Violent Campaign.*” *The Irish News,* 24th January 2014